TRAORE v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MALICK-FARDY B. TRAORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
COMPANY, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-6077
Pappert, J. 	January 5, 2026
MEMORANDUM
Pro se plaintiff Malick-Fardy B. Traore sued three insurance companies alleging
a host of state-law claims. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, American Strategic
Insurance Corporation and Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company now
move to dismiss his Complaint.1 The Court grants their motions but allows Traore to
amend some of his claims.
I
Traore allegedly obtained a default judgment of $200,000 in state court for
property damage caused by insureds of State Farm and/or American Strategic. (Compl.
¶¶ 1, 11, Dkt. No. 1-1); (Certification of J. at 20, Dkt. No. 1-1.) The property damage
“arose from unfinished, negligently performed, and abandoned work.” (Compl. ¶ 15.)
Traore says he notified State Farm and American Strategic—and his “own carrier,”
1 	Traore formally sued State Farm Insurance Company, Progressive Insurance Company and
Allstate Insurance Company. (Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, Dkt. No. 1-1.) But the defendants have since clarified
their proper names: State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, American Strategic Insurance
Corporation and Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company. See (State Farm Fire and Cas.
Co. Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Dkt. No. 14); (Am. Strategic Ins. Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Dkt. No. 4); (Allstate
Vehicle and Prop. Ins. Mot. to Dismiss at 4, Dkt. No. 6).
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Allstate—of his judgment and demanded payment, but received nothing. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 12–
15.) State Farm denied coverage citing a policy exclusion for “business purpose[s],” (id.
¶ 13), American Strategic “engaged in delay tactics, refusing to confirm or deny
whether [its] insureds were covered,” (id. ¶ 14), and Allstate denied payment citing an
exclusion for “workman’s craft/business pursuits,” (id. ¶ 15).
On the basis of these allegations, Traore sued State Farm, American Strategic
and Allstate in the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia, asserting several claims
under Pennsylvania and New Jersey law. (Id. ¶¶ 1–43.) After the defendants jointly
removed the lawsuit to this Court, (Notice of Removal at 1–7, Dkt. No. 1),2 each moved
to dismiss Traore’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II
The Court assesses the sufficiency of a pleading before discovery under Federal
Civil Rules 8 and 12. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint “must contain . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And Rule 12(b)(6) permits a district court to dismiss a complaint that
fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. 12(b)(6). Taken together,
the two rules require the plaintiff to allege sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that
2 	Traore moved to remand the case back to state court for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
(Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 1–10, Dkt. No. 10.) The Court denies his motion. Federal courts have
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions . . . between citizens of different States” when the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). To satisfy this rule, complete diversity between
all plaintiffs and all defendants is required; no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same State as any
defendant. Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005). Here, complete diversity exists.
Traore is a citizen of Pennsylvania; State Farm is a citizen of Illinois, American Strategic is a citizen
of Indiana and Florida and Allstate is a citizen of Delaware and Illinois. See (Compl. ¶ 3); (Notice of
Removal ¶¶ 9, 13, 18). And the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Compl. at 6) (asserting
more than $200,000 in damages.) In response, Traore argues that each of the defendants are
registered to do business in Pennsylvania. But that fact, alone, has no bearing on whether the
defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (explaining a corporation is a citizen
of every State where it is incorporated and has its principal place of business).
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is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The first
step in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible claim is to “tak[e] note of
the elements” underlying his claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009);
Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129–30 (3d Cir. 2010). The second
step is to examine the plaintiff’s complaint and determine whether the factual
allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to allow “the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. The reasonableness of an inference depends on common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct. Connelly v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2016); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. Plaintiffs do
not meet the plausibility burden when the facts alleged are “merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability” or show nothing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In gauging the plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded
factual allegations, construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
draw reasonable inferences from them. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 n.2. Because Traore
is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8
F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
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III
A
Traore first alleges bad faith. Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff may recover
certain damages “[i]n an action arising under an insurance policy” if “the insurer has
acted in bad faith toward the insured.” 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8371.
As an initial matter, Traore fails to show he is an “insured” of either State Farm
or American Strategic.3 An insurance company’s obligation to act in “good faith arises
from the insurance policy and is owed to the insured, not to a third-party claimant.”
Strutz v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 609 A.2d 569, 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Thus, to bring
a bad faith claim against an insurer, a plaintiff must first show he qualifies as an
“insured” under a policy. Seasor v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 941 F. Supp. 488, 491 (E.D. Pa.
1996); see also Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 895 F. Supp. 709, 715 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
An “insured” is a person “covered or protected by an insurance policy.” Insured, Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Traore fails to allege any facts to show he is covered or
protected by a State Farm or American Strategic policy. He attaches no policy to his
Complaint, nor does he make any allegations regarding who is covered or protected by
those companies. Traore, moreover, fails to allege any facts which could show he is a
third-party beneficiary of any policies issued by State Farm or American Strategic. See
Richard v. Fin. of Am. Mortgs., LLC, No. 18-CV-559, 2019 WL 1980693, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
May 3, 2019) (explaining third-party beneficiary status provides an “avenue” for a
3 	Under the heading “Parties” in his Complaint, Traore asserts that Allstate was his “own
carrier.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) This allegation, by itself, is so conclusory and unspecific the Court is unable
to determine whether Traore has an insurance policy with Allstate. But Allstate apparently
concedes it has some kind of policy with Traore. See, e.g., (Allstate Vehicle and Prop. Ins. Mot. to
Dismiss at 24–25). The Court will, therefore, assume that Traore is an insured of Allstate.
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plaintiff to bring a bad faith claim under Pennsylvania law); Davis v. AMCO Ins., No.
24-CV-00632, 2024 WL 4592998, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2024) (explaining a third-
party beneficiary may recover for bad faith under Pennsylvania law).
Even if Traore is an insured of the defendants, he fails to show they acted in
“bad faith.” To do so, he must allege the defendants had no “reasonable basis” for
denying his claim. O’Donnell ex rel. Mitro v. Allstate Ins., 734 A.2d 901, 906 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Traore says the defendants
“acted in bad faith by denying or delaying payment without [a] reasonable basis.”
(Compl. ¶ 20); (id. ¶¶ 13–15.) But that just regurgitates the bad faith standard, failing
to state a claim for relief. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (explaining a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not suffice at the motion-to-dismiss
stage). Traore’s allegations that the defendants improperly denied payment, or delayed
in evaluating his claim, do not change the calculus. “[N]egligence or bad judgment is
not bad faith.” Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)
(citation omitted).
B
Traore next alleges violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Insurance Practices Act
and Unfair Settlement Practices Regulations. But “there is no private cause of action
under the UIPA or the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations.” Smith v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 935 F. Supp. 616, 620 (W.D. Pa. 1996); see also Cresswell v.
Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins., 820 A.2d 172, 180 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (noting the “UIPA
does not create a private cause of action”); Albert v. Erie Ins. Exch., 65 A.3d 923, 931
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(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (noting the Unfair Settlement Practices “regulations
promulgated” in 31 Pa. Code § 146 “do not create a private cause of action”).
C
Traore also alleges violations of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law. That statute “aims to protect the consumers of the
Commonwealth against fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices.”
Commonwealth ex rel. Shapiro v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010,
1023 (Pa. 2018). To state a claim, Traore must first show he “purchase[d] goods or
services” primarily for personal or household purposes from the defendants. Gemini
Physical Therapy & Rehab., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 40 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1994); see also Chavanne v. Second Look, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 3d 662, 669–70 (E.D. Pa.
2022); 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2. He must next show he “justifiably relied on the
defendant’s wrongful conduct or representation and that he suffered harm as a result of
that reliance.” Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 439 (Pa. 2004).
To begin, Traore alleges no facts to suggest he purchased goods or services from
State Farm or American Strategic. Next, he makes no effort to allege justifiable
reliance. He says only State Farm, American Strategic and Allstate “engaged in
deceptive and unfair practices in their handling of [his] claims.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) But
without any allegations describing the defendants’ deceptive and unfair business
practices, the Court cannot determine whether Traore justifiably relied on their
wrongful conduct and suffered harm as a result.
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D
Traore next alleges State Farm and American Strategic violated New Jersey’s
Consumer Fraud Act. To state a claim, he must show (1) the defendants engaged in
unlawful conduct, (2) he suffered a loss and (3) a relationship between the defendants’
conduct and his loss. Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 963 A.2d 849, 854 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2009). Traore alleges only that “[t]o the extent conduct arose from New
Jersey-based insured and adjusters, State Farm and [American Strategic] violated the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) But this allegation is conclusory,
failing to state a claim for relief. See, e.g., Rusciano v. Atlantic City, No. 19-20922, 2021
WL 1138151, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2021) (explaining a “vague and conclusory
statement[]” that a defendant has “violated the law” fails to state a claim).
E
Traore next alleges unjust enrichment under Pennsylvania law. To plead such a
claim, he must show (1) he conferred a benefit on the defendants and (2) the
defendants’ acceptance and retention of the benefit would be inequitable. Liberty Mut.
Grp., Inc. v. 700 Pharmacy, LLC, 270 A.3d 537, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022); see also
SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 229 (3d Cir. 2022). Traore alleges he
“conferred a benefit, which Defendants knowingly retained without legal justification.”
(Compl. ¶ 33.) But again, this “formulaic recitation of [the] cause of action’s elements
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 545.
F
Finally, Traore alleges negligence under Pennsylvania law. To plead such a
claim, he must show (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) injury and (4) damages. Martin v. Evans,
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711 A.2d 458, 502 (Pa. 1998). Traore makes no effort to establish these elements,
alleging only that the defendants “negligently mishandled” his claims “exposing their
personal errors and omissions,” whatever that means. (Compl. ¶ 36.)
IV
A court should grant a plaintiff leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But a court need not do so when amendment would be futile or
inequitable. Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir.
2018). Amendment is futile if no new facts could fix the original complaint’s problems.
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988). And
amendment is inequitable if the plaintiff unduly delays, shows bad faith, or if
amendment would unfairly prejudice the defendant. Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).
It would be futile for Traore to amend his claims under Pennsylvania’s Unfair
Insurance Practices Act and Unfair Settlement Practices Regulations because these
provisions do not allow for a private cause of action. But the Court cannot say it would
be futile for him to amend his other claims. Nor can the Court conclude that
amendment for these claims would be inequitable. Traore may amend his Complaint,
consistent with the accompanying Order.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
________________________
Gerald J. Pappert, J.
/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
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