Lakeshia Nicole Jenkins

U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
District of South Carolina
Case Number: 26-03266-jd
Order Granting In Rem Relief from the Automatic Stay
The relief set forth on the following pages, for a total of 17 pages including this page, is
hereby ORDERED.
FILED BY THE COURT
09/23/2026
US Bankruptcy Judge
District of South Carolina
Entered: 09/23/2026
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN RE:
Lakeshia Nicole Jenkins,
Debtor(s).
C/A No. 26-03266-JD
Chapter 13
Order Granting In Rem Relief
from Stay
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion for Relief from Stay
(“Motion”) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), (4)1 filed by Creditor Walterboro
Development Corporation (“Creditor”). Lakeshia Jenkins (“Debtor”), appearing pro
se, filed an Objection to the Motion.2 The Court held a hearing on the Motion on
September 2, 2026. Debtor and Creditor attended.
The Court granted the Motion on the record and memorializes that decision in
this Order.
BACKGROUND
This is Debtor’s second bankruptcy case. Debtor’s prior chapter 13 case, C/A
No. 26-02000-JD (“First Case”), was filed on May 4, 2026, and was automatically
dismissed on June 19, 2026, pursuant to § 521(i), due to Debtor’s failure to file
documents. Creditor moved for relief from the automatic stay in the First Case.
Although Debtor opposed the motion, she failed to attend the hearing. Debtor also
failed to attend a hearing on an Order to Appear and Show Cause.3 The chapter 13
1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory cites in this order are to Title 11 of the United States Code.
2 ECF No. 38.
3 ECF No. 17, C/A 26-02000-JD.
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trustee’s final report reflects that Debtor failed to make plan payments as required
by § 1326.4
Debtor commenced this case by filing a chapter 13 petition on July 20, 2026
(“Petition Date”).5 Because this is Debtor’s second case pending within a one-year
period, the duration of the automatic stay is limited by § 362(c)(3). Debtor failed to
move within the first thirty days of the case to extend the automatic stay.6
While Debtor filed schedules with the petition, they were and remain
deficient.7 On Schedule A/B, Debtor did not disclose ownership of any real property,
but the record reflects her ownership interest in 903 North Lemacks Street,
Walterboro, SC 29488 (the “Property”).8 On Schedule D, Debtor listed one secured
creditor, Jefferson Capital LLC, as having a secured claim in the amount of
$68,000.00 secured by a single-family residence.9 Debtor’s schedules disclosed no
other creditors although several creditors have now filed claims. Debtor’s list of
creditors only included Jefferson Capital, LLC, so no other creditor received formal
notice of this case.
4 ECF No. 47, C/A 26-02000-JD.
5 ECF No. 1.
6 Debtor testified that she filed a motion to extend the automatic stay. The Court’s records reflect
that no such motion was filed.
7 On August 4, 2026, the Chapter 13 Trustee requested, and the Court entered a Rule to Show Cause
for Failure to File Documents, which included amended schedules. ECF Nos. 18 and 19. A hearing on
the Rule to Show Cause was held September 23, 2026, and the Court will enter a separate Order on
that matter.
8 See ECF No. 20.
9 On August 21, 2026, Jefferson Capital Systems LLC filed two Proofs of Claim in this case. The first
claim is for an outstanding credit card balance. Proof of Claim 8-1. The second claim is for a default
civil judgment entered against Debtor and Debtor’s son related to an auto loan. Proof of Claim No. 9-
1. See ECF No. 1.
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Debtor filed a proposed chapter 13 plan that addresses a debt secured by the
Property; however, the plan fails to specifically name the affected creditor.10 The
proposed plan also fails to account for claims filed in this case that, although
undisclosed in the schedules, are nevertheless allowed under the applicable rules.
The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to the plan on these and other grounds, but Debtor
has not yet filed a plan curing these facial defects.11
On August 4, 2026, Creditor filed the Motion seeking stay relief and in rem
stay relief as to the Property.12 A hearing was held September 2, 2026, and each
party provided evidence in support of their respective positions. Debtor testified.
Creditor provided the testimony of Chief Wade Marvin (“Chief Marvin”) of the
Walterboro Police Department (“WPD”) and Assistant City Manager Ryan McCleod
(“McCleod”) of the City of Walterboro. Creditor introduced into evidence the
mortgage, various assignments, a judgment of foreclosure, notices of sale, and
numerous police reports.
At the September 2, 2026 hearing, Creditor sought relief from the automatic
stay under § 362(d)(1) on five grounds: (1) Debtor’s bad faith in filing successive
bankruptcy cases on the eve of foreclosure sales; (2) failure to maintain insurance
on the Property; (3) waste arising from the Property’s extensive history of criminal
activity; (4) the risk of federal civil forfeiture; and (5) the risk of forfeiture under
South Carolina’s drug nuisance abatement statute.
10 ECF No. 26.
11 ECF No. 36.
12 ECF No. 20.
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The record establishes Creditor’s security interest in the Property and that
Debtor filed both bankruptcy cases shortly before scheduled foreclosure sales of it.13
A foreclosure sale was scheduled for May 4, 2026, and Debtor filed her first chapter
13 case that same day. After that case was unsuccessful, a second foreclosure sale
was scheduled for August 1, 2026, and Debtor filed the present case on July 20,
2026. Creditor presented evidence of this timeline and of Debtor’s lack of progress in
both cases, asserting that the circumstances demonstrated that the filings served
primarily to delay foreclosure.
The remaining grounds arise from the extensive history of criminal activity
at the Property and the resulting damage. Chief Marvin testified that the Property
is among Walterboro’s highest-volume locations for calls for service involving violent
crime. From February 1, 2021, through December 31, 2024, WPD documented
twenty-five investigations or incidents involving the Property, including six drive-by
shootings, a homicide, illicit gambling, the recovery of firearms and ammunition
pursuant to a search warrant, and an investigation identifying the Property as the
originating location of a residential burglary. Chief Marvin further testified that
criminal activity at the Property had not abated during the pendency of Debtor’s
two bankruptcy cases.
Chief Marvin also testified that he observed approximately forty to fifty
bullet holes on the front of the Property and that criminal activity had escalated
since he compiled the calls-for-service information. The Court admitted Movant’s
13 Movant Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
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Exhibit 8, which consists of police reports associated with the Property during
Debtor’s ownership. Chief Marvin testified that WPD maintained those reports in
the ordinary course of its business and that he excluded incidents not identifying
the Property. The reports document criminal activity at the Property and include
photographs showing significant damage to its interior and exterior. The Court
therefore found the reports relevant, over Debtor’s objection, to Creditor’s request
for relief from the automatic stay, including prospective in rem relief.
The evidence reflects that the Property has been neglected and has suffered
unrepaired exterior damage. The Colleton County tax assessment lists the
Property’s value at approximately $70,000. Debtor testified that the exterior
damage remains unrepaired and that, because of the Property’s condition, its value
has likely declined by approximately $20,000 from the assessed value. The
photographs included in Exhibit 8 corroborate the unrepaired damage and reflect
conditions that impair the Property’s value and marketability.
Finally, Creditor raised the risk of forfeiture as an additional basis for relief
under § 362(d)(1). See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-520(a). Creditor
contends that federal or state forfeiture proceedings could materially impair the
value and marketability of its collateral and could jeopardize its ability to enforce
its lien.
Debtor testified that she filed the present case to prevent foreclosure on her
home. She did not, however, identify a plan to cure the deficiencies identified in the
Chapter 13 Trustee’s objection to confirmation or in the Order to Appear and Show
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Cause. On cross-examination by Creditor, Debtor testified that she has not
maintained an active homeowner’s insurance policy covering the Property since
2025. When asked whether she could afford to pay off the mortgage in the event of a
total loss of the Property, Debtor testified that she could not. While testifying,
Debtor requested a continuance. The Court denied the request because the § 521(i)
issue identified in the Order to Appear and Show Cause could have rendered
Creditor’s requested relief moot before the Motion could be heard at a later date.
DISCUSSION
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, this
matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G), and the Court may
enter a final order.
I. The automatic stay does not apply in this case.
Creditor seeks relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1). The record
establishes ample cause for relief under § 362(d)(1), including continuing waste and
deterioration of the Property, the resulting impairment of Creditor’s collateral, the
extended payment default, and the lack of demonstrated prejudice to the estate
from foreclosure. However, the Court need not make further findings regarding
cause because the automatic stay terminated on August 19, 2026, pursuant to §
362(c)(3). This is Debtor’s second bankruptcy case in the last year, and Debtor did
not move to extend the automatic stay within the first thirty days after the Petition
Date. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Section 362(c)(3)(A)-(B) provides:
(A) The stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with
respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any
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lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after
filing the later case;
(B) On motion of a party in interest for continuation of the automatic
stay and upon notice and a hearing, the court may extend the stay in
particular cases as to any or all creditors [. . .] after notice and a
hearing completed before the expiration of the 30-day period only if the
party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in
good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. . .
Because Debtor did not file a motion seeking to extend the automatic stay within
thirty days of filing the petition, the Creditor’s request for relief for cause is
unnecessary. The protections of § 362(a) ceased to apply to this case as of August
19, 2026, and Creditor is permitted to exercise its state-law remedies without a
further order from this Court. In re Jupiter, 344 B.R. 754, 759-60 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2006).
II. The Court grants Creditor’s motion for in rem relief.
Creditor also moved for in rem relief under § 362(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The request under § 362(d)(4) presents a separate question from whether
cause exists under § 362(d)(1). In rem relief is extraordinary because it not only
binds the debtor presently before the Court, but also binds the real property itself,
prospectively precluding such property from receiving the protection of § 362(a) in a
subsequent bankruptcy case filed by another party. The Court therefore must find
more than merely cause for relief from the stay in the present case; it must find the
circumstances specified in § 362(d)(4).
Section 362(d) provides,
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section,
such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
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(4) with respect to a stay of an act against real property under
subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an
interest in such real property, if the court finds that the filing of
the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud
creditors that involved either—
(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest
in, such real property without the consent of the secured
creditor or court approval; or
(B) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real
property.
If recorded in compliance with applicable State laws governing notices
of interests or liens in real property, an order entered under paragraph
(4) shall be binding in any other case under this title purporting to
affect such real property filed not later than 2 years after the date of
the entry of such order by the court, except that a debtor in a
subsequent case under this title may move for relief from such order
based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown, after
notice and a hearing. Any Federal, State, or local governmental unit
that accepts notices of interests or liens in real property shall accept
any certified copy of an order described in this subsection for indexing
and recording.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).
As a threshold matter, the existence of an automatic stay is not a
prerequisite to relief under § 362(d)(4). See In re Cleckley, 677 B.R. 686, 691 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2026) (considering whether in rem relief can be granted when there was no
automatic stay in place pursuant to § 362(c)(4)); In re Wallace, 676 B.R. 298, 309
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2026). Section 362(d)(4) is specifically designed to break the cycle
of harm caused by multiple bankruptcy filings where a bankruptcy case is part of a
broader scheme to either delay, hinder, or defraud a creditor with a lien on real
property. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 70 (2005) (discussing the addition of §
362(d)(4) and Congressional intent to reduce abusive filings).
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The creditor bears the initial burden of establishing entitlement to relief
under § 362(d)(4). To obtain such relief, the creditor must demonstrate that: (1) it
holds a security interest in real property; (2) the filing of the petition was part of a
scheme; (3) the object of the scheme was to delay, hinder, or defraud the creditor;
and (4) the scheme involved either (a) a transfer of all or part ownership of, or
another interest in, the real property without the creditor’s consent or court
approval, or (b) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the property. See Cleckley, 677
B.R. at 690.
The creditor’s showing as to the existence and purpose of a scheme is subject
to burden shifting. Once the creditor establishes a prima facie case that the petition
was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud the creditor, the burden shifts to
the debtor to rebut that showing. In re Hudgens, 662 B.R. 250, 255 (Bankr. D.S.C.
2024) (citing In re Moss, 625 B.R. 305, 307 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2021)).
The first element is met. Creditor established the chain of title and holds a
security interest in the Property.
Regarding the second and third elements, “[a] scheme for purposes of §
362(d)(4) is an intentional artful plot or plan to delay, hinder [or] defraud creditors.”
Id. at 255 (quoting Moss, 625 B.R. at 307). Put simply, a scheme is an “intentional
plan to accomplish a particular result.” In re Anderson, 594 B.R. 509, 515 (Bankr. D.
Me. 2018). Direct proof of such intent is uncommon. As courts have recognized, a
debtor is not expected to admit that a filing was part of a scheme; the determination
therefore ordinarily requires the Court to draw reasonable inferences from the
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timing, sequence, and substance of the relevant filings and the debtor’s conduct in
those cases. See In re Briggs, No. 12-BK-14853, 2012 WL 3780542, at *5 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2012). The movant also need not establish fraud. Congress
amended § 362(d)(4) in 2010 to make clear that relief is available upon a showing of
a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors; thus, proof that the scheme was
intended to delay or hinder is sufficient. See Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559 (2010).
This Court identified nonexclusive considerations relevant to determining
whether prospective in rem stay relief was warranted in the context of serial
bankruptcy filings. In re Henderson, 395 B.R. 893, 901 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). The
request before the court in Henderson was under §§ 105(a) and 362(d)(1) and (2),
and the Court invoked its authority to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process by
granting prospective in rem relief. Id. at 898–902. In doing so, the Court relied, in
part, on authority decided before the 2005 enactment of § 362(d)(4) because that
provision did not apply to the facts before it. Although Henderson did not decide a
request for relief under § 362(d)(4), Henderson’s considerations are instructive in
evaluating whether in rem relief is appropriate under § 362(d)(4). Indeed,
subsequent decisions in this District have cited Henderson for that purpose. See
Hudgens, 662 B.R. at 255; Moss, 625 B.R. at 307.
The pertinent, nonexclusive considerations include: “(1) strategic filing of
bankruptcy petitions to prevent collection; (2) multiple petitions by multiple parties
to protect common property; (3) lack of evidence of changed circumstances between
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filings; and (4) inability to fund a plan.” Henderson, 395 B.R. at 901. Applied in the
§ 362(d)(4) setting, these considerations direct the Court to examine, among other
things, whether the petition was filed on the eve of a scheduled foreclosure sale or
other collection event; whether successive filings by the debtor, co-debtors, co-
owners, family members, transferees, or affiliated entities have repeatedly invoked
the stay as to the same property; whether circumstances materially changed
between cases so that the later filing presents a legitimate prospect of
reorganization or repayment; and whether the debtor has the income, financing,
equity, or other means to fund a feasible plan or otherwise address the secured
debt.
Henderson’s considerations do not constitute an exhaustive or rigid checklist.
The Court may also consider the disposition and prosecution of the prior cases. For
example, the Court may consider whether the debtor’s prior case was dismissed for
failure to make plan payments, file required documents, comply with court orders,
or confirm a feasible plan, as well as whether the debtor meaningfully pursued
bankruptcy relief in good faith. In re Montalvo, 416 B.R. 381, 387 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2009). The Court may also consider the debtor’s history of mortgage delinquency.
Grier v. U.S. Bank Tr. N.A., No. 1:22-cv-1234-MLB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120247,
at *8, 2023 WL 4359476, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2023). In addition, the Court may
weigh equitable considerations, including the relative harm to the movant
compared to other persons holding an interest in the real property. Hernandez v.
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U.S. Bank N.A., No. 6:25-cv-2050-JSS, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171523, at *21, 2026
WL 2219215 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2026).
Ultimately, whether a scheme exists turns on whether the evidence, viewed
as a whole, demonstrates an abuse of the bankruptcy process through multiple
filings designed to frustrate a secured creditor’s legitimate efforts to enforce its
interest in the property without a corresponding bona fide effort to comply with the
Bankruptcy Code or to reorganize the debtor’s financial affairs. See Henderson, 395
B.R. at 901.
Courts commonly recognize that repeated bankruptcy petitions filed on the
eve of successive foreclosure efforts may provide strong circumstantial evidence that
a debtor intended to delay or hinder a secured creditor. Wallace, 676 B.R. at 308
(quoting In re Hymes, No. A12-00599-GS, 2013 WL 653060, at *4 (Bankr. D. Alaska
Feb. 20, 2013)). This inference, however, is not automatic. Successive filings alone
do not establish a scheme as a matter of law; the movant must establish an
intentional “artful plot or plan,” rather than mere “misadventure or negligence,”
and must support that conclusion with evidence connecting the filings to an effort to
delay, hinder, or defraud the creditor. Cleckley, 677 B.R. at 691. The determination
is fact-sensitive and requires the Court to weigh all evidence presented. See In re
Skubinski, 677 B.R. 387, 394–95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2026).
Having weighed the evidence and the totality of the circumstances, the Court
finds that Creditor has established, by circumstantial evidence, an intentional
scheme and that its object was to delay or hinder Creditor’s enforcement of its
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interest in the Property. This finding rests on more than the existence of two
petitions or their proximity to foreclosure dates. Debtor filed the First Case on the
very date of Creditor’s scheduled foreclosure sale, failed to prosecute that case and
to file required documents, and then filed this case less than three weeks after
dismissal and shortly before a second scheduled foreclosure sale. These strategic
filings cancelled scheduled foreclosure sales and thereby delayed and hindered
Creditor’s enforcement efforts. While a bankruptcy filing timed to save property is a
common, appropriate, and lawful reason to seek bankruptcy protection, neither this
case nor the prior case has accomplished any other discernible bankruptcy purpose
beyond forestalling Creditor’s efforts to enforce its rights to reclaim an asset in
immediate jeopardy of loss.
In the prior case, Debtor failed to file required documents and failed to obtain
confirmation. She has made no meaningful progress toward confirmation in this
case. Indeed, the proposed plan contains facial deficiencies identified by the Chapter
13 Trustee, and Debtor had not filed an amended plan addressing those
deficiencies. The record also demonstrates no material change in Debtor’s
circumstances between the two filings. This case was filed less than three weeks
after the dismissal of the First Case, and Debtor remains employed by the same
employer. Debtor has again failed to file the full and complete disclosures required
by § 521(a), as well as other necessary documents, and further failed to appear and
prosecute her case at a hearing on an Order to Appear and Show Cause. Debtor did
not make plan payments in the prior case and has not made payments in this
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case,14 supporting a finding that the successive filings were not accompanied by an
earnest effort to reorganize her financial affairs and repay creditors.15
Considered together, these facts are not fairly characterized as an isolated
filing defect, an unsuccessful but good-faith attempt at reorganization, or mere
negligence or misadventure. The same foreclosure-driven sequence recurred after
the First Case was dismissed; Debtor again failed to provide complete and accurate
disclosures, filed a facially deficient plan, demonstrated no materially changed
financial circumstances or feasible path to address Creditor’s debt, failed to
prosecute successive bankruptcy cases, and remained in possession of uninsured
collateral that continued to deteriorate. The Court therefore infers an intentional
scheme to obtain the delay produced by the bankruptcy process without a
corresponding bona fide effort to comply with the Bankruptcy Code or reorganize.
Having established a prima facie case that this filing was part of a scheme to
delay or hinder Creditor, the burden shifted to Debtor to rebut that showing.
Debtor’s testimony did not do so. Instead, the evidence establishes that Debtor
remains in possession of the Property, without maintaining insurance or making
payments to Creditor, while the Property continues to face deterioration and other
risks. Debtor offered no evidence of a material change in circumstances, a feasible
means to cure the default, or a genuine prospect for reorganization. On this record,
14 ECF No. 36.
15 Debtor may be ineligible to proceed with this case. This case was filed fewer than 180 days after
dismissal of Debtor’s prior case, in which Debtor failed to file required documents, appear, and
prosecute the case. If those failures were willful, § 109(g) would bar Debtor from being a debtor in a
case filed during that 180-day period. As no party has raised the issue of eligibility, the Court
expresses no determination regarding Debtor’s eligibility under § 109(g).
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the Court finds that the filings served no demonstrated bankruptcy purpose but
constituted a scheme to delay and hinder Creditor’s foreclosure efforts.
Finally, the fourth element is met because the scheme involved multiple
bankruptcy filings affecting the real property. The Court recognizes that in rem
relief is more commonly granted in cases involving an extensive history of
bankruptcy filings. In this case, there is only one prior filing. Nothing in §
362(d)(4)(B) requires a minimum number of filings beyond the multiple filings
implicated by the statute. The statute requires only that the scheme involve
“multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4)(B).
That requirement is met here through the one prior filing and the current filing.
Although the filing history is limited, the unusual circumstances warrant in
rem relief under § 362(d)(4).16 The evidence establishes that the Property has
sustained ongoing damage from pervasive, unabated criminal activity that has
materially diminished, and continues to diminish, its value; that Debtor has not
made a mortgage payment in more than a year; that Debtor has failed to insure the
Property against loss; and that Creditor’s collateral faces ongoing risks of further
deterioration.
These facts provide substantial cause for relief under § 362(d)(1) and, more
importantly, demonstrate the significant prejudice Creditor would suffer if
16 The facts may also warrant relief under § 105(a). Henderson, 395 B.R. at 901 & n.15 (granting in
rem relief under § 105(a) and noting "Congress gave no indication in enacting § 362(d)(4) that it
intended to prevent bankruptcy courts from employing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) . . . to enter orders, when
necessary or appropriate, to prevent the harm arising from abusive filings. If anything, the 2005
amendments evidence a congressional intent that the courts crack down on abusive filings by
debtors" (alteration in original) (quoting In re McCray, 342 B.R. 668, 670 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006));
Kelly v. Naples Prop. Holding Co., LLC, 671 B.R. 432, 456 (D. Md. 2025).
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foreclosure were delayed again. Section 362(d)(4) is designed to prevent this type of
abuse by affording prospective protection against future bankruptcy filings affecting
the Property.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. The automatic stay is no longer applicable in this case, and Creditor
Walterboro Development Corporation, any successors and/or assigns, may
pursue any remedies available under state law with respect to the Property
located at 903 North Lemacks Street, Walterboro, SC 29488;
2. In rem relief is granted to Creditor Walterboro Development Corporation, any
successors and/or assigns, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) with respect to
903 North Lemacks Street, Walterboro, SC 29488; and
3. If recorded in compliance with applicable laws governing notices of interests
or liens in real property, this Order shall be binding in any other case under
this title purporting to affect 903 North Lemacks Street, Walterboro, SC
29488, filed not later than two (2) years after the date of the entry of this
Order by the Court.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
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