Spur Track Properties, LLC et al v. City of Providence et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
SPUR TRACK PROPERTIES, LLC;
NARRAGANSETT PROMOTIONS,
INC.; ADALBERTO ALEVAREZ; and
STEVEN MEDEIROS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF PROVIDENCE and SARA
SILVERIA in her capacity as Finance
Director of the City of Providence,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 1:24-cv-00010-MSM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is the defendant, City of Providence’s, Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 25.) The plaintiffs, Spur Track Properties, LLC, Narragansett
Promotions, Inc., Adalberto Alevarez, and Steven Medeiros (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
allege that the Providence Police Department engaged in discriminatory enforcement
activity targeting their business and patrons on the basis of sexual orientation. (ECF
No. 14.) They bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for
Summary Judgment.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court notes at the outset that the Plaintiffs did not submit a Statement of
Disputed Facts specifically responding to the City’s Statement of Undisputed Facts
as required by DRI LR Cv 56. Any properly supported facts set forth by the City that
Plaintiffs have not expressly disputed with citation to record evidence are deemed
admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(3). The Court therefore accepts the City’s supported
statements of material fact as true to the extent they are substantiated by the record,
do not rest on credibility determinations or legal conclusions, and are not contradicted
by the Plaintiffs’ submissions. 	The Court has nevertheless viewed all evidence and
factual inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, as required on a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
	Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Canadian Univ. Ins.,
924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1991).
The City’s uncontroverted evidence establishes the following. Spur Track owns
the property located at 257 Allens Avenue and leases it to Narragansett, which
operates The Mega-Plex. 	The Mega-Plex is a sauna that also provides lockers and
rooms for rent, showers, counseling, an adult video lounge, and sexual health and
wellness services. (ECF No. 25-2 at 16-17.) The Mega-Plex’s clientele consists largely
of members of the LGBTQ+ community.
	Id. at 12-13.
Other adult-oriented businesses operate in the immediate vicinity of the Mega-
Plex: the Studio, the Bull Pen, Wonderland, and (formerly) Silhouettes.
Id. at 18-19.
The Studio caters to straight, gay, and bisexual patrons of both sexes, the Bull Pen
serves the same mixed clientele, and Wonderland caters to all patrons “regardless of
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sexual orientation.”
	Id. at 18-21. 	The businesses’ hours of operation generally
overlap.1	
Id. at 19. 	All four businesses share a common parking area open to the
public: a large rear lot and the Bay Street parking area.2
Id. at 22, 51.
The security guard, Adalberto Nevarez, testified that anyone from the public
may park in either lot to visit the businesses.
Id. at 53. Beginning in early 2023 and
continuing through early 2024, Providence Police Department officers had consistent
presence in the parking areas described above.
	Id. at 65. 	There are no allegations
that officers entered any of the businesses themselves, nor that they entered the
parking lots when the businesses were closed.
	Id. at 54. Mr. Nevarez also testified
about persistent criminal activity in the shared parking areas.
	Id. at 64. 	He
described frequently removing “bad people” from the lots, including individuals
engaged in drug use, panhandling, solicitation, and harassment of patrons.
Id. at 60-
63. 	In instances where he could not remove individuals himself, Mr. Nevarez
contacted the police to escort them from the property.
Id. at 64.
Mr. Nevarez further testified that he filmed 19 interactions with police and
acknowledged that officers did not prevent him from speaking in those encounters.
Id. at 86. Several videos depict officers on public roads while Mr. Nevarez addressed
or confronted them from the rear lot.
	Id. at 107. 	In one exchange, Mr. Nevarez
1 The Mega-Plex is open 24 hours per day; the Studio operates from 10:00 a.m. to
10:00 p.m.; the Bull Pen opens at 10:00 a.m. and closes at either 9:00 p.m. or 11:00
p.m.; and Wonderland opens at 5:00 p.m. and closes between 11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m.
(ECF No. 25-2 at 19.)
2 The City of Providence abandoned the Bay Street parking area.
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admitted he sometimes sought police interactions to generate evidence for the
lawsuit.
	Id. at 289. 	He testified that another gay-oriented business (in another
location in Providence), the Eagle’s Nest, offered similar services but did not
experience comparable police presence.
Id. at 302.
The Plaintiffs allege that these police encounters are not isolated, but stem
from 	a 	policy 	or 	practice 	of 	targeted 	enforcement 	that 	officers 	learn 	through
departmental training.3 	(ECF 28 ¶ 50.) 	According to the Plaintiffs, officers
understand the Mega-Plex area to be populated by individuals from protected classes,
including LGBTQ+ individuals and racial minorities, and view the areas as one of the
“easiest” places to make arrests.
	Id.
The Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint advances two causes of action: Count
I, alleging a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Count II, alleging a deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 	(ECF No. 14.) 	The Plaintiffs allege that the City of Providence engaged in
targeted policing of the Mega-Plex, and its patrons based on the sexual orientation of
those patrons.
	Id. 	They further assert that the City effected unlawful entries onto
their private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment and infringed their First
Amendment rights.
Id.
3 Plaintiffs assert that their evidence includes patron letter describing intrusive police
encounters, security-staff testimony recounting years of alleged harassment, body-
camera footage of warrantless vehicle searches, and sworn complaints to Internal
Affairs. 	(
See ECF 28 at 12–13.) 	Yet Plaintiffs submit neither body-camera footage
nor any Internal Affairs complaints, leaving these assertions unsupported by specific,
admissible evidence.
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The City now moves for summary judgment. (ECF No. 25.)
II. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 	An issue is “genuine” if the
evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant, and
a dispute is “material” if it could affect the outcome under governing law.
	Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the initial
burden of identifying the basis for its motion and the portions of the record
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
	Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
When the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may satisfy
its initial burden by showing an absence of evidence supporting the nonmovant’s
position.
Id. Once that showing is made, the nonmovant must identify specific facts,
supported by competent evidence, showing a genuine issue for trial; conclusory or
self-serving assertions are insufficient.
	Id. at 322–24. 	Summary judgment is
therefore appropriate where the nonmovant fails to make a sufficient evidentiary
showing on an essential element of its case.
	Id.;
see also Theidon v. Harvard Univ.,
948 F.3d 477, 494 (1st Cir. 2020); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Standing
As a threshold matter, the City contends that plaintiffs Spur Track Properties,
LLC, and Narragansett Promotions, Inc. (collectively, the “Corporate Plaintiffs”) lack
standing to maintain this suit because the constitutional claims they are asserting
are on behalf of their patrons. According to the City, the Corporate Plaintiffs fail to
allege the requisite “close relationship” with their patrons and do not show that those
patrons face any hindrance to bringing their own civil rights actions. The City further
contends 	that 	the 	First 	Amended 	Complaint 	contains 	no 	factual 	allegations
establishing that the Corporate Plaintiffs themselves suffered a violation of their
constitutional rights.
To prove standing, the party invoking a court’s jurisdiction must show, with
evidence appropriate to the stage of the proceeding, that it “(1) suffered an injury in
fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). The first and perhaps most important element of standing
is that “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally
protected interest 	which 	is 	(a) 	concrete 	and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or
imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
Although the Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint references third-party
standing, the Corporate Plaintiffs do not rely exclusively on the constitutional rights
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of their patrons to support standing. 	Rather, the Corporate Plaintiffs contend that
their claims arise from direct and independent injuries, including lost revenue,
reputational harm, repeated trespasses upon the property, and the chilling of
expressive conduct. 	And, as set forth in the Affidavit of Steven Medeiros, the
President of Narragansett Promotions, the Mega-Plex experienced a sustained and
measurable decline in business performance directly attributable to the Providence
Police Department’s persistent and unwarranted presence, and Mr. Medeiros attests
that the Mega-Plex would have realized materially greater revenues and membership
growth absent this targeted law enforcement activity. (ECF No. 28-4.) The Corporate
Plaintiffs therefore have adequately established a concrete and particularized injury
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury in fact requirement.
B. 	Equal Protection Violation (Count I)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires all
persons similarly situated be treated alike.”
Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sanchez,
715 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 	To prevail on an Equal Protection claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent and that
the 	challenged 	conduct 	resulted 	in 	different 	treatment 	of 	similarly 	situated
individuals.
Lopera v. Town of Coventry, 652 F. Supp. 2d 203, 217 (D.R.I. 2009),
aff’d,
640 F.3d 388 (1st Cir. 2011). 	A showing of discriminatory intent requires evidence
that the defendant selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
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because of, and not merely in spite of, its adverse effects on an identifiable group.
In
re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118–19 (1st Cir. 2008).
The Plaintiffs allege that the Providence Police Department engaged in a
pattern of conduct intended to suppress the business operations of the Mega-Plex and
to harass its predominantly LGBTQ+ patrons based on their sexual orientation or
gender identity. Such allegations, if proven, would raise substantial Equal Protection
issues. The City responds that the record does not support a reasonable inference of
discriminatory intent, that the Plaintiffs have failed to identify similarly situated
businesses that were treated more favorably, and that the Plaintiffs therefore cannot
establish an underlying constitutional violation.
On this record, the Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to find that the City’s actions were motivated by discriminatory
animus. 	Much of the material the Plaintiffs rely upon consists of unsworn letters,
unsupported 	assertions, 	or 	documents 	lacking 	attestation, 	authentication, 	or
foundation. Such submissions are not admissible evidence and cannot be considered
at summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). An affidavit or declaration used
to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and demonstrate that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify to the matters stated. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 	Setting aside
these inadmissible submissions, the remaining record evidence does not support a
reasonable inference that the City’s conduct was undertaken because of the sexual
orientation or gender identity of the Mega-Plex’s patrons or staff. The record contains
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no statements, directives, or other indicia of discriminatory purpose, nor does it
reflect 	enforcement 	decisions 	that 	cannot 	be 	explained 	by 	non-discriminatory
considerations.
Equally significant, the Plaintiffs have not identified evidence that similarly
situated businesses were treated more favorably. 	They do not point to other
establishments with comparable size, operating hours, location, or history of police
interaction that were spared similar enforcement activity. 	Absent evidence of
differential treatment among appropriate comparators, the Plaintiffs cannot sustain
an Equal Protection claim based on selective enforcement.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have failed to adduce evidence from which a
reasonable 	jury 	could find intentional 	discrimination 	or unequal 	treatment 	of
similarly situated parties. 	Their Equal Protection claim therefore fails as a matter
of law, and the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Count
I.
C. 	Fourth Amendment (Count II)
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects against violations of the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, 	houses, 	papers, 	and effects, 	against 	unreasonable 	searches 	and
seizures ....” U.S. Const. amend. IV;
Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).
To establish an invasion of privacy, the plaintiff must have exhibited an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy in the area entered.
	Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S.
735, 740 (1979).
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The Plaintiffs allege that the Department entered the Plaintiffs’ private
property 	without 	a 	warrant 	and 	conducted 	unreasonable 	searches 	thereon 	in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The City moves for summary judgment on this
claim arguing that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject areas.
The record reflects that all four businesses share common parking areas for
their patrons. These include two primary lots, the rear parking lot and the Bay Street
parking area, both of which are used collectively by all four establishments. The City
presents 	substantial 	evidence 	that 	both 	parking 	areas 	constitute 	commercial
property serving multiple businesses, and that they are freely accessible to the public.
The record further reflects that the interior portions of each lot are plainly visible
from adjacent public streets and sidewalks. 	According to the City’s evidence, law
enforcement officers routinely patrol the vicinity due to frequent service calls and
elevated crime levels.
The Plaintiffs did not address the City’s Fourth Amendment argument in their
response to this Motion. 	When a plaintiff fails to respond to a properly supported
summary judgment motion, and the record discloses no genuine dispute of material
fact, summary judgment is appropriate.
Jakobiec v. Merrill Lynch Life Ins. Co., 711
F.3d 217, 226 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting
Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d
651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010)). Here, the City has met its burden and the Plaintiffs have
not “affirmatively point[ed] to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an
authentic dispute.”
	Kenney v. Floyd, 700 F.3d 604, 608 (1st Cir.2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	Similarly, the Plaintiff’s Statement of Disputed Facts
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provides no lifeline, as it fails to meaningfully dispute facts and instead sets forth
mere conclusory statements. (ECF No. 29.)
D. 	First Amendment Claim (Count II)
In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that Providence Police Department responded to
a legitimate exercise of plaintiff Adalberto Nevarez’s First Amendment right to film
officers with physical force despite Mr. Nevarez not presenting a danger to the
officers, himself, or anyone else, in violation of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 4 The City argues that Mr. Nevarez’s First Amendment rights
were not violated because the record shows he was not prevented from filming
officers, 	nor 	has 	he 	been 	prevented 	from 	speaking 	as 	evidenced 	by 	his 	own
admissions.
Indeed, the undisputed evidence shows that Mr. Nevarez routinely filmed
police activity without interference. 	The Plaintiffs produced nineteen cellphone
videos taken by Nevarez in the two-block area at issue, and none depict officers
preventing him from recording. 	Nevarez also admitted in his deposition that he
filmed police more times than he could remember and that officers frequently allowed
4 The Plaintiffs are bringing this claim in two parts. 	As to the Corporate Plaintiffs,
they 	allege: 	“by 	undertaking 	meritless 	enforcement 	activity 	against 	Plaintiffs,
Defendants have unlawfully and substantially deprived Plaintiffs of rights secured
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” 	ECF No. 	14 ¶ 59. 	As to Mr. Nevarez, the Plaintiffs allege, “PPD
repeatedly prevented the filming of government action which was not impeding the
ability of the government agents to properly conduct their assigned functions in
violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution […]”
Id. ¶ 60. As
the First Amended Complaint contains no allegation that the business entity was
prevented from filming, the allegation necessarily concerns Mr. Nevarez and is
analyzed accordingly.
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him to speak and question their actions. 	The City further relies on deposition
testimony and video footage showing that Nevarez actively engaged officers, often
inserting himself into their interactions with others and then alleging constitutional
violation when they responded. The record reflects no instance in which Nevarez was
prevented from filming or speaking.
Like the Fourth Amendment analysis above, Plaintiffs’ opposition offered no
response to the City’s motion and fails to establish any genuine dispute of material
fact. 	Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment Claims is GRANTED.
E. 	Municipal Liability
The Plaintiffs also allege that the City was liable for the police officers’ conduct
under
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Specifically, that the City maintained a policy or custom of conducting warrantless
searches and seizures on the private property of establishments primarily serving
LGBTQ+ patrons, purportedly to harass the businesses, their owners, and their
customers under the guise of policing a high crime area. The Plaintiffs further allege
that the City failed to train its officers on (1) proper practices for addressing alleged
high crime areas, (2) First Amendment protections, and (3) the prohibition against
using force in response to protected First Amendment activity.
To establish municipal liability and prevail on their
Monell claim, it is not
enough for Plaintiffs to allege that the City’s alleged policy injured them. 	Rather,
they must establish: (1) that they suffered a constitutional injury, and (2) that the
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City authorized or maintained a custom of approving the unconstitutional conduct
.
Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690;
see also Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 859 (7th
Cir.1994). Absent an underlying constitutional violation, a
Monell claim cannot lie.
The 	Plaintiffs’ 	allegations, 	if 	proven, 	would 	raise 	serious 	constitutional
concerns. 	But municipal liability under
Monell requires more than the existence of
an alleged policy or custom; it requires proof that such a policy caused a constitutional
injury to the plaintiffs. Here, the record does not establish that Plaintiffs suffered a
constitutional injury. 	The Plaintiffs’ evidence is limited to conduct involving the
Mega-Plex and the surrounding two-block area, which is insufficient to demonstrate
a Citywide policy or custom. 	Nor does the record support Plaintiffs’ failure-to-train
theory, as Plaintiffs did not seek or produce evidence of training materials or
deficiencies concerning First Amendment protections, policing of high-crime areas, or
use-of-force practices. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
Monell claim fails as a matter of law.
F. 	Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The City moves for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Plaintiff Steven
Medeiros. The City argues that, while he is a named plaintiff, there is no mention of
Medeiros anywhere in the First Amended Complaint. Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to
delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
In light of the Court’s granting of the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court
DENIES AS MOOT the City’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 	(ECF No. 25
at 5–6.)
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25)
is GRANTED. The City’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 25 at 5–6)
is DENIED AS MOOT.
T IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
March 30, 2026
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