Conville v. Northumberland County et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EMMA CONVILLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY,
MARGARET HUGHES,
THOMAS REISINGER,
PRIMECARE MEDICAL, INC.,
JENNIFER LOCKLIER, and
ALYSSA HENGST,
Defendants.
No. 4:25-CV-02536
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
OCTOBER 13, 2026
I. 	BACKGROUND
On December 29, 2025, Plaintiff Emma Conville filed a five-count complaint
against Defendants Northumberland County, Margaret Hughes, Thomas Reisinger,
PrimeCare Medical, Inc., Jennifer Locklier, Jamie Olivo, and Alyssa Hengst.1
Plaintiff later amended her complaint on March 23, 2026, adding two additional
counts.2
On April 6, 2026, Defendants PrimeCare Medical Inc., Jennifer Locklier, and
Alyssa Hengst (the “PrimeCare Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
1 	Doc. 1. In May 2026, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against Defendant Jamie Olivo.
See Docs. 36, 38.
2 	Doc. 23 ¶¶ 30, 33.
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Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	12(b)(6). 3 That 	same 	day, 	Defendants
Northumberland 	County, 	Margaret 	Hughes, 	and 	Thomas 	Resinger 	(the
“Northumberland Defendants”) also filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6).4 The motions are now ripe for consolidated disposition; for the reasons that
follow, both motions are granted. 	However, Plaintiff will be provided leave to
amend the complaint.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly5 and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,6 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’”7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed
that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court
reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note of the
elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations that,
3 	Doc. 27.
4 	Doc. 29.
5 	550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6 	556 U.S. 662 (2009).
7 	Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
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because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations” and
then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 8
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case does not need to establish a
prima facie case in his or her complaint. 	The Third Circuit clarified this point,
stating: “a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.”9
B. 	Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
The facts alleged in the amended complaint, which this Court must accept as
true for the purposes of this motion, are as follows.
Defendant 	PrimeCare 	Medical, 	Inc. 	(“PrimeCare”), 	is 	a 	Pennsylvania
corporation that provides medical and technical staff to correctional facilities and
advises such facilities regarding legal and professional compliance. 10 Plaintiff Emma
Conville is a Licensed Practical Nurse who worked for PrimeCare from March 6,
2019, until August 10, 2023.11 In that time, Conville worked primarily at the
Northumberland County Jail.12 PrimeCare required Plaintiff to maintain security
clearances issued by the Northumberland County Jail and maintained a policy
8 	Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
9 	Id. at 788.
10 	Doc. 23 ¶¶ 4, 17, 18.
11 	Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 35
12 	Id. ¶ 22.
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mandating the termination of any employee who lost a security clearance at any
facility.13
Plaintiff was romantically involved with an employee of the Northumberland
County Jail, Correctional Officer Logan Reynolds.14 On two occasions in August
2023, Officer Reynolds kissed Plaintiff on the forehead in the jailhouse medical
facility without any prompting from Plaintiff.15 Shortly after, Defendant Margaret
Hughes, a Deputy Warden at the Northumberland County Jail, informed Plaintiff’s
supervisor, Jamie Olivo, that the jail was revoking Plaintiff’s security clearance. 16
Moreover, a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint was also filed against
Plaintiff in connection with the kisses. 17
PrimeCare then terminated Plaintiff for the loss of her security clearance. 18
Additionally, PrimeCare—through their agents, Defendants Alyssa Hengst and
Jennifer Locklier—denied Plaintiff’s requests to continue her employment at other
facilities where she maintained appropriate clearances. 19 According to Plaintiff,
PrimeCare previously retained or rehired nurses who had lost their security
clearances at certain facilities, allowing them to work at facilities where they
13 	Id. ¶¶ 23, 98.
14 	Id. ¶ 28.
15 	Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
16 	Id. ¶ 30.
17 	Id. ¶ 31.
18 	Id. ¶ 35.
19 	Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
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maintained appropriate clearances. 20 Specifically, Plaintiff’s former supervisor,
Jamie Olivo, was once terminated and rehired by PrimeCare after losing her security
clearance at Pike County Prison. 21
Plaintiff’s former supervisor, Olivo, supported Plaintiff’s request and asked
PrimeCare to retain Plaintiff to work at other facilities.22 This was not possible,
according to PrimeCare, in light of the pending PREA complaint—of which Plaintiff
was then unaware. 23 According to Plaintiff, PrimeCare did not independently
investigate the incident that caused Plaintiff to lose her security clearance. 24 Nor did
it inform Plaintiff of the cause of her security clearance loss until weeks after her
termination.25
Although Plaintiff was stripped of her security clearance and terminated, her
significant other, Officer Reynolds, was not.26 Northumberland County placed
Officer Reynolds on paid administrative leave pending investigation of the kisses.27
After an internal hearing, the Northumberland County Jail permitted Officer
Reynolds to retain his security clearance and continue his employment at the jail. 28
20 	Id. ¶ 42.
21 	Id. ¶ 43.
22 	Id. ¶¶ 40-41.
23 	Id. ¶¶ 38, 44.
24 	Id. ¶ 45.
25 	Id. ¶ 46.
26 	Id. ¶ 51.
27 	Id. ¶¶ 48-49.
28 	Id. ¶¶ 50-51.
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Plaintiff timely filed complaints with the United States Equal Opportunity
Commission 	(“EEOC”) 	and 	the 	Pennsylvania 	Human 	Relations 	Commission
(“PHRC”).29 On September 30, 2025, Plaintiff received a Notice of Right-to-Sue
(“NORS”). 30 As noted above, Plaintiff then filed a complaint in this Court against
Defendants 	Northumberland 	County, 	Margaret 	Hughes, 	Thomas 	Reisinger,
PrimeCare, Jennifer Locklier, Jamie Olivo, and Alyssa Hengst. 31
C. 	Analysis
1. 	Sex Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff’s first six counts in the amended complaint allege sex discrimination
by Defendants in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) and
Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).32 Specifically, Count I alleges that
Northumberland County discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation
Title VII by revoking her security clearance while allowing a male colleague to
retain 	his 	security 	clearance 	for 	the 	same 	conduct.33 Count 	II 	alleges 	that
PrimeCare’s policy of terminating employees for loss of a security clearance
disparately impacts its predominantly female workforce in violation of Title VII.34
Count III alleges that Northumberland County’s conduct alleged in Count I also
29 	Id. ¶ 54.
30 	Id. ¶ 55.
31 	Doc. 1 (later amended at Doc. 23).
32 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 43 P.S. § 951 et seq., respectively.
33 	Doc. 23, pp 61-76.
34 	Id. ¶¶ 77-101.
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violates analogous provisions in the PHRA. 35 Count IV alleges that Warden Thomas
Resinger and Deputy Warden Margaret Hughes aided, abetted, incited, compelled,
or coerced Northumberland County into discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis
of her sex in violation of the PHRA. 36 Count V alleges that PrimeCare alternatively
subjected Plaintiff to disparate treatment on the basis of her sex or aided, abetted,
incited, compelled, or coerced Northumberland County into discriminating against
Plaintiff in violation of the PHRA. 37 Count VI alleges that PrimeCare employees
Jennifer Locklier, and Alyssa Hengst aided, abetted, incited, compelled, or coerced
PrimeCare into discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of her sex in violation of
the PHRA. 38
Employers are prohibited by Title VII from discriminating against their
employees on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin.39 Subsequent
amendments to Title VII specify that an unlawful employment practice is established
“when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.” 40
35 	Id. ¶¶ 102-11.
36 	Id. ¶¶ 112-36.
37 	Id. ¶¶ 137-51.
38 	Id. ¶¶ 152-67. As noted, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims—including the instant
claim—against Defendant Jamie Olivo. See Doc. 36.
39 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2.
40 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m).
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A plaintiff may succeed on a Title VII claim—or the analogous provision of
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 41—by demonstrating either a pretextual
basis or a mixed motive for a discriminatory employment practice. 42 At this stage,
the amended complaint “need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a
motion to dismiss.”43 In fact, Plaintiff need not even decide between pursuing a
pretextual or mixed motive theory.44 Rather, Plaintiff need only supply “enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary
elements.” 45
On each of her sex discrimination claims, Plaintiff alleges unlawful disparate
treatment. Such illicit disparate treatment is cognizable “when an individual of a
protected group is shown to have been singled out and treated less favorably than
others similarly situated on the basis of an impermissible criterion under Title VII.” 46
Accordingly, to prevail on a claim of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must offer a valid
41 	Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Claims under the PHRA
are interpreted coextensively with Title VII claims.”) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d
102, 105 (3d Cir.1996)).
42 	The former theory implicates McDonnell Douglas Corp.’s three-part burden shifting inquiry
in which a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, after which
the burden shifts to the defendant to furnish a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action,
and finally the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the nondiscriminatory explanation
is merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-
04 (1973). The latter theory implicates the framework set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir.2008).
43 	Connelly, 809 F.3d at 788.
44 	Id.
45 	Id. at 789 (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008)) (cleaned
up).
46 	E.E.O.C. v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 347 (3d Cir. 1990).
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“comparator” against which the Court can assess whether similarly-situated persons
outside the Plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably than herself.47 A
comparator employee need not be identical to Plaintiff but must be similarly situated
in “all material respects.” 48 Relevant factors include whether the employees reported
to the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and shared like
responsibilities.49 Employees that hold different job titles or work in different
departments are not similarly situated.50 At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff
need only “allege facts sufficient to make plausible the existence of such similarly
situated parties.” 51
Because Plaintiff fails to make plausible the existence of such similarly
situated parties, each of her sex discrimination claims fail. Plaintiff offers only one
comparator, Officer Reynolds.52 She claims that because they were subject to “the
same security clearance protocols, as well as the same policies and procedures
established by the Northumberland County Jail,” she and Officer Reynolds are
similarly situated. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff acted as a jail nurse; Officer
Reynolds acted as a corrections officer. Plaintiff worked for PrimeCare; Officer
47 	See Qin v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 474 (3d Cir. 2024).
48 	In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018).
49 	Id.
50 	Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2013).
51 	Perano v. Twp. Of Tilden, 423 F. App'x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009)).
52 	See Doc. 23 ¶¶ 48-53.
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Reynolds for the Northumberland County Jail. They operated under different titles
and within different departments and therefore are not similarly situated. 53 As
presently alleged, the Court has no basis to presume that discovery would yield
evidence of other similarly situated persons beyond her protected class who received
superior treatment. Having failed to allege facts from which one could reasonably
infer that she was treated differently than other employees on the basis of her sex,
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim is an unsupported conclusion.
Because the Court’s inquiries under Title VII and the PHRA are coextensive,
each of Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims—Counts I through VI of the amended
complaint—must be dismissed. 54
2. 	Civil Rights Claims
In the final count of the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that all
Defendants deprived her of her procedural due process rights in violation of 42
U.S.C. 	§ 	1983.55 Her 	theory 	is 	somewhat 	complex. 	She 	claims 	that 	the
Northumberland Defendants—Northumberland County, Hughes, and Reisinger—
filed a baseless PREA complaint against her and this led PrimeCare, with the help
of Locklier and Hengst, to “refuse to employ [her] at any other correctional
facility.” 56 In this way, Plaintiff alleges, Defendants deprived her of her “protected
53 	Mandel, 706 F.3d at 170.
54 	Atkinson, 460 F.3d at 454 n.6.
55 	Doc. 23 ¶¶ 168-92.
56 	Doc. 35, at 15-16.
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employment interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 57 Each Defendant, in
Plaintiff’s telling, played a role in this deprivation. First, the Northumberland
Defendants were responsible for filling the “baseless” PREA complaint. 58 And
second, the PrimeCare Defendants—PrimeCare, Locklier, and Hengst—failed to
recognize that the PREA complaint was baseless and failed to intervene with the
Northumberland Defendants on her behalf.59 The Defendants moved to dismiss the
Section 1983 claims on various grounds, including that they are time barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.60
The lapse of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. 61 Courts may
only grant motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds “when the statute of
limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” 62 The statute of
limitations under Section 1983 is borrowed from the personal injury tort law of the
state where the cause of action arose. 63 Pennsylvania’s personal injury statute of
limitations is two years.64 Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues.65
Civil rights claims accrue under federal law “when the plaintiff knew or should have
57 	Id. at 21.
58 	Id. at 16.
59 	Id. at 16-17.
60 	Doc nos
61 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
62 	Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2017).
63 	Nguyen v. Pennsylvania, 906 F.3d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 2018).
64 	Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524).
65 	Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).
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known of the injury upon which its action is based.” 66 This inquiry is objective: the
cause of action accrues “at the moment at which each of its component elements has
come into being as a matter of objective reality.” 67 Generally, a cause of action is
considered to have accrued “when the last act needed to complete the tort occurs.”68
“The cause of action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then
known or predictable. Were it otherwise, the statute would begin to run only after a
plaintiff became satisfied that he had been harmed enough, placing the supposed
statute of repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief.” 69
Plaintiff concedes that she knew “that PrimeCare had discriminated against
her by maintaining a policy that disproportionately disfavors female employees at
correctional facilities and that Locklier and Hengst had aided and abetted both
PrimeCare and the Northumberland Defendants in discriminating against her based
on her gender,” by August 10, 2023.70 For that injury, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 cause
of action expired by August 10, 2025.
Plaintiff seeks to avoid this fate for her claim, however, by alleging that the
PrimeCare Defendants “had taken another action that produced a different harm,”
and that Plaintiffs “did not and could not diligently discover” this action and harm
66 	Id. (quoting Sameric Corp., 142 F.3d at 599).
67 	Leonard v. City of Pittsburgh, 570 Fed. App'x 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing William A.
Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 150 (3d Cir. 2011))
68 	English v. City of Wilkes-Barre, No. 22-2477, 2023 WL 2400698, *2 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2023).
69 	Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
70 	Doc. 35, at 15-16.
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until Jamie Olivo revealed the same in December 2023.71 That is, PrimeCare had
refused to employ Plaintiff at any other correctional facility due to the PREA
complaint, and Plaintiff had no way of knowing of this injury until Olivo revealed it
to her. Thus, Plaintiff ostensibly seeks application of the discovery rule.
Pennsylvania’s discovery rule “tolls the statute of limitations where an injury
or its cause is not reasonably knowable.” 72 For a court to toll the statute of
limitations, the plaintiff must show that she used “reasonable diligence to investigate
[her] claims.” 73 A plaintiff demonstrates this reasonable diligence where she
“exhibit[s] ‘those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which
society requires of its members for the protection of their own interests and the
interests of others.’”74 Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
discovery rule is “strict” and “less plaintiff favorable.”75 That Court has also
emphasized that Pennsylvania’s formulation of the discovery rule is narrower and
more burdensome for plaintiffs than that of other jurisdictions.76 The Third Circuit
has observed that the discovery rule is applicable “only to those situations where the
71 	Id. at 16.
72 	Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 (Pa. 2021); Getchey v. Cnty. of
Northumberland, 120 Fed. App'x 895, 898 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the existence of the injury
is not known to the complaining party and such knowledge cannot be reasonably ascertained
within the prescribed statutory period, the limitations period does not begin to run until the
discovery of the injury is reasonably possible.”).
73 	Riad v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 22-1757, 2023 WL 8676234, *3 (3d Cir. Mar. 23, 2023).
74 	Id.
75 	Rice, 255 A.3d at 247.
76 	Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880, 892 (Pa. 2018)
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nature of the injury itself is such that no amount of vigilance will enable the plaintiff
to detect an injury.” 77
Based on the facts alleged, it does not appear plausible that Plaintiff’s alleged
injury is of such a nature that “no amount of vigilance [would] enable [her] to detect
an injury,” such that the discovery rule would apply.78 As the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has noted, although there are “very few facts which diligence cannot
discover,” there must be “some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in the
channel in which it would be successful.”79 Here, Plaintiff was given clear reason to
awaken inquiry and direct her diligence toward the basis of her injury. By her own
admission, Plaintiff was aware of her termination and its allegedly discriminatory
basis by mid-August of 2023.80 After her termination, she questioned her former
supervisor, Jamie Olivo, and more senior supervisors why she could not work at
other prisons where she maintained appropriate clearances. 81 Olivo even went to bat
for her, similarly inquiring up the chain of command why Plaintiff could not work
at another prison.82 According to Plaintiff, Olivo was told that Plaintiff could not
work elsewhere because she was subject to a PREA investigation—information
77 	Getchey, 120 Fed. App'x at 899.
78 	Id.
79 	Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 858 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Crouse v. Cyclops Industries, 745
A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. 2000)) (cleaned up).
80 	Doc. 35, at 15-16.
81 	Id. at 6.
82 	Id. at 6-7.
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Plaintiff claims was withheld from her.83 It is unclear to the Court, if Supervisor
Olivo was advocating for Plaintiff and became aware of the PREA complaint, why
Olivo would have withheld this vital information from Plaintiff until over two years
after the incident in question and after the statute of limitations had already expired.
The Court finds it implausible that no amount of diligence on Plaintiff’s part would
have yielded awareness of this alleged injury. For this reason, the Court finds the
discovery rule inapplicable here.
Setting the discovery rule aside and assuming arguendo that due diligence
would not have yielded to the Plaintiff awareness of the PREA complaint, the Court
is unpersuaded that Plaintiff’s alleged civil rights violation implicates the PREA
complaint in any material way. Plaintiff seeks relief under Section 1983 for the
alleged deprivation of her “protected employment interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”84 But Plaintiff concedes that she was aware that the last act required
for the completion of this deprivation occurred on August 10, 2023, when PrimeCare
terminated her employment because she lost her security clearance in violation of
PrimeCare policy.85
83 	Id.
84 	Doc. 35, at 21.
85 	See Doc. 35 at 15-16 (acknowledging that Plaintiff “knew that PrimeCare had discriminated
against her by maintaining [the security clearance policy] that disproportionately disfavors
female employees at correctional facilities”); Doc. 23 ¶ 98.
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Plaintiff submits evidence that, but for the PREA complaint, PrimeCare could
have retained her to work at other facilities where she retained appropriate
clearances. She notes that PrimeCare had terminated Jamie Olivo for losing her
security clearance at Pike County Prison before eventually rehiring her to work at
other facilities where she maintained appropriate clearances. 86 In Plaintiff’s view,
this demonstrates that PrimeCare could have likewise employed her at the other
facilities where she maintained appropriate clearances. 87 But these facts tilt against
Plaintiff. They validate her express acknowledgement that PrimeCare had a policy
of firing employees for losing a security clearance at any facility.88 Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s 	“protected 	employment 	interest” 	would 	have 	been 	deprived—and
Plaintiff concedes awareness of this deprivation—when she was fired for losing her
security clearance in violation of PrimeCare’s policy on August 10, 2023. That she
could have been rehired, like Olivo, but for the “baseless” PREA complaint of which
she was unaware, is immaterial given that her protected employment interest would
have already been deprived and her civil rights claim already ripened when she was
fired for losing her security clearance.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the alleged Section 1983 injuries accrued at
the time of their commission—that is, when Plaintiff was terminated in August of
86 	Id. ¶ 43.
87 	Id. ¶¶ 40-42.
88 	Id. ¶ 98 (“PrimeCare maintained a policy that established that if an employee lost her security
clearance at any facility, the subject employee would be terminated.”) (emphasis in original).
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2023. Under Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations, those injuries expired in August
of 2025—four months before Plaintiff filed her complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims must be dismissed.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is granted. Plaintiff
is granted leave to amend her complaint.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the situation in which a
deficiency in a complaint could be cured by amendment but leave to amend is not
sought.”89 But the law in the Third Circuit is clear that leave to amend should be
“freely given” regardless of whether leave is specifically requested.90
As such, Plaintiff will be given fourteen days from today’s date to file a
second amended complaint. 	If no amended complaint is filed, the action will be
subject to dismissal with prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
89 	Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).
90 	Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).
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