Shaik v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ZAK SHAIK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S OF LONDON, et. al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-271(FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.1
This 	case 	involves 	plaintiff 	Zak 	Shaik’s 	efforts 	to 	obtain
benefits 	under 	insurance 	policies 	issued 	by 	the 	defendants 	after
a 	tornado 	destroyed 	seven 	rental 	properties 	plaintiff 	owns 	in
Sulphur, 	Oklahoma. 	On 	May 	22, 	2026, 	this 	Court 	dismissed
plaintiff’s 	case 	with 	prejudice 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim.
(Docket No. 71.) 	Subsequently, this Court also denied plaintiff’s
motion 	to 	alter 	or 	amend 	the 	judgment. 	(Docket 	No. 	82.) 	Now
before 	the 	Court 	is 	plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	relief 	from 	judgment
pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	(“FRCP”) 	Rule 	60.
(Docket 	No. 	83.) 	For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	plaintiff’s
motion is DENIED.
1 Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	2
I. 	Background
Plaintiff is a resident of Texas and the owner of seven rental
properties located in Sulphur, Oklahoma. 	(Docket No. 2 at p. 3.)
On 	March 	10, 	2023, 	defendant 	“Certain 	Underwriters 	at 	Lloyd’s 	of
London” 	(“Lloyd’s”) 	issued 	property 	insurance 	policies 	to
plaintiff covering the seven properties. 	(Docket No. 2 at p. 3.)
Defendant Millennial Specialty Insurance (“Millennial”) served as
the 	insurance 	agent. 	(Docket 	No. 	19 	at 	pp. 	4-5.) 	Defendant
Baldwin Insurance Group Holdings, LLC (“Baldwin” and collectively
with 	Lloyd’s 	and 	Millennial, 	the 	“defendants”) 	is 	the 	parent
company 	of 	Millennial 	but 	was 	not 	otherwise 	involved 	in 	the
issuance of the insurance contracts. 	See Docket No. 21 at p. 4.
Although neither plaintiff nor defendants provided the Court
with 	the 	full 	insurance 	contracts, 	defendants 	filed 	Certificates
of Insurance which provide basic details about the policies. 	See
Docket 	No. 	54-1 	at 	pp. 	1-2; 	Docket 	No. 	54-2 	at 	pp. 	1-2; 	Docket
No. 54-3 	at 	pp. 	1-2; 	Docket 	No. 	54-4 	at 	pp. 	1-2; 	Docket 	No. 	54-5
at 	pp. 	1-2; 	Docket 	No. 	54-6 	at 	pp. 	1-2; 	GFF 	Corp. 	v. 	Assoc.
Wholesale 	Grocers, 	130 	F.3d 	1381, 	1384 	(10th 	Cir. 	1997) 	(“[I]f 	a
plaintiff 	does 	not 	incorporate 	by 	reference 	or 	attach 	a 	document
to its complaint, but the document is referred to in the complaint
and is central to the plaintiff’s claim, a defendant may submit an
indisputably 	authentic 	copy 	to 	the 	court 	to 	be 	considered 	on 	a
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	3
motion to dismiss.”) 	The certificates list Baari Ardmore Housing
LLC as the named insured and Zia Shaikh2 as an additional insured.
Id. 	Crucially, the certificates state that the coverage period of
the policies was from March 10, 2023 to March 10, 2024. 	Id.
On 	August 	15, 	2023, 	Millennial 	sent 	plaintiff 	a 	Notice 	of
Cancellation 	via 	email 	informing 	him 	that 	his 	insurance 	policies
would 	be 	cancelled 	on 	September 	1, 	2023 	due 	to 	non-payment 	of
premiums. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	19-1 	at 	p. 	1; 	Docket 	No. 	19 	at 	p. 	3.
Subsequently, 	Millennial 	sent 	plaintiff 	two 	more 	notices 	of
cancellation 	due 	to 	non-payment 	of 	premiums 	on 	November 	15, 	2023
and December 1, 2023. 	See Docket No. 19-1 at pp. 2-3. 	Plaintiff
claims 	that 	he 	never 	received 	these 	notices. 	(Docket 	No. 	2 	at
p. 5, ¶23.) 	Plaintiff does not dispute that, notwithstanding any
early 	cancellation, 	the 	policies 	expired 	by 	their 	own 	terms 	on
March 10, 2024.
On 	April 	26, 	2024 	a 	tornado 	struck 	Sulphur, 	Oklahoma 	and
destroyed 	plaintiff’s 	properties. 	(Docket 	No. 	2 	at 	p. 	4, 	¶16.)
Plaintiff then submitted a claim for benefits under the insurance
policies. 	Id. at p. 4, ¶17. 	Defendants denied plaintiff’s claim
on 	the 	basis 	that 	the 	policies 	had 	been 	cancelled 	due 	to 	non-
2 Plaintiff claims that he is also known as Zia Shaikh. 	See Docket No. 2 at
p. 1.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	4
payment 	of 	premiums. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	4, 	¶22; 	Docket 	No. 	19, 	pp. 	3-4;
Docket No. 33, p. 5.
II. 	Procedural History
After 	being 	denied 	coverage, 	plaintiff 	filed 	this 	diversity
suit against defendants on July 31, 2024 for $7.6 million dollars,
alleging breach of contract under Oklahoma law for wrongful denial
of coverage and breach of the duty of good faith. 	(Docket No. 2.)
Defendants each filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure
to 	state 	a 	claim. 	Docket 	No. 	52; 	Docket 	No. 	53; 	Docket 	No. 	54.)
Magistrate 	Judge 	Gerald 	L. 	Jackson 	issued 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation 	(“R&R”) 	recommending 	that 	defendants’ 	motion 	to
dismiss be granted. 	(Docket No. 59.) 	The magistrate judge found
that, 	even 	assuming 	Millennial’s 	notices 	to 	plaintiff 	did 	not
suffice to cancel the policies, plaintiff’s losses occurred after
the 	policies 	had 	lapsed 	by 	their 	own 	terms. 	(Docket 	No. 	59,
p. 11.) 	The magistrate judge also found that any attempt to amend
the 	complaint3 	would 	be 	futile, 	given 	that 	the 	loss 	occurred
outside the policies’ coverage period, and therefore denied leave
to amend. 	Id. at pp. 14-15. 	Plaintiff filed an objection to the
R&R, (Docket No. 60), and, notwithstanding the magistrate judge’s
3 	In 	his 	consolidated 	response 	to 	defendants’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	plaintiff
requested 	leave 	to 	amend 	“[i]f 	the 	Court 	identifies 	any 	technical 	pleading
deficiency . . . .” 	(Docket No. 56 at p. 7.)
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	5
finding 	of 	futility, 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint.
(Docket No. 70.)
This Court adopted the R&R and granted the defendants’ motion
to 	dismiss. 	(Docket 	No. 	71.) 	Without 	specifically 	addressing
plaintiff’s 	proposed 	amended 	complaint, 	this 	Court 	found 	that
plaintiff’s 	arguments 	were 	“mere 	conclusory 	allegations 	without
any supporting factual averments that might suggest such arguments
could plausibly exist.” 	(Docket No. 71 at p. 9.) 	The Court then
separately 	denied 	plaintiff’s 	outstanding 	request 	to 	amend 	the
complaint, 	referring 	to 	its 	previously-issued 	Opinion 	and 	Order.
(Docket 	No. 	72.) 	Judgment 	was 	entered 	dismissing 	plaintiff’s
claims with prejudice. 	(Docket No. 73.)
The day after judgment was entered, plaintiff filed a motion
to 	alter 	or 	amend 	the 	judgment 	pursuant 	to 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 	59(e),
arguing 	that 	it 	was 	improper 	for 	the 	Court 	to 	dismiss 	his 	claims
while 	a 	motion 	to 	amend 	the 	complaint 	was 	pending. 	(Docket
No. 76.) 	This 	Court 	denied 	the 	motion 	and 	indicated 	that 	the
futility 	of 	amendment 	had 	been 	previously 	addressed 	both 	by 	the
magistrate 	judge 	and 	in 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	order 	dismissing
plaintiff’s claims. 	(Docket No. 82.) 	Nonetheless, in its opinion,
the 	Court 	specifically 	addressed 	the 	merits 	of 	plaintiff’s
proposed 	amended 	complaint. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	5-8. 	It 	held 	that
plaintiff’s new allegation that the policies operated not based on
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	6
fixed 	coverage 	dates 	but 	on 	a 	“continuous 	reporting, 	scheduling,
and 	premium-based 	system” 	was 	not 	explained 	in 	sufficient 	detail
for the Court to decipher how it could support plaintiff’s claims,
nor did plaintiff support the allegation with any citations to the
language 	of 	the 	policies 	themselves. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	6. 	This 	Court
also held that Shaik’s proposed amended complaint again failed to
explain 	how, 	under 	Oklahoma 	law, 	Millennial’s 	notices 	of
cancellation 	to 	plaintiff 	were 	invalid, 	and 	appeared 	to 	be
contradictory 	regarding 	whether 	plaintiff 	in 	fact 	received 	the
notices. 	Id. at pp. 7-8.
Fourteen 	days 	after 	entry 	of 	the 	order 	denying 	plaintiff’s
Rule 	59(e) 	motion, 	plaintiff 	filed 	a 	motion 	seeking 	relief 	from
the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). 	(Docket No. 83.) 	Plaintiff
seeks to re-open the judgment to allow him to amend his complaint
to 	allege 	“extensive 	factual 	allegations 	and 	legal 	theories 	that
were not previously before the Court in their present form.” 	Id.
at 	p. 	3. 	Plaintiff 	attached 	to 	his 	motion 	a 	proposed 	second
amended 	complaint, 	as 	well 	as 	an 	excerpt 	of 	the 	“Master 	Policy”
provisions relevant to his claim, and a sworn declaration in which
he claims that he never received any notice that his policies would
be 	cancelled, 	that 	coverage 	would 	not 	be 	renewed, 	or 	that 	any
premiums 	were 	overdue. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	83-1 	(second 	amended
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	7
complaint); 	Docket 	No. 	83-2 	(Master 	Policy 	excerpts); 	Docket 	No.
87 (Declaration of Zak Shaik).
III. Legal Standard
Rule 	60(b) 	permits 	a 	court 	to 	relieve 	a 	party 	from 	a 	final
judgment 	in 	specific, 	enumerated 	circumstances. 	Waetzig 	v.
Halliburton 	Energy 	Servs., 	Inc., 	145 	F.4th 	1279, 	1282 	(10th
Cir. 2025). 	These 	circumstances 	include 	where 	there 	has 	been
mistake or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or
where 	the 	judgment 	is 	rendered 	void 	or 	otherwise 	satisfied,
released, 	or 	discharged. 	See 	Rule 	60(b)(1)-(5). 	The 	Rule 	also
contains a catchall provision allowing relief from a judgment for
“any 	other 	reason 	that 	justifies 	relief.” 	Rule 	60(b)(6). 	“To
obtain 	relief 	under 	Rule 	60(b)(6), 	a 	movant 	must 	‘show
“extraordinary circumstances.”’” 	Id. at 1283 (quoting González v.
Crosby, 	545 	U.S. 	524, 	535(2005)); 	see 	also 	Bud 	Brooks 	Trucking,
Inc. 	v. 	Bill 	Hodges 	Trucking 	Co., 	909 	F.2d 	1437, 	1440 	(10th 	Cir.
1990) 	(“Relief 	under 	Rule 	60(b) 	is 	extraordinary 	and 	may 	only 	be
granted in exceptional circumstances.”) (citations omitted).
While Rule 15 provides for the liberal amendment of pleadings,
the Supreme Court has recently made clear that a party seeking to
re-open 	its 	case 	after 	judgment 	has 	been 	entered 	for 	the 	purpose
of re-pleading “must first satisfy Rule 60(b) on its own terms and
obtain 	Rule 	60(b) 	relief 	before 	Rule 	15(a)’s 	liberal 	amendment
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	8
standard 	can 	apply.” 	BLOM 	Bank 	SAL 	v. 	Honickman, 	605 	U.S. 	204,
210 (2025); see also Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272,
1283 (10th Cir. 2021).
IV. 	Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the judgment in this case should be re-
opened 	to 	permit 	him 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint 	to 	allege 	“extensive
factual 	allegations 	and 	legal 	theories 	that 	were 	not 	previously
before the Court in their present form.” 	(Docket No. 83 at p. 3.)
Plaintiff, 	however, 	has 	not 	identified 	any 	extraordinary
circumstance 	that 	precluded 	him 	from 	presenting 	those 	facts 	and
legal 	theories 	during 	any 	of 	his 	prior 	attempts 	at 	amendment.
“Neither a [R]ule 59 nor a [R]ule 60 motion for reconsideration is
an appropriate vehicle to reargue an issue previously addressed by
the 	court 	when 	the 	motion 	merely 	advances 	new 	arguments, 	or
supporting facts which were available at the time of the original
motion.” 	SFF-TIR, 	LLC 	v. 	Stephenson, 	264 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	1148, 	1214
(N.D. 	Okla. 	2017). 	In 	other 	words, 	“Rule 	60(b) 	is 	not 	a 	vehicle
to give the losing litigant a second bite at the apple.” 	Kline v.
Mortg. 	Elec. 	Registration 	Sys., 	Inc., 	704 	F. 	App'x 	451, 	466 	(6th
Cir. 2017).
The 	Supreme 	Court’s 	holding 	in 	BLOM 	Bank 	SAL 	v. 	Honickman
demonstrates why Rule 60(b) relief is not warranted here. 	In that
case, 	after 	declining 	the 	opportunity 	to 	amend 	their 	complaint,
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	9
plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court
for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim. 	605 	U.S. 	at 	207. 	On 	appeal, 	the
Second 	Circuit 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	clarified 	the 	elements 	required
for 	plaintiffs’ 	cause 	of 	action 	but 	nonetheless 	found 	their
complaint insufficient. 	Id. at 208. 	On remand to the trial court,
plaintiffs moved pursuant to Rule 60(b) to re-open the judgment to
permit them to re-plead in accordance with the Second Circuit Court
of 	Appeal’s 	new 	standard. 	Id. 	at 	208-209. 	Their 	motion 	was
denied. 	Id. at 209. 	On appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed that
the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b) relief “follow[ed] from
the 	core 	tenets 	of 	Rule 	60(b) 	doctrine” 	when 	it 	held 	that 	a
clarification 	in 	law 	did 	not 	constitute 	“extraordinary
circumstances,” 	especially 	when 	“plaintiffs 	were 	unlikely 	to
succeed under that standard.” 	Id. at 216.
Plaintiff’s 	argument 	here 	is 	even 	less 	compelling 	than 	the
plaintiffs 	in 	BLOM 	Bank 	SAL, 	whose 	motion 	was 	ultimately 	denied.
Plaintiff 	identifies 	no 	change 	in 	Oklahoma 	law 	that 	might 	alter
the 	strength 	of 	his 	claim,4 	and 	his 	proposed 	second 	amended
4 In his papers, plaintiff cites Jai Hosp., LLC v. W. World Ins. Co., 2025 OK
13, 566 P.3d 580 (2025), in support of his argument that absent a timely notice
of 	non-renewal, 	a 	commercial 	insurance 	policy 	shall 	remain 	in 	effect 	by
operation 	of 	law 	until 	forty-five 	days 	after 	such 	notice 	of 	non-renewal 	is
mailed. 	(Docket No. 86 at p. 4). 	While the Court takes no position on whether
this case supports plaintiff’s claim, it was decided ten months prior to the
filing 	of 	defendants’ 	renewed 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	and 	therefore 	does 	not
constitute an intervening change in the law.
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	10
complaint contains no facts that were not available to him at the
outset 	of 	this 	lawsuit. 	The 	fact 	remains 	that 	even 	if 	plaintiff
could identify a change in Oklahoma law or newly discovered facts,
these 	alone 	do 	not 	constitute 	“extraordinary 	circumstances” 	that
would justify Rule 60(b) relief. 	Id.
Plaintiff 	attempts 	to 	distinguish 	BLOM 	Bank 	SAL 	by 	pointing
out 	that, 	unlike 	the 	plaintiffs 	in 	that 	case, 	he 	has 	attempted
multiple 	times 	to 	amend 	his 	complaint. 	(Docket 	No. 	86 	at 	pp. 	2-
3.) 	This 	fact 	instead 	only 	underscores 	why 	Rule 	60(b) 	relief 	is
inappropriate here. 	Plaintiff’s attempts to cure the deficiencies
in his pleadings have been rejected at multiple points throughout
this 	proceeding, 	and 	plaintiff 	points 	to 	no 	extraordinary
circumstances 	that 	prevented 	him 	from 	presenting 	his 	strongest
case 	to 	the 	Court 	prior 	to 	the 	entry 	of 	judgment. 	The 	“strong
interest 	in 	protecting 	the 	finality 	of 	judgments” 	dictates 	that
where, 	as 	here, 	no 	extraordinary 	circumstances 	warrant 	relief, 	a
judgment shall be final. 	Nelson v. City of Albuquerque, 921 F.3d
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Civil No. 24-271 (FAB) 	11
925, 	929 	(10th 	Cir. 	2019).5 	Accordingly, 	plaintiff’s 	motion 	for
relief from judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, August 7, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5 Courts have “long held that regardless of how characterized, a post-judgment
motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment questioning the correctness
of the judgment is properly construed as a Rule 59(e) motion.” Melton v. Fisher,
930 F.2d 34, 34 (10th Cir. 1991). 	Additionally, filing of a timely Rule 59(e)
motion “suspends the finality of the judgment.” Hogan v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp.,
73 F.4th 1150, 1159 n.8 (10th Cir. 2023). 	A judgment becomes final, however,
when “the district court has disposed of all claims against all parties, leaving
nothing 	for 	the 	district 	court 	to 	do 	beyond 	ministerial 	tasks.” 	Murphy 	v.
Schaible, 108 F.4th 1257, 1271 (10th Cir. 2024). 	In this case, the judgment
became final on June 18, 2026 upon entry of the order denying plaintiff’s Rule
59(e) motion. 	See Docket No. 82. 	Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion was filed on
July 2, 2026, 14 days after the judgment became final. 	Therefore, the Court
declines to consider the motion under the Rule 59(e) standard.
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