Diane Marie Hibble

1As this matter concerns a challenge to a claim against the
estate, it is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B).
2Secured to $23,000; unsecured to $6,700 for a total claim of
$29,700. 	See Second Amended Schedule D.
In 	the 	United 	States 	Bankruptcy 	Court
For 	the 	Eastern 	District 	of 	Pennsylvania
In re 	:
:
Dianne M. Hibble 	: Chapter 13
:
:
Debtor(s) 	: Bankruptcy No. 05-38556 SR
Opinion
By: Stephen Raslavich, United States Bankruptcy Judge.
Introduction.
The Debtor has objected to the claim of AmeriCredit
Financial Services, Inc. 	The objection is opposed. A hearing on
the matter was held May 30, 2007 at which the parties offered
oral argument. 	At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court
allowed the parties two weeks to brief the issues. 	Upon receipt
of those submissions, the Court took the matter under advisement.
For the reasons set forth below, the Objection is sustained. 1
Factual Background
No material facts are in dispute. 	The pleadings reveal that
the Debtor obtained a car loan prepetition from AmeriCredit. 	In
her Chapter 13 case, she scheduled the claim as partially
secured. 2 For its part, AmeriCredit filed a Proof of Claim
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3This meant that she would make her monthly contract payments to
AmeriCredit just as she was required to were there no bankruptcy.
However, she had not been doing even that: AmeriCredit had moved for
relief from stay because the Debtor had failed to make any post-
petition payment. 	See Motion for Relief from Stay, ¶ 16. 	That motion
was resolved via a stipulation requiring Debtor to make double
payments for six months to cure the delinquency. 	See Stipulation
4Under the parties’ stipulation, AmeriCredit needed only to give
10 days notice of the default and right to cure before it would
certify Debtor’s default to the Court to obtain relief. 	See
Stipulation.
2
asserting a fully secured claim of upwards of $30,000, although
it valued the car at $19,000. 	See Proof of Claim #10. 	In her
plan, the Debtor proposed to pay the AmeriCredit claim in full
and directly, i.e., “outside” the plan 3; unsecured creditors
would also be paid in full but through the plan. 	AmeriCredit did
not oppose such treatment or otherwise object to confirmation of
her plan. 	After confirmation, however, the Debtor defaulted on
her payments to AmeriCredit. 	AmeriCredit obtained relief from
stay, 4 recovered the car and sold it at a loss. 	That prompted
AmeriCredit to amend its secured claim to assert an unsecured
claim equal to that shortfall. 	The Debtor then objected to the
AmeriCredit claim.
The Arguments
The basis of the objection is that the amended claim is
untimely: it was filed after both the claims bar date as well as
the order of confirmation. 	See Objection, ¶ 12; Transcript (T-)
8. 	AmeriCredit’s response is that the amended claim relates back
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5Filed February 21, 2006. 	Importantly, the claim did not reserve
the right to pursue a deficiency claim in the event of repossession.
3
to its earlier, timely-filed claim. 5 	The amendment does not
assert a new claim, AmerCredit explains, but, rather, merely
changes its status from secured to unsecured. 	See, generally,
AmeriCredit’s Brief.
Preliminary Considerations
The issues implicated in this contested matter go beyond a
garden-variety objection to an amended proof of claim and the
“relation-back” doctrine. 	Involved are fundamental questions of
what follows from a material default under a confirmed plan.
Because the divergence of opinion on this question is so
great—and because there is no controlling authority on point—a
full analysis is warranted.
Post-Confirmation
Change in Circumstances
Once confirmed, a Chapter 13 plan binds the debtor and all
creditors—whether provided for in the plan or not—to its terms.
11 U.S.C. § 1327(a); see also In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1408
(3d Cir.1989) (“Under § 1327, a confirmation order is res
judicata as to all issues decided or which could have been
decided at the hearing on confirmation.”) 	But, as is often the
case, the debtor suffers a change in circumstances after
confirmation which makes implementation of the plan simply
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6This would appear to be the explanation for the Trustee’s
contention that the plan is infeasible. 	See Motion to Dismiss, ¶ 3.
As proposed, the plan would pay 100% to unsecured creditors. 	Filed
unsecured claims totaled about $8,300. 	See Claims Register. 	The plan
4
impossible. 	A leading commentator explains what options are
available to the debtor when that happens:
Chapter 13 debtors, during the duration of
their plans, often encounter circumstances
that were unforeseen at the time of
confirmation. 	Further persistent
deterioration in a debtor's financial
condition after confirmation usually leaves
only four courses of action open to the
debtor. 	The debtor may convert the case to
chapter 7, apply for a hardship discharge
under section 1328(b), dismiss the case or
modify the chapter 13 plan in response to
prevailing conditions. 	A debtor is not
eligible for discharge relief under section
1328(b) in circumstances when a
postconfirmation modification of the plan is
practicable. 	The procedure for modification
after confirmation is further elaborated by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3015(g).
8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1329.01 (Matthew Bender 15 th Ed.
revised) 	The Debtor in this case has apparently suffered such a
change in circumstance: having originally proposed to pay
AmeriCredit directly and in the amount of the contract, she has
since defaulted and decided to surrender the car. 	She has,
however, neither moved to convert or dismiss her case, sought a
hardship discharge, nor moved for modification of her plan. 	All
that she has done is to object to the AmeriCredit amended claim.
She maintains that such claim is untimely and, more importantly,
would render her plan infeasible if allowed. 6 May the Debtor
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proposes to pay that amount to unsecureds. 	See Third Amended Plan.
If the AmeriCredit unsecured deficiency claim of $18,000 were added to
that, the plan would become infeasible.
5
address this change of circumstances in such a way?
In the specific context of a post-confirmation surrender of
an automobile, courts disagree on the degree of latitude afforded
the debtor. 	There are essentially three schools of thought with
regard to what the debtor may (or must) do. 	The first does not
consider surrender to constitute a permissible modification of a
confirmed Chapter 13 plan. 	See, e.g., In re Nolan, 232 F.3d 528,
535 (6 th Cir.2000). 	The second reaches precisely the opposite
conclusion. 	See, e.g., Bank One, N.A. v. Leuellen (In re
Leuellen), 322 B.R. 648, 653 (S.D.Ind.2005). 	A third approach
avoids the issue of modification altogether and considers the
question in terms of claim reconsideration under § 502(j) and
lien valuation under § 506(a). 	See, e.g., In re Zieder, 263 B.R.
114, 117 (Bankr.D.Ariz. 2001). 	The Court will analyze each
method below in the context of the applicable Code provisions.
Res Judicata Effect
of Confirmed Plan
and Modification
Section 1329 governs modification of confirmed plans:
(a) At any time after confirmation of the
plan but before the completion of payments
under such plan, the plan may be modified,
upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or
the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to-
-
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7See, e.g., Sharpe v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 122 B.R. 708, 710
(E.D.Tenn.1991); In re Jefferson, 299 B.R. 468, 470 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio
2003); In re Wilcox, 295 B.R. 155, 157 (Bankr. W.D.Okla.2003); In re
Miller, 2002 WL 31115656 *4 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.); In re Jackson, 280 B.R.
703, 704 (Bankr.S.D.Ala.2001); In re Barclay, 276 B.R. 276, 284
(Bankr.N.D.Ala.2001); In re Cameron, 274 B.R. 457, 461 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.
2002); In re Coffman, 271 B.R. 492, 496 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 2002); In re
Smith, 259 B.R. 323, 326 (Bankr.S.D.Ill. 2001); In re Goos, 253 B.R.
416, 420 (Bankr.W.D.Mich. 2000); In re Meeks, 237 B.R. 856, 861
(Bankr. M.D.Fla. 2000); In re Coleman, 231 B.R. 397, 399-400
(Bankr.S.D.Ga.1999); In re Dunlap, 215 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.
1997); In re Banks, 161 B.R. 375, 379 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1993); In re
Holt, 136 B.R. 260 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1992); In re Cruz, 253 B.R. 638,
641-42 (Bankr.D.N.J..2000)
6
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments
on claims of a particular class provided for
by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such
payments;
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a
creditor whose claim is provided for by the
plan to the extent necessary to take account
of any payment of such claim other than under
the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(emphasis added). 	The majority of cases
ruling on this point hold that this section does not allow a
debtor to surrender collateral and treat any resulting deficiency
as an unsecured claim. 7 	They are led by the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Nolan, supra, which based its decision on five
premises:
1. Section 1329(a) does not expressly allow
the debtor to alter, reduce or re-classify a
previously allowed secured claim. Instead, §
1329(a)(1) only affords the debtor a right to
request alteration of the amount or timing of
specific payments. A modification that
reduces the claim of a secured creditor would
add a claim to the class of unsecured
creditors, a change prohibited by § 1329(a).
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7
2. The proposed modification would violate §
1325(a)(5)(B), which mandates that a secured
claim is fixed in amount and status and must
be paid in full once it has been allowed.
Debtors seeking modification are attempting
to bifurcate a claim that has already been
classified as fully secured into a secured
claim as measured by the collateral's
depreciated value and an unsecured claim as
measured by any unpaid deficiency.
3. The proposed modification would contravene
§ 1327(a), because a contrary interpretation
postulates an unlikely Congressional intent
to give debtors the option to shift the
burden of depreciation to a secured creditor
by reclassifying the claim and surrendering
the collateral when the debtor no longer has
any use for the devalued asset.
4. Only the debtor, trustee, and holders of
unsecured claims are permitted to bring a
motion to modify a plan pursuant to §
1329(a). A contrary interpretation would
create an inequitable situation where the
secured creditor could not seek to reclassify
its claim in the event that collateral
appreciated, even though the debtor could
revalue or reclassify the claim whenever the
collateral depreciated.
5. The language of § 1329 does not expressly
state that the plan may be modified to
increase or reduce the amount of claims.
Nolan, 232 F.3d at 532-34. (citations omitted). 	This reasoning,
essentially, accords res judicata effect to the debtor’s proposed
treatment of a secured claim. 	What must necessarily follow from
this is that the court must either convert or dismiss the case,
or the Debtor must request a hardship discharge.
The contrary line of cases holds that a confirmed plan may
be modified to account for surrender of an automobile because of
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8
subsection (b) of § 1329. 	That subsection makes those same
requirements which are applicable to confirmation likewise
applicable to modification: “Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and
1323(c) of this title and the requirements of section 1325(a) of
this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this
section.” 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1). 	A most thorough analysis of
this thinking is provided by United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana in Leuellen, supra. 	The Leuellen
Court undertook an examination of these provisions and concluded
that such a modification was permissible:
Section 1322(b)(8), which is [made applicable
by § 1329(b)(1)], states that the plan may
“provide for the payment of all or part of a
claim against the debtor from property of the
estate or property of the debtor.” This
option contemplates surrender of collateral
as a form of payment, and section 1322(b)
applies without qualification to
modifications under section 1329(a).
Under section 1325(a)(5)(C), also applied to
section 1329(a) by subsection (b)(1), a
debtor may choose to surrender property
securing a claim prior to confirmation.
…
Accordingly, Congress's explicit
incorporation of section 1322(b) and section
1325(a) into the standards for post-
confirmation modification under section
1329(a) makes clear that Chapter 13 debtors
retain the option to seek court permission to
modify a confirmed plan by surrendering
collateral to pay a secured claim. [citations
omitted].
Leuellen, 322 B.R. at 652-53 (emphasis added).
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8That section provides:
Any holder of a secured claim that has accepted
or rejected the plan is deemed to have accepted
or rejected, as the case may be, the plan as
modified, unless the modification provides for a
change in the rights of such holder from what
such rights were under the plan before
modification, and such holder changes such
holder's previous acceptance or rejection.
11 U.S.C. § 1323(c) (emphasis added).
9
The District Court in Leuellen next addressed some of the
premises of Nolan. 	In rejecting the distinction drawn between
claims versus payments, the Leuellen Court found that claim
adjustment is available under § 1323(c). 	That section, in turn,
is made applicable by §1329. 8 Id. at 656-57. 	Equally, surrender
did not constitute disparate treatment of secured creditors
because the Code allows secured creditors to be separately
classed. 	Id. at 657. 	Finally, post-confirmation surrender did
not unfairly shift the risk of collateral depreciation to the
auto lender. 	The secured lender could take a more active role in
the confirmation process knowing that “the risk of depreciation
of collateral is a risk a secured creditor always bears. 	That is
why car loans usually bear higher interest rates than home
mortgages.” 	Id. at 660. 	And on the subject of abuse, the
Leuellen Court pointed out that § 1329 requires that the
modification be proposed in good faith. 	Id. at 661. 	That is a
question of fact determined on a case by case basis. 	Id. 	In
sum, the District Court in Leuellen sees the same protections
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9For cases in accord with Leuellen, see: In re Jock, 95 B.R. 75,
77 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1989)(abrogated by Nolan); In re Day, 247 B.R. 898,
901 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.2000); In re Anderson, 153 B.R. 527, 528 (M.D.Tenn.
1993)(abrogated by Nolan); In re Rimmer, 143 B.R. 871, 873
(Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1992)(abrogated by Nolan); In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804,
808 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1989); In re Arenciba, 2003 WL 21004969 *4
(Bankr.S.D.Fla.); In re Townley, 256 B.R. 697, 699 (Bankr.D.N.J.2000);
In re Knappen, 281 B.R. 714, 715 (Bankr.D.N.M.2002); In re Ward, 348
B.R. 545, 550 (Bankr.D.Idaho 2005); In re Bell, 339 B.R. 309, 315
(Bankr.W.D.N.Y.2006); In re Marino, 349 B.R. 922, 923-24
(Bankr.S.D.Fla.2006)
10
which apply to confirmation as applying equally to modification. 9
Post-Confirmation Secured Claim
Reconsideration and Valuation
But the issue is not exclusively viewed in terms of
modification. 	Other courts focus not on the plan, but on the
particular secured claim whose treatment has been somehow
altered. 	A change in circumstances may have the practical effect
of redetermining the extent of that secured interest. 	In that
regard, Code § 506(a) provides: “An allowed claim of a creditor
secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest, …, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of
such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such
property, …, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the
value of such creditor’s interest,…, is less than the amount of
such allowed claim.” 	11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). 	This warrants
reconsideration of the secured claim under § 502(j) which
provides that “[a] claim that has been allowed or disallowed may
be reconsidered for cause. A reconsidered claim may be allowed or
disallowed according to the equities of the case.…” 	11 U.S.C. §
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10Coincidentally, that secured creditor was AmeriCredit.
11
502(j). 	The cases that follow this reasoning allow the Chapter
13 debtor to surrender collateral postconfirmation without
modifying the plan. 	In some cases, they grant the lender an
administrative expense for any unpaid postpetition use of the
collateral. 	See, e.g., In re Zieder, supra; In re Jefferson, 345
B.R. 577 (Bankr.N.D.MIss.2006); In re Rayborn, 307 B.R. 710, 720
(Bankr.S.D.Ala.2002); In re Mason, 315 B.R. 759
(Bankr.N.D.Cal.2004); In re McBride, 337 B.R. 451, 462
(Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 2004) (also allowing as administrative expense to
creditor the total of monthly unpaid postpetition payments)
It is from this third group of cases that this Court has
found one decision which involves the identical fact pattern. 	In
In re McBride, supra, the secured creditor 10 had filed a secured
claim asserting fully secured status in the debtor’s car. 	Id. at
453. 	And just as here, the Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay the
secured claim in full outside the plan. 	Id. 	Likewise, the
debtor defaulted post-confirmation and the secured lender moved
for stay relief. 	Id. 	The language in the order granting relief
is resonant: it provided that any surplus resulting from
collateral disposition would go the trustee, but was silent as to
what rights the secured creditor had in the event of a
deficiency. 	Id. at 454. 	Finally, after the secured lender
recovered the car and sold it at a loss, it filed an amended
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12
claim in the amount of the deficiency. 	An objection was lodged
as to that claim.
While the McBride Court’s ruling ultimately would
“reconsider” the secured lender’s claim based on the equities, it
disposed of the amended unsecured claim on procedural grounds.
The Court started from the premise that to be an amended claim
which relates back to the filing of the original claim, 	the
amended claim must bear a relationship to the original claim and
must simply be a correction or supplementation of that claim
supported by the same operative fact which gave rise to the
original claim. 	Id. at 460. 	In its original claim, the McBride
Court found, AmeriCredit provided no notice that it would seek a
deficiency claim in the event of a default. 	Id. 	Neither was
there a provision in the plan contemplating a deficiency claim
being paid on an unsecured basis. 	Id. 	Finally, AmeriCredit even
failed to plan for a deficiency when it obtained relief from stay
despite the fact that it knew that the collateral was
depreciating. 	Id. at 462. 	All of this doomed its attempt to
recover the deficiency via an amended claim.
But the McBride Court’s rejection of AmeriCredit’s attempt
to change the status of its claim from secured to unsecured did
not end the matter:
[ ]The fact of the matter is that Americredit
did timely file a proof of claim. 	The Court
does not agree with the majority in Adkins
that AmeriCredit is entitled to receive
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13
payment on its deficiency from the Debtor’s
estate as a secured creditor despite the fact
that it repossessed its collateral. 	The
Court believes that the most appropriate
approach under the circumstances of this case
is to treat the Debtor’s motion as one
pursuant to Code § 502(j)…
Code § 502(j) states that “[a] claim that has
been allowed or disallowed may be
reconsidered for cause. 	A reconsidered claim
may be allowed or disallowed according to the
equities of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(j).
In the view of the Court, Code § 502(j) gives
the Court the discretion to balance the
interest of both AmeriCredit and the Debtor
based on the totality of the circumstances of
the case.
…
In this case, AmeriCredit filed no opposition
to the provision in the debtor’s plan that it
continue to receive the payment of $306.10
per month directly from the Debtor.
AmeriCredit has not offered any evidence of
abuse to the vehicle on the part of the
Debtor which would have accounted for the
$8,000 depreciation AmeriCredit alleges. 	The
Court also takes into account that
AmeriCredit, in seeking relief from the
automatic stay, delayed approximately five
months before making its motion in August
2003. 	At the same time, the Court believes
that sufficient cause has been established
pursuant to Code § 502(j) by AmeriCredit to
warrant the granting of a administrative
expense claim pursuant to Code § 503(b)
of$2,248.80 (8 x 4306.10) as adequate
protection for the Debtors use of the vehicle
for the period from March 1, 2003, the date
of default, through October 27, 2003, the
date off repossession which takes into
account the payments made by the Debtor
postpetition between October 16, 202, the
date off the filing of the case, and February
28, 2003.
Id. at 460-62 (emphasis added). 	In sum, an unsecured deficiency
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14
claim filed out of time did not relate back to the earlier
secured claim; however, fairness dictated that the lender receive
something for the debtor’s post-petition use of the car. 	This
Court finds this approach to have the most appeal of the three.
It is just and reasonable as to all parties involved in the
bankruptcy proceeding and will, therefore, be adopted here.
Does the Deficiency
Claim Relate Back?
The Court begins with an analysis of AmeriCredit’s
contention that the amended claim relates back in time to the
original claim. 	Amendments to timely proofs of claim are
liberally allowed and may relate back to the initial filing if
filed after the bar date, but will not be permitted if they
actually constitute new claims. 	See In re Metro Transportation
Co., 117 B.R. 143, 147 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1990). 	If the initial proof
did not “give fair notice of the conduct, transaction or
occurrence that forms the basis of the claim asserted in the
amendment” then the amendment asserts new claims and will not be
allowed. 	Id. (quoting In re Westgate-California Corp., 621 F.2d
983, 984 (9th Cir.1980) 	On the other hand, amendments that
merely cure defects in the previously-filed claim, describe the
claim in more detail, plead new theories of recovery on the same
facts presented in the initial claim, or increase damages do not
constitute new claims. 	In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assoc., 1998 WL
94808 *3 (E.D.Pa.) What is the effect of this new claim?
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11See In re Hill, 286 B.R. 612, 615 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2002) (“As a
general rule, a secured in a Chapter 13 is not required to file a
proof of claim but may choose to ignore the bankruptcy proceeding and
look to its lien for satisfaction of the debt.”)
12That, in particular, troubles the Court. 	It appears that
AmeriCredit believes it could assert a right analogous to that
provided in § 1111(b). 	That section allows an undersecured creditor
in a Chapter 11 case to have its claim treated as fully secured
whether the underlying obligation is recourse or not. 	11 U.S.C. §
1111(b)(1). 	No such provision exists in Chapter 13. 	T-20; see In re
Castro, 285 B.R. 703, 712 (Bankr.D.Ariz. 2002)(noting the absence of
such provision in Chapter 13); In re Gray, 285 B.R. 379, 387 n.32
(Bankr. N.D.Tex.2002) (“The absence in Chapter 13 of provisions
similar to sections 1111(b) and 1124 suggests Congress did not intend
an undersecured creditor to receive full payment at the expense of
other unsecured creditors.”); In re Cushman, 217 B.R. 470, 475 n.8
(Bankr.E.D.Va.1998) (same)
15
Like its amended claim in McBride, AmeriCredit’s amended
claim in this case asserts entirely new matter: it is for a
deficiency resulting from disposition of collateral. 	This change
is highly significant. 	Unlike secured creditors, 11 unsecured
creditors must file claims in Chapter 13 to receive payment. 	See
B.R. 3002(a). 	This was all the more reason for AmeriCredit to
have reserved the right to seek a deficiency. 	They certainly
cannot argue surprise: their original proof of claim acknowledges
that they were undersecured by about $10,000. 12 	See Proof of
Claim. 	For that reason, the Debtor’s Objection to AmeriCredit’s
amended claim will be granted.
Debtor’s Post-Petition
Use of the Vehicle
That however, is not the end of the analysis. 	Eleven post-
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13The Contract provided that the Debtor’s payments were due on the
7 th day of the month. 	See Exhibit “A” to Motion for Relief.
14The Certificate of Default states that the Debtor made only the
double payment that would have paid for May and June 2006. 	See
Certification of Default. 	However, the Amended Proof of Claim lists
“Principal Payments by Trustee” of $1854.07. 	See Amended Claim,
supporting documentation. While this appears to be a typo given that
AmeriCredit was being paid, if at all, outside the plan, it equates
roughly to three monthly payments and Debtor will be given credit for
such.
16
petition months passed before AmeriCredit obtained relief from
the automatic stay: 	The case commenced October 15, 2006;
AmeriCredit’s Motion for Relief was filed February 2006 alleging
defaults for all four post-petition months 13 ; a stipulation was
reached in May 2006 whereby the Debtor would make 6 months of
double payment to cure the delinquency; AmeriCredit certified a
default under the stipulation in August 2006 alleging that the
Debtor made only one of the first four double payments; an Order
granting relief was entered on September 13, 2006; and sometime
between September 13 and December 15, 2006 (the date of the
amended AmeriCredit claim) AmeriCredit repossessed the car and
sold it at a loss. 	See Docket, Motion for Relief, Stipulation,
Certification of Default, Order Granting Relief from Stay, and
Amended Proof of Claim. 	During these months, the Debtor was
still in possession of the collateral. 	At a minimum, the Debtor
used the car for eight postpetition months without paying
AmeriCredit. 14 	Fairness requires that AmeriCredit be paid for
that use. 	This should not pose a financial burden given that
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15No evidence is offered of any new vehicle having been purchased.
Counsel stated at the hearing that he “[thought] they bought a junker
in the meantime” but that is hardly probative evidence. 	T-4.
Moreover, the Debtor did not appear at the hearing.
17
returning the car has decreased her monthly expenses by $595. 15
It will also not compromise the Debtor’s ability to pay the
unsecured claims in full. 	For those reasons, AmeriCredit shall
be awarded an administrative expense for eight monthly payments:
$4,766.40 (8 months @ $595.80/month).
Summary
The Debtor’s Objection to the AmeriCredit Amended Claim will
be sustained. 	In lieu of allowance of the amended claim,
AmeriCredit shall be awarded an administrative expense claim in
the amount of $4,766.40.
An appropriate Order follows.
By the Court:
_____________________
Stephen Raslavich
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Dated: 	July 18, 2007
Case 05-38556-sr Doc 92 Filed 07/18/07 Entered 07/18/07 15:48:34 Desc Main
Document Page 17 of 19

In 	the 	United 	States 	Bankruptcy 	Court
For 	the 	Eastern 	District 	of 	Pennsylvania
In re 	:
:
Dianne M. Hibble 	: Chapter 13
:
:
Debtor(s) 	: Bankruptcy No. 05-38556 SR
Order
And now, upon consideration of the Debtor’s Objection to
Amended Proof of Claim No. 10 of AmeriCredit Financial Services,
Inc., the Response of AmeriCredit thereto, after oral argument
and submission of briefs, and for the reasons set forth in the
attached Opinion, it is hereby:
Ordered, that the Objection is sustained and that the claim
of AmeriCredit is disallowed; and it is
Further Ordered, that AmeriCredit shall be allowed an
administrative expense claim in the amount of $4,766.40.
By the Court:
Stephen Raslavich
Dated: 	July 18, 2007 	United States Bankruptcy Judge
Case 05-38556-sr Doc 92 Filed 07/18/07 Entered 07/18/07 15:48:34 Desc Main
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2
Interested Parties:
George Conway, Esquire
Office Of The U.S. Trustee
833 Chestnut Street
Suite 500
Philadelphia PA 	19106
Counsel for Debtor
Michael D. Ward, Esquire
1518 Walnut Street, Suite 805
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for AmeriCredit
Brian N. Caine, Esquire
DEILY, MOONEY & GLASTETTER
One Greentree Centre, Suite 201
Marlton, NJ. 08503
Counsel for the Trustee
Polly Langdon, Esquire
2901 St. Lawrence Avenue
P.O. Box 4010
Reading, PA 19606
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