McGinnis v. Nationwide Life and Annuity Insurance Co et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LEW S. MCGINNIS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-23-641-G
)
NATIONWIDE LIFE AND ANNUITY )
INSURANCE CO. et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant James A. Mueller’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 74). Plaintiff Lew S. McGinnis has responded in opposition (Doc.
No. 79), and Defendant Mueller has replied (Doc. No. 84).
I. Background
Plaintiff filed this action on July 21, 2023, against Defendants Mueller, Nationwide
Life and Annuity Insurance Co., Nationwide Life Insurance Co. (together, the “Nationwide
Defendants”), and The ASA Group. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 1. Still pending, following
the Court’s Nationwide Order of September 27, 2024, are claims of breach of contract
against each of the Nationwide Defendants as well as claims against Defendant Mueller
for breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, common law fraud, breach of contract,
negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act
(“OCPA”), Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 753, and deceptive insurance practices in violation of title
36, section 1204 of the Oklahoma Statutes. See Compl. ¶¶ 31-57; Nationwide Order of
Sept. 27, 2024 (Doc. No. 43). All claims against Defendant The ASA Group were
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dismissed. See Dismissal Order of Sept. 27, 2024 (Doc. No. 44). Defendant Mueller
moves for summary judgment on each of the claims against him.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available
evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The
Court must grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the
undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant need not
convince the Court that it will prevail at trial, but it must cite sufficient evidence admissible
at trial to allow a reasonable jury to find in the nonmovant’s favor—i.e., to show that there
is a question of material fact that must be resolved by the jury. See Garrison v. Gambro,
Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court must then determine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact by:
• citing to “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record; or
• demonstrating “that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of
a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the fact.”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). While the Court views the evidence and the inferences
drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005), “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
III. Summary Judgment Record
Based on the materials presented and applying the standards described above, the
following facts are either not subject to any genuine dispute or, when such a dispute has
been shown, have been accepted by the Court upon viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Other material
facts, determined upon applying these same standards, are specifically addressed in the
Court’s discussion below.
Plaintiff and Defendant Mueller have known each other for approximately 30 to 40
years, having first met through church. Pl.’s Dep. 21:4-10 (Doc. No. 71-1); Mueller Decl.
¶ 6 (Doc. No. 71-2). Defendant Mueller is an independent insurance agent who was
affiliated with former defendant The ASA Group for 20 years. Mueller Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.
Through Defendant Mueller, Plaintiff purchased life insurance from various insurers. See
Pl.’s Dep. 21:11-17; id. Ex. 38; Mueller Decl. ¶ 6.
Between 2016 and 2017, Defendant Mueller procured two life insurance policies
for Plaintiff from Defendant Nationwide Life and Annuity Insurance Co.: Policy Nos.
B501931250 and B502053550 (respectively, the “1250 Policy” and the “3550 Policy”;
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collectively, the “Policies”). See Fluharty Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12, 14 (Doc. No. 71-3); id. Exs. 3-3,
3-4 (1250 Policy), 3-6 (1250 Receipt), 3-7 (1250 Check), 3-15 (1250 Payments); Fluharty
Decl. ¶¶ 16, 20-22; id. Exs. 3-9, 3-10 (3550 Policy), 3-13 (3350 Receipt), 3-14 (3350
Check), 3-16 (3350 Payments).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants misrepresented the nature of the Policies, sold
Plaintiff a product unsuitable for his needs that failed to perform as guaranteed, and failed
to physically deliver the Policies. See Compl. ¶¶ 25-26, 28. Plaintiff additionally asserts,
and the record likewise reflects, that Plaintiff became aware of Defendants’ alleged
misrepresentations and omissions on or about October 31, 2018. See id. ¶ 29; Pl.’s Decl. ¶
12 (Doc. No. 79, at pp. 19-23); Fluharty Decl. ¶ 37; id. Exs. 3-17, 3-18, 3-19 (Cancellation
Notifications).
IV. Discussion
A. Time-Barred Claims
1. Fraud, Negligent Misrepresentation, and Violation of OCPA
Defendant Mueller first asserts that Plaintiff’s claims of constructive fraud, common
law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Oklahoma Consumer
Protection Act (Counts II, III, V, and VI) are time barred pursuant to the findings made by
the Court in its Nationwide Order of September 27, 2024 (Doc No. 43). In that Order, the
Court dismissed identical claims raised against the Nationwide Defendants as untimely
filed. See id. at 3-7. Plaintiff argues to the contrary based on the assertion that Defendant
Mueller has continued to make “false statements regarding the Nationwide policies to the
Plaintiff up and until the time this case was filed.” Pl.’s Resp. at 5.
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A federal court sitting in diversity applies state law for statute of limitations
purposes. Miller v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 949 F.2d 1088, 1089 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
“Therefore, Oklahoma law governs when Plaintiff’s claims accrued, and Oklahoma’s
tolling rules apply, as well.” Hi-Tex, LLC v. Vorel, No. CIV-21-1125-D, 2025 WL 1679640,
at *7 (W.D. Okla. June 13, 2025). Under Oklahoma law, a two-year limitations period
applies to Plaintiff’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. See Nationwide Order
of Sept. 27, 2024, at 4; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); LL Ark Props. LLC v. David Stanley
Fam. Realty, LLC, No. CIV-19-464-SLP, 2022 WL 5245205, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11,
2022). A three-year limitations period applies to Plaintiff’s OCPA claim. See Legacy
Crossing, L.L.C. v. Travis Wolff & Co., 229 F. App’x 672, 682 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Okla.
Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(2)).
“[U]nder Oklahoma’s ‘discovery rule,’ a statute of limitations is tolled ‘until the
injured party knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the
injury.’” LL Ark Props., 2022 WL 5245205, at *3 (quoting Calvert v. Swinford, 382 P.3d
1028, 1033 (Okla. 2016)); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) (“[T]he cause of action in
[a fraud] case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud.”). As
for equitable tolling, Oklahoma permits the tolling of a statute of limitations (1) where
there exists a “legal disability,” such as when “a plaintiff’s competency is impaired or
where the plaintiff has not yet reached the age of majority”; (2) “when defendants engage
in false, fraudulent or misleading conduct calculated to lull plaintiffs into sitting on their
rights”; or (3) “in the appropriate case,” when “exceptional circumstances” are present.
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Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2009) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s own allegations establish that he became aware of Defendants’ alleged
misrepresentations and omissions on or about October 31, 2018—approximately four years
and nine months before this action was filed in July 2023. See Compl. ¶ 29; Pl.’s Decl. ¶
12. Plaintiff asserts that he attempted to contact Defendant Mueller at that time for
resolution but “to date, Mueller has refused to return [Plaintiff’s] numerous emails and
phone calls.” Compl. ¶ 29.
Plaintiff cites no evidence to establish a genuine dispute as to whether Plaintiff had
knowledge of Defendant Mueller’s alleged improper actions in October 2018. Instead,
Plaintiff argues:
[A]lthough . . . Plaintiff’s claims against Mueller manifested themselves in
2018, Mueller’s bad acts were on going and continued well into 2023. . . . .
Mueller was still making false statements regarding the Nationwide policies
to . . . Plaintiff up and until the time this case was filed. . . . . Because this
conduct was ongoing into 2023 there is no time bar as to any claims of . . .
Plaintiff against Mueller.
Pl.’s Resp. at 5.
To support his claim that Defendant Mueller’s conduct persisted into 2023, Plaintiff
refers to his declaration, in which he recounts that, up until their final meeting in the fall of
2020, Defendant Mueller “was still trying to straighten up the situation.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 16.
Plaintiff contends that it was not until 2021 that Defendant Mueller admitted that he could
not get the policies issued the way he had sold them. See id. ¶ 18. As quoted above,
however, Plaintiff pleads the inconsistent statement that as of the filing of the Complaint
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Defendant Mueller had not contacted Plaintiff regarding the alleged policy issues. See
Compl. ¶ 29.
Any recent “false statements” by Defendant Mueller may expand upon Plaintiff’s
claims, but they do not affect the point at which Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to trigger
the statute of limitations. See In re Woodward, 549 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Okla. 1976)
(explaining that the statute of limitations begins to run when fraud could or should have
been discovered with reasonable diligence). Moreover, the conduct Defendant Mueller is
alleged to have engaged in does not reasonably reflect an effort to lull Plaintiff into delaying
action. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence to support such an assertion, and Plaintiff
himself acknowledged that he believes Defendant Mueller’s misstatements were “made to
me to keep me working with him.” Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 17. Defendant Mueller continues to serve
as Plaintiff’s insurance agent to this day. Pl.’s Resp. at 5. Accordingly, the record reflects
an intent to maintain the business relationship after October 2018 but does not reasonably
demonstrate any intent by Defendant Mueller to prevent Plaintiff from pursuing legal
remedies.
The Court therefore finds that no genuine dispute exists as to whether Plaintiff’s
claims based on constructive fraud, common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
violation of the OCPA are time barred as against Defendant Mueller. Defendant Mueller
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims.
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2. Breach of Contract
a. The Applicable Statute of Limitations
Pursuant to title 12, section 95(A)(1) and (2) of the Oklahoma Statutes, if an
“instrument constitutes a written contract” then “the 5-year statute of limitations applies”;
if the contract is “not in writing,” “the 3-year statute of limitations applies.” Harlow Publ’g
Co. v. Patrick, 72 P.2d 511, 512 (Okla. 1937) (citations omitted); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §
95(A)(1), (2). Defendant Mueller asserts that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is barred
by the applicable three-year statute of limitations for oral contract, thereby entitling
Defendant Mueller to summary judgment. See Def. Mueller’s Mot. Summ. J at 6.
Plaintiff argues that the claim instead is governed by and accrued within the five-
year limitations period for written contracts and, because this case was initiated within five
years of Plaintiff’s October 31, 2018 discovery of Defendant Mueller’s breach, is not time
barred. See Pl.’s Resp. at 7-8.
Because Plaintiff admits that he and Defendant Mueller “never had a written
contract,” and therefore there is no genuine dispute as to that fact, the Court finds that the
relevant statute of limitations period is three years from Defendant Mueller’s alleged
breach of the parties’ oral agreement. Pl.’s Resp. at 9; see Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 488 P.3d 743, 750 (Okla. 2021); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(2); see also E. Cent.
Okla. Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 505 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Okla. 1973)
(“Where the contracting parties have assented to all the terms of the contract, and they are
completely understood in the same way by both parties, mere reference in conjunction
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therewith of a future contract in writing will not negate the existence of a present
contract.”).
b. Whether Plaintiff’s Claim Was Timely Brought
In Oklahoma, “[a]n action for breach of contract accrues when the contract is
breached,” “regardless of whether the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have known of the breach.” Morgan, 488 P.3d at 745.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mueller breached the contract by selling Plaintiff a
product that was unsuitable for Plaintiff’s needs and failed to perform as guaranteed and
by failing to physically deliver the Policies to Plaintiff. See Compl. ¶¶ 25, 42; Pl.’s Dep.
128:25-131:5, 154:17-23; Pl.’s Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, 10, 12. The asserted breaches therefore arose
when the Policies were issued or when Plaintiff began making premium payments but
failed to receive the expected benefit.
The 1250 Policy was issued October 26, 2016, and Plaintiff’s first premium was
received and went into force on or about November 3, 2016. See Fluharty Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12,
14; Exs. 3-3, 3-4 (1250 Policy), 3-6 (1250 Receipt), 3-7 (1250 Check), 3-15 (1250
Payments). The 3550 Policy was issued April 25, 2017, and Plaintiff’s policy went into
force May 19, 2017. See Fluharty Decl. ¶¶ 16, 20, 21, 22; Exs. 3-9, 3-10 (3550 Policy), 3-
13 (3350 Receipt), 3-14 (3350 Check), 3-16 (3350 Payments). By August 7, 2017, Plaintiff
expressed concern over Defendants’ perceived nonperformance. On that date, he wrote a
letter to Defendant Mueller indicating that Nationwide Annuity was asking for premium
payments he did not believe were owed. See Pl.’s Dep. 162:10-163:1; id. Ex. 39. At his
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deposition, Plaintiff confirmed that he knew he “had a problem with [his] policies” by that
time. Pl.’s Dep. 164:2-12.
The record therefore reflects that any breach by Defendant Mueller occurred no later
than August 7, 2017. Because Plaintiff’s claim for breach of their oral agreement was not
commenced until July 21, 2023, the claim would be barred by the three-year limitations
period of title 12, section 95(A)(2). See Morgan, 488 P.3d at 750, 753.
Plaintiff objects, however, that any statute of limitations does not bar the claim
because the asserted breach is continuous due to Plaintiff’s “ongoing contractual
relationship with Mueller.” Pl.’s Resp. at 7. In a footnote citing decisions such as
Chickasaw Telephone Co. v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., No. 96-6357, 1997
WL 290951 (10th Cir. May 27, 1997), Plaintiff nominally argues that Defendant Mueller
engaged in “a series of breaches each giving rise to a cause of action.” Pl.’s Resp. at 8
n.31. But Plaintiff does not cite any record evidence proving a series of breaches, instead
merely arguing that “defendants failed and refused to deliver and issue the insurance
policies he applied for and paid for, which was a breach of contract, and that breach
continues to this day.” Id. at 8.
While Oklahoma does recognize a “continuous-accrual doctrine,” which “treats
each breach as an independently actionable wrong with its own time limit for recovery,”
such continuous accrual only applies to “a continuing or recurring obligation.” Express
Servs., Inc. v. King, No. CIV-15-1181-R, 2017 WL 3741555, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 30,
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the continuous-accrual doctrine to apply,
Plaintiff would need to demonstrate that the insurance contract created continuing or
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recurring obligations on behalf of Defendant Mueller. Plaintiff cites to no contract term or
on-point authority supporting the proposition that Defendant Mueller’s procurement of
insurance “require[d] continuing performance for some period of time” or was an
“installment contract.” Chickasaw Tel. Co., 1997 WL 290951, at *4 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Therefore, any injury suffered by Plaintiff after Defendant Mueller’s
alleged failure to perform “constitutes damages flowing from the breach, not continuing
breaches.” Id.
Because Defendant Mueller’s alleged breach of the agreement occurred no later than
August 7, 2017, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was required to be filed within three
years of that date. See Morgan, 488 P.3d at 750; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(2). This action
was not commenced until July 21, 2023. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim is time barred, and
Defendant Mueller is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Plaintiff’s Claim for Deceptive Insurance Practices
Plaintiff seeks relief for Defendant Mueller’s “deceptive conduct” under title 36,
section 1204 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Compl. ¶ 55. Defendant Mueller argues, and
Plaintiff concedes, that there is no private right of action to seek relief under the statute.
See Def. Mueller’s Mot. Summ. J. at 5-6; Pl.’s Resp. at 6; see also Thomas v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1231 (W.D. Okla. 2008). Accordingly, Defendant Mueller
is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
C. Plaintiff’s Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Defendant Mueller moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, asserting that no “special” relationship existed to create a fiduciary duty
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and, in any event, such a claim would be time barred. See Def. Mueller’s Mot. Summ. J at
7; Def. Mueller’s Reply at 4.
To recover on this claim, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; (2) a breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) the breach of a fiduciary duty was the
direct cause of damages.” Graves v. Johnson, 359 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Okla. Civ. App. 2015).
Under Oklahoma law, “[f]iduciary or confidential relationship has a broad meaning that
includes legal, contractual, formal, and informal relations and exists when one person trusts
and relies upon another.” Horton v. Hamilton, 345 P.3d 357, 364 (Okla. 2015).
Such a relationship exists when one person acquires influence over another
such that the influenced allows the influencer to substitute his or her will for
the influenced’s own. The confidence’s source is of no consequence. In most
instances, the question of a fiduciary relationship is for a trier of fact.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Snow White, LLC v. State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance Co., No. CIV-14-
1397-F, 2015 WL 13573971 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2015), a judge of this Court dismissed an
insured’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty, explaining that Oklahoma law does not
recognize a fiduciary relationship between an insurer, including an insurance agent, and its
insured. See id. at *2 (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court . . . previously held that ‘an insureds’
relationship with their insurer was at arms’ length and they did not stand in any recognized
form of “special relationship.”’” (quoting Cosper v. Farmers Ins. Co., 309 P.3d 147, 150
(Okla. Civ. App. 2013))). Here, likewise, a mere insured-insurer status between Plaintiff
and Defendant Mueller does not establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship under
Oklahoma law.
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Plaintiff argues that a fiduciary relationship was present in this instance, however,
as Defendant Mueller’s relationship with Plaintiff goes beyond that of only an insurance
agent and the facts and circumstances reflect the requisite trust and confidence between the
parties. See Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 32; Pl.’s Resp. at 14. The Tenth Circuit has noted that
“Oklahoma law would recognize a fiduciary duty arising out of a commercial contract if
the transaction involved facts and circumstances indicative of the imposition of trust and
confidence, rather than facts and circumstances indicative of an arms length commercial
contract.” Quinlan v. Koch Oil Co., 25 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 1994). But cf. Siddique v.
W. Heritage Ins. Co., No. CIV-14-456, 2015 WL 2451734, at *2 (E.D. Okla. May 21, 2015)
(finding that, absent any pleading or discovery reflecting a relationship of trust and
confidence, the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a fiduciary duty arising out of an insurer–
insured relationship).
Even assuming Plaintiff could show a genuine fact issue as to whether a special
relationship existed between the parties sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary duty, however,
the Court concurs with Defendant Mueller that Plaintiff’s claim is time barred. A claim for
breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which runs from
when “the injured party knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
known of the injury.” Hi-Tex, 2025 WL 1679640, at *7-8 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3); Calvert, 382 P.3d at 1033).
Defendant Mueller argues that the claim accrued on or before October 31, 2018,
when Plaintiff became aware of Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations. See Compl. ¶ 29;
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Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff maintains that this awareness is immaterial, implicitly invoking
the doctrine of equitable estoppel:
Importantly, even up until the time of the filing of this case, Mueller
continued to assure Plaintiff he would make the situation with the
Nationwide Defendants right and that Plaintiff had nothing to worry about.
Mueller continued to promise Plaintiff that he would find another policy and
get Plaintiff value for what he paid for. It was not until Plaintiff filed this
action in Oklahoma did Plaintiff realize he had been strung along by Mueller.
This is further amplified by the fact that Mueller was not a part of the original
suits against the Nationwide Defendants; Mueller professed even then that
he would make it right to him.
Pl.’s Resp. at 15; see also Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 16 (alleging interaction between the parties until the
fall of 2020).
Under Oklahoma law,
[a] party may be equitably estopped to assert a statute-of-limitations defense
where . . . he engaged in any false, fraudulent[,] or misleading conduct or
committed some affirmative act to exclude suspicion and preclude inquiry,
which induces one to refrain from timely filing suit.
Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Anadarko OGC Co., No. CIV-08-668-R, 2011 WL 7053790, at *4
(W.D. Okla. July 14, 2011).
The elements of equitable estoppel are 1) a false representation or
concealment of facts; 2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive of the
real facts; 3) the party to whom the false representation is made or from
whom the facts are concealed must have been without knowledge, or the
means of knowledge, of the real facts; 4) the misrepresentation or
concealment must have been made with the intention that it should be acted
upon (or to induce forbearance from acting); and the party to whom the
misrepresentation was made or from whom facts are concealed must have
relied on, acted upon or forborne from acting as a result to his prejudice.
Id.
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The summary judgment record reflects no genuine dispute as to the fact that Plaintiff
became aware of Defendant Mueller’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions no later
than October 31, 2018, approximately four years and nine months prior to filing this suit
in July of 2023. Though aware of the facts underlying his claimed injury, Plaintiff
purportedly chose to rely on Defendant Mueller’s later assurances that Defendant Mueller
would “make it right.” Alleged statements made by Defendant Mueller after Plaintiff
became aware of the facts giving rise to his claim do not support application of equitable
estoppel. See id.
Because Plaintiff failed to file this action within the applicable two-year period, the
claim is barred under Oklahoma law. See Hi-Tex, 2025 WL 1679640, at *7-8; Okla. Stat.
tit. 12, § 95(A)(3). Accordingly, Defendant Mueller is entitled to summary judgment on
this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant James A. Mueller’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 74) is GRANTED. A separate judgment shall be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of March, 2026.
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