Simpson v. Quick et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
KENDRICK SIMPSON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1221-D
)
CHRISTE QUICK, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Doc.
No. 19] (“Motion”). Defendants assert that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to
both Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Plaintiff filed a
Response [Doc. No. 22], to which Defendants replied [Doc. No. 23]. The matter is fully
briefed and at issue.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an Oklahoma death row inmate, was among a group of inmates that
challenged Oklahoma’s method-of-execution statute 1 in state court. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) denied the claim as unripe. 	Underwood v. Harpe, PR-
2024-637 (Okla. Crim. App. Sep. 17, 2024). 	In a later case, the OCCA clarified that its
decision was based on the prudential ripeness standard. Littlejohn v. Harpe, PR-2024-740
(Okla. Crim. App. Sep. 25, 2024). 	Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this lawsuit under 42
1 Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1014.
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U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights to due process, judicial access,
and equal protection. 	Plaintiff names three state officials in their official capacity as
Defendants. 	For relief, he requests this Court 	“[d]eclare that Oklahoma’s procedural
process violated his rights to due process, judicial access, and equal protection” and
“[e]njoin the prison from executing [Plaintiff] until a lawful process is provided in which
he can meaningfully challenge the lawfulness of Oklahoma’s execution statute.” Compl.
¶¶ A-B. 	Defendants allege this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims, and
alternatively, that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Manuel Littlejohn (“Littlejohn”), a party to the initial state court lawsuit challenging
Oklahoma’s method-of-execution statute, brought a similar federal lawsuit claiming a
violation of procedural due process. Littlejohn v. Quick, No. CIV-24-996-SLP, 2024 WL
4314973 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 25, 2024). That suit was dismissed without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction pursuant to the doctrines of both Rooker-Feldman and Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Id. at *2-4. Littlejohn then filed an appeal and emergency motion for a stay of
execution pending appeal with the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit denied the emergency
motion for a stay noting that Littlejohn did “not address the jurisdictional basis for the
district court’s ruling or establish[] that he is likely to succeed on appeal in arguing that the
ruling was incorrect under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or as to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.” Littlejohn v. Quick, No. 24-6203 (10th Cir. Sep. 26, 2024).
STANDARD OF DECISION
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a defendant may move the court to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). It is presumed “that a cause lies outside this
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[Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the
party asserting jurisdiction.” 	United States v. Hopson, 150 F.4th 1290, 1298 (10th Cir.
2025). A facial attack regarding subject matter jurisdiction requires the court to accept the
allegations in the complaint as true. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (10th
Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Rooker-Feldman
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar “prohibit[ing] federal suits that
amount to appeals of state-court judgments.” 	Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129,
1139 (10th Cir. 2006); Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012).2
Rooker-Feldman applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Plaintiff claims Rooker-Feldman is
not applicable here because 1) his injuries were not caused by the state court’s judgment
and 2) he is not asking the Court to review and overturn the state court judgment. Resp. at
16. These defenses are intertwined because courts “approach the question . . . of whether
the state-court judgement caused . . . the injury . . . [by] paying close attention to the relief
2 The doctrine is named after the two cases it is derived from. D.C. Ct. of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 412 (1923).
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sought in the federal suit.” 	Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (citation
modified).
Plaintiff’s claims require this Court to review the OCCA’s judgment. The type of
appellate review barred by Rooker-Feldman “consists of a review of the proceedings
already conducted by the ‘lower’ tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in
accordance with law.” Bolden, 441 F.3d at 1143. In contrast, a claim does not run afoul
of Rooker-Feldman when the second court can reach a conclusion “without concerning
itself with the bona fides of the prior judgment (which may or may not have been a lawful
judgment under the evidence and argument presented to the first court).” Id. Plaintiff does
not allege any constitutional violations other than the OCCA’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
claim was not ripe. 	Providing the relief Plaintiff requests requires wading into the facts
and legal analysis performed by the OCCA to determine if the OCCA reached an improper
result as to ripeness in Plaintiff’s case based on a faulty application of the law. This is the
type of appellate review barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Further, Plaintiff’s requested relief would overturn the OCCA’s judgment. 	The
illustration provided in Bolden is helpful.
To illustrate, say a father was deprived of custody of his child by a state-court
judgment. If he files suit in federal court, seeking to invalidate the state-court
judgment on the ground that the state-court proceedings deprived him of due
process or that the judgment was otherwise contrary to federal law, his suit
would be barred by Rooker–Feldman; the suit usurps the Supreme Court's
exclusive appellate jurisdiction because it seeks to set aside the judgment
based on a review of the prior proceedings. 	If, however, the father simply
brought suit in federal court seeking custody of his child, without raising any
complaint about the state-court proceedings, Rooker–Feldman cannot be
invoked; his federal claim would have been the same even in the absence of
the state-court judgment.
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441 F.3d at 1145. The only relief this Court could grant would place Plaintiff in the same
position he occupied prior to the OCCA’s decisions. 	This amounts to reversing the
OCCA’s judgment. 	It also demonstrates that the state court judgment is what caused
Plaintiff’s alleged harm; sans allegations regarding the OCCA’s ripeness ruling, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is devoid of any specific state action for this Court’s review.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that his case is modeled after three cases allowing Texas
prisoners to challenge Texas’ postconviction DNA statute: Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U.S.
305 (2025); Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011).
These cases are distinguishable. 	In Skinner and Reed, the prisoner did not challenge the
decision reached by the state court in applying the statute to his motion but instead
challenged the constitutionality of the statute as construed by the state courts. Skinner, 562
U.S. at 530-32; Reed, 598 U.S. at 235. 	In Gutierrez, the prisoner also challenged “the
Texas courts[’] interpretation[ion] of Article 64.” Gutierrez, 606 U.S. at 312. In each of
the cases the prisoner asserted that the Texas statute was constitutionally inadequate as to
any prisoner who failed to seek DNA testing before trial. Here, Plaintiff does not allege
that 	the 	Court 	wrongly 	interpreted 	an 	independent 	statute 	making 	the 	statute
unconstitutional. 	Instead, Plaintiff is challenging the OCCA’s ripeness decision in his
specific claim; he claims “the state process he encountered was one of a kind” and that the
process “introduced an overwhelming ripeness burden that was discordant with the
underlying claim.” 	Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 12, 16. 	This amounts to a challenge of the adverse
OCCA decision rather than an independent constitutional challenge to a statute or rule
construed by the OCCA.
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Rooker-Feldman bars this Court from reviewing Plaintiff’s claims seeking direct
review of a state court judgment and therefore may be brought only in the Supreme Court
of the United States—not a lower federal court. Mo’s Express, LLC, 441 F.3d at 1233.
II. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff’s claims, suing three state officials in their official capacity, do not fall
under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 	“The Eleventh
Amendment constitutionalizes the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.” 	Free Speech
Coal., Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 735-36 (citation modified). 	The immunity from
suit in federal court extends to suits “against a state official in his or her official capacity.”
Id. 	However, the Ex parte Young exception allows suits against “state officers in their
official capacities if the lawsuit seeks prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal
law.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that the “ongoing violation of federal law” will continue “so long as
the prison plans to execute him while the state process bars his attempt to show that the
prison’s actions are unlawful.” Resp. at 23. For Ex parte Young to apply, the state officials
sued “must have some connection with the enforcement of the [state law], or else [the
lawsuit] is merely making [the officer] a party as a representative of the state, and thereby
attempting to make the state a party.” 	Ex parte Young, 	209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). 	The
official sued “must have a particular duty to enforce the statute in question.” Free Speech
Coal., Inc., 119 F.4th at 736 (citation modified). Here, while Plaintiff requests this Court
enjoin his execution, that injunction is not linked to the state action Plaintiff challenges in
the present lawsuit. Plaintiff is not challenging the method-of-execution statute before this
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Court. Resp. at 24. 	He is challenging the constitutionality of the OCCA’s ripeness
determination. 	Id. 	However, the officials he sued are not connected to the allegedly
unconstitutional ripeness determination by the OCCA. The Ex parte Young exception does
not apply to Plaintiff’s claims.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support [Doc. No.
19] is GRANTED, and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack
of jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19 th day of December, 2025.
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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