MIRARCHI v. ROBERTS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ERCOLE A. MIRARCHI, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6922
:
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM
SCHMEHL, J. - /s/ JLS 	JANUARY 9, 2026
Plaintiff Ercole A. Mirarchi, a self-represented litigant, filed this civil rights action
against all nine active United States Supreme Court Justices, alleging that an act of treason has
occurred with respect to recent Pennsylvania Elections. He seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Mirarchi leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his Complaint with prejudice because it is frivolous.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Mirarchi names as Defendants Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Associate Justices
Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett
M. Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett, and Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 2.)1
He asserts that the following federal criminal statutes are at issue: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 2381 -
Treason; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 2382 - Misprision of treason; (3) 18 U.S.C. § 2383 - Rebellion or
insurrection; (4) 18 U.S.C. § 2384 - Seditious conspiracy; (5) 18 U.S.C. § 2385 - Advocating
overthrow of Government; and (6) 18 U.S.C. § 2387 - Activities affecting armed forces
generally. (Id. at 2-3.) Mirarchi avers that 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(a)(b)(12) requires “each and
1 The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF system.
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every employee of the United States . . . to follow and abide by duties or obligations” set forth in
local, state, and federal law. (Id. at 3-4.) He contends that this federal regulation, in conjunction
with 18 U.S.C. § 2382, requires the United States Supreme Court Justices to “accept, review, and
address the evidence of treason” detailed in his Complaint. (Id. at 5-6, 44.)
Mirarchi avers that as “a citizen owing allegiance to the U.S.,” he provided
“incontrovertible evidence of treason” to the Justices proving that “the mechanics of PA and
U.S. election systems are covertly being attacked and manipulated to handpick the winners of
those holding high government offices,” but the Justices have responded that they cannot help
him. (Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).) He contends that the outcomes in several of
Pennsylvania’s recent elections are a “result of a vote configuration scheme, and not a result of
an organic count of votes cast by PA Citizens.” (Id. at 39.) Mirarchi claims that by his
mathematical examination of voter data, he has proved and made known to the Justices that
“treason . . . is covertly being perpetrated by a yet to be identified network of conspirators,
(possible) foreign and domestic collaborators, and insurrectionists,” who have “handpicked the
winners” of several elections. (Id. at 44.) Mirarchi alleges that he and all citizens of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania have sustained injuries from the “treasonous acts,” and he
requests a “special hearing” to determine damages. (Id. at 44, 57.)
This is not Mirarchi’s first case asserting treasonous acts based on Pennsylvania
elections. In April 2023, Mirarchi commenced an action in this Court against the executive
branches of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a United States senator,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, Cable News
Network, and several other governmental and non-governmental entities, alleging that “an act of
treason has occurred with respect to ‘Pennsylvania’s 2020 Presidential and 2022 Governor and
US Senate Elections.’” Mirarchi v. United States Exec. Branch of Gov’t, No. 23-1549, 2023 WL
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5598454, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023). In that case, Mirarchi invoked 18 U.S.C. § 2382 and
several other federal criminal statutes, asserting that defendants and other actors had covered up
a “‘falsified records crime’ that that was allowed to go unpunished and unaddressed by the courts
and other authorities, resulting in an attack against ‘the mechanics of our Elections System’ and a
‘literal takeover of the highest offices in our State, and in our Nation, against the will of the
People.’” (Id. at *2.) On August 29, 2023, the Court dismissed Mirarchi’s case as frivolous
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because the criminal statutes he invoked did not create a private
cause of action, the Court did not have authority to order any law enforcement agencies or
prosecutors to initiate investigations or prosecutions, and because Mirarchi’s “general grievances
about government” were insufficient to state a case or controversy over which the Court could
exercise jurisdiction. (Id. at *3-4.) Mirarchi appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed the frivolity dismissal on November 27, 2023. See Mirarchi v.
United States Exec. Branch of the Gov’t, No. 23-2673, 2023 WL 8179275, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov.
27, 2023) (per curiam).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Mirarchi leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if, among other things, it is frivolous.
A complaint is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is legally baseless if it is “based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir.
1995). As Mirarchi is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.
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Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Mirarchi’s Complaint, even when liberally construed, is frivolous and fails to state a legal
basis for any claim within the Court’s jurisdiction. As in his prior case, Mirarchi asserts claims
for treason pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381-2385 and 2387, but he has been informed that these
federal criminal statutes do not create a private right of action and cannot be relied upon by a
civil plaintiff to state a claim for relief. Mirarchi, 2023 WL 5598454, at *3 (citing Barrett v.
Biden, No. 22-2823, 2022 WL 16528195, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2022); Prunte v. Universal
Music Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (no private right of action in a bare criminal
statute); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1986) (“These offenses, which
include treason, sedition, and espionage . . . do not violate the private rights of individuals[.]”),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Noone v. Town of Palmer, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D. Mass 2014)
(“18 U.S.C. § 2381 is a criminal statute which does not provide a private right of action.”);
Cassaday v. Trump, No. 22-682, 2022 WL 3082464, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2022) (holding
that “political offenses,” such as treason, are perpetrated directly against the state and do not
intend to cause private injury) (quoting Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596 (4th Cir.
2007)); Doe v. FBI, No. 18-0707, 2019 WL 280268, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2019) (finding that,
where plaintiff’s allegations were “tantamount to an act of war against the government, and that
[d]efendants [had] therefore committed treason in violation of Article III, Section III of the
United States Constitution” . . . [b]ecause “[t]reason is best understood as a crime committed
against the United States . . . no private right of action exists that would allow an individual
plaintiff to pursue” a claim of treason against the government) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 560 (2004)); Taylor v. Virginia, No. 15-429, 2015 WL 13050092, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct.
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27, 2015)); Corrado v. New York Off. of Temporary, No. 15-7316, 2016 WL 3181128, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Jun. 2, 2016) (finding that there is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 2381)
(citing Nguyen v. Ridgewood Sav. Bank, No. 14-1058, 2015 WL 2354308, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. May
15, 2015)); Shaughnessy v. New York, 2014 WL 457947, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2014) (finding
that treason is “always prosecuted by the Federal Government, not by private complaints[,]” and
that “there is no private right of action for the crime.”) (citing Hill v. DiDio, 191 F. App’x 13,
14-15 (2d Cir. 2006); Carvel v. Ross, No. 09-722, 2011 WL 856283, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2011)); Vinh Hung Lam v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 08-4317, 2008 WL 11343432, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2008) (finding that plaintiff failed to state a civil claim because “[t]he United States
Code makes treason a crime[,]” and that 18 U.S.C. § 2381 “can be enforced only by the proper
authorities of the United States government, such as United States attorneys.”) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 547))). Accordingly, these claims are frivolous.
Mirarchi was also informed that he cannot compel a criminal investigation by filing a
complaint with this Court because the United States District Courts have no authority to order
any law enforcement agencies or prosecutors to initiate investigations or prosecutions. Mirarchi,
2023 WL 5598454, at *3 (citing Wagner v. United States Gov’t, No. 23-1626, 2023 WL
3948820, at *1 (D.D.C. June 9, 2023); Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141-42
(11th Cir. 1987); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982)). This is because “an
agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a
decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Wagner, 2023 WL 3948820,
at *1 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)); Smith v. Friel, No. 19-943, 2019
WL 3025239, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 4, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
3003380 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2019) (collecting cases and stating “courts have long held that a civil
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rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal
prosecution of some third parties”). His claims are frivolous for this reason as well.
Finally, as Mirarchi was previously advised, Article III of the Constitution limits the
power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of cases and controversies. Mirarchi, 2023 WL
5598454, at *3 (citing Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273
(2008)). “That case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing.”
Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 554 U.S. at 273. “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized” and
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Second,
there must be a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” such that
the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct. Id. Third, it must be likely that the
plaintiff’s injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 561; see also Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (explaining that the “irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing” requires the plaintiff to “have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision”).
Mirarchi is again attempting to address general grievances about government, and he has
not stated a case or controversy over which this Court has jurisdiction. See Lance v. Coffman,
549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government – claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large – does not state an Article III case or controversy.”
(quotations omitted)).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Mirarchi leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his Complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as
legally frivolous. Mirarchi will not be granted leave to amend because amendment would be
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Additionally,
Mirarchi is placed on notice that if he continues to file meritless lawsuits in this Court based on
the same subject matter, he may be subjected to an injunction that limits his ability to file cases
in the future. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1990) (“When a district
court is confronted with a pattern of conduct from which it can only conclude that a litigant is
intentionally abusing the judicial process and will continue to do so unless restrained, we believe
it is entitled to resort to its power of injunction and contempt to protect its process.”). An
appropriate Order dismissing this case and Mirarchi’s outstanding motion will be entered
separately. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL, J.
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