USA v. Harwood

FILED
APR 1'2322
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, I:I4-CR-10042-CBK
Plaintiff,
vs.
JESSE JAMES HARWOOD, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
In the early hours of September 8, 2014, Jesse Howard ("defendant") stabbed his
21-year-old brother Dallas Farmer to death over music. While listening to music and
drinking alcohol outside his house in Agency Village, South Dakota with his family and
girlfriend, an argument broke out concerning what to play on the stereo. Intoxicated, the
defendant turned off the stereo twice and proceeded to become aggressive and angry.
This led to Harwood throwing knives form the kitchen towards the group as he remained
inside the house. Acting as a peacemaker, Harwood's brother Dallas went into the house,
seeing if he could diffuse the situation. Minutes later, Harwood came outside bleeding
from the head. Upset over the defendant's outburst that evening, Ms. Ojeda ended the
relationship then and there. Harwood walked away. But during this back-and-forth,
nobody saw or heard from Dallas.
Ms. Ojeda went inside the house, finding Dallas lying on the living room floor
saturated with his own blood from a stabbing wound inflicted by the defendant. Dallas
was losing consciousness with every minute. Grabbing Aaron Farmer, who was sleeping
in a back bedroom, Ojeda tried to revive Dallas as Aaron called 911. Tragically, their
efforts were fruitless. But where was Harwood?
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The defendant was on a walk while his brother laid dying because of his stabbing
attack. He ultimately returned to the house while his(now ex-)girlfriend Ojeda tried to
revive his own brother. Instead of rendering first aid or trying to ameliorate the situation,
or simply do anything, Mr. Harwood retreated into his bedroom. This is where law
enforcement ultimately found him, mere feet from where his brother passed away.
This was not even the first time that this Court has sentenced the defendant for
stabbing a family member. In 2011 Harwood stabbed his uncle Stacy Farmer two times
in the back with a serrated steak knife. When another individual, Samuel Farmer, tried to
break up the fight, defendant bit Samuel's finger, and proceeded to throw two knives at
another, David Farmer. Harwood stabbed his brother Dallas to death while on
Supervised Release for the 2011 offense.
Mr. Harwood pled guilty to Assault with a Dangerous Weapon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3), 1153. The defendant's guideline range for killing his brother was
57-71 months. After considering all relevant constitutional and statutory factors,
including those listed under 18 U.S.C. 3553, this Court upwardly departed and sentenced
Mr. Harwood to the statutory maximum of 120 months, followed by three years of
supervised release. While acknowledging Harwood has a serious seizure disorder, the
Court noted that his condition had no bearing on the killing of his brother, in a nearly
identical series of circumstances that led to his first stabbing conviction from which he
was still on supervised release. In both instances Harwood was heavily intoxicated when
he stabbed his relatives. Tragically, in this offense the stabbing led to the loss of a young
father.
On February 23, 2022, Mr. Harwood motioned this Court for compassionate
release pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and to be
released to Sisseton, South Dakota. Doc. 44. While checking the requisite boxes for
consideration because of(1)a terminal illness;(2)a serious medical condition; and (3)
other extraordinary and compelling reasons, this Memorandum and Order explains why
only assertions based on a serious medical condition are properly presented before this
Court.
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Defendant is currently housed in FCI Beaumont, in Texas. Sentenced by this
Court in May 2015 to 120 months, Harwood's release date is scheduled for March 13,
2023. This motion would release the defendant almost a year earlier than originally
scheduled. Because Harwood's brief assertions for release because of his seizure
disorder are unavailing on its own, his motion should be denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212, authorized,
inter alia, the district court, upon motion ofthe Director of the BOP,to reduce a prison
term after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),"if it finds that
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and that such a reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
The United States Sentencing Commission was established by the Sentencing Reform
Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Effective November 1, 2006, the Sentencing
Commission adopted Guideline §IB 1.13, the policy statement on reduction of a term of
imprisonment pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). These provisions are known as the
compassionate release provisions of the federal criminal code and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of2018 was enacted. Pub. L. 115-391.
The First Step Act amended, inter alia, § 3582(c)(1)(A)to increase the use and
transparency of the compassionate release process. The Act added district court authority
to grant compassionate release upon motion of a defendant after the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Frustratingly, though, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
not been amended since passage ofthe First Step Act in 2018.' This Court proceeds in
'The Commission lost its quorum in January 2019, stopping any progress in the Commission's work these past
three years. See Guerrant v. United States. — U.S. —,142 S. Ct. 640,641 (2022)(statement of Sotomayor, J.,
joined by Barrett, J.)("At this point, the Sentencing Commission has not had a quorum for three full years. As the
instant petition illustrates, the resultant unresolved divisions among the Courts of Appeals (concerning differing
interpretations of sentencing guidelines) can have direct and severe consequences for defendants' sentences."). See
also United States v. Rodd. 966 F.3d 740,746 n.7(8th Cir. 2020)("As the Sentencing Commission lacks a quorum
to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, it seems unlikely there will be a policy statement applicable to
[compassionate-release] motions brought by defendants in the near fixture.")(alteration in original){quoting United
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three steps:(1)assessing whether Campbell has exhausted his administrative remedies;
(2)determining whether defendant has demonstrated that there are extraordinary and
compelling circumstances warranting early release; and (3)if he has demonstrated such
circumstances, whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)factors weigh in favor of early release.
United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2021){citing 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(l)(A)(i)).
B. Jurisdiction
Since sentences are final judgments, a court ordinarily "may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, an exception
exists where a court "may reduce the term of imprisonment" when "extraordinary and
compelling reasons" exist under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that the "reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(l)(A)(i); United States v. Tavlor, — F.—,2022 WL 815289, at *1 (8th Cir.
2022)(per curiam). The defendant carries the burden to show a sentence reduction is
warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). United States v. Jones. 836 F.3d 896, 899(8th Cir.
2016).
C. Exhaustion
This Court can only grant a sentence reduction upon motion of the defendant
"after [he] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure ofthe Bureau
ofPrisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of30 days from the
receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier."
18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(l)(A). See United States v. Houck. 2 F.4th 1082, 1083-84 (8th Cir.
2021). Here, Mr. Harwood requested a Reduction in Sentence("RIS")from the Warden
at FCl Beaumont on April 8, 2021, based on his seizure-related medical issues and
assertions ofimproper care inside the facility. Doc. 46 at 1094. On April 20, 2021
States V. Beck. 425 F.Supp.Sd 573, 579 n.7(M.D.N.C. 2019)). The Court hopes the other branches ofthe federal
government will soon resolve this long lapse in a quorum, inhibiting the Commission from pursuing much-needed
work.
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Warden J. Bartlett denied defendant's RIS. Id at 1093. Accordingly, this matter is now
ripe for adjudication.
D. Compassionate Release
Compassionate release offers defendants with "extraordinary and compelling
reasons" the opportunity to leave prison prior to the conclusion of their sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i). However, § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i) does not define what
"extraordinary and compelling reasons" may be; rather, that was left to the Commission.
And as this Court has noted, the Commission has failed to offer such explanations to
date. Prior to the First Step Act, though, the Commission established four categories for
district courts to consider when reducing a defendant's term of imprisonment. Pursuant
to U.S.S.G. §IB 1.13, Application Note 1, these four examples of extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release are:
(A)Medical Condition of the Defendant. —
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced
illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e.,
a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples
include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis(ALS), end-
stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(ii) The defendant is—
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because ofthe
aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability ofthe defendant to provide self-care
within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not
expected to recover.
(B)Age of the Defendant. — The defendant(i) is at least 65 years old;(ii) is
experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging
process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of
imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C)Family Circumstances.
(i) The death or incapacitation ofthe caregiver of the defendant's minor child or
minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation ofthe defendant's spouse or registered partner when the
defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered
partner.
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(D)Other Reasons. — As determined by the Director ofthe Bureau ofPrisons, there
exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in
combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions(A)through (C).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has not yet decided
whether the district court is bound by the Sentencing Commission's policy statement
when considering a compassionate release motion under the First Step Act amendment
to § 3582(c)(1)(A). "While some courts adhere to the pre-First Step Act policy
statements, other courts have ruled that the pre-First Step Act policy statements are
inapplicable, and that a judge has discretion to determine, at least until the Sentencing
Commission acts, what qualifies as extraordinary and compelling reasons." United States
V. Rodd,966 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2020)(cleaned up). To date the Eighth Circuit has
not yet addressed whether district courts are bound to the pre-First Step Act applicable
policy statements. See United States v. Crandall. 24 F.4th 582, 584 (8th Cir. 2022).
Chief Judge Lange has held that the "discretion given to the Director ofthe BOP
in §1B1.13 comment note 1(D) also allows federal judges to consider 'extraordinary and
compelling reason[s] other than' those specifically described." United States v.
Dillabaugh. 2020 WL 3402392, at *3(D.S.D. June 19, 2020). See also United States v.
Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 801-02(9th Cir. 2021){per curiam)(same); United States v.
Brooker. 976 F.3d 228, 237-38(2nd Cir. 2020)(same); United States v. McCov,981
F.3d 271, 281-82(4th Cir. 2020)(same); United States v. Jones. 980 F.3d 1098, 1110-11
(6th Cir. 2020)(same); United States v. Gunn,980 F.3d 1178, 1180(7th Cir. 2020)
(same); United States v. Contreras, 504 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1057-58(D.S.D. 2020)(same).
In other words, district courts are not limited by §IB 1.13 as drafted by the pre-First Step
Act Sentencing Commission. Utilizing this broader understanding also comports with the
purpose of the Act, which "was to expand the availability of compassionate release based
on judicial findings of extraordinary and compelling reasons without being restricted to
those categories identified by the Sentencing Commission or the rationale used by the
BOP before the passage ofthe First Step Act." United States v. Campbell. 2022 WL
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137977, at *3(D.S.D. Jan. 14, 2022)(emphasis in original)(quoting United States v.
Shangreaux. 2021 WL 1611500, at *3(D.S.D. April 26, 2021)).
Defendant briefly argues that he warrants early release because of his medical
history, specifically his seizure disorder that has on a prior occasion led to severe bums
alongside his arms and neck while incarcerated. Mr. Harwood wrongly checked the box
on his motion for compassionate release for being diagnosed with terminal illness; there is
no evidence in the record that his serious seizure disorder is terminal. See doc. 44 at 4.
Rather, it is a serious challenge that is being monitored and medicated while incarcerated.
Accordingly, he is correct in noting that he does have a "serious physical or medical
condition" because of his ongoing seizures, from which he is not "expected to recover."
Id. Third, defendant checked the box for "other extraordinary and compelling reasons,"
but fails to provide any substance. Rather, he provides a laundry list of allegations against
personnel for purportedly treating him unfairly, not taking his medical condition seriously,
being slammed onto the ground while experiencing a seizure, among other matters.
docs. 44-1 at 1, 46 at 1094. But this motion is not the proper vehicle for Harwood to raise
these specific claims of purported malpractice. And he makes the case himself. See doc.
46 at 1094 ("I am working on getting civil suit for malpractice"). These specific claims
conceming medical treatment should be resolved in a future civil suit, not as "other
extraordinary and compelling reasons" for release. Thus, the Court only addresses the
remaining barebones assertion that defendant ought to be released because of his seizure
disorder.
Mr. Harwood repeatedly notes his serious seizure disorder in his filings for
compassionate release. However, he fails to go further and explain how the disorder
"substantially diminishes" his ability to "provide self-care within" FCI Beaumont.
U.S.S.G. §lbl.l3. Application Note l(A)(ii). True, he asserts specific incidents of
alleged improper medical care, but Harwood does not venture further in explaining the
needed addendum on how FCI Beaumont impedes his ability to provide self-care under a
medical regime that ensures he receives his medication and how his treatment would be
different in Sisseton. Finally, these specifie instances of alleged neglect and
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maltreatment that are raised may be properly addressed in the civil suit he contends is
being prepared. Consequently, the defendant has not met his burden. The Court
nevertheless proceeds to analyze whether the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh
in favor of granting compassionate release.
E. 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a) Factors
I have considered all the § 3553(a) factors,just as I did during Mr. Harwood's
original 2015 sentencing. These factors include the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, need for the sentence imposed,
kinds of sentences available, pertinent policy statements, need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities, and need to provide restitution to any victims ofthe offense. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(7). This review is not to be a "mechanical recitation of the §
3553(a)factors," but rather district courts must conduct a thorough consideration of all
relevant factors, weighing and analyzing them as required in the individualized matter at
hand. United States v. Salazar-Aleman, 741 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir. 2013){quoting
United States v. Feemster. 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009)).
1. Nature and Circumstances ofthe Offense
Mr. Harwood stabbed and killed his brother when the victim sought to calm and
stop the defendant from throwing more knives at family when on a drunken tirade. There
was no provocation and no semblance of a ease for self-defense presented before this
Court. Rather, Harwood killed his brother who was acting as a mediator trying to diffuse
the situation. The defendant never sought to render first aid or call for help. Instead, his
former girlfriend. Fancy Ojeda, found Dallas lying on the living room floor saturated
with blood. Ms. Ojeda tried to revive Dallas while waiting for law enforcement, while
Aaron Farmer called 911. Law enforcement ultimately found the defendant in his
bedroom as his brother took his final breaths. It is an understatement to call this needless
act of violence heinous. It is likewise clear that this factor leans against an early release
for Mr. Harwood. For similar reasons the Court finds a continued need to reflect the
seriousness of the loss of life that Harwood took. See United States v. Vandebrake. 771
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F. Supp. 2d 961, 999-1000(N.D.Iowa 2011)(collapsing the nature and circumstances of
the offense and need for appropriate sentence prongs together in a single analysis).
2. History and Characteristics ofDefendant Harwood
Harwood has twice now been convicted of stabbing a relative with a knife. This
act offamilial violence occurred while the defendant was already on supervised released
for stabbing afamily member. Harwood's uncle, Stacy Farmer, was stabbed twice in the
back by the defendant in 2011, when the defendant's preliminary breath test("PBT")
registered .15%. In this instant offense, Harwood's PBT registered at .2%.
Defendant also holds other criminal convictions from South Dakota and from
Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Court. Mr. Harwood has served jail sentences in tribal court
on nine separate occasions, with suspended sentences on one other tribal conviction and
four instances in South Dakota State court.
Mr. Harwood did successfully graduate from Sisseton High School, which is
lauded. Because of his serious seizure disorder, the defendant does not have an
employment record. No doubt, defendant's ongoing seizures poses a great challenge to
his daily life. The Court properly takes into consideration the defendant's personal
history and characteristics.
3. Remainins ^ 3553(a) Factors
Considering the remaining § 3553(a) factors, including the need to afford adequate
deterrence, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct
and protect from further crimes ofthe defendant, among others, all factors lean against
early release. To afford adequate deterrence for such repeated misconduct against family
members, as well as to promote respect for the law, § 3553(a) demands that this Court
turn away from an early release. This original sentence provides just punishment in this
matter, while deterring fiirther criminal conduct and protecting the public - specifically,
his family - from further crimes. Accordingly, the defendant's motion should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Dallas Farmer's son will never know his father because of Jesse Harwood's
fratricide. Dallas needlessly died while trying to calm down his brother who was on
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another drunken spiral, an outburst sparked by a stereo. After stabbing his own brother,
who simply tried to calm Harwood down,the defendant did nothing to help his own kin.
Instead of offering medical aid, or calling 911, or yelling out for help, or anything, he
ultimately retreated to his bedroom. This defendant has a history of stabbing family
while drunk. Harwood killed his brother while on supervised release from this Court for
stabbing his own uncle twice in the back.
Failing to provide any evidence of rehabilitation while incarcerated, Harwood's
motion rests solely on grounds of insufficient medical care. Having previously explained
why specific instances of purported negligent and willful mistreatment are not appropriate
in this motion, the Court has carefully explained that while Harwood has a serious medical
condition, he fails to provide sufficient justification for alternative medical treatment
elsewhere in Sisseton. Like with a compassionate release motion decided by another
district court. Hardwood "has reportedly suffered seizures" for many years, "but that
condition clearly did not deter his criminal conduct." United States v. Wood, 2021 WL
742869, at *3 (E.D. Term. Feb. 25, 2021). Nor is it on its own sufficient grounds for
compassionate release.
Defendant Harwood's release date is less than a year away. For the reasons laid
out here, he should not receive even a day reprieve from his original sentence of 120
months. His seizure disorder is serious, but on its own measured with the scarce rationale
offered in his motion, do not Justify early release.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Jesse Harwood's motion for
compassionate release. Doc. 44, is denied.
DATED this /sj^av ofApril, 2022
BY THE COURT:
CHARLES B. KORNMAT
United States District Judge
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