Holbrook v. Anchor Glass Container Corporation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KATHLEEN HOLBROOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANCHOR GLASS CONTAINER
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge1
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (R&R) issued
by 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Jason 	A. 	Robertson 	regarding
defendant 	Anchor 	Glass 	Container 	Corporation 	(“Anchor 	Glass”)’s
motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil
Procedure 56. 	(Docket No. 42.) 	Having considered the magistrate
judge’s 	recommendation, 	plaintiff 	Kathleen 	Holbrook 	(Holbrook)’s
objections 	and 	Anchor 	Glass’ 	response 	to 	the 	objections 	(Docket
No. 	42; 	Docket 	No. 	43; 	Docket 	No. 	44), 	the 	Court 	ADOPTS 	IN 	PART
and 	REJECTS 	IN 	PART 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendations, 	and
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Anchor Glass’ motion for summary
judgment.
1 	Of 	the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	sitting 	by 	designation 	pursuant 	to
28 U.S.C. § 292(d). 	See Docket No. 181.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Anchor Glass is headquartered in Tampa, Florida and operates
multiple 	production 	facilities 	throughout 	the 	United 	States 	–
including 	a 	facility 	in 	Henryetta, 	Oklahoma 	(“Henryetta 	Plant”).
On April 13, 2010, the company hired Ms. Holbrook for the position
of 	line 	controller 	in 	the 	“cold 	end” 	of 	the 	Henryetta 	Plant.
(Docket 	No. 	25 	at 	p. 	9; 	Docket 	No. 	37 	at 	p. 	5.) 	During 	her 	new
employee 	orientation, 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	reviewed 	workplace 	policies
maintained 	by 	Anchor 	Glass, 	including 	an 	Equal 	Employment
Opportunity 	and 	Affirmative 	Action 	Policy 	(“EEO 	Policy”) 	[Doc.
25-3]; 	a 	Policy 	Against 	Harassment 	(“Anti-Harassment 	Policy”)
[Doc. 	25-4]; 	and 	an 	Attendance 	Control 	Program 	(“Attendance
Policy”) (Docket No. 25-5). 	(Docket No. 25 at p. 9; Docket No. 37
at p. 5.)
During 	the 	course 	of 	her 	employment 	with 	Anchor 	Glass,
Ms. Holbrook 	held 	the 	following 	positions: 	(1) 	cold 	end 	line
controller; (2) “hot end” apprentice machine operator; (3) hot end
journeyman machine operator; (4) hot end shop operator; and (5) hot
end 	upkeep. 	(Docket 	No. 	37-1 	at 	pp. 	52-53.) 	Glass 	bottles 	are
formed 	in 	the 	hot 	end 	of 	the 	Henryetta 	Plant 	and 	are 	packaged 	in
the cold end. 	(Id. at p. 29.)
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A. 	Anchor 	Glass’ Attendance 	Control 	Program
Anchor Glass’ Attendance Policy provides as follows:
In 	order 	to 	operate 	efficiently, 	Anchor 	must 	depend 	on
a 	reliable 	work 	force 	that 	is 	consistently 	on 	the 	job
when scheduled to work.
. . . .
Should you be disabled for three (3) days or more due to
illness or injury, you must contact Human Resources for
a release to return to work. 	You are required to present
a 	doctor’s 	release 	properly 	dated 	showing 	the 	dates 	of
disability and certifying that you are not able to resume
your regular duties.
Doctor’s 	certificates 	are 	to 	be 	presented 	to 	Human
Resources 	prior 	to 	the 	shift 	that 	the 	employee 	returns
to 	work. 	It 	is 	the 	responsibility 	of 	the 	employee 	to
promptly present all doctor statements regarding changes
in 	work 	status 	including 	work 	restrictions 	to 	Human
Resources. 	Failure 	to 	do 	so 	could 	result 	in 	absences
against 	your 	attendance 	record 	in 	accordance 	with 	this
policy.
(Docket 	No. 	25-5 	at 	p. 	3.) 	According 	to 	the 	Attendance 	Policy,
“[a]n employee will be subject to immediate discharge . . . in the
event 	the 	employee 	does 	not 	secure 	a 	doctor’s 	release 	to 	report
back 	to 	work. 	Three 	(3) 	consecutive 	working 	days 	of 	unknown
absence will be considered a voluntary quit.” 	(Id., § IV(A).) 	An
“unknown absence” is defined as “[a]n absence for which no proper
established 	procedure 	was 	utilized 	to 	notify 	the 	Company 	of 	such
absence.” 	(Id. at p. 1, § I(3).)
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B. 	Ms. Holbrook’s 	Medical 	Leave 	of 	Absence
On February 15, 2020, Ms. Holbrook suffered a broken arm
during a domestic dispute. 	(Docket No. 25 at p. 10; Docket No. 37
at p. 6.) 	She accordingly applied for, and Anchor Glass granted,
leave of absence from February 15 to May 10, 2020 pursuant to the
Family 	and 	Medical 	Leave 	Act. 	(Docket 	No. 	25 	at 	p. 	10; 	Docket
No. 37 	at 	p. 	7.) 	Anchor 	Glass 	also 	granted 	Ms. Holbrook 	its
insurance provider’s (Cigna), short-term disability benefits from
February 	15 	to 	August 	14, 	2020 	(Docket 	No. 	37-1 	at 	p p . 	57-59
(224:14-231:10, 	232:1-9), 	p . 	62 	(241:24-242:3)), 	and 	long-term
disability 	benefits 	from 	August 	26, 	2020 	to 	January 	13, 	2021.
(Id. at p. 59 (231:11-232:9), p. 62 (242:4-7).)
Ms. Holbrook underwent two surgeries for her broken arm,
on March 10 and July 7, 2020. 	(Id. at p. 59 (229:2-9), pp. 60-61
(236:20-237:8).) 	Lisa 	Humphrey, 	an 	employee 	in 	the 	Henryetta
Plant, 	Human 	Resources 	(HR) 	Department, 	e-mailed 	Ms. Holbrook 	on
July 	14, 	2020, 	stating 	that, 	according 	to 	Cigna’s 	records, 	her
leave 	would 	end 	that 	same 	day, 	and 	inquiring 	into 	her 	return-to
work 	date. 	(Id. 	at 	p. 	60 	(234:24-235:22).) 	Ms. Holbrook 	stated
that she had just undergone a second reconstructive surgery, would
be 	“in 	another 	cast 	for 	six 	to 	eight 	weeks,” 	and 	that 	she 	had
spoken 	to 	her 	Cigna 	case 	manager 	who 	had 	told 	her 	that 	her 	leave
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	5
would not end on July 14, 2020. 	(Id. at pp. 60-61 (236:13-237:12),
pp. 87-88 (344:5-346:24).)
On 	or 	around 	October 	17, 	2020, 	in 	response 	to 	a 	text
message 	from 	Danny 	Hoover,2 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	indicated 	that 	she 	was
working 	for 	DoorDash, 	Uber, 	Lyft, 	Postmates, 	and 	Uber 	Eats 	“for
extra 	cash 	to 	help 	pay 	bills” 	while 	on 	medical 	leave. 	(Docket
No. 37-1 	at 	p p . 	49-50 	(192:21-193:17), 	p p . 	81-82 	(319:7-
321:16); 	Docket 	No. 	37-2 	at 	p . 	3.) 	M r . 	Hoover 	promptly
contacted Fred Dorrell, the lead HR manager at the Henryetta Plant,
and Mr. Dorrell summarized their ensuing conversation in an e-mail
as follows:
I 	received 	a 	call 	this 	evening 	with 	some 	information
that Kathleen Holbrook, who has been off on medical leave
for 	quite 	some 	time, 	is 	working 	for 	Uber, 	DoorDash 	and
Lyft 	while 	drawing 	LTD 	[long-term 	disability]. 	I 	was
forwarded 	the 	following 	screenshot 	as 	well. 	The
individual stated they had spoke [sic] with her and she
has no intentions of coming back to work. 	Not sure what
to do with it but wanted to make you aware.
(Docket No. 37-2 at pp. 2-3.) 	According to Ms. Holbrook, she never
told 	Mr. 	Hoover 	that 	she 	had 	no 	intention 	of 	returning 	to 	Anchor
Glass. 	(Docket 	No. 	37-1 	at 	pp. 	51 	(199:18-25).) 	She 	also
testified that, while on medical leave, she never worked more than
a 	combined 	20 	hours 	each 	week 	for 	ride-hailing 	or 	food 	delivery
services. 	(Id. at p. 50 (196:2-9).)
2 A former Hot End tank manager at the Henryetta Plant.
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Ms. 	Holbrook 	had 	a 	follow-up 	appointment 	with 	her
surgeon, 	Dr. 	Marcy 	Clements, 	on 	January 	13, 	2021. 	(Id. 	at 	p. 	63
(248:9-13).) 	Dr. 	Clements 	purportedly 	recommended 	that 	she 	work
in 	the 	Cold 	End 	of 	the 	Henryetta 	Plant 	because 	her 	“arm 	wasn’t
strong 	enough” 	to 	work 	in 	the 	Hot 	End. 	(Id. 	at 	p. 	89 	(352:13-
25).) 	Ms. Holbrook also testified that Dr. Clements advised that
she take “an extra week or two” to heal before returning to work.
(Id. 	at 	86 	(338:7-12).) 	According 	to 	Ms. 	Holbrook, 	Dr. 	Clements
intentionally 	omitted 	the 	release 	date 	on 	her 	return-to-work
release 	form 	(“January 	13 	Form”) 	to 	allow 	her 	the 	choice 	between
immediately 	returning 	to 	work 	or 	following 	her 	medical 	advice.
(Docket 	No. 	25-7; 	Docket 	No. 	37-1 	at 	p. 	86 	(338:3-17).) 	In
addition, the January 13 Form does not state that Ms. Holbrook had
achieved maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on January 13, 2021.
(Docket No. 25-7.)
Two 	weeks 	later 	– 	on 	or 	around 	January 	27, 	2021 	–
Ms. Holbrook called Mr. Dorrell and informed him that she was ready
to return to work. 	(Docket No. 37-1 at pp. 	45-46 (176:22-177:6),
p. 	64 	(250:15-23), 	pp. 	84-85 	(332:10-333:5), 	p. 	86 	(339:8-16).)
On 	Mr. 	Dorrell’s 	instructions, 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	e-mailed 	him 	a 	copy
of her January 13 Form. 	(Id. at p. 85 (333:5-8).) 	On February 2,
Mr. 	Dorrell 	informed 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	that 	the 	January 	13 	Form 	was
“incorrect,” 	and 	that 	she 	needed 	to 	obtain 	a 	completed 	form 	from
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	7
Dr. 	Clements. 	(Id. 	at 	p. 	85 	(333:8-334:21).) 	Ms. 	Holbrook
e-mailed Mr. Dorrell on February 3, stating in pertinent part:
My 	apologies 	for 	not 	being 	able 	to 	get 	the 	correct
paperwork needed before my doctors’ [sic] office closed
yesterday. I am waiting for a call back from her office
and if I don’t hear anything before noon, I’ll go to her
office 	anyway 	to 	get 	the 	correct 	documentation 	needed.
I apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.
I’ll call you as soon as [I] get the documentation. 	I’m
looking forward to [] getting back to work.
(Docket 	No. 	25-8.) 	Mr. 	Dorrell 	responded 	that 	same 	day, 	asking
Ms. 	Holbrook 	to 	either 	e-mail 	or 	bring 	the 	correct 	paperwork 	to
him 	or 	Lisa 	Humphrey. 	Id. 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	received 	a 	new 	return-
to-work form from Dr. Clements’ office on February 4 (“February 4
Form”) 	and 	she 	forwarded 	it 	to 	Mr. 	Dorrell. 	(Doc. 	25-10.) 	The
February 4 Form indicated that Ms. Holbrook was released to return
to work on January 13, 2021. 	Id. 	The following day Ms. Holbrook
received a letter from Mr. Dorrell, stating in pertinent part:
On 	Thursday, 	February 	4, 	2021 	I 	received 	documentation
from your physician, dated February 4, 2021, [] that you
were 	released 	to 	return 	to 	work 	on 	January 	13, 	2021,
[which 	is] 	nineteen 	(19) 	days 	after 	being 	released 	to
return to work.
This letter serves as notification of your separation of
employment 	from 	Anchor 	Glass 	Container 	Corporation,
effective the date of this letter.
This 	decision 	is 	based 	on 	your 	failure 	to 	provide 	the
requested and necessary information to substantiate your
leave, resulting in failure to report off.
(Docket No. 25-11.)
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	8
C. 	EEOC Charge 	of Discrimination
Ms. 	Holbrook 	filed 	a 	discrimination 	charge 	with 	the
Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity 	Commission 	(“EEOC”) 	on 	April 	19,
2021, 	complaining 	of 	a 	hostile 	work 	environment, 	sexual
harassment, and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title
VII”), 	disability 	discrimination 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Americans
with 	Disabilities 	Act 	(“ADA”), 	as 	amended 	by 	the 	ADA 	Amendments
Act 	of 	2008, 	42 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	12101 	et 	seq.; 	discrimination 	based 	on
her use of her leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 	1993, 	29 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	2601 	et 	seq. 	(“FMLA”), 	retaliation, 	and
wrongful 	termination 	resulting 	from 	complaints 	she 	submitted
against Anchor Glass employees. 	(Docket No. 25-13 at p. 3.) 	The
EEOC sent Ms. Holbrook a Notice of Right to Sue. 	(Docket No. 2.)
D. 	Procedural Background
Ms. 	Holbrook 	filed 	this 	action 	against 	Anchor 	Glass 	on
August 	16, 	2022, 	asserting 	claims 	for 	gender 	discrimination,
hostile 	work 	environment, 	and 	retaliation 	pursuant 	to 	Title 	VII,
interference and retaliation pursuant to FMLA, and retaliation and
disability 	discrimination 	pursuant 	to 	the 	ADA. 	(Docket 	No. 	2.)
On 	September 	26, 	2022, 	Anchor 	Glass 	answered. 	(Docket 	No. 	14.)
Discovery ended on August 28, 2023. 	(Docket No. 24.)
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On 	August 	14, 	2023, 	Anchor 	Glass 	filed 	a 	motion 	for
summary 	judgment. 	(Docket 	No. 	25.) 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	responded 	on
September 25, 2023, and Anchor Glass replied on October 10, 2023.
(Docket 	No. 	37; 	Docket 	No. 	38.) 	On 	May 	23, 	2024, 	the 	motion 	was
referred to Magistrate Judge Jason A. Robertson. 	(Docket No. 39.)
Magistrate 	Judge 	Robertson 	issued 	a 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	on
December 	23, 	2024, 	recommending 	the 	Court 	grant 	Anchor 	Glass’
motion for summary judgment. 	(Docket No. 42.)
Magistrate Judge Robertson recommended finding (1) that
Ms. Holbrook 	voluntarily 	dismissed 	her 	ADA 	retaliation 	claim 	and
all her FMLA claims (Id. at p. 1), (2) that Ms. Holbrook failed to
make 	a 	prima 	facie 	showing 	for 	her 	gender-based 	discrimination
claim pursuant to Title VII because there was no evidence that her
complaints against Hawk and Hoover occurred in close proximity to
her 	termination, 	and 	failed 	to 	show 	she 	was 	treated 	differently
than 	similarly 	situated 	employees 	(Id. 	at 	pp. 	12-13), 	(3) 	that
even if Ms. Holbrook had a made a prima facie showing, Anchor Glass
had 	a 	legitimate 	and 	non-discriminatory 	reason 	for 	terminating
her, and that Ms. Holbrook had failed to show that the reason for
her 	termination 	was 	pretexted 	(Id. 	at 	pp. 	14-16), 	(4) 	that
Ms. Holbrook 	failed 	to 	make 	a 	prima 	facie 	showing 	of 	her
retaliation 	claim 	pursuant 	to 	Title 	VII, 	(5) 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook
failed to make a prima facie showing of a hostile work environment
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	10
pursuant 	to 	Title 	VII, 	(6) 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	failed 	to 	establish
a 	discrimination 	claim 	pursuant 	to 	the 	ADA 	because 	she 	was 	not
terminated 	because 	of 	her 	disability, 	and 	(7) 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook
failed 	to 	make 	a 	prima 	facie 	showing 	that 	Anchor 	Glass 	did 	not
accommodate her disability. 	(Id. at p. 25-27.)
Ms. 	Holbrook 	objected 	to 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Robertson’s
recommendations 	about 	her 	ADA 	claims, 	and 	Anchor 	Glass 	responded
to the objections. 	(Docket No. 43; Docket No. 44.) 	The case was
reassigned 	to 	me 	on 	April 	9, 	2026 	pursuant 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	292(d).
(Docket No. 47.)
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. 	Report and Recommendation
After 	a 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	has 	been 	issued, 	“a
party 	may 	serve 	and 	file 	specific 	written 	objections 	to 	the
proposed 	findings 	and 	recommendations.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b).
The 	Court 	“must 	determine 	de 	novo 	any 	part 	of 	the 	magistrate
judge’s 	disposition 	that 	has 	been 	properly 	objected 	to. 	The
district 	judge 	may 	accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify 	the 	recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate 	judge 	with 	instructions.” 	Id.; 	see 	also 28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). 	Any objection not properly raised, however, is waived
for 	purposes 	of 	review 	by 	the 	Court. 	Klein 	v. 	Harper, 	777 	F.3d
1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015); Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134,
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	11
1136 	n. 	2 	(10th 	Cir. 	2022). 	An 	objection 	to 	a 	report 	and
recommendation 	is 	properly 	raised 	if 	it 	is 	both 	timely 	and
specific. 	United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121
E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996). 	An objection is
sufficiently 	specific 	if 	it 	“enables 	the 	district 	judge 	to 	focus
attention 	on 	those 	issues 	— 	factual 	and 	legal 	— 	that 	are 	at 	the
heart of the parties’ dispute.” 	Id. 	“In the absence of a proper
objection, 	the 	district 	court 	may 	review 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s
recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate.” 	Davis v.
GEO Grp. Corr., Inc., No. CIV-16-00462-PRW, 2023 WL 2536727, at *1
(W.D. 	Okla. 	Mar. 	16, 	2023) 	(citing 	Summers 	v. 	State 	of 	Utah, 	927
F.2d 	1165, 	1167-68 	(10th 	Cir. 	1991)). 	“Mere 	regurgitation 	of
original 	arguments 	does 	not 	trigger 	the 	Court’s 	obligation 	to
perform 	de 	novo 	review.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Kirby, 	No. 	23-CR-026-
JFH, 2023 WL 3956685, at *2-3 (E.D. Okla. June 12, 2023).
B. 	Summary Judgment
Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	56 	provides 	that 	the
Court shall grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	“An issue is ‘genuine’
if 	there 	is 	sufficient 	evidence 	on 	each 	side 	so 	that 	a 	rational
trier 	of 	fact 	could 	resolve 	the 	issue 	either 	way.” 	Adler 	v.
Walmart 	Stores, 	Inc., 	144 	F.3d 	664, 	670 	(10th 	Cir. 	1998). 	“An
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	12
issue 	of 	fact 	is 	‘material’ 	if 	under 	the 	substantive 	law 	it 	is
essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” 	Id.
“The movant bears the initial burden to show the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” 	Lazy S Ranch Props., LLC v.
Valero 	Terminaling 	and 	Distrib. 	Co., 	92 	F.4th 	1189, 	1198 	(10th
Cir. 2024). 	If successful, the burden shifts to the non-movant to
“set 	forth 	specific 	facts 	showing 	that 	there 	is 	a 	genuine 	issue
for trial.” 	Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 	The non-movant must show
more 	than 	a 	“scintilla 	of 	evidence” 	in 	support 	of 	its 	position,
that is, the evidence must be sufficient for a jury to reasonably
find for the non-movant. 	Id. at 252.
A court views the facts and their reasonable inferences
in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	non-movant. 	Id. 	While 	these
inferences 	must 	be 	plausible, see Matsushita 	Elec. 	Indus. 	Co. 	v.
Zenith 	Radio 	Corp., 	475 	U.S. 	574, 	586–88 	(1986), 	a 	court 	should
not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or assess
the 	credibility 	of 	conflicting 	testimony 	at 	the 	summary 	judgment
stage. 	Forth 	v. 	Laramie 	Cnty. 	Sch. 	Dist. 	No. 	1, 	85 	F.4th 	1044,
1052 	(10th 	Cir. 	2023). 	Only 	when 	a 	specific 	set 	of 	facts 	is
“blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could 	believe 	it” 	can 	a 	court 	choose 	to 	disregard 	those 	facts.
Norwood v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 57 F.4th 779, 790 (10th Cir.
2023).
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	13
III. DISCUSSION
Ms. Holbrook objects to the magistrate judge’s R&R solely on
three 	grounds: 	(1) 	that 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	improperly 	invaded
the province of the jury by applying the attendance policy against
her 	(Docket 	No. 	43 	at 	pp. 	3-4), 	(2) 	that 	the 	magistrate 	judge
erroneously 	placed 	the 	burden 	of 	identifying 	a 	suitable 	vacant
position, 	which 	could 	serve 	as 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation. 	(Id.
at 	pp. 	4-5), 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	ignored 	evidence
that she was terminated because of her disability. 	(Id. at p. 2.)
The Court discusses each argument in turn.
A. 	Failure to Accommodate
Ms. 	Holbrook 	alleges 	that 	Anchor 	Glass 	discriminated
against 	her 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	her 	disability 	by 	terminating 	her,
instead 	of 	making 	reasonable 	accommodations 	for 	her 	disability.
To 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	claim 	for 	failure 	to 	accommodate
pursuant to the ADA, Ms. Holbrook must establish: 	(1) that she is
disabled, 	(2) 	that 	she 	was 	otherwise 	qualified 	for 	the 	position,
(3) 	that 	she 	requested 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation 	and 	(4) 	that
Anchor 	Glass 	refused 	to 	accommodate 	her 	disability. 	Aubrey 	v.
Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2020).
If 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	establishes 	a 	prima 	facie 	claim, 	the
burden 	shifts 	to 	her 	employer 	to 	“present 	evidence 	either
(1) conclusively 	rebutting 	one 	or 	more 	elements 	of 	plaintiff’s
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	14
prima 	facie 	case 	or 	(2) 	establishing 	an 	affirmative 	defense.”
Lincoln v. BNSF Ry., 900 F.3d 1166, 1204 (10th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1. 	Is Ms. Holbrook disabled?
Anchor Glass argues that it “had no reason to think
Plaintiff 	was, 	in 	fact 	disabled, 	or 	needed 	accommodation 	in
February 2021.” 	(Docket No. 25 at p. 18.) 	Anchor Glass points to
Dr. 	Clements’ 	January 	13 	Form 	and 	her 	February 	4 	Form 	indicating
that Ms. Holbrook could “return to work without any restrictions.”
(Docket 	No. 	25 	at 	p. 	100; 	Id. 	at 	p. 	103.) 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	asserted
in 	her 	deposition, 	however, 	that 	she 	could 	not 	work 	and 	that 	she
is disabled. 	(Docket No. 37-1 at pp. 89-90.)
Disability 	for 	purposes 	of 	the 	ADA 	includes 	“a
physical 	or 	mental 	impairment 	that 	substantially 	limits 	one 	or
more major life activities.” 	42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 	Major life
activities include “performing manual tasks . . . lifting, bending
. 	. 	. 	and 	working.” 	Id. 	at 	§ 	12102(2)(A). 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	stated
that 	she 	cannot 	lift 	over 	fifty 	pounds, 	which 	is 	required 	in 	her
position. 	(Docket No. 37-1 at p. 89.) 	Drawing all inferences to
Ms. Holbrook, a jury could find that she is disabled.
2. 	Is Ms. Holbrook otherwise qualified?
Assuming she is disabled, Anchor Glass argues that
Ms. Holbrook 	is 	not 	qualified 	to 	hold 	her 	job 	in 	the 	Hot 	End 	and
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	15
that she herself stated that there is no accommodation that would
allow 	her 	to 	perform 	that 	job. 	(Docket 	No. 	25 	at 	p. 	18; 	Docket
No. 25-1 at p. 2.) 	Additionally, Anchor Glass states that, based
on 	Dr. 	Clements’ 	release, 	it 	did 	not 	believe 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook
needed 	an 	accommodation 	because 	she 	was 	not 	disabled. 	(Docket
No. 25 	at 	p. 	18.) 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	in 	turn 	argues 	that 	Anchor 	Glass
had 	a 	duty 	to 	explore 	reasonable 	accommodations 	because 	she 	was
qualified for the position in the Cold End position she held prior
to her disability. 	(Docket No. 37 at p. 18.)
“The 	term 	‘qualified 	individual’ 	means 	an
individual 	who, 	with 	or 	without 	reasonable 	accommodation, 	can
perform 	the 	essential 	functions 	of 	the 	employment 	position 	that
such 	individual 	holds 	or 	desires.” 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12111(8). 	“To
meet [this second element], [Ms. Holbrook] had to show that there
was 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation 	that 	would 	have 	enabled 	her 	to
perform 	the 	essential 	functions 	of 	her 	job, 	at 	the 	time 	she 	was
terminated or soon thereafter.” 	Koppes, 975 F.3d at 1006.
No one disputes that Ms. Holbrook was qualified to
do her job before she broke her arm a second time. 	Ms. Holbrook,
however, 	stated 	in 	her 	deposition 	that 	there 	was 	no 	reasonable
accommodation 	available 	that 	would 	allow 	her 	to 	work 	at 	the 	Hot
End. 	(Docket 	No. 	25-1 	at 	p. 	92; 	Docket 	No. 	37-1 	at 	p. 	90.) 	But
she 	would 	be 	qualified 	to 	work 	in 	the 	Cold 	End, 	where 	she 	worked
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	16
early 	in 	her 	career. 	Id. 	In 	the 	Cold 	End, 	bottles 	that 	have
already 	been 	made 	in 	the 	Hot 	End 	are 	examined 	to 	make 	sure 	they
meet 	specifications 	and 	are 	then 	boxed 	and 	shipped. 	(Id. 	at
p. 29.) 	It requires less heavy lifting. 	Id. at pp. 89-90. 	Drawing
all inferences to Ms. Holbrook, a jury could find she was qualified
for 	the 	Cold 	End 	position, 	which 	would 	have 	been 	a 	reasonable
accommodation 	given 	that 	she 	had 	previously 	worked 	in 	that
position.
3. 	Did 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	request 	a 	reasonable
accommodation?
Magistrate Judge Robertson held that even assuming
that 	Ms. Holbrook 	requested 	to 	be 	reassigned 	to 	a 	Cold 	End
position, 	she 	failed 	to 	identify 	a 	vacant 	Cold 	End 	position 	to
which 	she 	could 	have 	been 	reassigned 	in 	February 	2021. 	(Docket
No. 	42 	at 	pp. 	27-28.) 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	argues 	that 	this 	finding 	is
incorrect because she only needs to identify an available Cold End
position if the interactive process had taken place before Anchor
Glass terminated her. 	(Docket No. 42 at p. 4.)
First, 	there 	seems 	to 	be 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	on
whether 	Ms. Holbrook 	requested 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation 	to
trigger 	the 	interactive 	process 	between 	employer 	and 	employee 	to
find 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation. 	See 	Kobbes, 	975 	F.3d 	at 	1007
(stating 	that 	plaintiff’s 	requests 	triggered 	defendant’s 	duty 	to
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	17
engage 	in 	good 	faith 	in 	an 	interactive 	process 	to 	determine 	her
limitations 	and 	consider 	whether 	the 	requested 	accommodations 	or
any 	other 	that 	may 	come 	up 	would 	allow 	plaintiff 	to 	return 	to
work). 	Anchor 	Glass 	argues 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	did 	not 	request 	a
reassignment 	to 	a 	Cold 	End 	position, 	and 	that 	it 	only 	knew 	that
Ms. Holbrook 	had 	been 	released 	to 	work 	without 	restriction.
(Docket 	No. 	25 	at 	p. 	18.) 	Meanwhile, 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	states 	in 	her
deposition that she made the request over the phone to Mr. Dorrell.
(Docket No. 25-1 at pp. 91-92; Docket No. 37-1 at p. 90.) 	This is
a credibility determination that is best determined by a jury.
Assuming 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	requested 	that
Mr. Dorrell 	reassign 	her 	to 	a 	Cold 	End 	position 	as 	a 	reasonable
accommodation, 	Anchor 	Glass 	was 	required 	to 	participate 	in 	the
interactive 	process 	with 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	to 	determine 	a 	reasonable
accommodation. 	The 	ADA 	recognizes 	reassignment 	as 	a 	reasonable
accommodation 	of 	the 	last 	resort. 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	12111(9)(B); 	see
Smith 	v. 	Midland 	Brake, 	Inc., 	a 	Div. 	of 	Echlin, 	Inc., 	180 	F.3d
1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999). 	The magistrate judge determined that
Ms. Holbrook failed to show there was a vacant position available
and granted summary judgment in favor of Anchor Glass.
Ms. 	Holbrook 	argues 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	made 	two
errors: 	(1) 	that 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	failed 	to 	consider 	that
Anchor Glass refused to participate in the good faith process; and
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	18
(2) 	that 	she 	was 	not 	required 	to 	show 	that 	a 	vacant 	position
existed. 	(Docket 	No. 	42 	at 	p. 	4.) 	This 	argument 	is 	incorrect.
“Despite 	the 	importance 	[of 	the 	interactive 	process, 	it] 	is 	only
a means to an end . . . . [a]n employer is not required to engage
an 	employee 	in 	a 	futile 	interactive 	process 	where 	. 	. 	. 	no
reasonable accommodation was possible.” 	Valdez v. McGill, 462 F.
App’x 814, 819 (10th Cir. 2012). 	Therefore, “[t]he employee must,
at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	summary 	judgment 	proceeding, 	specifically
identify 	and 	show 	[vacant 	positions] 	were 	available 	within 	the
company 	at 	or 	about 	the 	time 	the 	request 	for 	reassignment 	was
made.” 	Midland 	Brake, 	Inc., 	180 	F. 	3d 	at 	1179 	(emphasis 	added);
Iverson 	v. 	City 	of 	Shawnee, 	Kan., 	332 	F. 	App’x 	501, 	503-04 	(10th
Cir. 	2009). 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	failed 	to 	do 	so 	and 	does 	not 	now 	claim
that such evidence was presented.
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	ADOPTS 	the 	magistrate
judge’s 	findings 	and 	GRANTS 	summary 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	Anchor
Glass 	on 	Ms. 	Holbrook’s 	failure 	to 	accommodate 	claim 	pursuant 	to
the ADA.
B. 	Discriminatory Discharge pursuant to the ADA
Ms. Holbrook next claims that Anchor Glass discriminated
against 	her 	because 	of 	her 	disability 	when 	it 	terminated 	her
employment. 	A 	claim 	for 	discriminatory 	discharge 	differs 	from 	a
failure to accommodate claim in that Ms. Holbrook must prove that
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	19
“[Anchor 	Glass] 	acted 	with 	a 	discriminatory 	animus 	against 	her
because 	she 	had 	a 	disability.” 	Kobbes, 	975 	F.3d 	at 	1014 	(citing
Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1204).
Ms. Holbrook next argues that the magistrate judge erred
when 	he 	found 	that 	“the 	record 	. 	. 	. 	contains 	no 	indication 	that
Ms. Holbrook 	was 	terminated 	by 	Anchor 	Glass 	because 	she 	had 	a
disability and Ms. Holbrook herself asserts that she was terminated
by Mr. Dorrell ‘because of her prior complaints against his friend
Hoover.’” 	(Docket No. 43 at p. 2.) 	Ms. Holbrook argues that the
magistrate 	judge 	holds 	an 	argument 	she 	made 	as 	to 	her 	Title 	VII
claim 	against 	her. 	Id. 	“Under 	both 	Title 	VII 	and 	the 	ADA, 	an
employer can have multiple ‘but-for’ causes behind a decision . .
. 	. 	These 	motives 	are 	not 	mutually 	exclusive.” 	Odell 	v. 	Kalitta
Air, 	LLC, 	678 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	904, 	923-24 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	2023).
Therefore, 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	argues 	that 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Robertson
erred 	in 	recommending 	granting 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the
discrimination claim solely because she cited a motive under Title
VII. 	Because Magistrate Judge Robertson did not discuss the other
elements of a discriminatory discharge claim, the Court will do so
now.
To 	establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of 	discriminatory
discharge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), Ms. Holbrook must show
that “[s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; . . . that
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	20
[s]he 	is 	qualified 	for 	the 	job 	held 	or 	desired; 	and 	. 	. 	. 	that
[s]he 	was 	discriminated 	against 	because 	of 	h[er] 	disability.”
Koppes, 	975 	F.3d 	at 	1014; 	McDonnell 	Douglas 	Corp. 	v. 	Green, 	411
U.S. 	792 	(1973). 	The 	first 	two 	elements 	of 	the 	prima 	facie 	case
for discriminatory discharge are the same as the first two elements
for 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	for 	failure 	to 	accommodate 	a 	disability.
See 	Koppes, 	975 	F.3d 	at 	1014. 	Accordingly, 	we 	assume 	that
Ms. Holbrook is disabled and that she is a qualified individual.
Magistrate Judge Robertson recommended granting summary
judgment because Ms. Holbrook asserted in her deposition that she
believed 	she 	was 	fired 	because 	she 	was 	harassed; 	therefore, 	she
failed 	to 	provide 	evidence 	that 	she 	was 	terminated 	due 	to 	her
disability. 	(Docket 	No. 	42 	at 	p. 	25.) 	Anchor 	Glass 	focuses 	on
the second and third element of Ms. Holbrook’s prima facie showing:
that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	failed 	to 	establish 	she 	was 	a 	qualified
individual 	pursuant 	to 	the 	ADA, 	and 	that 	she 	failed 	to 	show 	that
she 	was 	terminated 	because 	of 	her 	disability. 	(Docket 	No. 	25 	at
p. 25.)
Pursuant to the above discussion, the Court assumes that
Ms. Holbrook is disabled and that she is qualified for the position
she held. 	Ms. Holbrook must also show, however, that Anchor Glass
discriminated 	against 	her 	because 	of 	her 	disability.
“Discrimination 	under 	step 	three 	requires 	plaintiff 	to 	suffer 	an
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	21
adverse 	employment 	action.” 	Buhrman 	v. 	Aureus 	Med. 	Grp., 	519 	F.
Supp. 	3d 	923, 	930 	(D. 	Colo. 	2021). 	Adverse 	employment 	actions
pursuant 	to 	the 	ADA 	include 	the 	discharge 	of 	employees. 	Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
Ms. 	Holbrook 	argues 	that 	the 	timing 	of 	her 	termination
when 	she 	was 	attempting 	to 	return 	to 	work 	from 	her 	medical 	leave
gives rise to the inference that she was terminated because of her
disability. 	(Docket 	No. 	42 	at 	pp. 	2-3.) 	“Depending 	on 	the
specific 	facts 	of 	the 	case, 	temporal 	proximity 	can 	contribute 	to
an inference of discrimination.” 	Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d
1149, 	1157 	(10th 	Cir. 	2008). 	Normally 	temporal 	proximity 	is
analyzed 	in 	the 	context 	of 	retaliation. 	See 	e.g., Foster 	v.
Mountain 	Coal 	Co., 	LLC, 	830 	F.3d 	1178, 	1191 	(10th 	Cir.
2016); Anderson 	v. 	Coors 	Brewing 	Co., 	181 	F.3d 	1171, 	1179 	(10th
Cir. 1999); Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th
Cir. 	1996). 	In 	some 	instances, 	however, 	the 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Court
of 	Appeals 	has 	also 	analyzed 	temporal 	proximity 	for 	claims 	of
straightforward 	discrimination, 	not 	retaliation. 	See 	e.g., Webb
v. 	Level 	3 	Commc’ns, 	LLC, 	167 	F. 	App'x 	725, 	731 	(10th 	Cir.
2006) (unpublished) 	(noting 	that 	prior 	alleged 	instances 	of
discrimination 	were 	too 	remote 	in 	time 	to 	be 	evidence
of pretext); Trujillo, 524 F.3d at 1157 (“Close temporal proximity
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	22
is 	important 	in 	establishing 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of 	association
discrimination.”).
Ms. 	Holbrook 	was 	terminated 	three 	days 	after 	reaching
out 	to 	Mr. 	Dorrell 	about 	returning 	to 	work. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	25-2
at 	p. 	2; 	Docket 	No. 	25-11. 	Her 	termination 	is 	temporally 	close.
See 	Trujillo, 	524 	F.3d 	at 	1157-58 	(six-week 	period 	gave 	rise 	to
inference 	of 	discrimination); 	Anderson, 	181 	F.3d 	at 	1179 	(noting
one 	and 	a 	half 	months 	was 	sufficient 	for 	inference 	without 	other
evidence). 	Considering 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable
to Ms. Holbrook, there can be an inference of discrimination based
on disability.
Once 	a 	plaintiff 	establishes 	a 	prima 	facie 	case 	of
discrimination, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	employer 	to 	state 	a
“legitimate, 	nondiscriminatory 	reason” 	for 	the 	employment 	action
in question. 	McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). 	If 	the 	employer 	establishes 	a 	reason, 	the 	burden 	shifts
back to the plaintiff to offer evidence to show that the reason is
pretextual. 	Anchor 	Glass 	argues 	that 	it 	terminated 	Ms. 	Holbrook
for 	violating 	its 	attendance 	policy 	because 	she 	failed 	to 	inform
it that she had been released for work since January 13, 2021, and
intentionally 	delayed 	notifying 	Anchor 	Glass. 	(Docket 	No. 	25 	at
p. 19; Docket No. 44 at p. 4.)
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The 	burden 	then 	shifts 	to 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	to 	show 	that
Anchor Glass’ justification for terminating her was a pretext for
disability discrimination. 	“In determining whether the proffered
reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they
appear 	to 	the 	person 	making 	the 	decision 	. 	. 	. 	we 	do 	not 	look 	to
the plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of the situation.” 	E.E.O.C.
v. 	C.R. 	England, 	Inc., 	644 	F.3d 	1028, 	1044 	(10th 	Cir. 	2011)
(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted) 	(citing Zamora 	v. 	Elite
Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007); McKnight v.
Kimberly 	Clark 	Corp., 	149 	F.3d 	1125, 	1130 	(10th 	Cir. 	1998)). 	To
ultimately prevail on her claim, Ms. Holbrook must establish by a
“preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by 	[Anchor 	Glass] 	were 	not 	its 	true 	reasons, 	but 	were 	a 	pretext
for 	discrimination.” 	Trujillo, 	524 	F.3d 	at 	1155 (quoting Texas
Dept. 	of 	Cmty. 	Affs. 	v. 	Burdine, 	450 	U.S. 	248, 	253 	(1981)). 	At
the 	summary 	judgment 	stage, 	however, 	“the 	trier 	of 	fact 	may
consider evidence establishing the prima facie case and inferences
properly 	drawn 	therefrom 	on 	the 	issue 	of 	whether 	the 	defendant’s
explanation is pretextual.” 	Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	has 	explained 	how
pretext can be shown:
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	24
A 	plaintiff 	may 	show 	pretext 	by 	demonstrating 	the
proffered 	reason 	is 	factually 	false, 	or 	that
discrimination 	was 	a 	primary 	factor 	in 	the 	employer's
decision. 	This 	is 	often 	accomplished 	by 	revealing
weaknesses, 	implausibilities, 	inconsistencies,
incoherences, 	or 	contradictions 	in 	the 	employer's
proffered 	reason, 	such 	that 	a 	reasonable 	fact 	finder
could 	deem 	the 	employer's 	reason 	unworthy 	of 	credence.
A 	plaintiff 	may 	also 	show 	pretext 	by 	demonstrating 	the
defendant acted contrary to a written company policy, an
unwritten 	company policy, 	or 	a 	company 	practice 	when
making 	the 	adverse 	employment 	decision 	affecting 	the
plaintiff.
DePaula 	v. 	Easter 	Seals 	El 	Mirador, 	859 	F.3d 	957, 	970 	(10th 	Cir.
2017) 	(internal 	citations 	and 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	Pretext
can 	also 	be 	shown 	by 	evidence 	that 	“the 	defendant 	has 	shifted
rationales 	for 	the 	adverse 	employment 	action” 	or 	that 	“the
defendant 	has 	treated 	similarly 	situated 	employees 	who 	committed
acts 	of 	comparable 	seriousness 	differently.” 	Didier 	v. 	Abbott
Labs., 	614 	F. 	App’x 	366, 	374 	(10th 	Cir. 	2015) (unpublished)
(citing Kendrick 	v. 	Penske 	Transp. 	Servs., 	Inc., 	220 	F.3d 	1220,
1230 	(10th 	Cir. 	2000)). 	“Mere 	conjecture[, 	however,] 	that 	the
employer's 	explanation 	is 	pretext 	is 	insufficient 	to 	defeat
summary judgment.” 	Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1179 (citing Morgan, 108
F.3d at 1323).
Anchor 	Glass 	argues 	that 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	provides 	no
evidence 	that 	the 	reason 	is 	pretextual. 	It 	argues 	that
Ms. Holbrook has not provided evidence that the attendance policy
has 	not 	been 	applied 	to 	other 	employees. 	Ms. 	Holbrook 	does,
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	25
however, argue that the attendance policy was incorrectly applied
to 	her 	because 	she 	did 	not 	have 	any 	shift 	scheduled 	and
consequently was not absent. 	(Docket No. 43 at p. 3.) 	The Court
agrees with Ms. Holbrook. 	It is unclear from the attendance policy
if 	she 	had 	to 	provide 	a 	medical 	excuse 	for 	the 	two 	weeks 	between
her 	communication 	with 	Mr. 	Dorrell 	and 	her 	release 	to 	return 	to
work if she did not have a shift scheduled. 	See Docket No. 25-5.
For example, the policy states that “Anchor [Glass] must depend on
a 	reliable 	work 	force 	that 	is 	consistently 	on 	the 	job 	when
scheduled to work.” 	Id. at p. 1. 	But further on, the policy also
states, 	“[s]hould 	you 	be 	disabled 	for 	three 	(3) 	days 	or 	more 	due
to 	illness 	or 	injury, 	you 	are 	required 	to 	present 	a 	doctor’s
release 	properly 	dated 	showing 	the 	dates 	of 	disability 	and
certifying 	that 	you 	are 	now 	able 	to 	resume 	your 	regular 	duties.”
Id. at p. 2. 	How this provision would apply to Ms. Holbrook, who
was already on leave and was not scheduled to work, is not entirely
clear. 	This uncertainty of whether Ms. Holbrook needed to report
her 	absences 	when 	she 	did 	not 	have 	a 	scheduled 	shift 	casts 	doubt
on the policy being the real reason for her termination. 	That is,
a 	jury 	could 	conclude 	that 	the 	reason 	Anchor 	Glass 	cited 	for 	her
termination 	was 	pretextual, 	and 	that 	the 	actual 	reason 	for 	her
termination 	was 	that 	she 	could 	not 	return 	to 	work 	in 	the 	Hot 	End
position 	due 	to 	the 	permanence 	of 	her 	disability. 	Accordingly,
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Case No. 22-CV-229-FAB-JAR 	26
the 	Court 	REJECTS 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendations 	and
DENIES defendant Anchor Glass’ summary judgment on Ms. Holbrook’s
disability discrimination claim.
While Ms. Holbrook has waived review of her other claims,
the Court has nonetheless conducted a complete review of the record
and 	agrees 	that 	summary 	judgment 	should 	be 	granted 	for
Ms. Holbrook’s 	Title 	VII 	claims 	and 	FMLA 	claims 	for 	the 	reasons
set forth in the R&R. 	For the reasons discussed, the Court GRANTS
IN PART the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	all 	of 	the 	above 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	ADOPTS 	IN 	PART 	and
REJECTS 	IN 	PART 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	recommendations 	contained
in 	Docket 	No. 	42. 	Accordingly, 	defendant’s 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 	All of plaintiff’s
Title 	VII 	claims, 	FMLA 	claims, 	and 	failure 	to 	accommodate 	claim
pursuant 	to 	ADA 	are 	DISMISSED 	with 	prejudice. 	Partial 	judgment
shall 	be 	entered 	accordingly. 	Anchor 	Glass’ 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment 	on 	Ms. 	Holbrook’s 	disability 	discrimination 	claim
pursuant to ADA is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 6, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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