Washington v. Farmington Estates Owners Association et al

1 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
WILMORE L WASHINGTON III,
Plaintiff,
v.
FARMINGTON ESTATES OWNERS
ASSOCIATION; NORTHWEST COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT, LLC; SARA BERG; MICHAEL
ORRANTIA; KATIE PATTERSON; BRIAN
HESS; JENNIFER LAYTON, THE
MANAGEMENT TRUST; NATALIE SEIBEL,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:21-cv-01032-YY
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
YOU, Magistrate Judge.
FINDINGS
Plaintiff Wilmore Washington, who is representing himself in this matter, has brought
this suit against the Farmington Estates Homeowners Association (“HOA Board”), The
Management Trust (“TMT”), the management company the HOA Board hired to manage the
community, various individuals who at times served on the HOA Board, including Sara Berg,
Michael Orrantia, Jennifer Layton, Katie Patterson, and Natalie Seibel (who was also plaintiff’s
neighbor), and Brian Hess, a TMT employee who was the manager of the community on TMT’s
behalf (collectively “defendants”). Plaintiff, who is African American, alleges that defendants
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2 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
violated the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) because they discriminated or retaliated against him in
failing to resolve plaintiff’s numerous complaints about his neighbors to his satisfaction, and that
this created a hostile housing environment that caused him to move out of the community.
Currently pending is plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Fourth Amended Complaint,
ECF 174, in which plaintiff requests permission to file a Fifth Amendment Complaint. Plaintiff
seeks to add as defendants Kelsie Roper and Sara Beddow, two employees of TMT, for their role
in allegedly discriminating or retaliating against him. Notably, plaintiff filed this motion in July
of 2025, more than three months after defendants, including TMT, filed motions for summary
judgment asserting that plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to sustain any of his
claims, ECF 152, 153, and more than two years after the deadline to amend pleadings passed on
May 3, 2023. See Minutes of Proceedings (Feb. 2, 2023), ECF 62. Moreover, this is not the first
time that plaintiff has sought leave to amend the complaint well beyond the expiration of the
deadline to amend pleadings; plaintiff filed another motion for leave to file a fifth amended
complaint on July 31, 2024, ECF 118, which was denied because “plaintiff . . . failed to
demonstrate the diligence required to establish good cause to modify the court’s scheduling order
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.” Findings and Recommendations (Sept. 3, 2024) 7,
ECF 124, adopted by Order (October 10, 2024), ECF 137.
The current motion fails for largely the same reasons plaintiff’s previous motion for leave
to amend failed. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” “In general, a court should liberally allow a party to amend
its pleading.” Sonoma Cty. Ass’n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However, leave to amend “is not to be granted
automatically.” Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii, 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). The court “may
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exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive
on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.’ ” Carvalho v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)) (alterations omitted).
When moving for leave to amend after a deadline has lapsed, a party cannot “appeal to
the liberal amendment procedures afforded by Rule 15; [the] tardy motion [must] satisfy
the more stringent ’good cause’ showing required under Rule 16.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v.
Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”).
Under Rule 16(b), a party “must show good cause for not having amended their complaints
before the time specified in the scheduling order expired.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232
F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). The Rule 16(b) “good cause” standard primarily depends on the
diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d
604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “The district court is given broad discretion in supervising the pretrial
phase of litigation, and its decisions regarding the preclusive effect of a pretrial order . . . will not
be disturbed unless they evidence a clear abuse of discretion.” Miller v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 758
F.2d 364, 369 (9th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend does not address the Rule 16 standards, and
plaintiff has failed to show that he acted diligently to justify modifying the scheduling order to
add new defendants at this very late stage of the case. Plaintiff’s motion asserts that he “found
out” about Beddow and Roper’s alleged actions “[a]fter the end of discovery,” Mot. Amend 2,
CEF 174, but discovery closed in August of 2024, see Minutes of Proceedings (June 5, 2024),
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4 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ECF 115, and plaintiff does not offer any explanation for why he waited almost a year before
seeking to amend the complaint to add these potential defendants.
Furthermore, it appears that is was not the discovery of some new fact that prompted
plaintiff’s current motion, but rather plaintiff’s further exploration of the legal standards
applicable to FHA claims. See Mot. Amend 2, ECF 174 (“[A]fter review, [p]laintiff determined
that [Roper] and [Beddow] should be added to the complaint based on § 100.7 [l]iability for
discriminatory housing practices[.]”). This is essentially the same argument plaintiff made in
support of his previous motion for leave to amend in July of 2024, in which he asserted that he
did not “realize there were so many different types of civil rights laws” and was “unaware” that
claims could be asserted under section 1981 or 1982 until he “started reviewing the case a little
bit more.” Transcript (August 6, 2024) 8–9, ECF 123. As the court already explained,
“[p]laintiff’s delay in researching potential claims does not establish the diligence required to
modify the scheduling order under Rule 16.” Findings and Recommendation (Sept. 3, 2024) 5,
ECF 124 (citing Corker v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:19-cv-00290-RSL, 2022 WL
16904801, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2022) (finding the defendant’s mistake in “not
realiz[ing]” that expert discovery was needed did not establish good cause warranting relief from
the scheduling order under Rule 16); Johnson v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 1:20-cv-01062-JLT-CDB,
2022 WL 1778015, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2022), report and recommendation adopted in part,
No. 1:20-cv-01062-JLT-CDB, 2022 WL 3335625 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2022) (finding the
plaintiff, who admitted that “it was through oversight and mistake that [certain] individuals were
not substituted in as Doe Defendants” before the deadline to do so, did not demonstrate diligence
under Rule 16)).
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5 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Even if plaintiff could satisfy Rule 16’s good cause standard to amend the scheduling
order, he has not met Rule 15’s standard for granting leave to amend. Plaintiff’s theory for
claims against Roper and Beddow is based on supervisory liability. See Mot. Amend 5, ECF 174
(“Adding [Beddow] and [Roper] who were both supervising [defendant] Brian Hess . . . will
provide direct liability on these individuals[.]”). Under the Fair Housing Act, the employer or
business entity is ordinarily the only party that can be vicariously liable for torts committed by
employees, not individual supervisors or corporate officers. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280,
286 (2003) (explaining that under the FHA, “in the absence of special circumstances it is the
corporation, not its owner or officer, who is the principal or employer, and thus subject to
vicarious liability for torts committed by its employees or agents”). Moreover, in separate
Findings and Recommendations issued on the same date as this one, the court exhaustively
analyzed plaintiff’s claims and numerous factual allegations, and found that the evidence
plaintiff submitted was not sufficient to establish any claim for FHA discrimination, retaliation,
or creation of a hostile housing environment. Because the evidence in the record does not support
a discrimination, retaliation, or hostile environment claim against defendant Hess, adding a
supervisory liability claim against Roper and Beddow is futile. See Watters v. City of Cotati, No.
C 4:10-cv-02574-SBA, 2011 WL 4853590, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct.13, 2011) (granting summary
judgment on supervisory liability claims because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate triable issue
of fact as to his underlying civil rights claims).
RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff’s Motion [for] Leave to Amend Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF 174) should
be denied because plaintiff has not demonstrated the diligence necessary to establish the good
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6 – FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
cause required by Rule 16 to amend the court’s scheduling order, and the proposed amendments
are futile.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if
any, are due Monday, December 01, 2025. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and
Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a
copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings
and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.
DATED November 7, 2025.
/s/ Youlee Yim You
Youlee Yim You
United States Magistrate Judge
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