McDaniel v. Preserve Property Management Company, LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
___________________________________
)
ALISON MCDANIEL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 23-292 WES
)
PRESERVE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT )
COMPANY, LLC, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM E. SMITH, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Dkt. No. 100. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.
I. BACKGROUND
This motion arises from Plaintiff Alison McDaniel’s action
against Defendants seeking to recover for alleged employment
discrimination, defamation, and battery. 2d Am. Verified Compl.
(“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 43. The Court recently issued a summary
judgment Memorandum and Order that provided a comprehensive
overview of the facts underlying this matter. Mem. & Order (Apr.
17, 2025), Dkt. No. 67. Specifically, the Court’s Memorandum and
Order details the parties’ respective backgrounds, the business
entities and their interrelationships with one another, and the
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work performed by McDaniel that eventually resulted in her decision
to bring this action. See id. at 1-6. The Court incorporates the
Memorandum and Order’s background facts by reference and only
provides the details necessary to its resolution of the instant
Motion for Summary Judgment.
At this stage, McDaniel’s Complaint contains five remaining
claims: Count VI, a violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment
Practices Act for retaliation, but only against Defendant Preserve
Property Management (“PPMC”); Count VII, Breach of Contract; Count
VIII, a violation of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990
(“RICRA”) pursuant to a theory that Defendants discriminated on
the basis of sex by creating a hostile work environment by sexually
harassing her; Count IX, a violation of RICRA pursuant to a theory
that Defendants discriminated on the basis of sex by engaging in
quid pro quo sexual harassment; and Count XIII, battery. See
Compl. ¶¶ 257-309, 332-334; Mem. & Order 1-2 (July 22, 2025), Dkt.
No. 88 (regarding Count VI).
The Court previously denied Defendants’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings and, in a separate order, invited them to move
for summary judgment on the aforementioned claims. Mem. & Order
(Sep. 22, 2025), Dkt. No. 96; Text Order (Oct. 23, 2025).
Critically, when denying Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the Court reconsidered its prior dismissal of
McDaniel’s claim for breach of contract based on the theory that
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she could have performed work for Defendants either as an
independent contractor or pursuant to an alternative employment
arrangement. Mem. & Order 6 (Sep. 22, 2025). Following the
Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for reconsideration,
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining counts in
this action.
II. DISCUSSION
To succeed on summary judgment, litigants must demonstrate
that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and that they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Boykin v. Genzyme
Therapeutic Prods., LP, 93 F.4th 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The standard is a familiar one: a court
can grant summary judgment ‘only if the record, construed in the
light most amiable to the nonmovant, presents no genuine issue as
to any material fact and reflects the movant’s entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law.’” United States ex rel. Omni
Healthcare, Inc. v. MD Spine Sols. LLC, 160 F.4th 248, 257 (1st
Cir. 2025) (quoting Irobe v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 890 F.3d 371,
377 (1st Cir. 2018)). Finally, courts must “proceed with caution
and restraint when considering summary judgment motions where, as
here, issues of pretext, motive, and intent are in play.” Taite
v. Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir.
2021).
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This Court’s resolution of Count VI — Defendants’ alleged
violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act —
centers on whether a factual dispute exists concerning Defendants’
motivation when they filed a criminal complaint against McDaniel,
accusing her of extortion and other crimes for allegedly stealing
their property. See Compl. ¶¶ 257-266. McDaniel argues that
Defendants filed the complaint in bad faith and sought to retaliate
against her for initiating this action and other forms of recourse
against them. Id. Counts VII-IX — claims for a breach of contract
and violations of RICRA — depend on whether a disputed fact exists
concerning McDaniel’s employment relationship with Defendants and
whether the parties formed an agreement that would allow her to
bring these claims. Finally, the viability of Count XIII —
McDaniel’s battery claim — centers on whether a factual dispute
exists concerning Mihailides’s alleged touching of McDaniel in a
harmful or offensive manner. The Court will address each issue in
turn.
A. Count VI
With respect to McDaniel’s claim for retaliation, the Court
determines that a genuine dispute of material fact exists
concerning Defendants’ motivation for filing the criminal
complaint against her. Specifically, McDaniel notes that, despite
contacting her and hiring an independent investigator to obtain
information about her alleged unlawful retention of property,
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Defendants did not file a criminal complaint against her until
after she filed: (1) an administrative charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission; (2) the instant action; and (3)
an administrative charge with the Rhode Island Commission for Human
Rights. Mem. L. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 34,
Dkt. No. 108-1. Only after these actions took place, McDaniel
argues, did Defendants engage in the allegedly retaliatory
conduct. Id.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the McDaniel, a
genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding Defendants’
motivation for filing this criminal complaint. In support of this
determination, the Court notes that Defendants waited almost two
years before filing this complaint against McDaniel,
notwithstanding the fact that they had expended significant
resources to investigate the alleged retention of property. Pl.’s
Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) Ex. I, Dkt. No. 108-3.
The timeline of events presented by McDaniel suggests at least the
possibility that the Defendants’ decision was retaliatory
behavior. This is a question a jury must resolve at trial. See
Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“We must exercise particular caution before sustaining summary
judgments for employers on such issues as pretext, motive, and
intent.”) (citation modified). Accordingly, the Court denies
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VI.
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Notwithstanding this factual dispute, Defendants argue that
summary judgment should enter in their favor. Specifically,
Defendants attempt to invoke the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
is rooted in antitrust law and the immunity it provides individuals
that advocate for legislation that would result in anticompetitive
practices. Defendants assert that this doctrine immunizes their
decision to file a criminal complaint against McDaniel in the
context of their private employment dispute. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.
32-34. Notwithstanding Defendants’ collection of a litany of case
law applying this doctrine in other, ostensibly analogous
contexts, they fail to provide the Court with binding authority
that mandates its application here. See id. The Court declines
to immunize Defendants’ conduct in this novel context as a matter
of first impression.
Defendants also attempt to undercut McDaniel’s retaliation
claim by arguing that she has not suffered a materially adverse
action under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act.
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 37-41. The Court rejects this argument as
well. Both McDaniel’s Complaint, which directly states that
Defendants’ actions have “sullied [her] reputation in the
community and created obstacles in obtaining employment in her
field,” and the testimony from her deposition stating that
Defendants’ actions have caused her “great stress” create a genuine
dispute of material fact on this issue. Compl. ¶ 260; Pl.’s Opp’n
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Attach. 5, at 377:21-25, Dkt. No. 108-5. The Court therefore
denies summary judgment on Count VI.1
B. Counts VII-IX
As outlined above, resolution of Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Counts VII-IX depends on whether a factual
dispute exists regarding McDaniel’s employment relationship with
Defendants. In order to determine whether two individuals have
formed a contract pursuant to Rhode Island law, the Court must
assess the parties’ “words and actions to determine whether they
have manifested the objective intent to promise or be bound.”
Bourque v. F.D.I.C., 42 F.3d 704, 708 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Smith
v. Boyd, 553 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I. 1989)). “Determining whether
there was mutual assent may involve factual questions: What did
the parties say (or do) to manifest their intent? Were the
parties’ understandings of each other’s actions reasonable under
all the circumstances? Answering these questions is the province
of the factfinder and not the court.” Id. (citing Salem Laundry
Co. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 829 F.2d
278, 280 (1st Cir. 1987)).
1 Defendants’ Reply Memorandum appears to argue that McDaniel’s
statement regarding her relationship with The Preserve at Boulder
Hills constitutes an implied concession that she did not have an
employment relationship with Preserve Property Management Company.
Defs.’ Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 19, Dkt. No. 111. McDaniel
clearly disputes this argument and asserts that a verbal agreement
existed between her and all three Defendants. Pl.’s Statement
Disputed Facts (“PSDF”) ¶¶ 1-3, Dkt. No. 110.
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Here, the record reveals that a genuine dispute of fact exists
regarding whether McDaniel formed a contract for independent
contractor services with Defendants. Specifically, the record
contains a critical dispute regarding the parties’ words and
actions and whether they formed a contract that governed the work
she performed for them. See Compl. ¶¶ 17-41. As Defendants
acknowledge, the Court must consider the allegations contained
within McDaniel’s Complaint as the functional equivalent of an
affidavit on summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 15.
Setting aside the other evidence offered by McDaniel, the
allegations contained in the Complaint alone foreclose summary
judgment on this issue. Compl. ¶¶ 17-41. Specifically, McDaniel
alleges that she performed a wide variety of work for Defendants
that ranges from waiting tables to managing Defendants’ presence
on social media and appearing in advertisements. Id. The
existence of this disputed employment relationship requires a
factfinder to address whether the parties’ words and actions
constitute enough evidence for it to determine that they formed a
contractual relationship for independent contractor services.
Bourque, 42 F.3d at 708. While Defendants clearly seek to
discredit McDaniel’s credibility and disagree with her
disorganized and sometimes contradictory characterization of her
relationship with Defendants, the Court must read the record in
the light most favorable to her. MD Spine Sols., 160 F.4th at
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257. The Court therefore denies summary judgment on Counts VII-
IX.
C. Count XIII
Defendants also seek summary judgment on Count XIII,
McDaniel’s claim for battery arising out of Mihailides’s alleged
history of behaving in a sexually inappropriate manner toward her.
As with her earlier claims, the Court determines that a factual
dispute exists regarding the nature and extent to which
Mihailides’s actions constitute harmful or offensive touching.
Notwithstanding McDaniel’s testimony describing Mihailides
touching her on multiple occasions, Defendants attempt to seize
upon what they characterize as “inconsistent and contradictory”
evidence associated with this claim. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 41.
For example, Defendants seek dismissal of this claim by directing
the Court to examples where Mihailides “tried to kiss” her and
“attempted to touch” certain parts of her body and argue that these
characterizations do not describe direct contact in and of
themselves. Id. at 41-44.
However, when viewed in the light most favorable to McDaniel,
a genuine dispute of fact clearly exists regarding the physical
contact underlying her claim for battery. For example, the
Complaint directly states that Mihailides “intentionally touched
[her] body” on several occasions. Compl. ¶ 333. McDaniel’s
deposition testimony also clearly details her recollection of
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Mihailides’s alleged inappropriate contact with her and the harm
to her that resulted from it. See Pl.’s Opp’n Attach. 5, at
353:11-15-56 (“I think I’ve experienced a lot of harm [from the
alleged unwanted touching]. I think, even trying to forge through
a working relationship like that and trying to get paid and trying
to do the job, it caused a lot of harm to me. Mentally,
emotionally, it gave me anxiety, yes. It gives me fear.”).2 This
evidence unquestionably creates a factual dispute concerning
McDaniel’s battery claim and the Court therefore denies summary
judgment on Count XIII.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants
have not demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment. As
a result, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Dkt. No. 100.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
William E. Smith
Senior District Judge
Date: January 16, 2026
2 Based on McDaniel’s testimony clearly detailing the extent of
the harm that she suffered from her interactions with Mihailides,
the Court declines Defendants’ request to prevent her from
recovering economic or punitive damages at this stage of the
action.
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