ALEXANDER v. Dental Depot Tulsa Hills

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
IN RE:
NAKIMBRA E. ALEXANDER,
Debtor.
Case No. 25-11237-T
Chapter 7
NAKIMBRA E. ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENTAL DEPOT TULSA HILLS,
Defendant.
Adv. No. 25-01024-T
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff Nakimbra E. Alexander’s
(“Plaintiff”) Complaint 1 alleging that Defendant Dental Depot Tulsa Hills (“Defendant”) willfully
violated the automatic stay. Plaintiff requests the Court award her actual as well as punitive
damages. The Court held a trial on March 30, 2026, wherein evidence was taken, and argument
was heard. The matter was taken under advisement and is now ripe for review. For the reasons
stated below, the Court finds that Defendant willfully violated the automatic stay; however, the
Court is unable to award Plaintiff damages. The following findings and conclusions are made
pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.
1 ECF No. 1.
T
Filed/Docketed
Apr 28, 2026
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Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this bankruptcy case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). 2
Reference to the Court of the bankruptcy case is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). The
granting or denial of relief from violation of the automatic stay is a core proceeding as defined by
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
Findings of Fact3
On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 In her schedules, Plaintiff listed Defendant as holding a
noncontingent, undisputed claim for $408.36. 5 On August 27, 2025, the Bankruptcy Noticing
Center mailed the Certificate of Notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing to Defendant at 710 W. 71st
St., Tulsa, Oklahoma 74132. 6
Despite having received notice of Plaintiff’s pending bankruptcy case, Defendant sent
Plaintiff three separate billing statements during the months of October, November, and December
of 2025 while her bankruptcy case was still pending. 7 Each billing statement was followed by a
letter 8 reminding Plaintiff of her unpaid account balance and advising her that the past due balance
may be sent to a collection agency. On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint claiming
Defendant 	willfully 	violated 	the 	automatic 	stay 	and 	requesting 	the 	Court 	award 	her
actual/emotional damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages. In response, Defendant
2 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to sections of the United States
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.
3 In addition to evidence admitted at the trial on March 30, 2026, the Court has taken
judicial notice of the documents filed in this adversary proceeding and Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case.
4 Case No. 25-11237, at ECF No. 1.
5 Id. at 28.
6 Case No. 25-11237, at ECF No. 13.
7 Plf’s Ex. 1A, 2A, 3A.
8 Plf’s Ex. 1B, 2B, 3B.
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filed a letter, 9 which the Court treated as a pleading, 10 appearing to acknowledge the bankruptcy
filing and stating that Plaintiff no longer had an outstanding account balance.
Plaintiff was the only party to appear at the trial on March 30, 2026. 11 At the trial, Plaintiff
described dealing with various stressors since filing her bankruptcy case. She also stated that while
she spent “a little more than ten hours” dealing with the “Dental Depot situation” she did not
sustain any financial damages as a result of the post-bankruptcy correspondence. Ultimately,
Plaintiff presented no evidence that she sustained actual compensable damages, such as lost wages,
travel expenses, or medical costs, due to the actions of which she now complains.
Conclusions of Law
Plaintiff alleges Defendant contravened § 362(k) by willfully and intentionally violating
the automatic stay imposed by § 362(a). She requests that the Court award her actual and punitive
damages for said conduct. The Court finds sufficient evidence to conclude Defendant’s actions
constitute a willful violation under § 362(k). However, due in large part to a lack of supporting
evidence, the Court is unable to award Plaintiff her requested damages.
A. Violation of the Automatic Stay
According to § 362(a)(6), the filing of a voluntary petition for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code automatically stays “any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title[.]” The scope of the automatic stay is broad
9 ECF No. 6.
10 The address on Defendant’s letter was the same address used by the Bankruptcy Noticing
Center to mail Defendant the Certificate of Notice. The Court notes that Defendant’s letter was
not signed by an attorney in compliance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011. ECF
No. 10. However, on January 21, 2026, the Court entered an order stating that it would treat the
letter as a pleading for purposes of this adversary proceeding, and ordering Defendant to appear
by counsel in future appearances before the Court. ECF No. 11.
11 The Court issued the Notice of Setting of Trial to Defendant at 710 W. 71st St., Tulsa,
Oklahoma 74132 on February 20, 2026. ECF No. 19.
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and operates “to protect the debtor and h[er] creditors by allowing the debtor to organize h[er]
affairs, and by ensuring that the bankruptcy procedure may operate to provide an orderly resolution
of all claims.” 12 Section 362(k) provides that “an individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.” To recover damages for
violation of the stay, the movant must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a
violation occurred, the violation was committed willfully, and the violation caused actual
damages.” 13
B. “Willful Violation”
A “willful violation” under § 362(k) does not require specific intent; rather, a “willful
violation” means “the creditor knew of the automatic stay and intended the actions that constituted
the violation.” 14 The controlling characteristic of the term “willful” is the “deliberateness of the
conduct, coupled with knowledge of the filing.” 15 However, even a violation committed by a
defendant without knowledge of the stay may be considered “willful if the creditor fails to remedy
the violation after receiving notice of the stay.” 16 Moreover, notice of the stay “need not be formal
or official to put a creditor on notice.” 17 For instance, the proper mailing of a Certificate of Notice
12 Pursifull v. Eakin, 814 F.2d 1501, 1504 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Fortier v. Dona Anna
Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1984)).
13 In re Christie, 614 B.R. 726, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2020) (citing Johnson v.
Smith (In re Johnson), 501 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007)); see In re Escobedo, 513 B.R. 605,
612 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2014) (citing In re Kline, 424 B.R. 516, 524 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2010)).
14 In re Christie, 614 B.R. at 734; In re Sutton, 670 B.R. 355, 362 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2025)
(citing In re Gagliardi, 290 B.R. 808, 818–19 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003)).
15 In re Christie, 614 B.R. at 734 (citing In re Kline, 472 B.R. 98, 103 (10th Cir. BAP
2012)). 16 Id. (citing Diviney v. NationsBank of Tex., N.A. (In re Diviney), 225 B.R. 762, 776 (10th
Cir. BAP 1998)).
17 In re Escobedo, 513 B.R. at 612 (quoting Johnson, 501 F.3d at 1172).
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to a defendant’s address, in and of itself, can create “a rebuttable presumption that the [notice] was
received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail.” 18
Here, the Certificate of Notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing was mailed to Defendant at
the address it uses for business correspondence on August 27, 2025. 19 As such, there is a
presumption, which Defendant failed to rebut, that it received notice of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy
filing prior to the alleged stay violations. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that
Defendant intended to mail the statements and letters to Plaintiff despite its knowledge of her
pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant’s actions were
willful violations of the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(k).
C. Establishing Actual Damages
The language of § 362(k)(1) mandates that an individual injured by a violation of the stay
receive compensation for actual damages. 20 However, the debtor must present evidence sufficient
to allow the court to determine the amount of “actual damages with reasonable certainty.” 21 For
example, courts have awarded actual damages when presented with evidence of lost wages, travel
costs, and attorneys’ fees, among other fact-specific expenses resulting directly from the
violation. 22
18 Id. (quoting Reading Ventures, Ltd. v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Colo.
1997)). 19 ECF No. 6; Case No. 25-11237, at ECF No. 13.
20 See In re GeneSys, Inc., 273 B.R. 290, 295 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2001) (“[The court] has no
discretion to withhold an award of compensatory damages for violation of the automatic stay.”).
21 In re Montoya, 547 B.R. 439, 448 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016) (quoting In re Gagliardi, 290
B.R. 808, 819 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003)).
22 See In re Escobedo, 513 B.R. at 613; In re Alcon, Case No. 24-10174, 2024 WL 3912257,
at *5 (Bankr. D.N.M. Aug. 22, 2024).
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Some courts have also included emotional damages within the meaning of actual damages
under § 362(k). 23 Although the Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, the In re Velasquez court
determined that a debtor must provide “‘specific information’ concerning the alleged emotional
distress damages, and cannot rely only on ‘generalized assertions.’” 24 As such, the debtor must
offer something more than statements of general distress, and provide evidence which establishes
a causal connection between the injury and the alleged conduct. Such evidence may consist of a
plaintiff’s own testimony sufficiently detailing the emotional distress experienced because of the
stay violation, as well as medical records or medical bills. 25
Although the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s plight and the additional strain she
experienced due to Defendant’s willful violation of the automatic stay, Plaintiff provided
insufficient evidence of actual damages resulting from Defendant’s actions. Defendant has ceased
the behavior complained of by Plaintiff. Furthermore, Plaintiff provided no evidence, beyond her
statements at trial, showing that she lost wages or experienced emotional distress due to
Defendant’s actions. Because Plaintiff is a pro se party, she is not entitled to attorneys’ fees and
costs. 26 Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown by sufficient evidence that she is entitled
to actual damages.
23 In re Velasquez, No. 12-10670, 2015 WL 2215455, at *7–8 (Bankr. D.N.M. May 11,
2015) (citing Snowden v. Check into Cash of Wash. Inc. (In re Snowden), 769 F.3d 651, 656–57
(9th Cir. 2014); Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014); Fleet
Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 1999)).
24 In re Valasquez, 2015 WL 2215455, at *8; see In re Fontaine, 603 B.R. 94, 111–12
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2019) (finding that the debtor’s testimony that she experienced emotional distress,
depression, and anxiety due to violation of the automatic stay and sought herbal and massage
treatment insufficient evidence to sustain an award of actual damages for emotional distress).
25 See In re Diviney, 211 B.R. 951, 967 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997).
26 See In re Alcon, 2024 WL 3912257, at *5 (“Debtor was pro se, so attorneys’ fees are
avoided.”); Greer v. Moon, Case No. 2:24-cv-00421, 2026 WL 881394, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 31,
2026) (“Courts have generally held that pro se litigants may not recover attorney fees as a
sanction.”); In re Moore, 631 B.R. 764, 785 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2021) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit BAP
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D. Establishing Punitive Damages
In addition to actual damages, a debtor may recover punitive damages “in appropriate
circumstances.” 27 While courts have interpreted “appropriate circumstances” in various ways,
“[t]he 	Tenth 	Circuit 	Bankruptcy 	Appellate 	Panel 	has 	expressly 	approved 	of 	two
[interpretations].” 28 The first interpretation requires that the defendant have “acted with actual
knowledge that he was violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether
he was doing so.” 29 The second interpretation consists of a four-factor test which requires that the
court examine: “(1) the nature of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s ability to pay; (3)
the motives of the defendant; and (4) any provocation by the debtor.” 30 Therefore, to impose
punitive damages, courts generally must find that the defendant’s behavior constituted something
more than merely a willful violation. 31
has said, ‘Pro se litigants cannot recover attorney’s fees as an item of actual damages in an action
under § 362(k)’”); In re Laskaratos, 605 B.R. 282, 310 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he case law
confirms that the time spent and the burdens taken on by a self-represented litigant such as [the
debtor] cannot, without more, be viewed as a compensable substitute for attorneys’ fees and
costs.”); Beckford v. Romano (In re Beckford), Case No.: 13-20749, 2018 WL 3956590, at *4
(Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2018) (“[A] pro se litigant is not entitled to attorneys’ fees for self-
representation.”).
27 § 362(k)(1); see In re Montoya, 547 B.R. at 448 (“The [c]ourt may impose punitive
damages arising from a willful violation of the automatic stay even if a debtor fails to prove actual
damages.”) (citing In re Jean-Francois, 532 B.R. 449, 457–58 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015)).
28 In re Escobedo, 513 B.R. at 613.
29 In re Diviney, 225 B.R. at 776.
30 Id. at 777.
31 See In re Repine, 536 F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding the defendant’s persistent
collection efforts which resulted in the debtor’s continued incarceration to be egregious behavior
warranting the imposition of punitive damages); In re Harrison, 599 B.R. 173, 188 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 2019) (finding the defendant’s continued pursuit of foreclosure action which resulted in the
debtor being denied access to property for more than ninety days to be egregious conduct); In re
Weathers, 670 B.R. 20, 40 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2025) (determining that punitive damages were
warranted because the defendant retained possession of the debtor’s vehicle for six weeks).
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Regardless of the interpretation applied here, there is nothing to indicate Defendant’s
actions constituted something more than a willful violation as defined by § 362(k)(1). Although ill
advised, Defendant’s actions did not rise to the level of egregious or malicious conduct. As such,
the 	Court 	finds 	that 	it 	would 	be 	inappropriate 	to 	award 	punitive 	damages 	under 	these
circumstances.
Conclusion
The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to actual or punitive damages. A separate
judgment consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is entered concurrently herewith.
Dated this 28th of April, 2026.
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