Kumar v. Johnson et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
NAVEEN KUMAR, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-352-J
)
JOSHUA JOHNSON, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
ORDER
Petitioner Naveen Kumar, a noncitizen from India, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 2]. The matter was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Chris M. Stephens consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Judge
Stephens issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court: (1) grant the
Petition in part and (2) order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within five business days or otherwise release him. Judge Stephens also recommends
that Respondents be ordered to certify compliance within seven business days. (Rep. & Rec.)
[Doc. No. 12]. Respondents filed a timely objection (Obj.) [Doc. No. 13], triggering de novo
review. See Quint v. Vail Resorts, Inc., 89 F.4th 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2023).
For the reasons discussed below, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and the
Petition is GRANTED IN PART to the extent it alleges Petitioner’s lack of bond hearing violates
federal law.
I. Background
Petitioner entered the United States in December 2022 and was shortly thereafter detained
and released by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In November 2025, Petitioner was
arrested for a traffic violation and ICE detained him again pending removal proceedings. In his
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Petition, Petitioner asserts that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and his Fifth Amendment due process rights.1
II. Report and Recommendation
Upon review, Judge Stephens concluded that Petitioner is not seeking admission as
contemplated under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) controls his detention.
As such, Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates the INA. See Rep. &
Rec. at 4-8.
III. Analysis
Respondents object to Judge Stephens’ conclusion that § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s
detention.
Initially, Respondents argue generally that § 1225(b)(2)(A) controls because Petitioner –
like all immigrants who have been living in the United States – is an applicant for admission and
the section unambiguously requires all applicants for admission to be subject to mandatory
detention. See Obj. at 3-9. Although employing a de novo review, the Court declines to engage
in a lengthy analysis on this general objection. This Court, and indeed most courts in this circuit
and nationwide, have repeatedly concluded that § 1226(a) controls in this situation. See Coreas v.
Noem, No. CIV-26-151-J, 2026 WL 541151, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 26, 2026) (collecting cases).
Others have disagreed, see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v.
Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026); however, unless the Tenth Circuit
and/or Supreme Court hold differently, the matter is well settled in this Court and further discussion
is unwarranted.
1 Because the Court grants Petitioner relief, it declines to address his constitutional claim.
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Respondents also argue more specifically that Petitioner is an applicant for admission
because (1) his ICE parole was terminated and (2) he applied for asylum. See Obj. at 9-14. The
Court disagrees on both points.
First, Respondents argue that once Petitioner received his Notice to Appear, which
effectively terminated his parole,2 Petitioner’s status reverted “to that of any ordinary applicant for
admission to the United States” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Obj. at 9. But courts have
rejected this theory, holding:
[Section] 1182(d)(5)(A) does not state that a noncitizen is returned to the ‘status’
they held upon their parole, that they revert to status as an arriving alien, or that
they must be detained. Rather, it states that, following the expiration of parole, the
noncitizen shall (1) forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he
was paroled and (2) thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States. Neither
of these requirements justify treating petitioner, who was paroled, as if he is arriving
in the United States.
Khubiev v. Baltasar, No. 25-CV-03955-STV, 2026 WL 864237, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2026)
(cleaned up). In other words, Petitioner’s “detention . . . does not arise from any ongoing entry or
inspection process, but from [ICE’s] decision to place him in removal proceedings . . . . In that
posture, detention is properly understood as detention ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed,’ which falls within Section 1226(a), notwithstanding Petitioner’s initial
classification at the time of entry.” Id. (same); see also Rafibaev v. Noem, No. 26-CV-00461-PAB,
2026 WL 607559, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 4, 2026) (finding no merit in Respondents’ argument that
petitioner became an applicant seeking admission, for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A), simply
because his ICE parole was terminated (collecting cases)); Salgado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6524
2 Judge Stephens found conflicting information regarding whether Petitioner was actually paroled,
as that term is used in immigration proceedings, but found it irrelevant. See Rep. & Rec. at 2, note
4.
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(VEC), 2026 WL 915304, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2026) (“The Government’s position – that
‘Petitioner remains an applicant for admission, notwithstanding Petitioner’s prior release on
humanitarian parole, – is, in a word, poppycock.” (collecting cases)).
Second, Respondents argue that Petitioner is an applicant seeking admission because he
filed for asylum. See Obj. at 11-14. But again, this Court stands with those jurisdictions who have
rejected this argument. See Raj v. Anda-Ybarra, No. CIV-26-125-D, 2026 WL 852093, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. Mar. 27, 2026) (“Further, this Court has previously declined to find that . . . submitting an
asylum application constitutes ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of § 1225(b)(2)(A)” (collecting
cases)); Singh v. Bondi, No. CIV-26-43-J, 2026 WL 483482, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 2026)
(“Respondents assert that Petitioner is seeking admission because he filed a Form I-589 asylum
application during his removal proceedings. But this Court has previously rejected a similar
argument.”); Li v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1426-HE, 2026 WL 147438, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026)
(“The court additionally agrees with Judge Maxfield that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply even
though petitioner filed an application for asylum.”).
Having found § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable to Petitioner, the Court agrees with Judge
Stephens that § 1226(a) controls his detention. See Maldonado v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1379-J, 2026
WL 160950, at *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026) (holding that because “Petitioner has been
unlawfully living in the United States for many years without seeking admission, § 1225(b)(2)(A)
does not apply, and § 1226(a), instead, controls Petitioner’s detention.”). And “[n]oncitizens
detained under § 1226(a) are generally entitled to a prompt bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” Id. at 3. Here, Petitioner has not received a bond hearing, and Respondents raise no
objection challenging their obligation to provide bond hearings for noncitizens under § 1226(a).
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Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing and Respondents’ failure to
provide one violates § 1226(a) of the INA.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court ADOPTS the thorough and well-reasoned Report and
Recommendation [Doc. No. 12] on de novo review and GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition
in so far as it finds Respondents violated the INA. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Respondents
to provide Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business
days or otherwise release Petitioner. Respondents shall certify compliance within seven business
days of this Order’s date.
A separate judgment will enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of April, 2026.
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