Childers v. Nelinda et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PRIEOR FRANKLIN CHILDERS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NELINDA, Provider at Minnehaha
County Jail, in his or her individual
and official capacity; ROBERTS,
Medical Staff at Minnehaha County
Jail, in his or her individual and official
capacity; MICHAEL MATTSON, Warden
at Minnehaha County Jail, in his
individual and official capacity,
Defendants.
4:22-CV-04088-KES
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND 1915A
SCREENING
Plaintiff, Prieor Franklin Childers, an inmate at the Minnehaha County
Jail, filed a pro se civil rights lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Docket 1.1
Childers moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and has included a
prisoner trust account report. Dockets 2, 4.
I. 	Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Childers reports average monthly deposits of $7.73 and an average
monthly balance of $0.14. Docket 4 at 1. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
1 Childers does not provide facts regarding the reason he is detained at the
Minnehaha County Jail, nor does he provide his expected release date. See
Docket 1; Docket 2 at 1. The court will treat him as a pretrial detainee because
he was incarcerated at a county jail when he filed the present action. See
Docket 1 at 1.
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Act, a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis
. . . shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). “[W]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the only issue is whether
the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a
period of time under an installment plan.” Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481,
483 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (quoting McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)).
The initial partial filing fee that accompanies an installment plan is
calculated according to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), which requires a payment of 20
percent of the greater of
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-
month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or
notice of appeal.
Based on the information regarding Childers’ prisoner trust account, the court
grants Childers leave to proceed in forma pauperis and waives the initial partial
filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited
from bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has no assets
and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”).
In order to pay his filing fee, Childers must “make monthly payments of
20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The statute places the burden on the prisoner’s
institution to collect the additional monthly payments and forward them to the
court as follows:
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After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding
month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency
having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the
prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in
the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The installments will be collected pursuant to this
procedure. The Clerk of Court will send a copy of this order to the appropriate
financial official at Childers’ institution. Childers remains responsible for the
entire filing fee, as long as he is a prisoner. See In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529-
30 (8th Cir. 1997).
II. 	1915A Screening
A. 	Factual Background
The facts alleged in Childers’ complaint are: that on June 24, 2022,
Childers was diagnosed with Hepatitis-C while in the Minnehaha County Jail.
Docket 1 at 4. Childers claims that Roberts, a member of the Minnehaha
County Jail medical staff, and Michael Mattson, the Minnehaha County Jail
Warden, told him that he has to wait a year before he can get treatment for
Hepatitis-C. Id. He claims that waiting a year will result in his Hepatitis-C
becoming chronic and could cause liver damage, cirrhosis, liver cancer, liver
failure, need for a liver transplant, and death. Id. at 5. He claims that early
diagnosis and treatment can prevent these complications. Id.
Childers has submitted transcripts of his medical grievances and
responses. Docket 1-1 at 3. In his first grievance, Childers stated that he has
been diagnosed with Hepatitis-C and denied treatment because he has not yet
been in custody for a year, and Roberts responded that “[y]our current lab
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results are not indicative that treatment is needed at this time.” Id. Childers
appealed this grievance, and Lieutenant McGovern replied that “[u]nless your
labs determine otherwise you will not be treated for Hep[atitis]-C until you’ve
been in custody for at least one year.” Id. He appealed to Mattson, claiming
that he needed immediate treatment to prevent the disease from becoming
incurable, and Mattson responded that “[m]edical advised that there currently
is no medical indication for treatment at this time.” Id.
Childers brings a claim for inadequate medical care against Nelinda, who
is a medical provider at the Minnehaha County Jail, Roberts, and Mattson in
their individual and official capacities. Docket 1 at 2, 4. He asks for all his
medical bills to be paid and for $1,000,000 for pain, suffering, and emotional
stress. Id. at 6. Construing his complaint liberally, he also seeks treatment for
his Hepatitis-C. See id. at 4-5.
B. 	Legal Background
The court must assume as true all facts well pleaded in the complaint.
Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 36 (8th Cir. 1995). Pro se and civil
rights complaints must be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam); Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.
2004) (citation omitted). Even with this construction, “a pro se complaint must
contain specific facts supporting its conclusions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d
1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see also Ellis v. City of
Minneapolis, 518 F. App’x 502, 504 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
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A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [but] requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations omitted). If it does not contain these bare essentials,
dismissal is appropriate. See Beavers v. Lockhart, 755 F.2d 657, 663-64 (8th
Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (explaining that a district court does not err when
it dismisses a claim based on vague allegations or unsupported
generalizations). Twombly requires that a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true[.]” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted); see also Abdullah v. Minnesota, 261
F. App’x 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that a “complaint must
contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements
necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory” (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 553-63)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must screen prisoner complaints
and dismiss them if they “(1) [are] frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek[] monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The court will now
assess each individual claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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C. 	Legal Analysis
1. 	Official Capacity Claim for Money Damages
Childers brings a claim against Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson in their
official capacities for money damages. Docket 1 at 2, 6. Nelinda, Roberts, and
Mattson were employees of the Minnehaha County Jail at the time of the
incidents in question. Id. at 2. “A suit against a government officer in his
official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing
governmental entity.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257
(8th Cir. 2010). Childers’ official capacity claims against Nelinda, Roberts, and
Mattson are equivalent to claims against Minnehaha County.
“[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury
inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A municipal government may be sued only “when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers
or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,”
deprives a plaintiff of a federal right. Id.; see also Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d
1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that “the [governmental] entity’s official
‘policy or custom’ must have ‘caused’ the constitutional violation” in order for
that entity to be liable under § 1983).
To establish governmental liability premised on an unofficial custom
rather than an official policy, a plaintiff must allege facts to support a finding of
“a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct
by the governmental entity’s employees” and “deliberate indifference to or tacit
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authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking
officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct[.]” Brewington v. Keener,
902 F.3d 796, 801 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Corwin v. City of Independence, 829
F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2016)). A § 1983 complaint does not need to
“specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom to
survive a motion to dismiss.” Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp., 388
F.3d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340
F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2003)). But the complaint must still include some
allegation, reference, or language that creates an inference that the conduct
resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom. Id.; see also Doe, 340 F.3d
at 614 (“At a minimum, a complaint must allege facts which would support the
existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom.”).
Here, Childers alleges that the Minnehaha County Jail will not treat
inmates for Hepatitis-C until they have been incarcerated for at least a year.
Docket 1 at 4-5. Although Childers does not specifically plead the existence of
an unconstitutional policy or custom, he alleges that his rights were violated by
“conduct [that] resulted from an unconstitutional policy or custom” of denying
treatment to inmates with Hepatitis-C who have not been at the Minnehaha
County Jail for a year. See Crumpley-Patterson, 388 F.3d at 591 (citing Doe,
340 F.3d at 614). Thus, this court must consider whether Childers’ rights were
violated by this allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom.
A pretrial detainee’s claims of inadequate medical care are analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections, rather than the
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Eighth Amendment. Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151, 152 (8th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (citing Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989)).
These claims are examined under the same deliberate indifference standard as
Eighth Amendment claims by convicted inmates. Karsjens v. Lourey, 988 F.3d
1047, 1051-52 (8th Cir. 2021). Construing his complaint liberally, Childers
brings a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Nelinda, Roberts,
and Mattson in their official capacities for money damages.
“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). “This is true whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05
(footnotes omitted). “This conclusion does not mean, however, that every claim
by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 105. “[A] prisoner must allege acts
or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Id. at 106. Allegations of negligence will not suffice, nor will
mere disagreement with treatment decisions. Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094,
1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Estate of Rosenberg, 56 F.3d at 37).
The deliberate indifference standard includes both an objective and
subjective component. Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
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1997) (citing Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997)). “The
plaintiff[] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered objectively serious medical
needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately
disregarded those needs.” Id. (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). “A serious
medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’ ” Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784
(quoting Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995)). To be liable
for deliberately disregarding medical needs, “the official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Childers alleges facts sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs against Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson in their official
capacities for money damages. Hepatitis-C is a serious medical need. Childers
alleges that Minnehaha County Jail officials are aware of his serious medical
need and refused to treat it because of a policy against providing Hepatitis-C
treatment to inmates who have not been incarcerated for a year. Docket 1 at 4-
5. The attached grievance responses show that Childers has undergone testing,
and monitoring his condition may be a form of treatment. See Docket 1-1 at 3.
But the grievance responses also state that Childers would receive treatment if
he had been in custody for over a year, independent of his current test results.
Id. Without more information, this court cannot determine whether the
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Minnehaha County Jail’s policy of basing Hepatitis-C treatment on the time an
inmate has spent in custody is a treatment decision or deliberate indifference.
See Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096. Thus, Childers’ Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against
Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson in their official capacities for money damages
survives § 1915A screening.
2. 	Official Capacity Claims for Injunctive Relief and
Individual Capacity Claims
Childers brings claims against Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson in their
individual capacities and in their official capacities for injunctive relief. See
Docket 1 at 2, 4-6. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
Thus, each Government official . . . is only liable for his or her own
misconduct. As we have held, a supervising officer can be liable for
an 	inferior 	officer’s 	constitutional 	violation 	only 	if 	he 	directly
participated in the constitutional violation, or if his failure to train
or supervise the offending actor caused the deprivation.
Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Childers’
individual capacity claims must allege that each individual defendant either
directly participated in the unconstitutional conduct or caused the conduct to
occur through a failure to train or supervise the offending actor.
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a. 	Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
Construing his complaint liberally, Childers brings a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs against Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson in their individual capacities and
in their official capacities for injunctive relief. See Docket 1 at 2, 4-6.
Childers makes no allegations regarding Nelinda’s actions, and he does
not mention Nelinda in his complaint other than to name Nelinda as a
defendant and explain that Nelinda acted under state law “[b]ye [sic] not
starting treatment with antiviral medicines that can cure Hep-C in most cases
if started fast enough.” See id. at 2, 4-5. Childers does not allege that Nelinda
directly participated in the alleged constitutional deprivation or caused the
conduct to occur through a failure to train or supervise as required under
Parrish. See id. at 4-5; 594 F.3d at 1001. Childers also makes no allegations
that Nelinda was aware of his serious medical needs. See Docket 1 at 4-5;
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Childers’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Nelinda in his or
her individual capacity is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
Childers alleges that Roberts and Mattson told him that he has to wait a
year for Hepatitis-C treatment. Docket 1 at 4. Thus, he alleges that Roberts
and Mattson were aware of and deliberately disregarded his serious medical
needs. Id.; see Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239 (citing Coleman, 114 F.3d at 784). The
Eighth Circuit has explained that prison officials who lack medical expertise
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are entitled to rely upon the opinions of medical staff. Holden v. Hirner, 663
F.3d 336, 343 (8th Cir. 2011); Camberos, 73 F.3d at 176. Mattson, unlike
Roberts, does not have medical expertise and was entitled to rely on the
opinions of Minnehaha County Jail medical staff. See Holden, 663 F.3d at 343;
Camberos, 73 F.3d at 176. Childers’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Mattson in his
individual capacity is dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Childers’ Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against
Roberts in his individual capacity and against Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson in
their official capacities for injunctive relief survives § 1915A screening.
Thus, it is ORDERED:
1. 	That Childers’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket
2) is granted.
2. 	That the institution having custody of Childers is directed that
whenever the amount in Childers’ trust account, exclusive of funds
available to him in his frozen account, exceeds $10.00, monthly
payments that equal 20 percent of the funds credited the preceding
month to Childers’ trust account shall be forwarded to the U.S.
District Court Clerk’s Office under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), until the
$350 filing fee is paid.
3. 	That 	Childers’ 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claim 	for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Nelinda,
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Roberts, and Mattson in their official capacities for money damages
survives § 1915A screening.
4. 	That 	Childers’ 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claim 	for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Roberts in
his individual capacity and against Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson
in 	their 	official 	capacities 	for 	injunctive 	relief 	survives 	§ 1915A
screening.
5. 	That 	Childers’ 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claim 	for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Nelinda and
Mattson in their individual capacities is dismissed without prejudice
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
6. 	That 	the 	Clerk 	of 	Court 	shall 	send 	blank 	summons 	forms 	and
Marshal Service Forms (Form USM-285) to Childers so that he may
cause the complaint to be served upon defendants Nelinda, Roberts,
and Mattson.
7. 	That Childers shall complete and send the Clerk of Court a separate
summons and USM-285 form for defendants Nelinda, Roberts, and
Mattson. Upon receipt of the completed summons and USM-285
forms, the Clerk of Court will issue the summons. If the completed
summons and USM-285 forms are not submitted as directed, the
complaint may be dismissed.
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8. 	The 	United 	States 	Marshal 	Service 	shall 	serve 	the 	completed
summonses, together with a copy of the complaint (Docket 1) and
this order, upon defendants Nelinda, Roberts, and Mattson.
9. 	Defendants Nelinda, Roberts and Mattson will serve and file an
answer or responsive pleading to the complaint on or before 21 days
following the date of service or 60 days if the defendants fall under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) or (3).
10. 	Childers will keep the court informed of his current address at all
times. All parties are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and by the court’s Local Rules while this case is pending.
Dated November 8, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen E. Schreier
KAREN E. SCHREIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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