BECKLEY v. TRILLIUM PLACE BY TANDEM LIVING

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MARQUITA CHANTE BECKLEY, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-1548
:
TRILLIUM PLACE BY 	:
TANDEM LIVING, 	:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM
SCHMEHL, J. 	OCTOBER 16, 2026
Currently before the Court is an Amended Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Marquita
Chante Beckley that alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) against Defendant Trillium Place by Tandem
Living (“Trillium”). For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint
with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
In her initial Complaint, Beckley alleged that Trillium violated the ADA by terminating
her the day before she was expected to begin employment as a medication technician because
she had previously disclosed that she suffered from a disability. (See ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”) at
3-4.) Although she was told by a Trillium representative that her job offer was rescinded
because of “phone usage and refusal of patient care,” Beckley claimed that these allegations
were false because she had no prior disciplinary issues. (Id.) Beckley brought claims of
1 The Court adopts the sequential pagination supplied to the Complaint (ECF No. 2) and the
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) by the CM/ECF docketing system.
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wrongful termination and retaliation, alleging that her “anxiety disorder, depression disorder, and
ADHD” were “disabilities within the meaning of the ADA.” (Id. at 4.)
In a June 9, 2026 Memorandum and Order, the Court screened the initial Complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed it without prejudice to amendment.
Beckley v. Trillium Place By Tandem Living, No. 26-1548, 2026 WL 1670109 (E.D. Pa. June 9,
2026); see also ECF Nos. 9 & 10. With respect to her ADA discrimination claims, the Court
concluded that Beckley failed to state a plausible ADA claim because she did not adequately
allege that she suffers from a disability or that Trillium discriminated against her because of it.
Beckley, 2026 WL 1670109, at *2. Specifically, Beckley did not allege how she was limited by
her anxiety disorder, depression, and ADHD. Id. Moreover, even if she had sufficiently alleged
that she suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA, Beckley failed to plausibly
allege that Trillium rescinded her job offer because of a disability. Id. With respect to her ADA
retaliation claim, Beckley failed to allege that she engaged in protected activity under the ADA
or that there was a causal connection between any alleged protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Id. at *3. Beckley was provided with an opportunity to file an amended
complaint. Id.
Beckley has returned with an Amended Complaint against Trillium, reasserting claims of
disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA and adding claims pursuant to
the PHRA. (See ECF No. 11 (“Am. Compl.”) at 1, 2-3, 4.) She alleges claims based on failure
to hire, termination of her employment, unequal terms and conditions of unemployment, and
retaliation. (Id. at 2-3.) She claims that Trillium “abruptly rescinded [her] signed job offer less
that 24 hours before [her] start date, manufacturing a false pretext to penalize [her] for [her]
protected disability disclosure.” (Id. at 3.)
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Beckley asserts that she was diagnosed during her youth with major depression and
anxiety disorder. (Id. at 4.) Between 2021 and 2023, she was also “diagnosed with Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).” (Id.) She avers that these conditions “substantially
limit [her] major life activities” including her “ability to learn, concentrate, sleep, think, interact
with others, regulate intense emotional distress, and maintain basic neurological and cognitive
executive functioning.” (Id.) Beckley alleges that while her conditions caused severe
manifestations that affected her high school academic performance, her conditions have been
“well-managed through routine clinical care and medical management” since May 2025. (Id.)
Beckley worked at Trillium through a staffing agency (IntelyCare) as a Certified Nursing
Assistant (CNA) from April 2025 through the summer of 2025. (Id.) She claims that her CNA
duties were performed successfully, and she “maintained an exemplary work ethic, routinely
received 5-star shift reviews,” and had no disciplinary issues or patient care complaints. (Id.)
On July 5, 2025, Beckley applied for a direct hire position with Trillium as a medication
technician. (Id.) On the “Voluntary Self-Identification of Disability section” of the employment
application, she “checked the box” indicating that she has, or previously had, a disability.2 (Id.)
Beckley claims that by doing so, she put Trillium’s “human resources personnel and hiring
managers on direct corporate notice of [her] protected status.” (Id.)
On July 18, 2025, Beckley was interviewed by representatives of Trillium for the
medication technician position as a direct hire. (Id.) She asserts that Trillium reviewed her
application and “successful history since April” and “extended an official offer letter” that she
signed on July 30, 2025. (Id.) Beckley alleges that her official start date was set for August 12,
2 It is unclear from the allegations of the Amended Complaint whether Beckley was required to
identify the nature any disability on the application form.
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2025. (Id.) However, on August 11, 2025, Beckley received a phone call from Justin Lewis, a
Trillium HR representative, notifying her that the job offer was being rescinded, effective
immediately. (Id. at 5.) She was told that Trillium was rescinding the job offer because of
“phone usage and refusal of patient care.” (Id.)
Beckley claims that Trillium’s accusations are false. (Id.) She maintains that no
concerns or complaints were ever raised regarding her compliance with policy or her work
performance and behavior. (Id. at 4.) She further asserts that Trillium did not “give [her] an
opportunity to speak before making the decision to pull [her] offer.” (Id. at 5.) Beckley alleges
that Trillium’s “manufacture [of] an extreme, unsubstantiated accusation of the eve of [her] start
date” after initialing clearing her for hire, is a “direct causal link” demonstrating “a deliberate,
bad-faith pretext formulated entirely to conceal unlawful discrimination based on [her] protected
disability status.” (Id.)
Beckley avers that she engaged in “legally protected activity under the ADA” by
“disclosing [her] mental health conditions” on Trillium’s employment application. (Id. at 5.)
She claims that the “extreme temporal proximity of just 12 days” between her acceptance of the
employment offer and Trillium’s “abrupt” recission demonstrates that Trillium’s “true
motivation was illegal retaliation to punish [her] for making a protected disability disclosure.”
(Id.)
Beckley filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”) on November 5, 2025, and avers
that she received a Notice of Right-To-Sue letter from the EEOC on December 15, 2025. (Id. at
7-8.) She asserts ADA claims against Trillium for wrongful termination and retaliation. (Id. at
1-3.) She seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. (Id. at 6.)
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
As Beckley is proceeding in forma pauperis (see ECF No. 10), 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotations omitted). At the screening stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se
Amended Complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in Beckley’s favor, and “ask only
whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.”
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), abrogation on other
grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory
allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[T]he plausibility paradigm . . . applies with
equal force to analyzing the adequacy of claims of employment discrimination.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 212 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Court construes the allegations of a pro se litigant liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th
182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.
2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to
name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to
support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout
procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id.; see
also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1,
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2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law,
irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683,
688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible
claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Disability Discrimination
Beckley’s ADA and PHRA3 discrimination claims are not plausible. As the Court
previously instructed Beckley, to state a claim for employment discrimination under the ADA, a
plaintiff must allege that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, she was “otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodations by the employer[;] and she suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision
as a result of discrimination.” Beckley, 2026 WL 1670109, at *2 (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Individuals are disabled within the meaning of the ADA if they: (1) have “‘a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more’ of their ‘major life
activities’; (2) have ‘a record of such an impairment’; or (3) are ‘regarded as having such an
impairment.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). Major life activities include, inter alia,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working, and impairment of the operation of a major bodily function. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A), (B).
3 Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with their federal counterparts. Atkinson
v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d
102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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Beckley has not stated a plausible ADA claim because she has not adequately alleged that
she suffers from a disability or that Trillium discriminated against her because of it. Beckley
alleges in conclusory fashion that she has been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and ADHD.
(Am. Compl. at 4.) Although Beckley avers that these conditions “substantially limit [her] major
life activities” including her “ability to learn, concentrate, sleep, think, interact with others,
regulate intense emotional distress, and maintain basic neurological and cognitive executive
functioning” (id.), she does not include any facts explaining how these activities are limited, let
alone, how they are substantially limited, which she is required to do to meet her pleading
burden. See Taylor v. L. Sch. Admission Council, Inc., No. 25-1312, 2025 WL 1710056, at *2
(E.D. Pa. June 18, 2025), aff’d sub nom. Taylor v. LSAC, No. 25-2478, 2026 WL 2030371 (3d
Cir. July 14, 2026) (dismissing ADA claims where the plaintiff alleged only that she “lives with
an injury, illness or impairment without alleging that the impairment substantially limits a major
life activity” and did not “include any facts explaining how these activities are limited” citing
Sally-Harriet v. N. Child. Servs., No. 17-4695, 2019 WL 1384275, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26,
2019)). Rather, Beckley avers that her conditions have been “well-managed through routine
clinical care and medical management” since May 2025. (Am. Compl. at 4.) Although a
plaintiff need not “go into particulars about the life activity affected by her alleged disability or
detail the nature of her substantial limitations” at the pleading stage, she still must allege some
facts to support an inference that she suffered from a disability within the meaning of the statute.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213; Karipidis v. ACE Gaming LLC, No. 09-3321, 2010 WL 2521209, at *8
(D.N.J. June 9, 2010) (“By simply stating that the plaintiff lives with an injury, illness or
impairment without alleging that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity creates
a defect in the Complaint.”).
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Beckley has also failed to allege plausibly that her job offer was rescinded because of a
disability. She avers only that Trillium rescinded the job offer because of “phone usage and
refusal of patient care.” (Am. Compl. at 5.) She contends that Trillium’s “manufacture [of] an
extreme, unsubstantiated accusation of the eve of [her] start date” after initialing clearing her for
hire, is a “direct causal link” demonstrating “a deliberate, bad-faith pretext formulated entirely to
conceal unlawful discrimination based on [her] protected disability status.” (Id.) Even accepting
her assertion that Trillium’s purported basis for rescission was false, Beckley has not alleged
facts to tie the rescission of the job offer to her disability. See, e.g., Grossinger v. Anthropic,
PBC, No. 26-4705, 2026 WL 2280727, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2026) (“Even if a person is
disabled, that does not mean that any action with negative impact on their lives happened
because they are disabled.”) (citing cases). Accordingly, her disability discrimination claim will
be dismissed.
B. Retaliation
Beckley also avers that she was subject to retaliation by Trillium. (Am. Compl. at 3.)
She alleges that she engaged in “legally protected activity under the ADA” by “disclosing [her]
mental health conditions” on Trillium’s employment application. (Id. at 5.) She claims that the
“extreme temporal proximity of just 12 days” between her acceptance of the employment offer
and Trillium’s “abrupt” recission demonstrates that Trillium’s “true motivation was illegal
retaliation to punish [her] for making a protected disability disclosure.” (Id.)
The ADA retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), states that “[n]o person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA].”
This provision is similar to Title VII’s prohibition of retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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Accordingly, courts analyze ADA retaliation claims under the same framework employed for
retaliation claims arising under Title VII. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing cases).
As Beckley was previously instructed, to state a plausible retaliation claim based on
disability discrimination, she must “plead[] sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) she engaged in
conduct protected by [the ADA]; (2) the employer took adverse action against her; and (3) a
causal link exists between her protected conduct and the employer’s adverse action.” Beckley,
2026 WL 1670109, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 2026) (citations omitted). A general complaint about
unfair treatment does not constitute protected activity; a plaintiff must allege that she complained
specifically about unlawful discrimination. Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d
Cir. 1995); see also Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“[I]t is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee based upon the employee’s
opposition to anything that is unlawful under the ADA.” (emphasis added)).
Beckley has not alleged that she engaged in any activity that is protected under the ADA.
See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). Merely checking the box on
the Trillium employment application indicating that she has or had a disability is not protected
activity. See Leffert v. Walmart Inc., No. 23-2815, 2023 WL 8810790, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
2023) (finding that plaintiff’s disclosure about his wife’s disability did not constitute protected
activity); Brown v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., No. 16-946, 2017 WL 412802, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30,
2017) (“[S]imply disclosing that you have a disability is not engaging in a protected activity
because it is neither an act of participating in a proceeding under the ADA, nor an opposition to
discrimination made unlawful by the ADA.”); Lackey v. Heart of Lancaster Reg’l Med. Ctr., No.
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15-415, 2016 WL 5461185, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2016) (finding the plaintiff had not engaged
in protected activity under the ADA when she disclosed her panic attacks but presented no
evidence that she requested an accommodation as a matter of law).
Beckley does not allege that she complained about unlawful discrimination or that she
took any actions to oppose discrimination or otherwise exercise her rights under the law, such as
by filing a charge or complaint of discrimination or requesting a reasonable accommodation,
prior to being informed that her job offer had been rescinded. Without facts demonstrating that
Beckley engaged in protected activity, including providing specific details about when the
protected activity took place, and facts showing a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action, Beckley has not asserted a plausible claim for ADA
retaliation.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court concludes that further
attempts at amendment would be futile. See Posey v. Klinefelter, No. 25-1428, 2025 WL
1937084, at *2 (3d Cir. July 15, 2025) (per curiam) (“A District Court has discretion to deny a
plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in [her]
complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”) (quoting Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC,
305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver &
Transportation Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by pro se litigant would be
futile when litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”); Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-
2378, slip op. at 5 (3d. Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (per curiam) (“[B]ecause Robinson has had two
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opportunities to amend his complaint, declining to grant further leave to amend was proper.”).
An appropriate Order follows, which dismisses this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
JEFFREY L. SCHMEHL, J.
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