USA v. Medina et al

1:21-cr-00062Rid18.08.2022

Gesamter Gesetzestext

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OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
V. )
) No. 21-cr-62-JJM-PAS
ANDRES GARAY, )
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Chief Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Andres Garay’s Motion to Suppress based on his
detention and the search and seizure of his car. ECF No. 54. Mr. Garay alleges that
there was a lack of probable cause for his arrest and therefore the evidence derived
from his arrest is the fruit of the poisonous tree. See id. at 1-2. The government
contends that leading up to Mr. Garay’s arrest police made various observations of
Mr. Garay and a Toyota Camry that led them to suspect that he was involved in a
drug trafficking conspiracy with Edgar Medina~a conspiracy that involved two armed
men abducting a United States Postal Service (“‘USPS”) employee. See ECF No. 55
at 1.
BACKGROUND!

Two unidentified individuals abducted a USPS employee at gunpoint. During

the abduction, the two individuals asked the USPS employee about a package that

1 Because the parties both rely on the affidavit of Postal Inspector Richard F.
Atwood (ECF No. 55-1) for their facts, the Court will do the same.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION

GPO.

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the Post Office had delivered to an address on Melrose Avenue in Providence, Rhode

Island from Puerto Rico.

After speaking to witnesses about the abduction of the postal employee,
investigators searched USPS proprietary databases for inbound parcels from Puerto
Rico that might be connected to folks involved in the parcel previously delivered to
Melrose Avenue. The investigators found that one person (i.e., the same IP address)
inquired into the tracking status of two packages: one to be delivered to Melrose
Avenue (“Melrose Parcel”) and one to be delivered to an apartment on Harris Avenue
(“Harris Parcel”). Both packages were shipped from Puerto Rico. “(T]he handwriting
on the label for both parcels, based on [the] training and experience [of Inspector
Atwood], appeared to be the same.”2 ECF No. 55-1 at 4. One of the names associated
with the Melrose Parcel was Mr. Medina, and the name associated with the Harris
Parcel was Mr. Medina’s mother. Shortly after the Harris Parcel was delivered, an
individual in a gray Toyota arrived at the building. That individual walked into the
apartment and left soon after “carrying a bag with a large item inside.” /d. at 6.

Postal inspectors came to learn that another parcel was shipped to “Mr.

Medina [on] George Waterman Rd Johnston, RI 02919,” (“GW Parcel”). Jd. at 8. “A

2 “Despite being sent on the same date, the parcels listed different senders,
were sent from different post offices in Puerto Rico, and/or were sent to different
recipients and/or address in Rhode Island. However, the parcels were tracked by the
same IP address, causing officials to believe that the parcels were related, despite
efforts of the sender(s) to conceal the connection between the parcels.” ECF No. 55-1
at 4n.1.

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review of USPS databases . . . revealed [that] the return address did not exist.”? Jd.
at 8. Inspector Atwood “learned that either the same individual or device that was
querying the status of GW PARCEL . . . was also querying the status of alnother]
parcel shipped from Puerto Rico” to an address on Atlantic Avenue in Providence
(“Atlantic Parcel”). Jd. at 8-9. Again, the return address for the Atlantic Parcel did
not exist. Furthermore, “the same individual or device that was querying the status
of the ATLANTIC AVE PARCEL was also querying the status of a parcel” shipped on
the same day from Puerto Rico to an address on Congress Avenue in Providence
(“Congress Parcel”). Jd. at 8. Once more, the return address for the Congress Parcel
did not exist.!

A Magistrate Judge authorized search warrants for the GW Parcel, Atlantic
Parcel, and the Congress Parcel. A Rhode Island State Trooper’s narcotic trained K-
9 “reacted in a positive manner” to each parcel, “indicating the presence of a narcotic
odor.” See id. at 10-11. The police then executed the search warrant, and all three
parcels had “a white powdery substance, which field tested positive for cocaine. The
collective weight from all three parcels was 3.25 kilograms (3250 grams).” /d. at 11.

On the day these parcels were to be delivered, surveillance was set up around
the George Waterman Road residence. Mr. Garay arrived at roughly 8:30 a.m. in a

Toyota Camry. There, an individual met with both Mr. Medina and Mr. Garay

3 “The sender name... was the same last name as an individual who received
mail at... George Waterman Road.” ECF No. 55-1 at 8.

4 The individuals to whom the Atlantic Ave. and Congress Ave. Parcels were
shipped did not live there.

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outside. Mr. Garay then left the George Waterman Road location and was seen on
Congress Avenue later that morning. The Toyota Camry parked down the street from
the package's destination. Mr. Garay walked down the street, and turned around,
returning to his car. He “exitled] the parking spot, travelled] past [the] Congress
Avenue [delivery location] at a slow rate of speed, and later return[ed] to the same
parking spot.” Jd. at 12. After the police took Mr. Medina and another confederate
into custody, “the surveillance team then responded to the Toyota Camry... .
occupied by [Mr.] Garay and took him into custody.” /d. at 15.

The police then searched Mr. Garay’s Toyota Camry. Law enforcement officials

uncovered
one black expendable baton . . ., one black Taser . . . and two black surgical
masks .... The black surgical masks match the description provided by [the
USPS worker] VICTIM-1 as being worn by the individuals who held him at
gunpoint.

Id. at 15.

The grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging Mr. Garay with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,

kidnapping, and possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of

cocaine.

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I. DISCUSSION®

Mr. Garay alleges that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him and
therefore the Court should suppress the evidence gathered from a post-arrest search
of his car his car as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

“Law enforcement officers may effect warrantless arrests provided that they
have probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a
crime.” United States v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 726 (1st Cir. 1995). “Probable
cause exists when police officers, relying on reasonably trustworthy facts and
circumstances, have information upon which a reasonably prudent person would
believe the suspect committed or was committing acrime.” United States v. Centeno-
Gonzdélez, 989 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Burhoe, 409 F.3d
5, 10 (1st Cir. 2005)). “Probable cause is also a ‘commonsense, nontechnical
conceptionI] that dealls] with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life

on which reasonable and prudent [people], not legal technicians, act.”° United States

5 An evidentiary hearing is not needed here because the Court has determined
that Mr. Garay has not made a “sufficient threshold showing that material facts were
in doubt or dispute.” United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2009). “A
hearing is required only if the movant makes a sufficient threshold showing that
material facts are in doubt or dispute, and that such facts cannot reliably be resolved
on a paper record. Most importantly, the defendant must show that there are factual
disputes which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief.”
United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 603 (1st Cir. 1996)) (upholding district court's decision to forego
evidentiary hearing on motion to suppress)). The Court grants Mr. Garay’s request
to supplement the record with the inventory sheet. ECF No. 62 at 1.

6 This reasonably prudent person is that of a reasonably prudent police officer.
As the government notes in their brief, this prudence allows police officers “to draw
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude

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v. Burhoe, 409 F.3d 5, 10 (ist Cir. 2005) (alterations in original) (citing Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)). Therefore, “[p]lrobable cause must be
evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances.” United States v. Uricoechea-
Casallas, 946 F.2d 162, 165 (1st Cir. 1991).

Mr. Garay argues that there was insufficient information before his arrest that
“implicates [him] in any criminal activity.” ECF No. 54 at 7. As a result, he argues,
his arrest was without probable cause. On the other hand, the government responds
by arguing that the counter-surveillance of Mr. Garay provided trained law
enforcement officers with probable cause.? The government supplements this with
the fact that Mr. Garay “met with [Mr.] Medina and a third person, and less than two
hours later parked outside 102/104 Congress Ave, where another of the drug parcels
was destined to be delivered — consequently, to a person not associated with that
address.” ECF No. 55 at 4.

The Court finds that a reasonably prudent officer would have, and did have,
probable cause to arrest Mr. Garay based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Mr.
Garay’s action on the morning of his arrest when combined with the investigative

information the officers had obtained, meets the probable cause standard because of

an untrained person.” ECF No. 55 at 3 (internal quotations omitted) (citing United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

7 Mr. Garay was seen with Mr. Medina the morning the Congress Avenue
package was to be delivered. Mr. Garay then drove to Congress Avenue and appeared
to have conducted “counter-surveillance” driving near the package’s destination.
Nonetheless, Mr. Garay remained in his car while Mr. Medina retrieved the Congress
Parcel later that morning.

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the reasonable likelihood that he retrieved a parcel containing drugs from Mr.
Medina’s mother.

The handwriting on the Melrose and Harris Parcels was the same. One
individual queried the status of both packages, despite them being shipped to
different addresses.’ An individual in a gray Toyota Camry entered Mr. Medina’s
mother’s home shortly after the package was delivered to her and left with a “bag
with a large item inside,” while Mr. Medina most likely retrieved the other since it
was delivered to an address to which he is associated. Most critically, the GW Parcel?®
was discovered to contain cocaine, and the handwriting on the Harris and Melrose
Parcels matched that of the GW Parcel. A reasonable officer could conclude that there
were trustworthy facts to show that Mr. Garay and Mr. Medina were likely involved
in a drug conspiracy.

When considered with Mr. Garay’s “counter-surveillance” around the delivery
site for the Congress Parcel, a reasonably prudent officer could “believe the suspect
had committed or was committing a crime.” The inference is that Mr. Garay was on
the lookout for the delivery of package containing the same contents (and bearing the

same weight) as packages previously delivered to Mr. Medina from Puerto Rico.

8 “[T]he parcels were tracked by the same IP address, causing officials to
believe that the parcels were related, notwithstanding efforts of the sender(s) to
conceal the connection between the parcels.” ECF No. 55-1 at 4n.1.

9 The GW Parcel had a return address for a sender not from Puerto Rico, but
who was living in an apartment on George Waterman Road. Given GW Parcel’s
seeming connection to the Harris and Melrose Parcels, it is reasonable to conclude
that they are all related.

—l

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Thus, the Court finds that there was probable cause of the police to arrest Mr.
Garay.!0

Admittedly, the evidence is not concrete but does lead to proper inferences of
probable cause.!! One cannot say for certain that the Harris or Melrose Parcel
contained drugs, nor can one guarantee that Mr. Garay retrieved a package
containing drugs from Mr. Medina’s mother. But guarantees are not needed for there
to be probable cause.
OU. CONCLUSION

When taken in their totality, the circumstances at the time of the arrest tend
to suggest that Mr. Garay was involved in a drug conspiracy with Mr. Medina. Asa
result, the police had probable cause to arrest Mr. Garay and therefore the evidence
before the Court is not be suppressed. The Court DENIES Mr. Garay’s Motion to

Suppress. ECF No. 54.

10 Mr. Garay also argues that the police exceeded their constitutional scope in
searching his car. But an officer may search the entire automobile if “it is reasonable
to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Arizona v. Gant, 556
US. 332, 351 (2009). As reflected above, it is reasonable to presume that Mr. Garay
retrieved a package from Mr. Medina’s mother containing drugs in his Toyota Camry.
Indeed, it is part and parcel of the conspiracy. As a result, it would be reasonable for
officers to search his entire car for the package or indications towards its contents.
Thus, the search of Mr. Garay’s entire automobile did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, nor were its contents fruit of the poisonous tree

11 “(Narcotics traffickers often use fictious sender names, along with existing
return addresses, on parcels containing controlled substances or proceeds from the
sale of controlled substances.” ECF No. 55-1 at 4n.1.

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RED, , (

John J. McConnell, dr.
United States District Chief Judge

ITIS SO OR

August 18, 2022

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