PEREZ DIAZ v. WARDEN OF MOSHANNON VALLEY PROCESSING CENTER et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LUIS PEREZ DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF MOSHANNON VALLEY
PROCESSING CENTER, et. al.,
Respondents.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil No. 26-1694
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (ECF No. 1) filed by Luis Perez Diaz (“Diaz”), a citizen and national of Mexico. On
September 8, 2026, Respondents filed a Response to the petition (ECF No. 5). The petition is ripe
for decision.
On or about September 25, 2023, Diaz entered the United States without proper documents,
and after receiving a Notice to Appear, was paroled into the United States (ECF No. 1 at 11; ECF
No. 5 at 2). On May 12, 2026, Diaz was taken into custody “following a traffic violation” and was
not offered a bond hearing (ECF No. 1 at 12). He is currently detained at the Moshannon Valley
Processing Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania (Id.).
Due to “his living in the interior of the country for years[,]” Diaz asserts that he is subject
to discretionary detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and as such, contends that he is entitled to a bond hearing in which the government
will bear the burden of proof (Id. at 16-17, 36). Respondents contend that Diaz is an arriving alien
and is therefore subject to mandatory detention (ECF No. 5 at 2, 5). However, recognizing the
Case 3:26-cv-01694-JFC Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 1 of 3

2
precedent in this circuit, Respondents suggest that, if the court were inclined to grant relief, a bond
hearing would be sufficient to satisfy due process (Id. at 5).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC,
No. 26-1150, 2026 WL 2546223 (3rd Cir. Aug. 28, 2026), concluded that noncitizens detained in
the interior of the United States are detained under § 1226(a) and are therefore entitled to an
individualized bond hearing. In the present case, both parties acknowledge that Diaz was present
in the country at the time of his most recent arrest (see ECF No. 1 at 12; ECF No. 5 at 3), so
following Buele Morocho, the court concludes that Diaz’s detention is governed by § 1226(a).
Because his detention is governed by § 1226(a), Diaz has a statutory right to an
individualized bond hearing, but the burden of proof at this bond hearing will remain on Diaz. See
Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that the
burden of proof always remains on the detainee under § 1226(a)); see also Abdoulaye Ba v. Oddo,
No. 26-1466, 2026 WL 2529806, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2026).1
To the extent that Diaz seeks an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), the court concludes that they will not
be awarded. Under the EAJA, a court may award fees and expenses to a prevailing party against
the United States, unless “the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The
key issue here is whether Diaz is an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a).
Respondents argued that “applicant for admission” includes noncitizens like Diaz who have
1 The court notes that, even if a burden-shifted bond hearing for § 1226(a) detainees could be considered by this court,
the court would not shift the burden because Diaz’s detention has not become unreasonably prolonged under German
Santos. See German Santos v. Warden Pike Cty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2020). Diaz has only
been detained for four months, which is not unreasonable. C.f. Foula Bah, v. Oddo, No. 3:26-CV-01393, 2026 WL
2561261, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2026) (concluding that the burden of proof shifted where the petitioner had been
detained for over eleven months).
Case 3:26-cv-01694-JFC Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 2 of 3

3
already been residing in the interior of the United States. See generally ECF No. 5. Respondents’
interpretation of § 1225(a), while incorrect under Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ precedent, is
substantially justified because two United States Courts of Appeals and the dissent in Buele
Morocho have found that “applicant for admission” includes noncitizens who have resided in the
interior of the country for years. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026);
Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. March 25, 2026). Because the Respondents’ position is
supported by other Circuits’ reasonings and the issue has not yet been resolved by the Supreme
Court, the court concludes that Diaz is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the EAJA.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) will
be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. It will be GRANTED in that within thirty
(30) days of this Order, Diaz must receive an individualized bond hearing before a neutral
immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The petition will be DENIED to the extent it
requests any additional relief.
An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: October 8, 2026 /s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Joy Flowers Conti
Senior United States District Court Judge
Case 3:26-cv-01694-JFC Document 6 Filed 10/08/26 Page 3 of 3