Gaines et al v. Moore City of et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
BRYAN GAINES, in his individual capacity
and as personal representative of the Estate of
EMILY GAINES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF MOORE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. CIV-20-851-D
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 154], Defendant City of
Moore’s Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 158], and Defendant Kyle Lloyd’s Motion in Limine
[Doc. No. 163]. Defendants filed responses [Doc. Nos. 178, 179] to Plaintiffs’ Motion.
Plaintiffs and Defendant Kyle Lloyd filed responses [Doc. Nos. 173, 178] to Defendant
City of Moore’s Motion. Plaintiffs also filed a response [Doc. No. 175] to Defendant Kyle
Lloyd’s Motion. Defendant City of Moore did not file a response to Defendant Kyle
Lloyd’s Motion and the time to do so has passed. Thus, the Motions are fully briefed and
at issue.
BACKGROUND
The facts of the present case are more fully set out in the Court’s Order granting in
part and denying in part Defendant City of Moore’s (“City”) motion for summary judgment
[Doc. No. 146] and will not be restated at length. In summary, this case arises from a fatal
car accident.
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On the morning of December 14, 2019, Defendant Lloyd, a former Moore police
officer, was off-duty when an on-duty Moore police officer called and asked Mr. Lloyd to
bring him a spare key to a police car, as the officer had locked his keys in the car. When
Mr. Lloyd was driving his personal vehicle to deliver the spare key, he tragically collided
with a vehicle driven by Emily Gaines (“Decedent”). Ms. Gaines died at the scene of the
accident.
Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	for 	§ 	1983 	liability— 	substantive 	due 	process 	and
negligence/wrongful death against Defendant Lloyd remain, and their claim under the
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”) for respondeat superior liability
against the City remains.
LEGAL STANDARD
Although motions in limine are not formally recognized under the Federal Rules,
district courts have long recognized the potential utility of pretrial rulings under the courts’
inherent powers to manage the course of trial proceedings. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S.
38, 41 n.4 (1984). “A motion in limine presents the trial court with the opportunity ‘to rule
in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are
definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.’” Wilkins v.
Kmart Corp., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1218 (D. Kan. 2007) (quoting Palmieri v. Defaria, 88
F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996)). Although such pretrial rulings can save time and avoid
interruptions at trial, “a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess
the value and utility of evidence. Consequently, a court should reserve its rulings for those
instances when the evidence is plainly ‘inadmissible on all potential grounds’ … and it
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should typically defer rulings on relevancy and unfair prejudice objections until trial when
the factual context is developed[.]” Id. at 1218-19 (citations omitted); see also Hawthorne
Partners v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“Unless
evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that
questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper
context.”).
Some in limine rulings, such as relevance, are preliminary in nature because the
required balancing may be reassessed as the evidence is actually presented. Accordingly,
“[a] district court ‘may change its ruling at any time for whatever reason it deems
appropriate.’” United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1152 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Jones
v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 146 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42 (“The ruling
is subject to change when the case unfolds, particularly if the actual testimony differs from
what was contained in the defendant’s proffer. Indeed, even if nothing unexpected happens
at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a previous
in limine ruling.”).
“A motion in limine should address specific evidence that is irrelevant, inadmissible
or prejudicial. Thus, motions in limine that generally lack specificity as to particular evidence
are properly denied.” Shotts v. GEICO General Ins. Co., CIV-16-1266-SLP, 2018 WL
4832625, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 12, 2018) (citing Kinzey v. Diversified Servs., Inc., No. 15-
1369-JTM, 2017 WL 131614, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 13, 2017)). “Without a detailed
presentation of the facts which give rise to the issue sought to be addressed by the motion in
limine, a motion in limine amounts to little more than a request that the court faithfully apply
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the rules of evidence.” Hussein v. Duncan Regional Hospital, Inc., CIV-07-439-F, 2009 WL
10672480, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 20, 2009).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 154]
I. 	Evidence/Argument attributing Fault to Decedent.
Plaintiffs seek to exclude any evidence or argument that Decedent was contributorily
negligent because it is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial as it would confuse the jurors.
Plaintiffs argue that there is no evidence that Decedent was responsible or negligent
regarding the accident. Further, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have not identified any
witnesses to testify that Decedent acted negligently. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that until
Defendants present admissible evidence at trial of Decedent’s alleged negligence, they
should be prohibited from arguing that Decedent acted negligently.
The City did not object to Plaintiffs’ request. However, Defendant Lloyd objected
and argued that there is evidence that Decedent was contributorily negligent. Indeed,
Defendant Lloyd asserts that in his deposition he testified that he believes he had a green
light at the time of the incident, and does not know why Decedent attempted to turn when
she did.
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A court may exclude relevant evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, [or] misleading the jury . . ..” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence may be unfairly prejudicial
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if it would likely provoke the jury’s emotional response or would otherwise tend to adversely
affect the jury’s attitude toward a particular matter ... [but] [e]vidence is not unfairly
prejudicial merely because it damages a party’s case.” Leon v. FedEx Ground Package
System, Inc., 313 F.R.D. 615, 622 (D.N.M. 2016) (citation omitted). “To be unfairly
prejudicial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” United States v. Caraway, 534
F.3d 1290, 1301 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted).
However, Rule 403 favors admissibility, and the Court should “give the evidence its
maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Deters
v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation and
citation omitted).
Upon consideration, the Court finds that evidence regarding Decedent’s contributory
negligence, such as Defendant Lloyd’s testimony regarding his observations and beliefs as
he was entering the intersection, is relevant to his comparative negligence defense.
Moreover, the Court finds that the probative value of permitting argument and evidence of
Decedent’s purported negligence, is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion on this point is DENIED.
II. 	Evidence/Argument regarding Plaintiffs’ Motivation to Obtain a Windfall or
Secondary Gain.
Plaintiffs seek to exclude testimony, evidence, or argument regarding their motivation
for asserting their claims against Defendants, such as Plaintiffs seeking a windfall or
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secondary gain, or money not being able to bring back Decedent. Defendants do not object
to Plaintiffs’ request.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion on this point is GRANTED.
III. 	Evidence/Argument regarding Defendant Lloyd’s Criminal Charges, Guilty
Plea, Conviction, or Sentence, and Related Sympathy Evidence.
Plaintiffs seek to exclude testimony, evidence, or argument regarding Defendant
Lloyd’s criminal charges, guilty plea, or sentence in State of Oklahoma v. Kyle Ray Lloyd,
Case No. CF-2020-11 (Cleveland Cnty. Dist. Ct., Okla. Jan. 2, 2020) (“Criminal Matter”),
and his feelings of remorse or other personal consequences. Specifically, Plaintiffs request
Defendants be prohibited from arguing to the jury that Defendant Lloyd has already been
sufficiently punished because he received an “18-year sentence” for the accident and
“suffered enough.” Plaintiffs allege that evidence and arguments relating to Defendant
Lloyd’s Criminal Matter and sentencing should be excluded because they are irrelevant and
unduly prejudicial.
The City did not object to Plaintiffs’ request that Defendants be precluded from
proffering evidence, testimony, and argument of Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea in the
Criminal Matter for the purpose of advancing emotional pleas to the jury. However, the City
does object to Plaintiffs’ request for a blanket exclusion of all evidence and argument
regarding Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea. The City asserts that the submission of argument
and evidence of Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea to the jury is relevant and not unduly
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prejudicial because it directly pertains to its defense that the “egregiousness” of Defendant
Lloyd’s conduct “took him outside the scope of his employment.”1
Additionally, Defendant Lloyd objects to Plaintiffs’ request to the extent the jury finds
that an award of punitive damages is warranted. Indeed, he argues that evidence and
argument regarding his Criminal Matter should be permitted at the second stage regarding
punitive damages, as such is relevant to his financial status/ability to pay a judgment.
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A court may exclude relevant evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, [or] misleading the jury . . ..” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence may be unfairly prejudicial
if it would likely provoke the jury’s emotional response or would otherwise tend to adversely
affect the jury's attitude toward a particular matter ... [but] [e]vidence is not unfairly
prejudicial merely because it damages a party’s case.” Leon, 313 F.R.D. at 622 (citation
omitted). “To be unfairly prejudicial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”
Caraway, 534 F.3d at 1301 (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted). However,
1 The City also argues that Plaintiffs conceded the admissibility of Defendant Lloyd’s guilty
plea, as they listed the hearing transcript from the sentencing in the Criminal Matter as an
exhibit in the final pretrial report [Doc. Nos. 165, 167]. However, for the reasons outlined
in the Court’s order dated September 2, 2025, the Court rejected the parties’ final pretrial
report. [Doc. No. 180]. In the parties’ amended final pretrial report [Doc. No. 182], it does
not appear that Plaintiffs included the transcript as an exhibit. Thus, the Court finds that
the City’s argument on this point is moot.
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Rule 403 favors admissibility, and the Court should “give the evidence its maximum
reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Deters, 202 F.3d
at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted).
Under the GTCA, “a political subdivision shall not be liable under the provisions of
[the GTCA] for any act or omission of an employee acting outside the scope of the
employee’s employment.” Okla. Stat. tit. 51. § 153(A). 	The GTCA defines “scope of
employment” as “performance by an employee acting in good faith within the duties of the
employee’s office or employment or of tasks lawfully assigned by a competent authority
including the operation or use of an agency vehicle or equipment with actual or implied
consent of the supervisor of the employee, but shall not include corruption or fraud.” Id. §
152(13).
The Court finds that evidence of Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea in the Criminal Matter
is relevant, and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Indeed, Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea is relevant to whether he was acting in the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the incident, and can be used to impeach his
credibility if he testifies at trial under Fed. R. Evid. 609. Moreover, the Court finds
unpersuasive Plaintiffs’ argument that the evidence of Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea should
be excluded because they will be unduly prejudiced as it will “engender sympathy” from the
jury for Defendant Lloyd. Indeed, Defendants did not object to Plaintiffs’ request to prohibit
Defendants from using the evidence of the Criminal Matter to make pleas of sympathy to the
jury during the liability and compensatory damages phase of the trial.
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion on this point is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN
PART, and RESERVED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ request that the parties be prohibited from
presenting evidence, argument, and testimony regarding Defendant Lloyd’s Criminal Matter
to advance pleas of sympathy to the jury, excluding stage two regarding punitive damages,
is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ request that parties be prohibited from presenting all evidence,
testimony, or argument regarding Defendant Lloyd’s guilty plea in the Criminal Matter is
DENIED. Plaintiffs’ request that the parties be prohibited from presenting all evidence,
argument, and testimony regarding Defendant Lloyd’s Criminal Matter during stage two
regarding punitive damages is RESERVED.
Defendant City’s Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 158]
I. 	References to Mr. Lloyd as “Officer” or “Sergeant.”
The City seeks to exclude reference to Defendant Lloyd as “Officer Lloyd” and
“Sergeant Lloyd.” The City argues that Defendant Lloyd should not be referred to as an
officer or sergeant during the trial because it would be unduly prejudicial as it would mislead
the jury to believe that he is still employed/affiliated with the City.
Plaintiffs and Defendant Lloyd object to the City’s request. They argue that references
to Defendant Lloyd as an officer or sergeant are relevant because he was an officer at the
time of the accident, and the jury will be tasked with determining whether he was acting
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Moreover, they
argue that references to him as an officer are not unduly prejudicial and will not mislead the
jury, as Defendant Lloyd’s current employment status can be addressed through examining
witnesses.
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Under Fed. R. Evid. 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice . . . [or] misleading the jury . . ..”
Rule 403 favors admissibility, and the Court should “give the evidence its maximum
reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Deters, 202 F.3d
at 1274 (citation and quotation omitted).
The Court finds that reference to Defendant Lloyd as “Officer Lloyd” or “Sergeant
Lloyd” is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. Moreover, the Court finds that the probative value of
referring to Defendant Lloyd as an officer or sergeant is not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Furthermore, to the extent referring to Defendant Lloyd as officer or
sergeant causes the jurors confusion, the Court is confident that the parties can provide the
jury with clarity through their examination of witnesses about the status of Defendant
Lloyd’s employment.
Accordingly, the City’s Motion on this point is DENIED.
II. 	Photos of Decedent at the Scene of the Accident and Autopsy Photos of Decedent.
The City seeks to prohibit Plaintiffs from presenting photographs of Decedent that
depict her at the scene of the accident, that are contained in her post-accident medical records,
and that are in the Medical Examiner’s report.2 The City argues that these photographs
should not be permitted to be presented to the jury because they have little to no relevance
2 Specifically, the City identifies the following records as the photographs it seeks to
prevent Plaintiffs from using at trial: 1. GAINES 000008-000009, 2. GAINES 000583-
000601, 3. GAINES 000946, and 4. Decedent’s medical records with a date of service of
December 14, 2019.
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as causation has been admitted, and the little relevance they do have is substantially
outweighed by their prejudicial effect due to their graphic depictions.3
Plaintiffs object to the City’s blanket request to prohibit them from using the
photographs at issue during trial. Plaintiffs argue that the photographs are relevant to their §
1983 claim against Defendant Lloyd as they pertain to the egregiousness of his conduct and
are relevant to their wrongful death claim as they pertain to Decedent’s pain and suffering.
Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that any prejudicial effect caused by showing the photographs to
the jury does not substantially outweigh the images’ probative value. However, Plaintiffs
concede that they are not opposed to the Court imposing reasonable measures (such as
“limiting the number of images, using technological means to present [the photos] briefly,
or in black-and-white, etc.) to mitigate [the photographs] emotional impact.”
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A court may exclude relevant evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice . . . or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence may be unfairly
prejudicial if it would likely provoke the jury’s emotional response or would otherwise tend
to adversely affect the jury’s attitude toward a particular matter ... [but] [e]vidence is not
3 The City further argues that, to the extent the Court finds the photographs relevant to
Decedent’s pain and suffering, such “photographs should only be displayed at the second
stage of the trial when determining damages.” However, neither the City nor any other party
in this matter has requested the trial be bifurcated into a liability phase and a damages phase.
Thus, the Court finds the City’s argument regarding the timing of presentation unpersuasive.
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unfairly prejudicial merely because it damages a party’s case.” Leon, 313 F.R.D. at 622
(citation omitted). “To be unfairly prejudicial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one.” Caraway, 534 F.3d at 1301 (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted).
However, Rule 403 favors admissibility, and the Court should “give the evidence its
maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Deters,
202 F.3d at 1274 (quotation and citation omitted).
Neither the City nor any other party provided the Court with a copy of the
photographs at issue to review in determining their admissibility. Thus, the Court cannot
determine in the abstract whether the images are relevant, irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial.
However, without having the benefit of viewing the photographs, the Court gleans
from the parties’ arguments and descriptions of the images that the photographs are likely
relevant to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim against Defendant Lloyd, and relevant as to the extent
of Decedent’s pain and suffering. Further, the Court believes that any issues of prejudice
can be mitigated by limiting the number of photographs, lessening the graphic nature of
the images by showing them in black and white, or other limitations as appropriate.
Accordingly, the parties are ordered to meet and confer in an attempt to reach an agreement
regarding the use of such photographs at trial. The parties shall file a joint status report
regarding their progress on this issue on or before March 2, 2026.
Accordingly, the Court RESERVES ruling on this issue.
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Defendant Mr. Lloyd’s Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 163]
I. 	Evidence relating to His Prior Acts— Driving History and Disciplinary Actions.
a. 	Defendant Lloyd’s Driving History
Defendant Lloyd seeks to prohibit the parties from presenting evidence, testimony,
and argument regarding his driving history. Specifically, Defendant Lloyd requests that
Officer Dave Roberts be prohibited from testifying about a traffic stop that he conducted
several years prior to the accident, when he caught Defendant Lloyd speeding through the
same intersection at issue here, while Defendant Lloyd was off-duty and in his personal
vehicle. Defendant Lloyd asserts that evidence and testimony regarding his prior speeding
and the resulting traffic stop should be excluded because it is not relevant, would be unduly
prejudicial, and would constitute impermissible character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404.
The City did not object to his request. However, Plaintiffs objected to his request.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Lloyd’s prior speeding incident should not be excluded
because it is relevant and is not improper character evidence as it would be used to prove his
motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, or lack of accident, as permitted under Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Indeed, Plaintiffs argue that the prior speeding incident shows “a pattern
of reckless driving on non-emergency police business . . ..” Moreover, Plaintiffs argue that
the prior speeding incident shows Defendant Lloyd’s “awareness of the speed limit, road
condition, and intersections, as well as [his] knowledge of the risks inherent in his decision
to speed” on the date of the accident. Furthermore, they argue that the prior speeding incident
also shows Defendant Lloyd’s “motive” and “intent” for speeding. Plaintiffs specifically
argue the prior speeding incident demonstrates that “Moore officers (including Lloyd) could
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‘speed . . . without consequences,’” as he did not receive a ticket or any other reprimand.
Further, Plaintiffs argue that the evidence’s probative value is not substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Lloyd’s prior speeding
incident is admissible habit evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 406.
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A court may exclude relevant evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, [or] misleading the jury . . ..” Fed. R. Evid. 403. However, Rule 403 favors
admissibility, and the Court should “give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative
force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Deters, 202 F.3d at 1274 (quotation
and citation omitted).
Moreover, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence of a “crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” But the “evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Four factors
govern the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b): (1)
the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant; (3) its probative
value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule
403; and (4) the court must give a proper limiting instruction if it is requested. United States
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v. Tennison, 13 F.4th 1049, 1055 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485
U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)).
Furthermore, under Rule 406, “[e]vidence of a person’s habit ... may be admitted to
prove that on a particular occasion the person ... acted in accordance with the habit or routine
practice.” Fed. R. Evid. 406. “Habit is defined as one’s regular practice of meeting a
particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct.” United States v. Morris, 41 F.
App'x 160, 164-65 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (quotation and citation omitted).
Upon consideration, the Court finds that evidence of Defendant Lloyd’s prior
speeding incident has very little if any probative value here, particularly since he has
admitted to speeding at the time of the incident. Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’
purported use of Defendant Lloyd’s prior speeding incident would constitute improper
character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404. Plaintiffs asserted that a purpose for using
evidence of the prior speeding incident is to show “a pattern of reckless driving on non-
emergency police business.” Stated otherwise, Plaintiffs want to show that Defendant Lloyd
had a propensity to drive recklessly on non-emergency business, because he had done so on
one other prior occasion. This is precisely the type of propensity evidence Rule 404 prohibits.
Moreover, at this time, the Court finds unpersuasive Plaintiffs’ argument that their
use of the prior speeding incident comes within the exceptions of Rule 404(b). Indeed, there
is no evidence in the record before the Court that Defendant Lloyd is disputing his knowledge
of the speed limit, road conditions, or intersection. Furthermore, the prior speeding incident
was from years prior and did not result in a motor vehicle collision, so it is unclear to the
Court how it would make Defendant Lloyd’s “knowledge of the risks inherent [in] his
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decision to speed” more probable. Additionally, it is also unclear how an Oklahoma City
police officer’s failure to issue Defendant Lloyd a ticket for the prior speeding incident would
demonstrate the Moore Police Department’s “tacit approval” of Defendant Lloyd’s driving,
and thus, motivate him to “speed without consequence.”
The Court further finds that the prior speeding incident is not admissible as habit
evidence under Rule 406. One prior event does not demonstrate a regular practice. Thus, it
is insufficient to establish that Defendant Lloyd had a “habit” of speeding.
Accordingly, Defendant Lloyd’s Motion as to this point is GRANTED.
b. 	Defendant Lloyd’s Disciplinary Reprimand.
Defendant Lloyd seeks to prohibit the parties from presenting evidence or argument
regarding his request that a reprimand he received while he was employed as an officer for
“horseplay” in 2011 be removed from his disciplinary file two days after the accident
involving Ms. Gaines. Defendant Lloyd argues that such evidence and argument should be
excluded because it is not relevant, would be unduly prejudicial, and would constitute
impermissible character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404.
The City did not object to Defendant Lloyd’s request. However, Plaintiffs objected.
Plaintiffs argue that evidence regarding Defendant Lloyd’s request for the police department
to remove his reprimand should be permitted because it is relevant, does not constitute
improper character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404, and is not unduly prejudicial.
Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Lloyd’s deposition testimony that he sought
removal of the reprimand because he “didn’t want any embarrassment to be on the City” is
probative of whether he was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of
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the incident. Plaintiffs further argue that the expungement of his disciplinary record is not
improper character evidence because it is not used to show that he had a propensity to do bad
acts. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that they will use Defendant Lloyd’s request that his reprimand
be removed to show his knowledge and belief that he was in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of the incident, as he wanted to minimize the negative media
attention the City might receive from the accident. Further, Plaintiffs argue that any
prejudicial effect to Defendant Lloyd can be minimized by Plaintiffs not delving into the
contents of the reprimand he had removed, and focusing on his request for the removal and
his reasoning for it.
Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. A court may exclude relevant evidence if “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, [or] misleading the jury. . ..” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Evidence may be unfairly prejudicial
if it would likely provoke the jury’s emotional response or would otherwise tend to adversely
affect the jury's attitude toward a particular matter ... [but] [e]vidence is not unfairly
prejudicial merely because it damages a party’s case.” Leon, 313 F.R.D. at 622 (citation
omitted). “To be unfairly prejudicial, the evidence must have an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”
Caraway, 534 F.3d at 1301 (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted). However,
Rule 403 favors admissibility, and the Court should “give the evidence its maximum
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reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” Deters, 202 F.3d
at 1274 (quotation and citation omitted).
Moreover, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence of a “crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
person acted in accordance with the character.” But the “evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Four factors
govern the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under Rule 404(b): (1)
the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) it must be relevant; (3) its probative
value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule
403; and (4) the court must give a proper limiting instruction if it is requested. Tennison, 13
F.4th at 1055 (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92).
The Court finds that evidence regarding Defendant Lloyd’s request that the reprimand
be removed from his disciplinary file two days after the incident to minimize the City’s
negative media attention is relevant to the determination of whether he was acting in the
course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident. Indeed, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ use of the evidence to prove that Defendant Lloyd knew he was acting in the
course and scope of his employment at the time of the incident does not constitute improper
character evidence, as it is not being used to prove that he acted in conformity with his prior
bad act. Moreover, the Court finds the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The Court further finds that if requested by a party, a
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limiting instruction to the jury regarding their consideration of the evidence will minimize
the purported prejudice caused by the evidence.
Accordingly, Defendant Lloyd’s Motion as to this point is DENIED.
II. 	Post Accident Evidence
a. 	Responding Officers’ Body-Camera and Dash-Camera Videos.
Defendant Lloyd seeks to prohibit parties from presenting as evidence the videos that
were recorded on the responding officers’ body-cameras and dash-cameras. He argues that
the 	videos 	should 	be excluded 	because 	they 	are 	irrelevant 	and 	unduly 	prejudicial.
Specifically, he argues that videos of his post-accident demeanor, such as chewing gum, have
no probative value as they are not relevant to any determination of liability or damages and
would only be used to prejudice him.
The City did not object to Defendant Lloyd’s request. However, Plaintiffs objected.
Plaintiffs argue that they should be permitted to use the videos because they are relevant to
Defendant Lloyd’s “state of mind” and “credibility,” and relevant as to punitive damages.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the videos may be used as impeachment evidence.
Neither Defendant Lloyd nor Plaintiffs provided the Court with a copy of the videos
to review in determining their admissibility. Moreover, it is unclear what the videos depict
based on the parties’ limited descriptions. Thus, the Court cannot determine in the abstract
whether the videos are relevant, irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial.
Therefore, on or before March 2, 2026, Defendant Lloyd shall submit to the Court
the videos at issue for review.
Accordingly, the Court RESERVES ruling on this issue.
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b. 	Photos of Decedent at the Scene of the Accident and Autopsy Photos of
Decedent.
Defendant Lloyd also seeks to prohibit Plaintiffs from presenting the same images
that the City seeks to prohibit Plaintiffs from presenting and asserts the same arguments as
the City in its Motion in Limine II, which is addressed supra. Plaintiffs object to Defendant
Lloyd’s request and assert the same arguments that they assert in response to the City’s
Motion in Limine II, as addressed supra.
The Court adopts and incorporates its reasoning and conclusions here.
Accordingly, the Court RESERVES ruling on this issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 154] is
GRANTED in part, RESERVED in part, and DENIED in part; Defendant City’s
Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 158] is RESERVED in part and DENIED in part; and
Defendant Lloyd’s Motion in Limine [Doc. No. 163] is GRANTED in part, RESERVED
in part, and DENIED in part. In summary, the Court ORDERS:
1. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. I [Doc. No. 154] is DENIED.
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. II [Doc. No.154] is GRANTED.
3. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine No. III [Doc. No. 154] is GRANTED in part,
DENIED in part, and RESERVED in part.
1. 	Defendant City’s Motion in Limine No. I [Doc. No. 158] is DENIED.
2. 	Defendant City’s Motion in Limine No. II [Doc. No. 158] is RESERVED.
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1. 	Defendant Lloyd’s Motion in Limine No. I [Doc. No. 163] is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
2. 	Defendant Lloyd’s Motion in Limine No. II [Doc. No. 163] is RESERVED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2 nd day of February, 2026.
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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