Kenyon et al v. Shekarchi et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
____________________________________
)
BRUCE KENYON; FRANK 	)
ANDRADE; and TIMOTHY 	)
SCANLON, 	)
Plaintiffs 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 25-cv-351-JJM-AEM
)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 	)
U.S. OFFICE OF JUSTICE 	)
PROGRAMS; and ASSISTANT A.G. 	)
BRENT J. COHEN, 	)
in his Official Capacity, 	)
Defendants. 	)
____________________________________)
____________________________________
)
BRUCE L. KENYON; FRANK 	)
ANDRAD; HELBERTH PEREZ; 	)
JEREMY BEAUSOLEIL; 	)
CHRISTOPHER L. SMITH; 	)
TIMOTHY SCANLON; WOLF 	)
PAWOCHAWOG-MEQUINOSH; 	)
JOSE LANTIGUA; DAVID J. 	)
GIRARD; CHARLES MITCHELL; 	)
JOSEPH MEDEIROS; JESSE 	)
PERRY; GUISEPPE PIRRI; 	)
JACOB HARDIN; RICARDO 	)
HERNANDEZ; MIGUEL 	)
MONTERO; JOSHUA RATHBUN; 	)
MYQUL MONTI; CRAIG PREUIT; 	)
and GEORGE TABORA,1 	)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 25-cv-521-JJM-PAS
)
1 The Defendants reported to the Court that Plaintiff George Tabora died on
March 6, 2026. ECF No. 48.
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K. JOSEPH SHEKARCHI;2 	)
VALARIE J. LAWSON; SHELDON 	)
WHITEHOUSE; and SETH 	)
MAGAZINER, 	)
Defendants. 	)
____________________________________)
ORDER
The 	Plaintiffs 	are 	a 	group 	of 	state 	prisoners,3 	proceeding
	pro 	se 	and
challenging the facial constitutionality and implementation of Rhode Island’s sex
offender registration scheme, R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-8.2.1(b)-(b)(2) (the “Jessica
Lunsford provisions”) and R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-6 (authorizing the labeling of an
individual as a “sexually violent predator” that imposes certain constraints). 	The
requirements on post-custody registration may be imposed for the offender’s lifetime.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37.1-4(b) and (c).
The thrust of the Plaintiffs’ challenge is that the statutory scheme fails to
consider the circumstances of individual offenders and the characteristics of the
crimes they committed. 	A second theme is that the underlying assumption of the
registration requirement and behavior restrictions is that the individuals cannot
exercise impulse control and modify their behavior, in which case, the Plaintiffs
reason, they are not sane and competent enough to be prosecuted criminally;
conversely, 	if 	they 	are 	deemed 	sane 	and 	competent 	enough 	to 	be 	prosecuted
2 K. Joseph Shekarchi resigned as Speaker of the Rhode Island House of
Representatives and was replaced by Christopher R. Blazejewski. 	But because the
Plaintiffs alleged actions by former Speaker Shekarchi individually, the Court is not
substituting Speaker Blazejewski now.
3 The original Plaintiffs numbered nine. The Amended Complaint was brought
on behalf of 20.
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criminally, they are able to exercise impulse control and do not need the strictures
imposed on them by the registration scheme. 	They note that the federal law that
underlies the state scheme, 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6), is directed at “sexually dangerous
person[s]” who are defined as those who “suffer[s] from a serious mental illness,
abnormality or disorder as a result of which [they] would have serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct.” 	ECF No. 1-1 at 17. 	There is far more
alleged in a lengthy, somewhat difficult to follow Amended Complaint – including a
theory that the statutes at issue deny them the opportunity to meaningfully assert
viable mental health-based defenses4 – but the relationship between the sex offender
scheme and mental illness seems to be at the heart of the allegations.
They cite an array of injuries, starting with “more than a decade of wrongful
incarceration,” and including “reputational destruction, economic deprivation and
psychological trauma.” ECF No. 30 at 4.
This is the fourth action brought by inmate Bruce Kenyon raising a challenge
to the same statutory scheme.
Kenyon v. United States, No. 24-cv-306-WES-PAS was
dismissed because the Complaint violated the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) that
it contain a “short and plain” statement of the claim.
	Kenyon v. United States,
No. 25-cv-209-JJM-PAS was dismissed for the same reason and for want of standing
since the vast majority of the Plaintiffs are still incarcerated and therefore under no
4 The Amended Complaint introduces a novel argument based on the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right to present
a defense in a criminal prosecution. 	According to the Amended Complaint, the sex
offender scheme “impairs defense counsel from presenting viable trial strategies,”
ECF No. 1-1 at 24, thus violating the Constitution.
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duty to register.5
Kenyon v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 25-cv-351-JJM-AEM
is in a somewhat strange posture. 	It was consolidated with this case, but it was
independently dismissed shortly thereafter, for want of standing and failure to state
a claim. ECF No. 17. 	Despite the directive to file all papers in this case (
Kenyon v.
Shekarchi), the Plaintiffs have continued to file Motions in 25-cv-351-JJM-AEM (e.g.,
Motion to Clarify, ECF 19, Motion to Preserve Separate Adjudication, etc., ECF
No. 21 and others). They have also asked to be relieved from the judgment in No. 25-
cv-351-JJM-AEM (ECF No. 26) or to have the judgment altered. ECF No. 25.
The Plaintiffs have not taken to heart everything from this Court’s previous
declarations about their attempts to avoid application to them of Rhode Island’s sex
offender registration scheme. This Amended Complaint is another lengthy (54-page)
document that reads similarly to the previous ones and creates the same Rule 8(a)
issue by throwing a kitchen sink of legal theories against the statutes. Even more to
the point, the Amended Complaint indicates all but one is still in custody, therefore
they are still not required to register. That fact creates the same standing issue that
was already decided against them at least with respect to the requirement to register
and adhere to the conditions outlined in the statute.
5 All but one Plaintiff has given the Court addresses at the Adult Correctional
Institutions, Department of Corrections, in Cranston, Rhode Island. Plaintiff Jeremy
Beausoleil has given an address in Indiana, but the Amended Complaint maintains
he is a resident of Rhode Island. 	(ECF No. 30 at ¶ 71. 	There is no section of the
Amended Complaint that really describes the 20 Plaintiffs. Person-specific facts are
discussed for nine of the Plaintiffs at ECF 30 at ¶ 18-39, simply asserting in
conclusory terms that those Plaintiffs were subject to registration and suffered injury.
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The Amended Complaint has a new, insurmountable obstacle: it sues two state
legislators and two members of Rhode Island’s congressional delegation because they
voted for legislation that imposed on Rhode Island (or induced with the carrot of
federal funds) the sex offender registration construct. 	K. Joseph Shekarchi, then-
Speaker of Rhode Island’s House of Representatives, is sued because the Speaker has
oversight of all House proceedings, including the advancement of bills like R.I. Gen.
Laws § 11-37.1-2(L). 	He exercised “administrative authority over the routing and
advancement of legislation.” ECF No. 30 at ¶ 109.6	
Id. Valerie Lawson, President
of the Rhode Island Senate, is sued because she “controlled committee referrals and
floor calendars ...”
	Id. 	United States Senator Sheldon Whitehouse is sued, as is
Congressman Seth M. Magaziner, because of their participation in passing H.R. 4472
which, the Amended Complaint alleges, funded the registration mechanism that
effectuated the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”),
and Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 34 U.S.C.
§ 20901. The Amended Complaint accuses both of a variety of activities undertaken
as legislators to help in moving federal funding to Rhode Island.
The connection here between federal and state Defendants is that SORNA
distributes federal funds to jurisdictions that establish and maintain sex offender
registries under SORNA guidelines. 34 U.S.C. § 20912(a) and (b). It is SORNA that
6 The Amended Complaint details a series of legislative actions attendant to
Mr. Shekarchi’s oversight and alleged help he rendered to advance the bill.
	See
Complaint, ECF 30, ¶ 110.
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suggests tiers of registration and specifies the durational period. 34 U.S.C. § 20915.
Funds are supplied through federal grants and failure to comply can result in loss of
or reduction in federal funds. 	Godin, “The New Scarlet Letter: 	Are We Taking the
Sex Offender Label Too Far?” 60-DEC R.I.B.J. 17 (Nov./Dec. 2011). 	Rhode Island
enacted a sex offender registry construct in response to the federal legislation and
accepts funding for it. 	The state Defendants here are sued for their actions in
establishing what is alleged to be an unconstitutional scheme; the federal Defendants
are sued for inducing the state to do that by holding out federal funding as a carrot
and for dictating requirements that the Plaintiffs allege are unconstitutional.
The Court need go no further than legislative immunity and dismisses the case
based on that defense, granting Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos 34 and 36.7
7 Were there no legislative immunity, the Plaintiffs would have to successfully
overcome the claim preclusion doctrine of
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Heck held that a civil lawsuit is an impermissible method of collaterally attacking
criminal convictions.
	Id. at 486-87. Any action that calls into question the integrity
of a conviction
or sentence is prohibited unless the conviction or sentence “has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
	Id. at 487. 	Later, that condition
precedent was softened in a way not relevant here by the holding of
Thompson v.
Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022), that a plaintiff must show only that the criminal
prosecution ended in a favorable way, without a conviction. 	The Plaintiffs seek to
avoid
Heck by asserting that they do not seek to vacate their convictions. ECF No. 30
at 12. But declaring it does not make it so. First,
Heck applies to claims for monetary
damages, and the Plaintiffs seek $10 million apiece. ECF No. 30 at 5. Second, even
though
Heck applies to claims for monetary damages and does not preclude actions
for prospective relief only,
Olivier v. City of Brandon, 607 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 916
(Mar. 20, 2026), it applies to actions “challeng[ing] the validity of a prior conviction
or sentence so as to obtain release from custody or money damages.”
Id. at 920. The
Plaintiffs directly assert that their incarcerations are “unlawful.” 	ECF No. 30 at 4.
The sex offender designation is a direct consequence of convictions and, by statute,
part of the sentence. Monitoring is imposed by statute “as a condition of parole and
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Legislative Immunity
Legislative immunity is absolute, and it attaches to local, state, and federal
legislators.
Acevedo -Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1992).
It serves the purpose of “help[ing] guarantee that legislators are free to legislate,
unfettered by fear of constituents’ lawsuits.”
	Id. at 22. 	Immunity is a complete bar
to liability. 	Whether legislative immunity applies turns on the nature of the act.
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (even though the Mayor is an executive
official, the act of introducing and signing ordinances was legislative). Accord
Carlow
v. Mruk, 425 F. Supp. 2d 225, 234 (D.R.I. 2006), adopted No. 04-cv-325S, ECF No. 23
(3/28/06).
The Plaintiffs break down the Defendants’ actions to try to establish that they
were “administrative” not “legislative.” 	They claim the activities fell into the
“implementation” or “enforcement” category (that has an executive “ring” to it) and
were therefore not legislative. The Plaintiffs simply declare conclusory allegations of
probation.” 	R.I. 	Gen. 	Laws 	§ 11-37-8.2(b). 	In
	Olivier, 	an 	important 	factual
circumstance differentiating that plaintiff’s situation from a
Heck scenario was that
Olivier’s request for remedy implicated
only prospective application of the statute; he
“did not seek in his § 1983 suit to upset that conviction,
or even to avert its collateral
effects.”
Olivier, 146 S. Ct. at 923 (emphasis supplied). Here, the Plaintiffs precisely
seek that.
The Plaintiffs proffer a theory that because they are attacking the structure of
the sex offender scheme, they are not really challenging their individual convictions
or sentences. ECF No. 30 at 12. But that strikes the Court as too facile. For example,
a death row inmate person who challenges the death penalty system-wide is, in the
process, attacking his own sentence and terms of incarceration.
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“administrative enforcement,” citing
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625
(1972).8
The specific acts that the Plaintiffs claim make the Defendants civilly liable
for application of the sex offender registry to them are:
• 	directing “committees and agencies to implement [the Act]”
• 	“supervising compliance” through federal mandates
• 	“maintaining and reenacting [SORNA]”
• 	“overseeing the statutory classification system”
• 	“ensuring continued enforcement through budgetary, administrative
and supervisory actions.”
ECF No. 30 at 12-13.
These acts are ancillary to the passage of legislation, or they are part of the
mandate of the Act. 	In other words, it is the Act itself that, by law, consigns
enforcement and the task of ensuring compliance to the executive agencies that
oversee it. 	Nowhere are the state Defendants tasked with accomplishing those
activities.
As for the federal Defendants, other than voting for the legislation, which is
beyond 	dispute 	a 	legislative 	activity, 	there 	are 	no 	alleged 	actions 	of 	Senator
Whitehouse or Congressman Magaziner that in any way could be considered their
personal participation in the mandated enforcement activities that by virtue of
8
Gravel is inapposite here as far as it held that an alleged arrangement made
by a United States Senator with a private publisher for publication of classified
documents was
not within legislative activity.
Id. at 622.
Gravel is useful, however,
for its declaration that participation in committee hearings and other non-voting
actions that are “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes . .
. with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation”
are shielded from liability.
Id. at 625.
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separation of powers are consigned to the Executive Branch. 	And on the face of it,
reenacting SORNA, and passing budgetary legislation dedicating funds to states that
comply with SORNA are integral parts of lawmaking. 	Those legislators who voted
for the legislation are no more responsible for “overseeing” it than they are for making
sure that the Fair Housing Act is complied with.
State lawmakers are sued on the theory that by accepting federal funds and
complying with SORNA by passing state laws establishing a registry and mandating
adherence 	to 	the 	federal 	requirements, 	they 	are 	themselves 	carrying 	out
unconstitutional procedures. But voting for legislation and enacting budget plans are
quintessentially legislative activities.
	Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1,
8 (1st Cir. 2000). Generally, the hallmark of legislative action is that it accomplishes
generalizations concerning policy or the state of affairs.
Id. at 9. Decisions that stem
from specific facts about individuals or situations are more likely to be deemed
administrative.
	Id. For example,
Bogan itself upheld as legislative the preparation
of a budget calling for elimination of a position, because while there was a person
occupying that position, the elimination of the person’s department was an “integral
step in the legislative process” that had implications beyond the position’s then-
current occupant and was therefore generalized. 523 U.S. at 55. Similarly, while in
Carlow v. Mruk, the action of the Town Meeting Moderator that was challenged was
targeted at a particular person speaking out of turn – as the legislative acts here
target the group to which the Plaintiffs belong – but as an adopted Rule prohibiting
nonresidents from speaking, the Moderator’s enforcement reflected a general policy
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beyond the specific facts of that individual and thus was legislative activity entitled
to absolute immunity
. 	Carlow v. Mruk, 425 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237 (D.R.I. 2006),
adopted No. 04-cv-325S, ECF No. 23 (3/28/06). 	The same rationale led the First
Circuit to conclude that the decision of the New Hampshire General Assembly
Speaker of the House in prohibiting remote voting during the COVID-19 pandemic
was a legislative act establishing a general rule, not a determination of the rights of
specific individuals based on specific situational facts.
Cushing v. Packard, 30 F.4th
27, 49 (1st Cir. 2022).
In this case, all the activities assertedly performed by all four legislative
Defendants were legislative in nature and absolute immunity attached to them. The
wisdom and, indeed, even the lawfulness of the legislation does not affect that
immunity. “Legislative activities otherwise entitled to immunity in a § 1983 suit do
not lose the full protection of that immunity merely because plaintiffs allege that such
activities violate their constitutional rights.”
	Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-Alverio,
221 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2000). 	So long as an activity occurred within “the sphere of
legitimate legislative activity,” liability for it is barred.
Id. at 4.
The Plaintiffs are clearly sincere in their belief that the statutes they challenge
are unconstitutional, and there is no doubt in the Court’s mind that being subject to
the sex offender registration scheme is a substantial burden. But the Plaintiffs have
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not, in their four lawsuits, been able to mount a challenge that survives long enough
to get to the merits.9
Conclusion
In
Kenyon v. Shekarchi, No. 25-cv-521-JJM, the Court GRANTS the Motions
to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 10, 27, 34, and 36) and this case is DISMISSED. 	The Court
DENIES AS MOOT all the remaining motions in 25-cv-521-JJM:
• 	Motion to Transfer Venue to The District of Columbia Pursuant to 28
U.S.C : 1404(a) (ECF No. 8);
• 	Motion to Compel Discovery or Preserve Jury Trial Rights Prior to
Amendment (ECF No. 9);
• 	Motion to Preserve the Integrity of the Record and Notify the Court of
Potential Judicial Misconduct (ECF No. 11);
• 	Motion to Update Record (ECF No. 13);
• 	Motion to Compel Targeted Discovery re: Plaintiffs' Right to Amend and
Demand Discovery (ECF No. 14);
• 	Motion to Preserve Jury Trial Rights (ECF No. 16); and
• 	Motion to Clarify Fact-Finding Standard and Preserve Right to Jury
Trial (ECF No. 19).
In
Kenyon v. DOJ, 25-cv-351-JJM, the Court DENIES the Motions to Alter
Judgment and for Relief from Judgment. ECF Nos. 25 and 26. The Court DENIES
as moot the Motions to Preserve Integrity of Record and to Compel Targeted
Discovery. ECF Nos. 24 and 27.
In addition, the Plaintiffs, individually and as a group, are barred from filing
pro se while they are incarcerated any further civil lawsuits aimed at invalidating
the sex offender registration scheme without leave of the Court.
9 In the two cases that were consolidated, Nos. 25-cv-351-JJM and 25-cv-521-
JJM, there are a slew of pending Motions. This Order will terminate them all.
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IT IS SO ORDERED:
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.,
Chief Judge
United States District Court
May 15, 2026
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