Deaton v. Town of Barrington et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
JOHN DEATON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	C.A. No. 20-15 WES
)
TOWN OF BARRINGTON, JAMES CUNHA, 	)
DAVID WYROSTEK, ANTHONY 	)
DECRISTOFORO, TIMOTHY 	)
HARRINGTON, and JOHN LaCROSS 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
ECF No. 25. 	For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED in
part 	and 	DENIED 	in 	part. 	Further, 	the 	remaining 	state 	law 	claim
and associated supervisor liability and municipal liability claims
are REMANDED to the Rhode Island Superior Court.
I. Background
The 	present 	case 	arises 	from 	an 	altercation 	between
Plaintiff, 	John 	Deaton, 	and 	his 	girlfriend’s 	ex-husband, 	Ronald
Warner, after which Plaintiff was arrested. 	See Defs.’ Statement
of 	Undisputed 	Facts 	(“DSUF”) 	¶¶ 	1, 	4, 	14 	ECF 	No. 	26; 	Pl.’s
Statement of Disputed Facts (“PSDF”) ¶ 1, 14 ECF No. 30; Am. Compl.
¶ 	11, 	ECF 	No. 	23. 	The 	outcome 	of 	this 	lawsuit, 	which 	challenges
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the 	constitutionality 	of 	the 	arrest 	as 	well 	as 	the 	ensuing
prosecution, 	largely 	depends 	upon 	whether 	the 	arresting 	officer
had 	probable 	cause 	to 	arrest 	Plaintiff. 	While 	many 	of 	the 	facts
surrounding 	the 	altercation 	and 	the 	investigation 	are 	hotly
disputed, 	the 	probable 	cause 	determination 	hinges 	upon 	what 	the
arresting 	officer 	knew 	about 	the 	altercation 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the
arrest. 	The 	following 	facts, 	viewed 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable
to 	Plaintiff, 	are 	undisputed 	and 	establish 	what 	the 	arresting
officer knew at the time he arrested Plaintiff.
On the afternoon of September 24, 2017, the Barrington Police
Department 	(“BPD”) 	received 	a 	911 	call 	from 	Warner, 	who 	reported
that 	Plaintiff 	had 	“put 	his 	hands 	on 	[Warner’s] 	throat” 	and
assaulted him1 outside of Barrington High School after a football
game. 	DSUF 	¶ 	4; 	911 	Call 	Tr., 	Ex. 	17, 	ECF 	No. 	28-18; 	see 	PSDF
¶ 7. 	Two 	Officers, 	Defendants 	Wyrostek 	and 	DeCristoforo, 	were
dispatched to the scene. 	DSUF ¶ 5; see PSDF ¶ 2.
Officer 	Wyrostek 	arrived 	first 	and 	met 	with 	Warner, 	who
explained that during an argument his ex-wife’s boyfriend had put
his hands on Warner’s throat. 	DSUF ¶¶ 6–7; PSDF ¶ 7. 	As Officer
Wyrostek was speaking with Warner, Plaintiff drove by, and Warner
1 	Plaintiff 	admits 	that 	“[his] 	hand 	may 	have 	touched
[Warner’s] 	throat 	. 	. 	. 	or 	touched 	his 	neck 	area,” 	but 	testified
that 	this 	occurred 	when 	he 	was 	acting 	in 	self-defense, 	trying 	to
push Warner away. 	Deaton Dep. 90:6-9, 106:1-3, ECF No. 28-45.
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pointed 	and 	identified 	Plaintiff 	as 	the 	person 	who 	had 	assaulted
him. 	DSUF ¶¶ 10–11; PSDF ¶ 11. 	Officer Wyrostek conducted a stop
of 	Plaintiff 	a 	short 	distance 	from 	school 	grounds. 	DSUF 	¶¶ 	12–
13; 	see 	PSDF 	¶¶ 	11, 	14. 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	asked 	Plaintiff 	what
happened, 	and 	Plaintiff 	said 	he 	did 	not 	attack 	Warner2 	and 	that
there 	might 	be 	an 	active 	warrant 	for 	Warner’s 	arrest.3 	Pl.’s
Additional Undisputed Facts (“PAUF”) ¶ 38, ECF No. 29; Defs.’ Resp.
PAUF 	¶ 	38, 	ECF 	No. 	33. 	At 	some 	point 	during 	the 	stop, 	Plaintiff
exited 	his 	vehicle 	to 	speak 	with 	Officer 	Wyrostek, 	and, 	shortly
thereafter, 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	placed 	Plaintiff 	in 	handcuffs. 	See
Am. 	Compl. 	¶ 	22. 	After 	a 	few 	minutes 	of 	questioning, 	Officer
Wyrostek informed Plaintiff that he was being arrested for simple
2 	At 	his 	deposition, 	Plaintiff 	testified 	that 	he 	maintained
his innocence when Officer Wyrostek pulled him over. 	Deaton Dep.
108:13-15, ECF No. 25-12. 	When asked during his deposition whether
Plaintiff 	maintained 	his 	innocence, 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	responded:
“[Plaintiff] told me not to believe what [Warner] said because he
was 	a 	loser 	with 	a 	warrant.” 	Wyrostek 	Dep. 	70:4-10, 	ECF 	No. 	28-
49. 	Similarly, while Plaintiff testified that that he told Officer
Wyrostek 	that 	Warner 	was 	the 	one 	who 	assaulted 	him, 	Officer
Wyrostek did not testify to the same. 	Deaton Dep. 108:13-15; see
Wyrostek 	Dep., 	ECF 	No. 	28-49. 	The 	arrest 	report 	notes 	that
Plaintiff claimed he was acting in self-defense. 	Arrest Report 3,
Ex. 19, ECF No. 28-20.
3 Plaintiff also asked Officer Wyrostek if he could take his
girlfriend 	and 	her 	children, 	all 	of 	whom 	were 	also 	in 	the 	car,
home 	and 	then 	return 	to 	the 	scene 	to 	respond 	to 	questioning;
Officer 	Wyrostek 	denied 	this 	request. 	Pl.’s 	Additional 	Undisp.
Facts 	(“PAUF”) 	¶¶ 	34-35, 	ECF 	No. 	29; 	Defs.’ 	Resp. 	PAUF 	¶¶ 	34-35,
ECF No. 33.
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assault and battery and disorderly conduct.4 	See DSUF ¶ 14; Arrest
Report 4, ECF No. 23-3.
Officer 	DeCristoforo 	arrived 	at 	the 	school 	shortly 	after
Officer Wyrostek pulled Plaintiff over. 	PAUF ¶ 33; Defs.’s Resp.
PAUF 	¶ 	33. 	Upon 	arrival, 	he 	spoke 	with 	Warner 	and 	Warner’s
girlfriend, 	Ashley 	Maryyanek,5 	who 	confirmed 	Warner’s 	story.
Arrest 	Report 	4; Maryyanek 	Statement, 	ECF 	No. 	23-3. 	Officer
DeCristoforo 	also 	examined 	Warner 	for 	injuries 	and 	observed 	that
his 	“throat 	did 	not 	appear 	red, 	swollen, 	or 	show 	finger 	marks.”
Arrest 	Report 	4. 	At 	some 	point,6 	Officer 	DeCristoforo 	spoke 	to
4 Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine dispute of material
fact as to when he was arrested because in his deposition Officer
Wyrostek 	said 	the 	arrest 	occurred 	when 	he 	told 	Plaintiff 	he 	was
being 	arrested 	while 	Plaintiff 	claims 	he 	was 	arrested 	the 	moment
he 	was 	handcuffed. 	Pl.’s 	Mem. 	Supp. 	Opp’n 	S.J. 	(“Pl.’s 	Opp’n”)
16. 	First, as Defendants point out, this is a legal question, not
a 	factual 	one. 	Second, 	Plaintiff 	has 	not 	clarified 	the 	legal
significance 	of 	the 	timing 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	arrest. 	However, 	for
the purposes of this decision, the Court assumes without deciding
that Plaintiff was arrested when he was placed in handcuffs.
5 The parties also refer to Ms. Maryyanek as “Ms. Marryaneu”
at times. 	The Court uses the spelling provided on Ms. Maryyanek’s
sworn statement. 	See Maryyanek Statement, ECF No. 23-3.
6 	The 	parties 	dispute 	when 	this 	conversation 	occurred.
Plaintiff asserts that it occurred much later in the day, after he
had already been released, while Defendants assert that it occurred
before Plaintiff’s arrest. 	See Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts
(“PSDF”) 	¶ 	15, 	ECF 	No. 	30; 	Defs.’ 	Mem. 	Supp. 	Summ. 	J. 	(“Defs.’
Mem.”) 	25, 	ECF 	No. 	25-1. 	This 	dispute 	is 	not 	material, 	however,
as 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Fisher’s 	statement 	was 	not 	needed 	to
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Seth 	Fisher, 	who 	said 	that 	he 	witnessed 	Plaintiff 	“put 	his 	right
hand 	on 	[Warner’s] 	throat” 	before 	Fisher 	broke 	up 	the 	fight.
Fisher 	Statement, 	Ex. 	12, 	ECF 	No. 	28-13. 	After 	Plaintiff 	had
already 	been 	placed 	in 	handcuffs, 	Officer 	DeCristoforo 	told
Officer 	Wyrostek 	that 	he 	had 	witness 	confirmation 	of 	Warner’s
story. 	See Wryostek Dep., 91:19-92:4, ECF No. 25-13; DeCristoforo
Dep., 	101:16-19, 	ECF 	No. 	25-14; 	Kristiana 	Warner 	Statement, 	ECF
No. 	23-2. 	At 	some 	point 	that 	day, 	after 	Plaintiff’s 	arrest,
Officer 	DeCristoforo 	learned 	that 	there 	was 	an 	active 	arrest
warrant 	for 	Warner, 	and 	Warner 	was 	subsequently 	arrested 	by 	the
Providence 	Police 	Department 	pursuant 	to 	that 	warrant. 	Arrest
Report 4.
After 	approximately 	two 	hours 	at 	the 	police 	station,
Plaintiff 	was 	released 	on 	his 	own 	recognizance. 	DSUF 	¶ 	14; 	PSDF
¶ 	14. 	Louis 	Pulner, 	the 	prosecutor 	for 	the 	Town 	of 	Barrington,
prosecuted 	the 	charges 	against 	Plaintiff. 	Pulner 	Dep. 	10:15-16,
11:4-11, ECF No. 25-16; 48A Dismissal, Ex. 33, ECF No. 28-34. 	The
case 	was 	scheduled 	for 	trial 	but 	before 	trial 	occurred 	a 	48A
dismissal 	was 	entered 	and 	the 	charges 	were 	dismissed.7 	48A
establish probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. 	See discussion infra
Part III. A.
7 The parties dispute the reason for the 48A dismissal but do
not 	dispute 	that 	it 	was 	entered. 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	the
prosecutor “was motivated by his desire to protect the family unit
from the possible ramifications of a conviction,” Defs.’ Statement
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Dismissal; see DSUF ¶¶ 15-17; PSDF ¶¶ 15-17.
Thereafter, 	Plaintiff 	brought 	the 	present 	lawsuit. 	The 	case
was initially brought in Rhode Island Superior Court and later was
removed 	to 	this 	Court. 	See 	Notice 	of 	Removal, 	ECF 	No. 	1.8
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges unlawful arrest in violation
of R.I.G.L. § 12-7-3 (Count I); false imprisonment in violation of
R.I.G.L. 	§ 	12-7-1 	(Count 	II); 	malicious 	prosecution 	(Count 	III),
invasion 	of 	privacy 	(Count 	V); 	assault 	and 	battery 	(Count 	VI);
failure 	to 	supervise 	(Count 	VII); 	municipal 	liability 	(Count
VIII); unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment 	via 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	(Count 	IX); 	conspiracy 	to 	violate
Plaintiff’s 	constitutional 	rights 	via 	§ 	1983 	(Counts 	IV 	and 	X);9
of Undisp. Facts (“DSUF”) ¶ 17, ECF No. 26, and Plaintiff asserts
that the case was dismissed “to avoid an embarrassing loss at trial
and avoid the Officers committing perjury,” PSDF ¶ 15.
8 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Motion 	to 	Remand 	arguing 	that 	his
Complaint did not raise any federal questions and that, therefore,
the Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.
ECF No. 7. 	The Court denied the motion to remand, concluding that
the Complaint clearly alleged violations of state and federal law,
thus 	invoking 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction 	over 	the
constitutional violation claims and supplemental jurisdiction over
the state-law claims. 	ECF No. 14.
9 	Count 	IV 	is 	titled 	“conspiracy 	to 	violate 	plaintiff[’]s
civil rights under R.I.[G.L.] § 9-31-1.” 	See Compl. ¶¶ 69-74, ECF
No. 1-1; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-73, ECF No. 23. 	In the Court’s Memorandum
and 	Order 	denying 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Remand, 	ECF 	No. 	14, 	the
Court determined that because “[§] 9-31-1 is Rhode Island’s waiver
of sovereign immunity and does not create its own cause of action
. . . . 	Plaintiff’s allegations of a ‘conspiracy to violate [his]
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and 	failure 	to 	intervene 	via 	§ 	1983 	(Count 	XI). 	Defendants 	have
moved 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	all 	counts, 	arguing 	that 	it 	is
warranted 	both 	on 	the 	merits 	and 	based 	on 	qualified 	immunity.
Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Mem.”) 2, 38, ECF No. 25-1.
II. Legal Standard
“The object of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the boilerplate
of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in order to determine
whether trial is actually required.’” 	Tobin v. Federal Exp. Corp.,
775 	F.3d 	448, 	450 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014) 	(quoting 	Wynne 	v. 	Tufts 	Univ.
Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992)).
Summary 	judgment 	is 	warranted 	when 	“there 	is 	no 	genuine
dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the 	movant 	is 	entitled 	to
judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	“In ruling
on 	the 	motion[,] 	the 	. 	. 	. 	[C]ourt 	must 	view 	‘the 	facts 	in 	the
light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	non-moving 	party, 	drawing 	all
reasonable inferences in that party's favor.’” 	Bienkowski v. Ne.
Univ., 	285 	F.3d 	138, 	140 	(1st 	Cir. 	2002) 	(quoting 	Barbour 	v.
Dynamics Rsch. Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995)). “[A]n issue
of 	fact 	is 	genuine 	if 	it 	may 	reasonably 	be 	resolved 	in 	favor 	of
either party. . . . 	For the same purpose, material facts are those
civil 	rights’ 	must 	be 	based 	on 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983.” 	Thereafter,
Plaintiff added a specific § 1983 conspiracy claim (Count X). 	See
Amend. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	103-108. 	Given 	the 	Court’s 	previous 	decision,
these counts are considered one and the same.
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which 	possess 	the 	capacity 	to 	sway 	the 	outcome 	of 	the 	litigation
under the applicable law.” 	Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960
(1st Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Finally, if the nonmoving party “fail[s] to come forward with
sufficient 	evidence 	to 	generate 	a 	trialworthy 	issue, 	[that]
warrants 	summary 	judgment 	to 	the 	moving 	party.” 	Vineberg 	V.
Bissonnette, 	529 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	300, 	302 	(D.R.I. 	2007) 	(internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Section 1983 (Counts IV, IX, X, and XI)
The 	Court 	begins 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	§ 	1983 	claims, 	resolving
these claims on the merits and concluding that there was probable
cause 	to 	arrest 	Plaintiff.10 	To 	successfully 	establish 	a 	claim
under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right
“secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” by one
acting 	under 	the 	color 	of 	law. 	Flagg 	Bros., 	Inc. 	v. 	Brooks, 	436
U.S. 	149, 	156 	(1978) 	(internal 	quotations 	omitted). 	Plaintiff
alleges 	that 	Defendants 	conspired 	to 	violate 	and 	did 	violate 	his
Fourth 	Amendment 	rights 	by 	arresting 	him11 without 	probable 	cause
10 In light of this determination, the Court need not address
Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
11 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that Defendants
lacked probable cause to prosecute him, the parties confine their
arguments 	to 	the 	circumstances 	leading 	up 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	arrest,
and the Court follows suit. 	Further, the Supreme Court has never
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to 	do 	so.12 	Thus, 	in 	analyzing 	Plaintiff’s 	§ 	1983 	claims, 	the
Court is tasked with answering whether there was probable cause to
arrest 	Plaintiff 	for 	misdemeanor 	assault 	or 	disorderly 	conduct.
The Court answers in the affirmative.
Assault is “a physical act of a threatening nature or an offer
of corporal injury which puts an individual in reasonable fear of
imminent 	bodily 	harm.” 	Broadley 	v. 	State, 	939 	A.2d 	1016, 	1021
(R.I. 	2008) 	(quoting 	Hennessey 	v. 	Pyne, 	694 	A.2d 	691, 	696 	(R.I.
1997)). 	Battery 	is 	“an 	act 	that 	was 	intended 	to 	cause, 	and 	does
decided 	that 	probable 	cause 	is 	a 	constitutional 	prerequisite 	to
prosecution. 	See 	Albright 	v. 	Oliver, 	510 	U.S. 	266, 	274 	(1994)
(leaving question open).
12 Count IV and Count X, which allege a conspiracy to deprive
Plaintiff of his civil and constitutional rights, list violations
of 	Plaintiff’s 	Fourth, 	Fifth, 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	rights.
See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 71, 106. 	However, these claims, like the others,
are 	entirely 	based 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	allegation 	that 	Defendants
lacked 	probable 	cause 	to 	arrest 	and 	thus 	must 	be 	construed 	to
allege violation of the Fourth Amendment only. 	See id. at ¶¶ 69-
70, 104-105.
Thus, 	all 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	§ 	1983 	claims 	are 	based 	on 	the
allegation that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest,
and 	that, 	therefore, 	the 	arresting 	officer 	violated 	his
constitutional rights. 	The conclusion that probable cause existed
therefore 	disposes 	of 	all 	four 	§ 	1983 	claims. 	See 	Landrigan 	v.
City 	of 	Warwick, 	628 	F.2d 	736, 	742 	(1st 	Cir. 	1980) 	(successful 	§
1983 	conspiracy 	claim 	requires 	“an 	actual 	deprivation 	of 	a 	right
secured by the Constitution and laws”); Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d
980, 	990 	(1st 	Cir. 	1995) 	(Where 	“no 	underlying 	constitutional
violation 	. 	. 	. 	occurred 	. 	. 	. 	no 	supervisory 	liability 	can 	be
attributed to [supervisor] under [§] 1983”).
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cause, 	an 	offensive 	contact 	with 	or 	unconsented 	touching 	of 	or
trauma 	upon 	the 	body 	of 	another, 	thereby 	generally 	resulting 	in
the consummation of the assault.” 	Id. (quoting Fenwick v. Oberman,
847 	A.2d 	852, 	855 	(R.I. 	2004)). 	“A 	person 	commits 	disorderly
conduct 	if 	he 	. 	. 	. 	intentionally 	knowingly, 	or 	recklessly 	. 	. 	.
engages 	in 	fighting 	or 	threatening, 	or 	in 	violent 	or 	tumultuous
behavior.” 	R.I.G.L § 11-45-1(a)(1). 	There need only be probable
cause 	to 	believe 	that 	Plaintiff 	committed 	one 	of 	these 	three
misdemeanors 	for 	the 	Court 	to 	conclude 	that 	Plaintiff’s
constitutional 	rights 	were 	not 	violated. 	See 	Wilber 	v. 	Curtis,
872 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (analyzing only one of two criminal
charges).
“A 	warrantless 	arrest, 	like 	the 	one 	at 	issue 	here, 	must 	be
based 	on 	probable 	cause.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Fiasconaro, 	315 	F.3d
28, 34 (1st Cir. 2002). “Probable cause exists when ‘the facts and
circumstances within [the police officers’] knowledge and of which
they 	had 	reasonably 	trustworthy 	information 	were 	sufficient 	to
warrant 	a 	prudent 	[person] 	in 	believing 	that 	the 	[defendant] 	had
committed 	or 	was 	committing 	an 	offense.” 	Id. 	at 	34-35 	(quoting
United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir. 1987)).
Evaluated 	objectively, 	considering 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances, 	probable 	cause 	“requires 	only 	a 	probability 	that
the 	[accused] 	committed 	the 	crime.” 	Holder 	v. 	Town 	of 	Sandown,
585 	F.3d 	500, 	504 	(1st 	Cir. 	2009). 	Questions 	of 	probable 	cause
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“ordinarily 	[are] 	amenable 	to 	summary 	judgment” 	if 	the 	material
facts 	are 	not 	in 	dispute. 	Acosta 	v. 	Ames 	Dep’t 	Stores, 	386 	F.3d
5, 	9 	(1st 	Cir. 	2004); 	see 	also 	Jordan 	v. 	Town 	of 	Waldoboro, 	943
F.3d 	532, 	541 	(1st 	Cir. 	2019) 	(“[W]hether 	a 	given 	set 	of 	facts
constitutes 	probable 	cause 	is 	a 	legal 	question.”), 	abrogated 	on
other grounds by Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022); Horton
v. 	Portsmouth 	Police 	Dep’t, 	22 	A.3d 	1115, 	1123 	(R.I. 	2011).
Further, “[e]ven where factual disputes exist, as in this case, a
§ 	1983 	claim 	may 	fail 	if 	the 	plaintiff's 	version 	of 	events
establishes 	probable 	cause 	to 	arrest.” 	Mistretta 	v. 	Prokesch, 	5
F. 	Supp. 	2d 	128, 	133 	(E.D.N.Y. 	1998). 	Finally, 	“[t]he 	probable
cause 	standard 	does 	not 	require 	the 	officers’ 	conclusion 	to 	be
ironclad, or even highly probable. 	Their conclusion that probable
cause 	exists 	need 	only 	be 	reasonable.” 	United 	States 	v.
Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555–56 (1st Cir. 1999).
“[P]robable 	cause 	determinations 	predicated 	on 	information
furnished by a victim are generally considered to be reliable[.]”
B.C.R. 	Transp. 	Co. 	v. 	Fontaine, 	727 	F.2d 	7, 	10 	(1st 	Cir. 	1984).
This is not a per se rule, however. 	Id. 	In cases where officers
rely on a victim’s complaint, “the primary inquiry . . . is whether
there 	is 	any 	evidence 	that 	the 	officers 	acted 	unreasonably 	when
they 	determined 	that 	[the 	victim]’s 	accusation 	was 	credible, 	in
light 	of 	all 	the 	circumstances 	known 	at 	the 	time.” 	Forest 	v.
Pawtucket 	Police 	Dep’t, 	377 	F.3d 	52, 	57 	(1st 	Cir. 	2004) 	(holding
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that 	officer’s 	determination 	that 	victim-witness 	was 	“fairly
intelligent 	and 	credible” 	was 	reasonable 	given 	that 	victim-
witness’s 	report 	did 	not 	indicate 	that 	molestation 	was 	in 	clear
view and was not obviously criminal and where there was no evidence
that victim-witness’s ADHD impacted his credibility).
Here, presented with conflicting accounts of the altercation
from the victim and alleged perpetrator, a reasonable officer could
make a credibility assessment and determine that Warner’s account
was 	more 	credible 	than 	Plaintiff’s. 	Although 	Plaintiff 	argues
that 	the 	active 	warrant 	against 	Warner 	made 	him 	inherently
uncredible, 	this 	argument 	must 	fail 	because 	the 	undisputed 	facts
establish 	that 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	learned 	of 	the 	active 	arrest
warrant after Plaintiff’s arrest.
Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	the 	relationship 	between 	himself 	and
Warner 	meant 	that 	Warner 	could 	not 	be 	a 	credible 	witness. 	Pl.’s
Mem. 	Supp. 	Opp’n 	Summ. 	J. 	(“Pl.’s 	Opp’n”) 	18, 	ECF 	No. 	28-1. 	The
Court 	does 	not 	disagree 	that 	the 	nature 	of 	the 	victim’s
relationship with Plaintiff could be cause to suspect the victim’s
credibility, see Misretta, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 133 (“The most common
situation in which [doubts as to a victim’s honesty] arise is when
there 	exists 	a 	prior 	relationship 	between 	the 	victim 	and 	the
accused that gives rise to a motive for a false accusation.”), but
it 	does 	not 	render 	a 	victim-witness 	per 	se 	unreliable.
Importantly, 	Plaintiff 	has 	alleged 	no 	facts 	that 	would 	have 	made
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it 	unreasonable 	for 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	to 	determine 	that 	Warner’s
account 	was 	credible. 	See 	Smith 	v. 	City 	of 	Boston, 	C.V. 	No. 	21-
10039-IT, 	2021 	WL 	3742478, 	at 	* 	9 	(D. 	Mass. 	Aug. 	24, 	2021).
Plaintiff 	has 	alleged 	nothing 	about 	Warner’s 	demeanor 	when
reporting 	the 	incident 	or 	details 	of 	his 	account 	that 	would 	have
undermined 	his 	credibility. 	See 	id. 	In 	fact, 	the 	only 	evidence
of Warner’s demeanor is that “[h]e was visibly upset” when he spoke
to 	Officer 	DeCristoforo. 	See 	Arrest 	Report 	4. 	It 	remains 	that
“[u]ncorroborated 	testimony 	of 	a 	victim 	or 	other 	percipient
witness, 	standing 	alone, 	ordinarily 	can 	support 	a 	finding 	of
probable cause.” 	Charron v. Cnty. Of N.Y., 49 F.4th 608, 616 (1st
Cir. 2022) (quoting Karamanoglu v. Town of Yarmouth, 15 F.4th 82,
87-88 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021)). 	On 	this 	record, 	Officer 	Wyrostek’s
credibility assessment was not unreasonable.
Plaintiff 	also 	contends 	that 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	had 	a 	duty 	to
investigate the situation further before making the arrest. 	Pl.’s
Opp’n 	21. 	He 	argues 	that 	because 	“Defendant 	Wyrostek 	was 	faced
with 	conflicting 	stories, 	existence 	of 	a 	prior 	relationship
between 	the 	alleged 	victim 	and 	the 	accused 	of 	a 	domestic 	nature,
no 	injuries 	and 	information 	that 	the 	alleged 	victim 	may 	have 	a
warrant 	[against 	him],” 	he 	should 	have 	“investigate[d] 	further
before arresting anyone.” 	Id. 	In making this argument, however,
Plaintiff ignores that the inquiry focuses on what Officer Wyrostek
knew 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	arrest. 	At 	that 	point, 	Officer 	Wyrostek
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knew 	only 	the 	following: 	Warner, 	the 	alleged 	victim, 	was
Plaintiff’s 	girlfriend’s 	ex-husband; 	Warner 	stated 	that 	the
perpetrator had assaulted him and put his hands to his throat; and
Plaintiff 	accused 	Warner 	of 	attacking 	him. 	As 	Plaintiff 	himself
points 	out, 	Officer 	DeCristoforo 	was 	the 	officer 	who 	observed 	a
lack 	of 	injuries. 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	6; 	Arrest 	Report 	4. 	Further,
Officer Wyrostek only knew that Plaintiff accused Warner of having
a 	warrant 	out 	against 	him, 	not 	that 	such 	a 	warrant 	actually
existed. 	Officer Wyrostek was not required to credit Plaintiff’s
characterization of the events or blindly believe his accusations
against Warner. 	See Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25, 32 n.2 (1st Cir.
2004) 	(“A 	reasonable 	police 	officer 	is 	not 	required 	to 	credit 	a
suspect’s 	story.”); 	see 	also 	Charron, 	49 	F.4th 	at 	616 	(“But 	even
where 	a 	witness 	account 	is 	disputed, 	police 	officers 	do 	not 	have
an unflagging duty to complete a full investigation before making
a 	probable 	cause 	determination.” 	(internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted)).
Plaintiff 	also 	claims 	that 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	should 	have
investigated 	his 	claims 	of 	innocence. 	While 	this 	may 	be 	true 	as
a 	matter 	of 	best 	practice 	in 	a 	case 	like 	this, 	an 	officer 	is 	not
required to conduct further investigation once probable cause has
been 	established, 	“even 	though 	witnesses 	who 	could 	have 	been
consulted 	were 	readily 	available.” 	Forest, 	377 	F.3d 	at 	57; 	see
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (“[W]e do not think
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a 	sheriff 	. 	. 	. 	is 	required 	by 	the 	Constitution 	to 	investigate
independently 	every 	claim 	of 	innocence 	. 	. 	. 	. 	The 	ultimate
determination 	of 	such 	claims 	of 	innocence 	is 	placed 	in 	the 	hands
of the judge and the jury.”).
Even if the Court agreed that Officer Wyrostek had a duty to
investigate further before arresting Plaintiff, it is unclear what
the 	officer 	would 	have 	found 	that 	would 	have 	vitiated 	probable
cause. 	The 	available 	witnesses 	presented 	several 	different
versions 	of 	the 	story, 	but 	none 	remove 	Plaintiff 	from 	the
altercation or diminish probable cause. 	See Lamoureux Statement,
Ex. 1, ECF No. 28-2 (stating that she observed the two men “yelling
at each other” but did not see Plaintiff “put his hands on [Warner]
at 	any 	time”); 	Frances 	Munafo 	Statement, 	Ex. 	2, 	ECF 	No. 	28-3
(stating 	that 	she 	observed 	the 	two 	men 	arguing 	but 	did 	not 	see
Plaintiff 	touch 	Warner); 	Jacob 	Munafo 	Statement, 	Ex. 	3, 	ECF 	No.
28-4 	(stating 	that 	he 	observed 	the 	altercation 	but 	did 	not 	see
Plaintiff touch Warner, and noting that his view was obstructed);
Fisher 	Statement 	(stating 	that 	he 	witnessed 	the 	altercation 	and
saw 	Plaintiff 	“put 	his 	right 	hand 	on 	the 	other 	man’s 	throat”);
Kristiana 	Warner 	Statement 	(stating 	that 	she 	heard 	Plaintiff,
Warner, and Warner’s girlfriend “exchanging words” but did not see
the fight itself); Maryyanek Statement (stating that “[Plaintiff]
followed 	[her 	and 	Warner] 	and 	started 	yelling 	. 	. 	. 	[with]
intimidating and demeaning statements . . . . and got physical and
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put 	his 	hand 	on 	[Warner’s] 	throat 	. 	. 	. 	then 	quickly 	raised 	his
left 	fist 	to 	hit 	him 	in 	the 	face”). 	Further, 	although 	the
discovery 	of 	the 	active 	warrant 	for 	Warner’s 	arrest 	could 	have
given 	rise 	to 	concern 	about 	Warner’s 	credibility, 	given 	that 	two
witnesses confirmed Warner’s version of events, that concern does
not 	remove 	probable 	cause. 	See 	Fisher 	Statement; 	Maryyanek
Statement. 	Finally, 	a 	lack 	of 	apparent 	injuries 	does 	not 	in 	and
of 	itself 	require 	the 	conclusion 	that 	no 	crime 	occurred. 	Thus,
even if further investigation were required, probable cause still
existed.
Finally, 	to 	the 	extent 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Defendants’
alleged failure to follow Rhode Island General Laws § 12-7-3, which
requires 	a 	warrant 	for 	misdemeanor 	arrests 	with 	some 	exceptions,
discussed 	infra 	at 	Part 	III.C., 	removes 	probable 	cause, 	that
argument must also fail as a state misdemeanor warrant requirement
does not affect the probable cause analysis. 	Although the Supreme
Court 	has 	never 	expressly 	held 	that 	an 	officer 	may 	perform 	a
warrantless 	arrest 	of 	a 	misdemeanant 	when 	the 	officer 	has 	not
witnessed the misdemeanor, see Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 340 n. 11 (2001) (“We need not, and thus do not, speculate
whether 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	entails 	an 	‘in 	the 	presence’
requirement 	for 	purposes 	of 	misdemeanor 	arrests”)); 	Welsh 	v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer's
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presence 	to 	justify 	a 	warrantless 	arrest 	is 	not 	grounded 	in 	the
Fourth 	Amendment 	. 	. 	. 	and 	we 	have 	never 	held 	that 	a 	warrant 	is
constitutionally 	required 	to 	arrest 	for 	nonfelony 	offenses
occurring 	out 	of 	the 	officer's 	presence.” 	(citations 	omitted)),
the 	First 	Circuit 	has 	upheld 	such 	arrests 	as 	constitutional, 	see
Vargas-Badillo 	v. 	Diaz-Torres, 	114 	F.3d 	3, 	6 	(1st 	Cir. 	1997)
(“neither 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	nor 	this 	circuit 	ever 	has 	held 	that
the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	prohibits 	warrantless 	arrests 	for
misdemeanors 	not 	committed 	in 	the 	presence 	of 	arresting
officers”); 	Budnick 	v. 	Barnstable 	Cty. 	Bar 	Advocates, 	Inc., 	989
F.2d 	484 	at 	*(1st 	Cir. 	1993) 	(per 	curiam) 	(unpublished 	slip 	op.)
(concluding 	that 	an 	officer 	need 	not 	be 	in 	the 	presence 	of 	a
suspected 	misdemeanant 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	offense 	to 	perform 	a
warrantless arrest of the suspect).
The 	Court 	thus 	concludes 	that 	there 	was 	probable 	cause 	to
arrest 	Plaintiff13 and, 	therefore, 	Plaintiff’s 	§ 	1983 	claims 	fail
13 	In 	addition, 	because 	of 	the 	Court’s 	probable 	cause
determination, 	Plaintiff 	cannot 	sustain 	his 	claims 	for 	malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment. 	See Beaudoin v. Levesque, 697
A.2d 1065, 1067 (R.I. 1997) (lack of “[p]robable cause in our law
is 	a 	necessary 	element 	in 	false 	arrest, 	false 	imprisonment, 	and
malicious 	prosecution 	claims”). 	To 	the 	extent 	Plaintiff’s 	false
imprisonment claim is based on R.I.G.L. § 12-7-1 rather than Rhode
Island 	common 	law, 	Plaintiff 	has 	indicated 	that 	he 	agrees 	with
Defendants 	that 	an 	adverse 	ruling 	on 	the 	probable 	cause 	issue
warrants summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 	See Pl.’s Opp’n
16. 	Thus, summary judgment is GRANTED on Counts II and III.
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as 	a 	matter 	of 	law. 	Thus, 	summary 	judgment 	is 	GRANTED 	on 	Counts
IV, IX, X, and XI.14
B. Invasion of Privacy (Count V)
Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	Defendants 	invaded 	his 	privacy 	in
violation of Rhode Island law when they (1) physically intruded on
his 	privacy 	by 	arresting 	him 	and 	(2) 	released 	information 	of 	his
Further, 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	challenge 	Defendants’ 	position
that 	the 	existence 	of 	probable 	cause 	vitiates 	his 	assault 	and
battery claim (rather, Plaintiff argues that there was no probable
cause 	and 	that 	the 	facts 	relevant 	to 	probable 	cause 	are 	in
dispute). 	See id. at 32. 	Thus, summary judgment is also GRANTED
on Count VI.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	municipal 	liability 	count, 	insofar
as it is relevant to these claims, must also fail. 	See Acosta v.
Ames Dep’t Stores, 386 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Given probable
cause, 	there 	was 	no 	constitutional 	violation 	— 	and 	without 	the
deprivation 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right, 	those 	claims 	cannot
proceed.”); 	see 	also 	Part 	III.C., 	infra 	(addressing 	municipal
liability 	relevant 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	state-law 	false 	arrest 	claim).
Similarly, 	Plaintiff 	premises 	part 	of 	his 	failure 	to 	supervise
claim 	on 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	violation 	(in 	addition 	to
failure 	to 	supervise 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	alleged 	violation 	of
R.I.G.L. § 12-7-3) and, therefore, the Court’s determination that
probable cause to arrest existed warrants summary judgment on this
claim, 	to 	the 	extent 	it 	relates 	to 	the 	alleged 	constitutional
violation, 	as 	well. 	See 	Am. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	482-86. 	Thus, 	summary
judgment is GRANTED on Counts VII and VIII in so far as they relate
to Counts II, III, and VI.
14 	Defendants 	have 	also 	moved 	to 	strike 	the 	expert 	report
Plaintiff submitted in support of his argument that probable cause
did 	not 	exist. 	Defs.' 	Reply 	10, 	ECF 	No. 	32. 	Given 	the 	Court's
determination 	on 	the 	probable 	cause 	issue, 	this 	motion 	is 	DENIED
as MOOT.
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arrest to the public. 	See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 74-77.
The 	right 	to 	privacy 	is 	statutory. 	Pontbriand 	v. 	Sundlun,
699 	A.2d 	856, 	871 	n.12 	(R.I. 	1997) 	(“[W]e 	recognize 	that 	in 	this
jurisdiction the only right to privacy is statutory in origin.”);
R.I.G.L. § 9-1-28.1. 	Subsections 9-1-28.1(a)(1) and (4) establish
“[t]he 	right 	to 	be 	secure 	from 	unreasonable 	intrusion 	upon 	one’s
physical solitude or seclusion” and “[t]he right to be secure from
publicity 	that 	reasonably 	places 	another 	in 	a 	false 	light 	before
the public[.]”
The facts presented here establish neither an intrusion upon
seclusion 	nor 	any 	publication 	that 	placed 	Plaintiff 	in 	a 	false
light. 	First, 	the 	arrest 	occurred 	in 	public. 	“The 	right-to-
privacy 	statute 	‘only 	protects 	against 	an 	invasion 	of 	one’s
physical 	solitude 	or 	seclusion, 	neither 	of 	which 	is 	present 	when
one 	ventures 	outside 	his 	or 	her 	house 	into 	the 	public 	view.’”
Silva 	v. 	Rhode 	Island, 	527 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	168, 	178 	(D.R.I. 	2021)
(quoting 	Swerdlick 	v. 	Koch, 	721 	A.2d 	849, 	857 	n.11 	(R.I. 	1998));
Wiggins 	v. 	Rhode 	Island, 	326 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	297, 	312 	(D.R.I. 	2004)
(police did not invade plaintiff’s physical solitude or seclusion
when they allegedly engaged in false arrest where incident occurred
in public).
Second, 	the 	statute’s 	protection 	“does 	not 	extend 	to 	those
records 	deemed 	public.” 	Doe 	v. 	Edward 	A. 	Sherman 	Pub. 	Co., 	593
A.2d 457, 459 (R.I. 1991). 	Rhode Island law provides that “reports
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reflecting the initial arrest of an adult and the charge or charges
brought 	against 	an 	adult 	shall 	be 	public.” 	R.I.G.L. 	§ 	38-2-
2(4)(D). 	Plaintiff 	has 	presented 	nothing 	to 	suggest 	that 	“the
publication 	of 	his 	arrest 	was 	the 	publication 	of 	a 	private 	fact”
Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 1259 (R.I. 2012) (internal quotation
marks 	and 	citation 	omitted)). 	Thus, 	Plaintiff 	cannot 	sustain 	an
invasion 	of 	privacy 	claim 	on 	either 	theory, 	and 	summary 	judgment
is GRANTED on Count V.
C. Arrest in Violation of R.I.G.L. § 12-7-3 (Count I)15
Plaintiff 	next 	argues 	that 	Defendants 	arrested 	him 	in
violation 	of 	Rhode 	Island 	General 	Laws 	§ 	12-7-3. 	Section 	12-7-3
provides:
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the
person 	is 	committing 	or 	has 	committed 	a 	misdemeanor 	or
a 	petty 	misdemeanor, 	and 	the 	officer 	has 	reasonable
ground 	to 	believe 	that 	person 	cannot 	be 	arrested 	later
or 	may 	cause 	injury 	to 	himself 	or 	herself 	or 	others 	or
15 Defendants argue that this count should be read as another
§ 	1983 	claim. 	Defs.’ 	Mem. 	10-11. 	However, 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended
Complaint 	clearly 	seeks 	to 	raise 	a 	claim 	alleging 	a 	violation 	of
the 	Rhode 	Island 	Statute. 	See 	Am. 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	52-53. 	Therefore,
the 	Court 	addresses 	it 	as 	such. 	To 	the 	extent 	that 	this 	count
seeks 	to 	raise 	an 	additional 	claim 	under 	§ 	1983 	for 	violation 	of
Plaintiff’s 	constitutional 	or 	state 	constitutional 	rights, 	the
Court’s 	probable 	cause 	determination 	is 	dispositive. 	See
discussion 	supra 	at 	Part 	III.A.; 	see 	also 	State 	v. 	Berker, 	391
A.2d 	107, 	111 	(1978) 	(“[A]rticle 	1, 	[section] 	6 	of 	[the 	Rhode
Island] 	constitution 	has 	the 	same 	effect 	as 	the 	fourth 	amendment
of the Federal Constitution.”).
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loss or damage to property unless immediately arrested.
In 	support 	of 	their 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	this 	claim
Defendants argue that (1) the undisputed facts establish that the
statute’s requirements were followed and (2) they are entitled to
qualified immunity.16 	Both arguments fail.
First, 	Defendants 	assert 	that 	it 	was 	reasonable 	for 	Officer
Wyrostek 	to 	conclude 	that 	Plaintiff 	would 	cause 	injury 	to 	others
if not arrested immediately because Plaintiff was in a fight that
had 	to 	be 	broken 	up 	and 	was 	“animated” 	when 	discussing 	the
altercation 	with 	Officer 	Wyrostek.17 	Defs.’ 	Mem. 	35. 	Defendants
also 	contend 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	“a 	flight 	risk” 	because 	he
continued 	to 	exit 	the 	school 	premises 	even 	after 	seeing 	Warner
speaking with a police officer. 	Id. at 36.
Plaintiff, for his part, contends that there was no reasonable
basis 	to 	believe 	that 	he 	would 	cause 	any 	injury 	because 	he 	was
16 	Defendants 	also 	argue 	that 	the 	law 	is 	not 	a 	civil 	rights
statute. 	However, 	they 	have 	failed 	to 	explain 	the 	relevance 	of
the 	statute’s 	classification 	and 	have 	further 	failed 	to 	provide
any support for the assertion. 	Thus, the Court does not consider
this argument.
17 	Defendants 	also 	rely 	on 	the 	“fact” 	that 	Plaintiff
threatened 	to 	“kick 	[Warner’s] 	ass” 	but 	would 	not 	do 	so 	in 	front
of the kids, arguing that such a threat “could present reasonable
basis to support concern that [Plaintiff] would return” and “injure
Mr. 	Warner 	at 	a 	later 	time.” 	Defs.’ 	Mem. 	35. 	However, 	even 	if
the 	record 	were 	to 	support 	a 	conclusion 	that 	such 	a 	threat 	was
made, the record does not reveal whether Officer Wyrostek was aware
of the threat at the time of arrest.
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leaving 	the 	premises 	when 	he 	was 	pulled 	over 	and 	his 	conduct
indicated 	no 	intent 	to 	injure. 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	25-26. 	He 	further
says 	he 	was 	not 	a 	flight 	risk 	because 	Officer 	Wyrostek 	knew 	his
name, address, and profession and because he had specifically told
the officer that he would return for a later interview if permitted
to take his family home first. 	Id. at 24.
The 	only 	question 	posed 	at 	this 	juncture 	is 	whether 	it 	was
reasonable to believe that Plaintiff would cause harm to others or
pose 	a 	flight 	risk 	if 	he 	was 	not 	arrested 	before 	a 	warrant 	was
obtained. 	This 	is 	a 	circumstance 	where 	reasonableness 	must 	be
determined by a jury. 	See DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d
585, 	614-615 	(R.I. 	2011) 	(quoting 	R.E. 	King 	v. 	Avtech 	Aviation,
Inc., 	655 	F.2d 	77, 	78 	(5th 	Cir. 	1981)) 	(although 	material 	facts
are 	undisputed, 	a 	case 	requiring 	“the 	determination 	of 	the
reasonableness 	of 	the 	acts 	and 	conduct 	of 	the 	parties 	under 	all
the facts and circumstances of the case . . . cannot ordinarily be
disposed 	of 	by 	summary 	judgment”) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks
omitted); 	Botelho 	v. 	Caster's 	Inc., 	970 	A.2d 	541, 	546–47 	(R.I.
2009) 	(agreeing 	with 	the 	trial 	justice's 	assessment 	that 	“there
were significant factual issues still to be determined by the jury,
concerning 	which 	issues 	reasonable 	persons 	might 	reach 	differing
conclusions”); 	Shaffer 	v. 	Regions 	Fin. 	Corp., 	29 	So.3d 	872, 	882
(Ala. 2009) (“Ordinarily, [t]he question of reasonableness is one
of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact.”) (internal quotation
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marks 	omitted); 	Gliottone 	v. 	Ethier, 	870 	A.2d 	1022, 	1028 	(R.I.
2005); 	Southern 	Gen. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Holt, 	416 	S.E.2d 	274, 	276 	(Ga.
1992); 	Liberty 	Mut. 	Ins. 	Co. 	v. 	Davis, 	412 	F.2d 	475, 	480 	(R.I.
1969). 	Unlike 	with 	the 	probable 	cause 	analysis 	provided 	above,
the present case does not present a situation where the Court can
determine reasonableness as a matter of law.
Defendants 	also 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to 	qualified
immunity on this claim because even though qualified immunity was
developed 	in 	response 	to 	federal 	constitutional 	claims, 	it
“applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s [Rhode Island] state law
claims.” 	Defs.’ Mem. 39.
Although 	this 	Court 	has 	previously 	extended 	the 	doctrine 	of
qualified 	immunity 	to 	Rhode 	Island 	state-law 	claims, 	see, 	e.g.,
Camelo 	v. 	Bristol-Warren 	Reg’l 	Sch. 	Dist., 	C.A. 	No. 	19-660, 	2021
WL 	949363, 	at 	*6 	(D.R.I. 	Mar. 	12, 	2021), 	it 	has 	not 	done 	so 	with
this 	statute. 	The 	question 	of 	whether 	the 	rights 	conferred 	by
§ 	12-7-3 are clearly established has not been addressed and there
is 	a 	dearth 	of 	state 	case 	law 	examining 	and 	applying 	the 	statute
itself. 	Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that qualified immunity is
inapplicable 	because 	it 	does 	not 	extend 	to 	officials 	who 	are
“plainly 	incompetent 	or 	those 	who 	knowingly 	violate 	the 	law.”
Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	35 	(quoting 	Farry 	v. 	City 	of 	Pawtucket, 	725 	F. 	Supp.
2d 	286, 	297 	(D.R.I. 	2010)). 	In 	support 	of 	this 	contention,
Plaintiff 	presents 	evidence 	that 	§ 	12-7-3’s 	requirements 	for
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misdemeanor 	arrests 	are 	addressed 	in 	the 	BPD 	arrest 	procedures
manual, 	testimony 	of 	Officer 	DeCristoforo 	explaining 	that 	the
statute should be followed and that he thought it was not followed
at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest,18 and that Officer Wyrostek, the
arresting 	officer, 	was 	unaware 	of 	the 	statute 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the
arrest. 	Id.; 	see 	also 	DeCristoforo 	Dep. 	164:20-166:19, 	ECF 	28-
42; Wryostek Dep. 34:18-36:13, ECF No. 28-49; BPD Arrest Procedures
Manual 	3-4, 	Ex. 	9, 	ECF 	No. 	28-10. 	Given 	that 	there 	are 	genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Officer Wyrostek was plainly
incompetent 	and 	unresolved 	issues 	of 	law 	as 	to 	whether 	and 	how
qualified immunity applies to claims made under this statute, the
Court 	concludes 	that 	summary 	judgment 	is 	not 	appropriate 	on 	this
claim. 	As 	a 	result, 	the 	supervisor 	liability 	and 	municipal
liability 	claims, 	to 	the 	extent 	they 	relate 	to 	this 	claim, 	also
survive summary judgment.
Finally, although the Court concludes that Defendants are not
entitled 	to 	summary 	judgment 	on 	these 	claims, 	it 	nevertheless
remands 	these, 	the 	only 	claims 	that 	survive 	summary 	judgment, 	to
state court as they present undeveloped questions of Rhode Island
law that the state courts are best equipped to adjudicate.
Per 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1367(c)(3), 	“district 	courts 	may 	decline 	to
18 	The 	Court 	assumes 	that 	Plaintiff 	cites 	Officer
DeCristoforo’s 	opinion 	as 	relevant 	to 	what 	a 	“competent 	police
officer” would do and not as binding opinion of law.
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exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	a 	claim 	. 	. 	. 	[when] the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”
When any and all federal claims have been dismissed prior
to trial, “the balance of factors to be considered under
the 	pendent 	jurisdiction 	doctrine—judicial 	economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity” often will counsel in
favor 	of 	declining 	jurisdiction 	over 	any 	remaining
state-law claim. 	Where . . . the only federal claim[s]
ha[ve] 	vanished 	before 	trial 	and 	the 	remaining 	state-
law 	claim 	raises 	a 	knotty 	and 	unresolved 	question 	of
state law, dismissal without prejudice typically will be
a prudent option.
Lawless v. Steward Health Care Sys., LLC, 894 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir.
2018) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
n.7 (1988)).
Dismissal, however, is not the only option. 	Where a case is
initiated in state court and subsequently removed to federal court,
a 	court 	may 	remand 	the 	case 	to 	state 	court 	when 	the 	claims 	over
which 	it 	has 	original 	jurisdiction 	have 	been 	eliminated. 	See
Desjardins 	v. 	Willard, 	777 	F.3d 	43, 	46 	(1st 	Cir. 	2015) 	(citing
Camelio v. American Fed’n, 137 F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir. 1998)).
In 	considering 	these 	factors, 	the 	Court 	notes 	the 	dearth 	of
case law relevant to § 12-7-3 and its application. 	This is exactly
the 	type 	of 	dispute 	that 	is 	best 	resolved 	by 	state 	courts.
Further, “the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity” counsel in favor of declining jurisdiction over these
claims. 	Carnegie-Mellon 	Univ., 	484 	U.S. 	at 	350. 	Accordingly,
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Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated § 12-7-3 (Count I), and
Plaintiff’s 	supervisor 	liability 	claim 	(Count 	VII) 	and 	municipal
liability 	claim 	(Count 	VIII), 	to 	the 	extent 	they 	pertain 	to
Defendants’ 	alleged 	violation 	of 	§ 	12-7-3, 	are 	REMANDED 	to 	the
Rhode Island Superior Court.
III. Conclusion
For 	the 	above 	reasons, 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED as to Counts II, III, IV, V, VI,
IX, X, XI and as to Counts VII and VIII in so much as they relate
to 	these 	claims 	and 	DENIED 	and 	REMANDED 	as 	to 	Count 	I 	and 	Counts
VII and VIII in so much as they relate to Count I.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
District Judge
Date: 	March 29, 2023
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