EUBANKS v. MYERS et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAWN EUBANKS, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	No. 25-cv-2799
:
SERGEANT ERIKA MYERS, et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. 	January 2, 2026
United States District Judge
Shawn Eubanks, Jr., filed a pro se Complaint in May 2025, asserting civil rights
violations stemming from the seizure of his car incident to an arrest. Eubanks named as
Defendants various officers of the Philadelphia Police Department. For the reasons set forth
below, this matter will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
The events that underlie Eubanks’s claims are alleged to have begun on July 2, 2024,
when Eubanks was arrested after “fighting with his neighbor.” Compl. at 4. Eubanks states that
“[i]ncident to [his] arrest, Sergeant Erika Myers seized [Eubanks]’s Audi car keys,” but that the
car “was never linked to a crime and the officers never had a warrant to seize it.” Id. Eubanks
asserts that “[his] sister attempted to get the car from the police station, but they claimed it was
not there.” Id. Eubanks alleges that he spoke with an Officer Rivera “multiple times,” but that
Officer Rivera made “misleading” statements and told Eubanks “not to worry about the car.” Id.
Eubanks further alleges that Officer Rivera “said that the car was taken to police impound by
1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Eubanks’s Complaint
(ECF No. 3). The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing
system.
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Detective Lackman.” Id. at 6. Eubanks states that he contacted Detective Lackman, “who was
in charge of the impound,” but that “Detective Lackman claimed not to have the car.” Id. at 4.
Eubanks alleges that “[m]ultiple tickets were issued in [his] name for thousands of dollars,” and
[s]ome unknown officers [drove his] car after his arrest,” because “[s]ix months later, the car was
returned damaged . . . in an amount exceeding thousands of dollars.” Id. He asserts that
unidentified officers at the Philadelphia Police 39th District “wouldn’t let his sister report the car
stolen.” Id. at 6. Eubanks seeks compensatory and punitive damages totaling $70 million. Id. at
3.
In an Order dated June 17, 2025, the Court granted Eubanks in forma pauperis status and
directed the Clerk of Court to send Eubanks USM-285 Forms for the Defendants identified by
name—Myers, Lackman, and Rivera—to facilitate service of the Complaint on these Defendants
by the United States Marshals Service. ECF No. 5. That Order also instructed Eubanks that
“[s]ervice cannot be made on the unidentified Defendants named as ‘Several Unknown Officers’
unless or until Eubanks provides sufficient identifying information to allow for service.” Id. at 2.
Eubanks returned the USM-285 Forms, and the Court issued summonses and directed the U.S.
Marshals to effect service. See ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9. On July 30, 2025, the U.S. Marshals
returned the USM-285 Forms executed as to Defendants Lackman and Myers, but unexecuted as
to Defendant Rivera, explaining that “Officer Rivera (39th District)” was insufficient to identify
the Defendant, and the U.S. Marshals were “unable to locate[;] need first name or more info to
ID.” (ECF No. 10 at 3.) The Court sent Eubanks another blank USM-285 Form on August 1,
2025, for Defendant Rivera, detailing the deficiency in the prior form. See ECF No. 11. The
Court gave Eubanks yet another opportunity by sending another blank USM-285 Form on
August 28, 2025. See ECF No. 12.
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On September 10, 2025, Defendants Lackman and Myers filed a Motion to Dismiss
Eubanks’s Complaint, and the Court ordered Eubanks to respond to the Motion by October 10,
2025. See ECF Nos. 13, 14. When Eubanks did not respond, the Court issued an Order on
November 5, 2025, directing Eubanks to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for
failure to prosecute, based both on his failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Defendants Lackman and Myers and his failure to effect service on Defendant Rivera. See ECF
No. 15. When Eubanks still did not respond, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Prosecution, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), and the Court directed Eubanks
to respond to that Motion. See ECF Nos. 18, 19. Eubanks has filed no response, and his time to
do so has now expired. For the reasons set forth below, Eubanks’s Complaint will be dismissed
with prejudice.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) allows for the dismissal of an action when a
plaintiff fails to prosecute the case, fails to comply with the rules of procedure, or fails to comply
with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “A District Court has the authority to dismiss a
suit sua sponte for failure to prosecute by virtue of its inherent powers and pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” See Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Philadelphia Police Dep’t, 159 F.
App’x 371, 373 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-
31 (1962)). Ordinarily, a court determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a case because of a
plaintiff’s failure to prosecute must consider several factors as set forth in Poulis v. State Farm
Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). See, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-
55 (3d Cir. 1994). However, an analysis under Poulis usually is not required when a plaintiff
willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F.
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App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that
he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff’s behavior is so contumacious as
to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”);
Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court
need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons
her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).
In the context of a pending motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss a case where the plaintiff has failed to respond thereto
is effectively akin to sanctioning the plaintiff for failing to comply with a local rule or court
order, and a “drastic” sanction like dismissal with prejudice requires a Poulis analysis. See
Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1991). A court cannot grant a Rule 12
motion as “unopposed” or “uncontested” without a Poulis analysis. See, e.g., Washington v.
Wenerowicz, No. 21-2741, 2022 WL 39870, at *2 n.5 (3d Cir. Jan. 5, 2022) (per curiam); Adkins
v. Reynolds, 788 F. App’x 824, 828 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Wiggins v. MacManiman, 698
F. App’x 42, 43-44 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Jones v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 381
F. App’x 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Shuey v. Schwab, 350 F. App’x 630, 632-33 (3d
Cir. 2009); Hernandez v. Palakovich, 293 F. App’x 890, 895-96 (3d Cir. 2008). That is so even
if, as here, the plaintiff has been ordered to respond and warned that failure to respond could
result in dismissal. Brzozowski v. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm’n, 738 F. App’x 731, 734 (3d Cir.
2018) (per curiam) (remanding where “[t]he District Court did not acknowledge the Poulis
factors. Instead, in dismissing Brzozowski’s amended complaint, the District Court merely
noted that: (1) it directed Brzozowski to respond to the Commission defendants’ motion; (2) it
warned him that failure to respond might result in dismissal; and (3) Brzozowski nevertheless
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failed to respond.”). Thus, the Court will consider the Poulis factors to determine whether it is
appropriate to dismiss Eubanks’s case for failure to prosecute.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Failure to Respond to the Motion to Dismiss
In Poulis, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated six factors
to consider when determining whether to dismiss an action due to a plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary . . . ; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or
the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other
than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
747 F.2d at 868 (emphasis omitted). When balancing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic
formula,” “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and all six factors need not be satisfied for a
court to dismiss a complaint. See Briscoe v. Klause, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008). In this
case, an assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing this action.
As to the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, it is
Eubanks’s sole responsibility to prosecute his case and comply with Court orders. See id. at 258-
59 (explaining that “a pro se plaintiff is personally responsible for complying with the court’s
orders” and “it is logical to hold a pro se plaintiff personally responsible for delays in his case
because a pro se plaintiff is solely responsible for the progress of his case”); Emerson v. Thiel
Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002) (where litigant was proceeding pro se, any failure to
comply with orders was attributable to him). Eubanks was given three opportunities to file a
response to the Defendants’ Motion by orders dated September 10, November 5, and December
9, 2025. See ECF Nos. 14, 15, 19. Eubanks was expressly informed that if he failed to respond,
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this case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See ECF Nos. 15, 19. Nonetheless,
Eubanks failed to file a response to the Motion and did not communicate with the Court in any
other respect. Eubanks, as a self-represented litigant, is solely responsible for complying with
the Court’s orders. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of dismissal.
The second factor, prejudice to the defendants, is neutral here. “Examples of prejudice
include ‘the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the
excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.’” Adams v.
Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1984). Since this case is in its early
stage of litigation, there appears to be no prejudice to the Defendants at this point. However, as a
practical matter, it is unclear how the Defendants could be expected to defend against a case with
an unresponsive plaintiff if the case were to move forward.
The third factor, a history of dilatoriness, must be assessed over the lifetime of the case,
keeping in mind that “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at
261. However, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of
dilatoriness, such as . . . consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at
874. On the one hand, this case is in the early stages of litigation. On the other hand, the
litigation cannot proceed beyond its initial stage due to Eubanks’s failure to comply with the
Court’s Orders to file his response. The delay is solely attributable to Eubanks and nothing in
the record provides a reasonable explanation as to why he is unable to comply with the Court’s
directives. For example, there is no indication on the docket that Eubanks failed to receive the
Court’s Orders directing him to file his response. Because the record shows unexplained delays
in Eubanks’s prosecution of the case, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
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The fourth factor, whether plaintiff’s conduct was willful or in bad faith, weighs in favor
of dismissal. As noted above, Eubanks has been expressly and repeatedly instructed on what he
was required to do to prosecute this case, namely respond to the pending Motion, and also has
been expressly informed of the consequences of the failure to comply with the Court’s Orders.
The Court’s last two Orders (ECF Nos. 15, 19) made clear that if Eubanks failed to comply with
the Order, his case could be dismissed. On this record, Eubanks’s failure to file a response may
fairly be understood as willful, and this factor weight in favor of dismissal.
An examination of the fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal,
reveals that no other sanction would be effective. Eubanks is proceeding pro se and his apparent
refusal to respond to the pending Motion, if left unaddressed, would be a complete barrier to this
case proceeding beyond the pleadings stage. Given the procedural posture of this case,
Eubanks’s pro se and in forma pauperis status, and Eubanks’s apparent unwillingness to
prosecute his claims by responding to the pending Motion, it is difficult to determine what lesser
sanction might be available or appropriate in this context. See Adonai-Adoni v. King, 506 F.
App’x 116, 119 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“Because Adonai-Adoni proceeded pro se and in
forma pauperis, monetary sanctions were not a viable form of alternative sanction.”); Guyer v.
Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1430 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of case where dilatory conduct
“made adjudication of the case impossible. Therefore, any lesser sanction would not have
furthered the interests of justice.”); King v. Galano, No. 14-1691, 2015 WL 6523459, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s history of nonparticipation and noncompliance in this matter
suggests that alternative sanctions would be futile.”). As such, no other sanction would be
effective. The fifth factor thus weighs in favor of dismissal.
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Under the sixth Poulis factor, the Court must consider if the claims or defenses are
meritorious. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70 (“A claim or defense, will be deemed meritorious
when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff
or would constitute a complete defense.”). Here, Defendants Lackman and Myers have
advanced compelling arguments as to fatal deficiencies in Eubanks’s Complaint, primarily that
the Complaint fails to allege their personal involvement in his claims with sufficient
particularity. (See ECF No. 13 at 5-6.) Defendant Myers argues that Eubanks’s only factual
allegation against her is that she seized the car’s keys “incident to his arrest,” so he cannot state a
claim to relief under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 6-7 (quoting Compl. at 4; and citing Moore
v. Pennsylvania, No. 21-2880, 2022 WL 2345739, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2022), aff’d sub nom.
Moore v. Montgomery Cnty. Dist. Att’y Off., No. 22-2642, 2023 WL 5972045 (3d Cir. Sept. 14,
2023)).) Defendant Lackman argues that Eubanks’s allegations are insufficient to support a
Fourth Amendment claim against him because Eubanks does not plead that Lackman caused the
seizure of his vehicle. (See id. at 7-8 (citing Oliver v. Pa. State Police, 2025 WL 662399, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2025).) Finally, the Defendants argue that Eubanks fails to state a due process
claim, because he does not plead that he pursued any available post-deprivation remedies. (See
generally id.at 8-10); see also Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If there is a
process on the books that appears to provide due process, the plaintiff cannot skip that process
and use the federal courts as a means to get back what he wants.”).
As in Poulis, the Court can discern no allegations in Eubanks’s Complaint that would
avoid these compelling defenses, and Eubanks filed no response to the motion to dismiss that
specifies which of his allegations would overcome the identified defenses. See Poulis, 747 F.2d
at 870 (explaining that the proffered defense was “on its face, compelling,” where plaintiffs
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made no allegation in the complaint that would avoid the defense and did not respond to the
motion to dismiss, and concluding that “[w]hile we express no opinion on whether summary
judgment or dismissal would have been warranted on this ground, the existence of a prima facie
defense is a factor to be weighed along with the foregoing factors.” (internal citations omitted)).
Even if the Court were to find the sixth Poulis factor to be neutral at this stage of the litigation,
the first, third, fourth, and fifth Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
B. 	Failure to Effect Service on Defendant Rivera
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that “[i]f a defendant is not served within
90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the
plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service
be made within a specified time.” In other words, under Rule 4(m), “the court has the option of
dismissing the action or extending time for service” if a defendant is not served within the
specified time period. Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995).
Here, Eubanks’s Complaint was deemed filed on June 17, 2025, when he was granted in forma
pauperis status and the Court directed Service.2 See ECF No. 5. The deadline to effect service
under Rule 4(m) was then extended to run from the date that the Clerk of Court forwarded the
2 “When a complaint is submitted along with an IFP application, the complaint is not deemed
filed unless and until IFP status is granted.” Spuck v. Fredric, 415 F. App'x 358, 359 (3d Cir.
2011) (per curiam); see also Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990) (“When
a complaint is accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, rather than by payment of
a filing fee, the complaint is not docketed, and it is therefore not filed, until the motion has been
granted.”). The common practice in this circuit has historically been that “both the filing of the
complaint and the authorization of service of the complaint on the defendants are postponed
while the magistrate judge and/or district judge consider the § 1915(a) (indigency) and (d)
(frivolousness) issues together.” Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 455 (3d
Cir. 1996). So, for cases in which an order issues that both grants in forma pauperis status and
directs service of the complaint, as has been the practice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
filing happens at that time.
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service materials to the U.S. Marshals, on July 28, 2025. See ECF Nos. 7, 9. The time to effect
service thus expired ninety days later, on October 27, 2025.
However, the Court must extend the time for service if the plaintiff demonstrates “good
cause” for failure to serve. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir.
1997) (“If good cause exists, the extension must be granted.”). Even if a plaintiff fails to show
good cause for failure to serve, the court must still consider whether any additional factors
warrant a “discretionary extension of time” prior to dismissal. Boley, 123 F.3d at 758;
Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1305 (“If, however, good cause does not exist, the court may in its
discretion decide whether to dismiss the case without prejudice or extend time for service.”).
Although “courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible . . . justice also
requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion so
that the defendant is not forced to defend against stale claims.” McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic
Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1998).
The U.S. Marshals Service is required to serve process for any plaintiff proceeding in
forma pauperis. See Freeman v. Lincalis, 158 F.4th 166, 180 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d)). A court should extend the time for service, rather than dismiss, “after a plaintiff
furnishes identifying information,” if the U.S. Marshals are unable to locate the identified
defendant. See id. But here, Eubanks was notified that “Officer Rivera (39th District)” was not
sufficient “to locate or identify this individual.”3 ECF No. 11 at 1 (emphasis added). The Court
provided Eubanks with numerous opportunities to cure that defect, and he has completely failed
3 The only other identifying information Eubanks included for “Officer Rivera” in his Complaint
was a phone number, see Compl. at 6, but that number is listed as the general number for the
39th District, see https://www.phillypolice.com/districts/39th-district/.
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to respond, so the analysis of the first five Poulis factors above applies with equal force.4 The
Court therefore concludes that dismissal of Eubanks’s claims against the insufficiently identified
and unserved “Officer Rivera” is warranted. See Tagliamonte v. Wang, 496 F. App’x 208, 211
(3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“A plaintiff, upon becoming aware of a service defect, may not
remain silent and do nothing to effectuate such service; if he fails to act upon discovering a
service defect, and his suit is thereafter dismissed, he is not being penalized for the failure of the
U.S. Marshals and the clerk of the court to effect service but instead because of inaction and
dilatoriness on his part.” (cleaned up)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
A plaintiff may have a meritorious claim, but he must prosecute that claim in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s orders to prove that claim and entitle
him to judgment, if warranted. Absent a plaintiff who is participating in the legal process, this
case cannot move forward. So, for the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Poulis factors
weigh in favor of dismissing this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for
Eubanks’s failure to prosecute. An appropriate order will be filed separately.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.___________
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge
4 As to the sixth Poulis factor, the Court notes that Eubanks’s claims against Officer Rivera
center on Rivera having told Eubanks whom to contact at the impound lot and having made
“misleading” statements as to the whereabouts of Eubanks’s car. See Compl. at 4, 6. In brief,
these allegations appear to be insufficient to support Rivera’s personal involvement in any
constitutional claims.
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