Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 26-7439-KSM
MEMORANDUM
MARSTON, J. 	OCTOBER 15, 2026
The Executive Branch of the United States Federal Government is entrusted with
significant power and authority. What that means in theory is that the Executive Branch’s ability
to act is cabined to authority vested in it by the Constitution and laws passed by the people’s
representatives in Congress. See U.S. Const., Art. II. What that means in practice is that when
the Executive Branch acts, whether on the street or in court, it must comply with the law and
Constitution and—at a bare minimum—show its work. Here, instead, the Court has been
confronted with a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agency policy
that limits fulsome judicial review1 and an Assistant United States Attorney who stood up in
1 To be abundantly clear, the Court is extremely troubled by the representations of Respondents’
counsel at oral argument that (1) Respondents have a policy to not provide body camera footage—even to
their counsel—absent a court order and (2) because of this policy, counsel had not reviewed the footage
prior to oral argument on the Petition. (See Doc. Nos. 8, 9.) Here, this policy led directly to a waste of
judicial resources and made it impossible for counsel on both sides to comprehensively advocate on
behalf of their clients. If and when there are similar Section 2241 cases before this Court where the initial
arrest was warrantless, Respondents should be prepared to promptly produce all relevant body camera
footage to the Court and Petitioner’s counsel.
LESTER OMAR REYES TORRES,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, United States
Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
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open court and claimed that Government agents in this country can, with unbounded authority,
restrain a person’s liberty without the possibility of a habeas remedy.2 (See Doc. No. 8.)
It was only after this Court held oral argument and sua sponte ordered the body camera
footage of Petitioner’s arrest that we were able to accurately and completely evaluate Petitioner’s
habeas claim. (Doc. No. 7, 8.) And upon review and consideration of the Petition (Doc. No. 1),
the Respondents’ Response (Doc. No. 4), Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. No. 6), oral argument on the
Petition held on October 7, 2026, and October 8, 2026 (Doc. Nos. 8, 9), and the body camera
footage of Petitioner’s arrest on September 23, 2026 (see Doc. No. 7), we find the agents here
acted in accordance with their statutory and constitutional authority. Accordingly, Petitioner
Lester Omar Reyes Torres’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1) will be denied.
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States without inspection
approximately six years ago. (Doc. No. 1-3; Doc. No. 4; Body Camera #4, at 10:46:29–34.)
Prior to the September 23, 2026 incident at issue here, Petitioner had never had any interactions
with United States Customs and Border Protection, United States Department of Homeland
Security, or ICE. (See Body Camera #4, at 10:46:41–50.) Based on the Form I-213 for
Petitioner submitted by Respondents, Petitioner works in New Jersey in repair operations and
does not have any direct familial ties to the United States. (Doc. No. 4-2 at 3.) Petitioner also
2 The Court must emphasize that we are deeply disturbed by Respondents’ counsel’s position at
the October 7, 2026 oral argument. In sum and substance, counsel argued that agents of the Executive
Branch “can just go around and talk to anybody they want to talk to and then determine they are illegal
and just arrest them” without any statutory or constitutional authority whatsoever. (10/7/26 Hr’g Rough
Tr. 15:25–16:02.) Not only is this position legally incorrect, see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975), when taken to its logical conclusion, it claims—without a shred of support—that we
have “transformed our country into a police state and abandoned one of the fundamental tenets of our free
society,” Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986). Counsel must not forget that a
fundamental mandate of the Executive’s role is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S.
Const., Art. II, § 3. Carte blanche authority to ICE agents is a far cry from that mandate.
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does not have either a pending application for a work authorization nor an approved work
authorization. (See Body Camera #4, at 10:47:06–20.)
Around 10:45 a.m. the morning of September 23, 2026, at least four ICE agents were
conducting a “targeted enforcement action in an attempt to locate”3 Petitioner and stopped
Petitioner’s vehicle on Allentown Road in Lansdale, Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 4-2 at 3.) The
agents then approached Petitioner’s vehicle and began interrogating him. (Body Camera #4, at
10:45:50–56.) They requested identification, and Petitioner provided a New Jersey Probationary
Auto License. (Id. at 10:45:56–07.) The agents asked where Petitioner was from and if he had
further ID, at which point Petitioner stated he was from Guatemala and provided a Guatemalan
ID. (Id. at 10:46:09–23.) Petitioner was then asked if he was legally or illegally in the United
States, and he stated he was illegally in the United States. (Id. at 10:46:24–30.) Petitioner also
stated he had no pending court date with an immigration judge and had never been arrested by
either immigration officials or police. (Id. at 10:46:31–42.) At that point, ICE asked for and
took possession of Petitioner’s keys and arrested him. (Id. at 10:46:55–47:30.)
At some time after Petitioner was detained, but on the same day, ICE issued an
administrative warrant for Petitioner’s arrest. (Doc. No. 4-3.) And slightly less than two hours
after his arrest, Petitioner was also served with a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court and a
Notice of Custody Determination. (Doc. Nos. 4-1, 4-4.) The Notice to Appear charged
Petitioner with a violation of Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) and set a hearing for October 5, 2026. (Doc. No. 4-1.) The Notice of Custody
3 At oral argument, Respondents’ counsel was unable to explain what a “targeted enforcement
action” means generally or as applied to this action. (See 10/7/26 Hr’g Rough Tr. at 13:13–14:06.) But,
from the Court’s independent review of the body camera footage here, we do not see any support for the
idea that the ICE agents were looking specifically for Petitioner on the morning of September 23, 2026.
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Determination states that SSDO4 Clark determined at 1:26 p.m. on September 23, 2026, that
Petitioner would be detained “pending a final administrative determination in [his] case.” (Doc.
No. 4-4 at 1.) Petitioner requested review of SSDO Clark’s custody determination by an
immigration judge. (Id. (“I do request an immigration judge review of this custody
determination.”) (emphasis in original).) And Petitioner has a custody redetermination hearing
in front of an immigration judge today at 1:30 p.m.5 (Doc. No. 4-5.) Since his arrest, Petitioner
has been detained at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia.6 (See Doc. No. 1-3.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 25, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, in which he argues that
habeas relief is warranted because his initial arrest and continued detention are in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
(See generally Doc. No. 1.) Respondents filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 4), arguing
that the Court should deny habeas relief because: (1) Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) and he has not exhausted his administrative remedies; (2) any claim that his
initial arrest was unlawful is not cognizable through habeas; and (3) his due process claims fail
4 The Court understands this to stand for “Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer”.
5 The Court also recognizes this Memorandum and its accompanying Order may not be issued in
time for Petitioner to attend his hearing today. If that is the case, and especially in light of the factual and
procedural history of this action, we expect Respondents to promptly reschedule his bond hearing to the
next available date. See Zheng v. Rokosky, 826 F. Supp. 3d 545, 554 (D.N.J. 2026) (“Respondents must
also provide detainees with a ‘prompt bond hearing.’”) (quoting Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2018)); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018)
(“Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of
detention.”) (emphasis added).
6 Upon receipt and review of the Petition on September 25, 2026, this Court issued an Order
enjoining Respondents from moving Petitioner from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pending the
outcome of this action. (Doc. No. 2.)
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because he is properly detained under Section 1226(a). (Id.)7 Petitioner filed a reply which
argued that this action is factually and legally similar to two other recent actions in this District
where the court granted habeas relief because the initial arrest of the petitioners did not comply
with ICE’s warrantless arrest statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a), Section 1357’s implementing
regulations, or due process of law. (See Doc. No. 6 (citing Tabora-Brizuela v. Mullin, No.
26cv7010, 2026 WL 2908095 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2026); Alameda Juarez v. Mullin, No.
26cv7008, 2026 WL 2981947 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026)).) Over the course of two days, the Court
then held oral argument on the Petition (Doc. Nos. 8, 9), and in between, ordered the production
of and reviewed the body camera footage of Petitioner’s September 23, 2026 arrest (Doc. No. 7).
The Petition is thus ripe for resolution.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Under that
provision, a federal district court is authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner
who is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3). The petitioner
carries the burden of showing his detention violates the Constitution or federal law.
Id. § 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, no
person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const.
amend. V. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
7 Strangely, the Response did not address Petitioner’s APA claim. (See generally Doc. No. 4.)
Nevertheless, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met his burden of showing Respondents’ actions in
this case were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. As discussed infra, the Court finds that the
ICE agents here complied with the statutory requirements of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357(a) and 1226(a) and their
implementing regulations. Thus, to the extent Petitioner’s APA claim is cognizable on habeas, it
necessarily fails.
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[noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)
(recognizing that Fifth Amendment due process protections extend to deportation proceedings
but noting that “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of
the deportation process”).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
On the record before this Court, Petitioner has not met his burden under Section 2241.
He has not shown any clear or unambiguous violation of his statutory or constitutional rights, nor
has he shown that Respondents’ procedures are so inadequate that they will cause irreparable
injury. But before the Court addresses the merits of Petitioner’s claims, we must clarify the
scope of the dispute here.
As a preliminary matter, Petitioner’s argument that his unlawful detention flows from an
unlawful arrest pursuant to Section 1357 was only raised for the first time on reply. (Compare
Doc. No. 1, with Doc. No. 6.) Then at oral argument on October 7, 2026, Respondents’ counsel
claimed their “main argument” was that Petitioner’s improper arrest theory under Section 1357
“is just not a proper habeas argument.” (10/7/26 Hr’g Rough Tr. at 13:01–02.) And,
incredulously, counsel argued that it was Respondents’ position that “the arrest [did not meet]
the standard of [Section] 1357” and counsel did not “know the exact answer why [the ICE
agents] did not have a warrant.” (Id. at 12:14–15, 13:21–22.) But counsel also made clear that
he had not, at that time, reviewed the body camera footage from Petitioner’s arrest due to ICE’s
policy, discussed in footnote 1 supra. (Id. at 4:10–14, 8:08–18.) So, the Court orally ordered
that the body camera footage be produced, and oral argument was continued to October 8, 2026.
(See Doc. Nos. 7–9.)
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At oral argument on October 8, 2026, Respondents’ counsel changed positions and
argued that the body camera footage showed that the arrest actually did comply with Section
1357, and thus, Petitioner was lawfully arrested and detained without a warrant. (See Doc. No.
9.) Petitioner’s counsel argued that the footage still fails to provide any insight into whether the
“targeted enforcement action” that led to the agents pulling Petitioner over was supported by
probable cause, so Respondents still had not met their burden under Section 1357.8
Generally, “this Court is not required to consider legal arguments raised for the first time
on reply.” Lopez Cruz v. Jamison, No. 26cv2278, 2026 WL 1257329, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 7,
2026); see also Calderon v. Noem, No. 25cv2136, 2025 WL 3754042, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec.
29, 2025) (“It is well-settled that a habeas petitioner cannot amend his petition – much less
introduce wholly new claims – in his reply brief.”) (cleaned up). And we generally do not
consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument. See Tomasko v. Iran H. Weinstock,
8 Petitioner’s argument here is, in all but name, a claim that this was an unlawful Terry stop. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). But, to the extent we could even reach that inquiry, it is collateral to the
custody question before this Court. See Vakhtangadze v. Jamison, No. 26cv6630, 2026 WL 2969613, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2026) (“The relevant question on habeas review is whether Petitioner is presently in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, and not whether ICE’s
paperwork could have been more complete at the moment of arrest.’” (quoting Par v. Jamison, No.
26cv3504, 2026 WL 1603299, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2026) (cleaned up)).
Here, the custody Petitioner challenges only includes his initial arrest pursuant to Section
1357(a)(2) and ongoing detention pursuant to Section 1226(a), not any brief detention during the initial
investigatory stop pursuant to Section 1357(a)(1). See Babula v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 665
F.2d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 1981) (“We hold that under section 1357(a)(2) and section 287.3, ‘arrest’ means an
arrest upon probable cause, and not simply a detention for purposes of interrogation.”). As a preliminary
matter, Petitioner has waived any challenge to his initial stop. (See 10/7/26 Hr’g Rough Tr. 3:25–4:01.)
And even if the propriety of that stop was cognizable here, Petitioner may need to exhaust his remedies as
to that issue before an immigration judge at his removal proceedings. See Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen. of
U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Accordingly, we reiterate today that the exclusionary rule may
apply in removal proceedings where an alien shows ‘egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other
liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the
evidence obtained.’”) (quoting I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984)). Therefore, such a
Terry stop claim is thus not properly before this Court on habeas. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466
(1976) (holding that a state prisoner may not be granted habeas relief on Fourth Amendment grounds
when they had an opportunity to bring that claim in state court).
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P.C., 357 F. App’x 472, 479 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that “the specific objections that Weinstock
raised for the first time at oral argument in the District Court have been waived”); In re Corio,
371 F. App’x 352, 355 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to consider an argument raised for the first time during oral argument).
But, considering the instant action has novel underlying facts and legal arguments, and the fact
that material evidence—the body camera footage—was only produced in the middle of oral
argument, the Court will consider the arguments made for the first time on reply or at oral
argument.
And when considering the full scope of evidence and argument before this Court, we find
that the Petition must be denied. As Petitioner challenges both his initial arrest and his current
detention, we will analyze them sequentially. First, we find that Respondents did not violate 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a) when they arrested Petitioner.9 Second, because Petitioner’s arrest and
detention is statutorily proper, we find that Petitioner must exhaust his due process claims before
an immigration judge.
A. 	Petitioner’s Initial Detention Under Section 1357 Was Lawful
The INA provides that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, [a noncitizen]
may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed
from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). But ICE agents also have some authority to act
without a warrant. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a). Section 1357(a) provides them with the “power
without warrant—(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to
9 This ruling does not foreclose this Court granting habeas in other factual scenarios where a
noncitizen’s initial arrest was unlawful. We agree with other judges in this Court that such a claim is
cognizable through a § 2241 habeas petition and need not be exhausted. See, e.g., Tabora-Brizuela, 2026
WL 2908095, at *2; Alameda Juarez, 2026 WL 2981947, at *3; see also Dos Reis v. McShane, No.
26cv3775, 2026 WL 1746649, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026) (“A later bond hearing does not necessarily
cure the alleged constitutional violation that preceded it.”).
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be or to remain in the United States; (2) . . . to arrest any alien in the United States, if [the agent]
has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law
or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Id.
(emphases added). While the Third Circuit has not ruled directly on what the “reason to believe”
standard is in the context of Section 1357(a)(2), other circuits have found it equivalent to a
probable cause analysis. See Lee v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 590 F. 2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.
1979); see also Ramirez Ovando v. Noem, 810 F. Supp. 3d 1209, 1216 (D. Colo. 2025)
(collecting non-Third Circuit decisions).
Here, the ICE agents’ authority to pull over Petitioner and initially interrogate him under
Section 1357(a)(1) is not in dispute. (10/7/26 Hr’g Rough Tr. 3:25–4:01 (Petitioner’s counsel
stating “I believe [the ICE agents] had the authority to stop and perhaps ask some questions”).)
And it is clear from the body camera footage that Petitioner, upon very brief initial questioning
from the agents, admits he is a citizen of Guatemala who is in the United States illegally. (See
Body Camera #4, at 10:46:24–30.) The only dispute is the second prong of Section 1357(a)(2):
whether the agents believed that Petitioner was likely to escape before a warrant could be
obtained. At oral argument, Petitioner’s counsel argued that Petitioner was not likely to escape
because he was surrounded by four ICE agents and had pulled over to the side of the road. (See
Doc. No. 9.) We disagree. At the time the officers decided to take Petitioner into custody, i.e.,
request his keys, order him out of the vehicle, and arrest him (see Body Camera #4, at 10:46:58–
47:24), Petitioner was in the driver’s seat of a truck on a residential street. It would be highly
impractical and contrary to the purpose of the statute for the ICE agents to leave the scene, obtain
an administrative warrant, and then find Petitioner later—especially as Petitioner is, in his
counsel’s words “a true earwig, a ghost if you will” who despite entering the country at the
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border six years ago had avoided any interactions with DHS or ICE prior to September 23, 2026.
(10/7/26 Hr’g Rough Tr. 3:17–18.) So, the Court finds that the ICE agents here had probable
cause to believe that Petitioner was in the United States in violation of the immigration laws and
that he was likely to escape prior to them obtaining a warrant. Therefore, his initial arrest was
lawful under Section 1357(a)(2).10
B. 	Petitioner’s Due Process Challenge to His Current Detention Fails
Having established that Petitioner was properly arrested under Section 1357(a)(2), we
move to whether his continued detention comports with due process. The Fifth Amendment
provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
But “[i]n general, [a petitioner] must exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding
on a habeas petition brought under § 2241.” Ubaid v. Jamison, No. 26cv2681, 2026 WL
1346670, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2026) (quoting Pinet v. Holt, 316 F. App’x 169, 171 (3d Cir.
2009)). “Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241, [courts] have
consistently applied an exhaustion requirement to claims brought under § 2241.” Callwood v.
Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000). There are limited exceptions to exhaustion.
“Exhaustion is not required if administrative remedies would be futile, if the actions of the
agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the
10 The Court also notes that, upon review of all four body camera videos here, we commend the
ICE agents for their professionalism and empathy. The videos show the agents asking questions in a
respectful tone, answering all of Petitioner’s questions with useful information, explaining their actions to
Petitioner as they were effecting the arrest, and coordinating the safe pickup of Petitioner’s truck with a
third-party after he was placed in an agent’s vehicle for transport.
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administrative procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.” Lyons
v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit has “ruled that these
exceptions apply only in extraordinary circumstances.” Republic Indus., Inc. v. Cent. Pa.
Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1982) (cleaned up).
Here, Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this habeas
Petition, and the Court does not find his claims meet any of the exceptions through which
exhaustion would be excused. Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to Section 1226(a),
which permits ICE to “arrest[ ] and detain[ ] [an alien] pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). This provision and its implementing
regulations provide a two-step administrative process by which an alien may request review of a
custody determination: (1) the detained noncitizen may request a bond redetermination hearing
before an immigration judge; and (2) the noncitizen may appeal the immigration judge’s bond
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Ubaid v. Jamison, No. 26cv2681, 2026 WL
1346670, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2026) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)).11
Notably, Petitioner does not argue that such an administrative remedy would be futile, as
he “request[ed] an immigration judge review of this custody determination” on the day of his
detention and such a hearing—at which he will be able to put on evidence regarding his risk of
flight and danger to the community—has not yet occurred. (Doc. No. 4-4; see also Piatukho v.
J.L. Jamison, No. 26cv6413, 2026 WL 2719267, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2026) (determining
that exhaustion was not futile after Petitioner filed his habeas petition two days after DHS’s
11 In relevant part, Section 236.1(d)(1), (3) states: “(1) Application to immigration judge. After an
initial custody determination by the district director, including the setting of a bond, the respondent may,
at any time before an order under 8 CFR part 240 becomes final, request amelioration of the conditions
under which he or she may be released. . . . (3) Appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. An appeal
relating to bond and custody determinations may be filed to the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . .”
(emphasis in original).
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initial custody determination) (citing Ubaid, 2026 WL 1346670, at *9 (“Speculation that a claim
is merely unlikely to prevail in the administrative process based on statistical trends does not
make raising that claim futile.”))). And, in fact, the Government noticed his custody
determination hearing only six days after his initial detention and set it for today, October 15,
2026. (See Doc. No. 4-5.) Further, merely because Petitioner asserts a due process claim does
not, on its own, mean that exhaustion should be waived. See Okorafor v. Att’y Gen. of United
States, 787 F. App’x 808, 810 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the argument, stripped of its due process
language, could have been made before and adjudicated by the [Board of Immigration Appeals],
then it must be exhausted as any other claim.” (citing Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442,
448 (3d Cir. 2005)). Now that the Court has determined that Petitioner’s initial arrest was
lawful, his due process argument is simply a preview of the argument that he will be able to
make at his custody redetermination hearing—that he is not a flight risk or a danger.
And Petitioner has not met his burden to show that Respondents’ actions here clearly and
unambiguously violate due process such that exhaustion should be waived. 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3); Johnston, 312 U.S. at 286. Petitioner does not meaningfully dispute that (1) has
been served with a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court (Doc. No. 4-1); (2) he was served
with an arrest warrant on September 23, 2026 (Doc. No. 4-3); (3) he illegally entered and has
been present in the country for more than six years without ever interacting with DHS or ICE
(Doc. No. 4-2); (4) he has no familial ties to the United States (id.); and (5) he is subject to
President Trump’s Executive Order titled, “Protecting the American People Against Invasion”
(id.). In light of all that, an ICE officer determined that Petitioner would be detained without
bond and provided Petitioner with the opportunity to see review of that determination. (Doc. No.
4-4.) All of which complies with the statutory and constitutional process due to a noncitizen
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when being initially held in custody in these factual circumstances. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531
(“Detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”).
So, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show his current detention
violates due process such that exhaustion should be waived. See Lyons, 840 F.2d at 205.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Petitioner was lawfully arrested under Section 1357(a) and is properly detained under
Section 1226(a), so the Petition must be denied so that Petitioner may exhaust his administrative
remedies. An appropriate order follows.
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