YOUNG v. LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TREVOR A. YOUNG, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 5:26-cv-02739-JDW
:
LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON,
et al. 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM
Trevor Young asserts a long list of claims about his incarceration at Lancaster
County Prison. Many of those claims are not viable, but his claims against Warden Cheryl
Stebeger over excessive heat at the prison can proceed. Of the remaining claims, I will
sever some into a separate lawsuit, and I will dismiss the rest. I will give Mr. Young an
opportunity to file an amended complaint, if he wants, to add additional facts for some
of those claims.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Mr. Young has been incarcerated at LCP since July 2025. His Complaint contains
several different sets of factual allegations to support a variety of claims.
A. 	Excessive Heat
Mr. Young arrived at LCP on July 18, 2025, when the outside temperatures were
mid-90 degrees and humid. There was no air circulation in his cell or any other. Most of
the time, cells had no air flow and were noticeably hotter than common areas. The heat
and exhaustion prevented Mr. Young from sleeping. At some point, he was moved to a
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different block, where he experienced the same high temperatures and stagnant air. In
response to a grievance from Mr. Young dated August 13, ,2025 concerning the excessive
heat, an LCP staff member responded: “Humanity existed for a significant period of time
without air conditioning. In fact, the convenience of modern air conditioning has only
existed since 1902. With that said, air conditioning is not Federally required nor is it state
mandated. You are not alleging suffering any adverse effect from the heat.” (ECF No. 3-1
at 2.)
LCP provided inmates with a free pair of shorts and brought a cooler of ice water
to the block every few hours. Mr. Young learned that the prison provided those things
after an inmate reportedly died of heat stroke, and Warden Steberger told the media that
the free shorts and water would mitigate the heat problem. The water provided often
tasted like salt, soap, and mop water. Prison authorities denied his requests for bottled
water. Mr. Young asserts that an answer to one of his grievances about the water admitted
that the water is treated on-site for the newer part of the prison.
The heat issues continued in July and August 2025. Most prisoners must stay in
their cells to eat meals, so there was no relief from the heat. Throughout that time, Mr.
Young asked prison employees, management, and sick call to do something about the
extreme heat, the drinking water in the coolers, and bad water coming through faucets.
Mr. Young spoke with Warden Steberger personally during the heat wave in early August,
and she replied that nothing could be done about it, but that it would be fixed in the new
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prison that Lancaster County was building. Staff echoed the same message, including in
response to Mr. Young’s grievance. A week after the Warden’s statement to him, prison
officials removed a heat stroke victim during the night.
B. 	Starvation And Congestive Heart Failure
The extreme heat caused Mr. Young to starve and suffer dehydration. He did not
eat anything due to the extreme heat during the first week of his arrival to LCP, which he
reported to the sick call nurse. Mr. Young told the prison and sick call that he was starving
and becoming weaker, with other symptoms. They ignored him and told him to eat the
food he was served. Guards had to check how much he ate.
The prison took him to the hospital at the end of the sixth week of not eating, after
his family called the court and prison. A doctor at the hospital found no problems after
imaging and blood tests. When Mr. Young returned to prison, the staff administered
prescribed medicine incorrectly, rendering it ineffective.
A Prime Care employee offered to put him on Ensure, and that helped. Yet after
the third day on the supplement, Prime Care discontinued it. It took two weeks, until the
same employee came back on duty, for him to get back on the supplement. He then had
several health problems, some of which persist. Prime Care removed the Ensure from Mr.
Young’s diet around September 4, 2025. Mr. Young suffered symptoms of congestive
heart failure, perhaps related to the heat, after he started eating prison food. His
symptoms commenced on September 15, 2025.
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Prime Care employees are, for the most part, rude and abusive. Nurses have abused
him during blood draws and required him to dress his own wounds. But they have refused
to give him more Ensure, even though he shows signs of malnutrition.
C. 	Back Injury
On October 11, 2025, Mr. Young fell. He felt most of the nerves in his back pinch,
particularly in his lower back on the left side. When he tried standing up, he could not do
so without using his arms and an object to help. Mr. Young submitted a sick call slip and
the block worker reported the fall to the on-duty corrections officer. At sick call, staff took
his vitals, but they did not examine his back or send him for X-rays. They offered him
Motrin. He was assigned a bottom bunk. Someone said that medical staff would follow
up within a week, but no one did so.
On November 12, 2025, a physician’s assistant came to address all of Mr. Young’s
issues: he performed an X-ray; asked about Mr. Young’s bowels; and offered medicine
and water pills. The PA also performed a sonogram to check for water around Mr. Young’s
heart, but Mr. Young doubted the efficacy. After that visit, medical staff ignored him for
months, but in or around February 2026, they informed Mr. Young that he only had
swelling and arthritis. Mr. Young doubts that conclusion
Around December 4, 2025, Prime Care removed all his restrictions imposed after
his fall, and Mr. Young was again assigned to a top bunk, even though he’s not physically
able to use a top bunk. On days he has to walk, even to medical, the pain progresses. He
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allegedly has kept sick call and the prison updated on his condition. On April 1, 2026, he
was granted bottom bunk restriction again.
D. 	Other Health Complaints
Mr. Young recites a long litany of other health issues. Once, his cellmate tested
positive for tuberculosis, and when a block officer called medical, the medical staff were
unwilling to help. Medical staff ignored Mr. Young for five days in January 2026 while he
had severe jaw, face, and head pain. Then they told him he could have Motrin unless he
had an infection. Mr. Young fears having to clip his nails or getting his face or hair
trimmed, due to unsanitary conditions. The prison barber purportedly does not clean
equipment between inmates and is supposedly an animal groomer.
E. 	C.O. Caine
On or around September 25, 2025, Mr. Young met Correctional Officer W. Caine,
who started a conversation. Officer Caine expressed his willingness to engage in violence
against current and former inmates. Minutes later, Officer Caine’s supervisor yelled at Mr.
Young and told him not to question an officer. After the supervisor left, Officer Caine
threatened Mr. Young.
Mr. Young filed a grievance on September 25, 2025, but it was denied as
unfounded. The grievance officer said that Mr. Young had encroached Officer Caine’s
boundaries during the exchange. In late November 2025, Mr. Young handwrote a criminal
complaint against Officer Caine and sent it to the district attorney’s office. The block
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counselor refused to give him a form, so Mr. Young had to improvise. A few weeks later,
there was a surprise canine inspection of a few cells on his block, including his. An officer
who resembled Officer Caine’s supervisor patted Mr. Young down, allegedly pushing his
body into Mr. Young’s rear, squeezing him very hard all over, and forcing his fingers into
Mr. Young’s testicles and penis. Mr. Young complained, and the officer departed. Mr.
Young submitted a complaint, which the answering supervisor called unfounded and
denied. Mr. Young reported the pat down and Officer Caine’s threats to a person outside
the prison. Mr. Young later heard that Officer Caine retired in December 2025. Mr. Young
has refiled the criminal complaint with the district attorney’s office.
F. 	Grievances
Mr. Young filed multiple grievances. He contends that prison officials, including
Warden Steberger, denied, ignored, and took no action in response to grievances he filed
concerning the extreme heat and lack of ventilation, foul-tasting water, administration of
his health care, allegations that a block worker was making his food unsanitary, and
alleged threats by Officer Caine.
G. 	Procedural History
Mr. Young alleges claims for violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. He seeks money damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed
in forma pauperis must establish that she is
unable to pay for the costs of her suit.
See Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d
598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Where, as here, a court grants a plaintiff leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis, it must determine whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be
granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). That inquiry applies the standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to that standard, I must determine whether
the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations
omitted). That means I must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, draw
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether there is a plausible claim.
See
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). Conclusory allegations do not
suffice.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a plaintiff is proceeding
pro se,, I construe her
allegations liberally.
See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A.	
In Forma Pauperis
Mr. Young has completed the required forms, attested under penalty of perjury
that he lacks the income and assets to pay the required filing fee, and submitted his prison
account statement. I will therefore permit him to proceed
in forma pauperis. Pursuant to
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, he will still have to pay the filing fee in installments.
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B. 	Misjoinder of Claims
Mr. Young’s Complaint is “best described as a ‘kitchen sink’ or ‘shotgun’ complaint
because it essentially seeks to bring every conceivable claim against every conceivable
defendant.”
Anderson v. First Premier Bank, No. 25-5502, 2025 WL 3214776, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 17, 2025) (quotation omitted)). Courts have criticized this type of pleading as
“troublesome for many reasons,” including that it “harms the plaintiff who brings it,”
because any “genuine dispute becomes almost impossible to discern when it is buried in
pages of various allegations, some of which may not rise to the level of a constitutional
claim.”
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a)
states that “[a] party asserting a claim ... may join, as independent or alternative claims, as
many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 allows
a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in one action if: (a) “any right to relief is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”; and (b) “any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” “For courts
applying Rule 20 and related rules, ‘the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest
possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties
and remedies is strongly encouraged.’”
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966)).
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“But this application, however liberal, is not a license to join unrelated claims and
defendants in one lawsuit.”
Pew v. Little, No. 22-1488, 2024 WL 967823, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
March 6, 2024) (quotation omitted). “Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine,
but Claim A against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against
Defendant 2.”
Williams v. Miller, No. 25-6293, 2026 WL 209815, at *8 n.12 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27,
2026) (quotation omitted). Indeed, courts “have frowned on prisoners’ attempts to lump
together 	their 	multifarious grievances about 	life 	in 	a 	single 	prison.”	
McKinney v.
Prosecutor’s Office, No. 13-2553, 2014 WL 2574414, at *15 (D.N.J. June 4, 2014). To
remedy a misjoinder, a judge may add or drop a party or sever any claims. Fed. R. Civ. P.
21. Rule 21 “give[s] district courts broad discretion in deciding whether to sever a case by
way of severing parties or claims.”
Graudins v. Retro Fitness, LLC, 921 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467
(E.D. Pa. 2013).
Mr. Young’s claims fall into allegations relating or at least tangentially relating to
his conditions of his confinement at LCP, as well as an alleged failure to treat those and
other medical conditions, and other unrelated claims against Officer Caine. The latter
claims are misjoined. To the extent that Mr. Young has also alleged individual liability of
Warden Steberger related to Officer Caine’s actions, those claims also do not belong in
this lawsuit. Accordingly, I will sever into a separate civil action the claims against Officer
Caine and against Warden Steberger individually to the extent they relate to Officer
Caine’s actions. If Mr. Young seeks to proceed on those claims, he will have to pay a
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separate filing fee to pursue them, whether outright or in accordance with 28 U.C.S. §
1915(b) after getting leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.
C. 	Merits Of Remaining Claims
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court
is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely
provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”
Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In a § 1983 action,
the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a
required element, and, therefore, a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved
in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims.
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
1. 	Claims against LCP
To bring claims under § 1983, the plaintiff must show a deprivation committed by
a
person acting under color of state law.
West, 487 U.S. at 48 (emphasis added). A jail or
correctional facility is not a “person” under § 1983, and thus, not an appropriate defendant
in this action.
Herr v. Lancaster Cnty. Prison, No. 24-6686, 2025 WL 553625, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 19, 2025). I will therefore dismiss with prejudice the claims against LCP. If Mr. Young
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seeks to file an amended complaint, he must allege claims against persons acting under
color of state law to proceed.
2. 	Claims against Prime Care
A private corporation under contract to provide medical services at a jail or prison
may be liable under § 1983 in certain circumstances. A private health company providing
services to inmates “cannot be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a
theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”
Natale v. Camden Cnty Corr. Facility,
318 F.3d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 2003). Rather, [t]o plead a § 1983 claim against a prison medical
provider, a plaintiff must allege the provider had “a relevant ... policy or custom, and that
the policy caused the constitutional violation [he] allege[s].”
Id. at 583-84 (citing
Bd. of the
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). “To satisfy the
pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must ... specify what exactly that custom or policy was.”1
McTernan v. City of York, Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “A plaintiff must also allege
that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.”
Est. of Roman v. City
1 A plaintiff may also state a basis for liability against an entity like Prime Care by “alleging
failure-to-supervise, train, or discipline ... [and alleging facts showing] that said failure
amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected.”
Forrest
v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019). In the context of a contract medical provider, the
provider’s “failure to train or supervise must amount to a policy or custom in disregard of
an obvious risk that its employees or agents would commit constitutional violations.”
Ponzini v. Prime Care Med., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 444, 526 (M.D. Pa. 2017),
aff’d in part,
vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Ponzini v. Monroe County, 789 F. App’x 313
(3d Cir. 2019). Mr. Young has not alleged that he was injured due to a failure to supervise,
train, or discipline.
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of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213
(3d Cir. 1996)).
Mr. Young has not tied his allegations of deliberate indifference to a Prime Care
custom or policy. In fact, he has not identified any Prime Care policy or custom that caused
his alleged constitutional violations. He maintains that Prime Care workers treat inmates
badly, but this is not a policy. A policy allegation based solely on a plaintiff’s own personal
experiences does not state a plausible
Monell claim.
See Phillips v. Northampton County,
687 F. App’x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2017) (
per curiam). In the absence of allegations of a Prime
Care policy or custom that caused his injuries, Mr. Young’s allegations are insufficient to
allege a plausible claim against Prime Care.
Lomax v. City of Philadelphia, No. 13-1078,
2017 WL 1177095, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017).
In addition, to state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical
treatment, a prisoner must allege facts indicating that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
A prison official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”
Id. at 837. “A serious medical need is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a layperson
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
	Thomas v. City of
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Harrisburg, 88 F.4th 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). “A serious medical need exists
where ‘failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.’”
Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff alleges
deliberate indifference “where (1) prison authorities deny reasonable requests for medical
treatment, (2) knowledge of the need for medical care is accompanied by the intentional
refusal to provide it, (3) necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons,
[or] (4) prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment for
serious medical needs.”
Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 141 (3d Cir. 2025)
cert. denied,
2026 WL 1718015 (U.S. June 15, 2026) (citation omitted). He can meet this standard by
alleging a delay or denial of medical care is intended to inflict pain without medical
justification or is based solely on a nonmedical reason without any effort to mitigate harm.
DiFraia v. Ransom, 171 F.4th 622, 630 (3d Cir. 2026). Mr. Young has not made the required
allegations. I will therefore dismiss the deliberate indifference claims against Prime Care
without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
3. 	Claims against Warden Steberger
I understand Mr. Young to assert constitutional claims against Warden Steberger
based the denial of or apparent inaction in the face of grievances he filed concerning the
extreme heat and lack of ventilation, foul-tasting water, administration of health care,
allegations that a block worker was making his food unsanitary, and alleged threats by
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Officer Caine. He also claims that Warden Steberger was deliberately indifferent to the
life-threatening conditions of his confinement.2
a. 	Claims about grievances
Mr. Young alleges Warden Steberger ignores grievances that raise concerns about
prisoner health and well-being. Claims based on the handling of prison grievances fail
because “prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures.”
Gerholt v. Wetzel, 858 F. App’x 32, 34 (3d Cir. 2021) (
per curiam) (citations omitted). Thus,
a prison official’s participation in the grievance process, failure to take action in response
to a prisoner’s letter about the conditions in which he is confined, or failure to act after
becoming aware of an employee’s actions, is, without more, an insufficient basis upon
which to base those officials’ personal involvement in the underlying violations.
See Curtis
v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (
per curiam). Thus, to the extent Mr. Young
2 In submitting his Complaint, Mr. Young checked the box on the form he used
indicating that he seeks to name Warden Steberger in her individual and official
capacities. Claims against county employees such as Warden Steberger named in their
official capacity are indistinguishable from claims against the governmental entity that
employs her.
See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). To state a claim for
municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s policies or customs caused
the alleged constitutional violation.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The plaintiff “must identify
[the] custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the
pleading standard.
McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658. Mr. Young fails to allege that he suffered
a constitutional violation due to a Lancaster County policy or custom. Accordingly, any
official capacity claims against Warden Steberger are not plausible, and it’s not clear to
me that Mr. Young actually intended to submit such a claim. I will entertain a request by
Mr. Young to amend his pleading to reassert an official capacity claim/
Monell claim
against Lancaster County should Mr. Young be able to cure this defect.
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bases his claims against Warden Steberger on the alleged improper handling of or
response to grievances generally, the claims are not plausible.
See Woods v. First Corr.
Med. Inc., 446 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2011) (
per curiam). I will dismiss this claim with
prejudice because there is nothing Mr. Young could add in an amended pleading that
would alter this outcome.
b. 	Excessive heat
“To determine whether prison officials have violated the Eighth Amendment, we
apply a two-prong test: (1) the deprivation must be ‘objectively, sufficiently serious; a
prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities’; and (2) the prison official must have been ‘deliberately indifferent to
inmate health or safety.’”
Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020)
(quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (alterations omitted)). Such necessities include food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.
Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). “[S]o long as the conditions of ... confinement are
not foul or inhuman, and are supported by some penological justification, they will not
violate the Eighth Amendment.”
Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020). A prison
official is not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
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In cases arising from inadequate cooling or ventilation, the Eighth Amendment is
concerned with both the “severity” and the “duration” of the prisoner’s exposure to these
conditions.
Rosa-Diaz v. Harry, No. 16-2303, 2017 WL 1316946, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2,
2017),
report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1283771 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2017). A
prisoner’s mere discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment.
Id. at
*9. An inmate may state an Eighth Amendment claim when officials are deliberately
indifferent to circumstances causing a serious medical condition like heat stroke.
Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 1993). Brief or intermittent prison ventilation
problems that correctional officials promptly address and that are not sufficiently severe,
protracted, or harmful to the prisoner do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
that violates the Eighth Amendment.
See Marinelli v. Sorber, No. 22-CV-2401, 2022 WL
4280476, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2022) (citing cases).
Mr. Young alleges an objectively serious deprivation. His assertions of prolonged
extreme heat without appropriate ventilation in July and August 2025, coupled with his
own pleaded health effects that included hospitalization after a six-week inability to eat,
plus the allegations that two other inmates suffered heat stroke, cannot all be disregarded
as an inmate’s mere “discomfort.”
Erskine, 2022 WL 16921844, at *4. “A condition which
might not ordinarily violate the Eighth Amendment may nonetheless do so if it persists
over an extended period of time.”
Dixon, 114 F.3d at 643. While intermittent interruptions
in air ventilation may not rise to constitutional magnitude, Mr. Young has plausibly alleged
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here that the air ventilation issues were not intermittent; they were the status quo during
mid-July and August 2025, and he and others suffered ill health effects as a result.
See
Rosa-Diaz, 2017 WL 1316946, at *9.
Under
Farmer, a plaintiff must allege that the prison official acted with “deliberate
indifference,” that is, that the official knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.”
Id.
In this case, Mr. Young alleges that Warden Steberger had direct knowledge of
LCP’s lack of air ventilation in the cells, as well as knowledge of the danger that the heat
posed because an inmate allegedly died that summer from heat stroke. Mr. Young filed
at least two grievances about the extreme heat and lack of ventilation. Staff responded
by confirming the lack of air conditioning while asserting that access to air conditioning
was not a federal right.
Mr. Young has alleged facts supporting a plausible inference of deliberate
indifference by Warden Steberger at this early stage of the litigation. Mr. Young
speculates that the coolers of water and shorts attempted to mitigate the heat. But
whether that supposed mitigation effort or others were sufficient considering the risk is a
question for a later time. At this point, I take the alleged facts together to infer that
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Warden Steberger was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Mr. Young
from the hot conditions.
See Forshey, 2015 WL 5173717, at *8.
c. 	Water
Mr. Young does not allege that Warden Steberger personally knew of any problems
with the quality of the water at LCP, either in coolers or from the tap, nor does he allege
any specific problems with the water, other than its taste. Mr. Young therefore has not
alleged an “objectively, sufficiently serious” deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.”
Porter, 974 F.3d at 441 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Access
to potable water is a “basic human need.”
Wolfe v. Christie, No. 10-2083, 2013 WL
3223625, at *5 (D.N.J. June 25, 2013). Deprivation of water can be sufficiently serious
where an inmate does not have access to other fluids.
See Collier v. Adams, 602 F. App’x
850, 853 (3d Cir. 2015) (
per curiam). Although Mr. Young alleges that the water provided
in coolers often tasted like salt, soap, and mop water, he does not specify when or how
often he used the coolers, nor does he state that he lacked access to other fluids at those
times.
See Gardner v. Lanigan, No. 137064, 2018 WL 4144689, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2018).
While Mr. Young speculates that the water contributed to kidney stones, he only makes a
single vague mention of it, when he has otherwise provided an exhaustive recitation of
his health history since July 2025. This speculative reference in passing to a potential
health issue does not state a plausible deprivation claim.
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Mr. Young also does not allege that he did not have access to water in his cell, nor
does he assert a plausible claim that the water in the coolers or from the faucet was not
potable and that staff were deliberately indifferent to his need. I will dismiss this claim but
grant Mr. Young leave to amend.
d. 	Medical care
Mr. Young does not allege that Warden Steberger herself was involved in the
health care he received for his eating difficulties, or that she personally lifted his health
restrictions in November 2025. Rather, he claims generally that she had the authority to
resolve medical issues at the prison but chose not to do so, suggesting that Mr. Young
wants to assert claims against Warden Steberger based on her supervisory role at LCP.
Generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for”
an office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying
constitutional violation.
See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005). Rather,
“[s]uits against high-level government officials must satisfy the general requirements for
supervisory liability.”
Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017). There are “two
general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts
undertaken by subordinates.”
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir.
2014),
reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). First, a
supervisor may be liable if he or she “with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the]
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constitutional harm.”
Id. (quoting
A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372
F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)). “Second, a supervisor may be
personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights,
directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.”
Chavarriaga v. New Jersey.
Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d Cir. 2015). Additionally, a supervisory claim requires
“a showing that there was an actual constitutional violation at the hands of subordinates”
before finding liability on the part of the supervisor prison official.
Allen v. Eckard, 804 F.
App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (
per curiam).
Mr. Young has not asserted that Warden Steberger maintained a practice, policy,
or custom that directly caused Mr. Young’s alleged health problems. Nor has he alleged
that she engaged in personal conduct or directed others to engage in conduct to violate
his constitutional rights with respect to his health.
Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227. Further,
Mr. Young has yet to plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation with respect
to his health care at LCP.
Allen, 904 F. App’x at 127. I will therefore dismiss these claims
against Warden Steberger will without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
e. 	Food served by block worker
Although 	Mr. 	Young 	mentions 	a 	block 	worker 	making 	food 	unsanitary 	in
grievances that he attaches to the Complaint, he has not included any allegations in the
body of his extensive Complaint. He only briefly mentions the fact that he filed a grievance
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which led to the purported assault, but the mere reference to the filing of a grievance or
grievances does not suffice to state a plausible claim. While I can consider exhibits
attached to a
pro se plaintiff’s complaint, a complaint cannot state a claim by relying solely
on exhibits, absent factual allegations in the complaint that explain the basis for the
plaintiff’s claims against the defendants.
See Kwanzaa v. Tell, No. 21-1939, 2022 WL
16756334, at *3 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2022) (
per curiam). Therefore, I will dismiss any such claims
for failure to state a claim.
D. 	Motions For Production, Preservation, And To Amend
Mr. Young’s request for discovery is premature, as his case has not passed the
required statutory screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), he has not completed service
of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, and no defendant has yet appeared in
this case. As Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) makes clear, “[a] party may not seek
discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f),
except in a proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when
authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.” As the parties have not
conferred and no exception listed above applies, Mr. Young’s motion is premature.
Mr. Young also seeks to amend his Complaint by adding claims through a motion.
Mr. Young cannot amend in this fashion because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not contemplate piecemeal pleadings or the amalgamation of pleadings, even in the
context of a
pro se litigant.
See Bryant v. Raddad, No. 21-1116, 2021 WL 2577061, at *2
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(E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021) If Mr. Young decides to amend his complaint, then consistent with
this decision and the accompanying Order, he can seek to add claims that are not
misjoined.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
I will grant Mr. Young leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. I will sever the claims
against Officer Caine from the rest of the claims in this Complaint. To the extent that Mr.
Young names Warden Steberger in her individual capacity with respect to claims involving
Officer Caine, I will also sever those claims. I will dismiss claims against LCP and against
Warden Steberger individually alleging deliberate indifference related to grievances with
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). I will dismiss
without prejudice the claims against Warden Steberger in her official capacity and those
alleged in her individual capacity for deliberate indifference with respect to water, health
care treatment, and food service/assault. I will dismiss claims against Prime Care without
prejudice for failure to state a claim. I will permit the claim for deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment against Warden Steberger based on excessive heat to
proceed. Finally, I will deny the Motion For Production And Preservation Of Records and
the Motion To Amend Complaint without prejudice. An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
October 15, 2026
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