Hearn v. The United States Department of Education et al

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
In re
Case No. 3:25-bk-32231-SHB
ANTHONY STUART HEARN 	Chapter 7
Debtor
ANTHONY S. HEARN
Plaintiff
v. 	Adv. Proc. No. 3:26-ap-03011-SHB
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, a subdivision of the
United States of America, NELNET
SERVICING, LLC, an official Student
Loan Servicer of the US DOE;
AMERICAN EDUCATION SERVICES,
an official Student Loan Servicer of US
DOE; and the UNITED STATES SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Defendants
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO INTERVENE AND FOR LEAVE
TO CONDUCT LIMITED DISCOVERY
Plaintiff, pro se, filed Debtor’s Complaint Seeking Discharge of Student Loans
(“Complaint”) on March 23, 2026 [Doc. 1], requesting, as it relates herein, a declaratory
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 2nd day of September, 2026
THIS ORDER HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE DOCKET.
PLEASE SEE DOCKET FOR ENTRY DATE.
_____________________________________________________________
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judgment that his student loans are dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). On April 23,
2026, Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”) filed a Motion to Intervene, to
Dismiss American Education Services, and for More Definite Statement with a supporting brief
[Docs. 12, 13], both of which were amended on April 30, 2026 [Docs. 23, 24] (collectively,
“ECMC Motion”). ECMC asks the Court for leave to intervene as the proper party in interest in
place of American Education Services (“AES”), to dismiss AES from the adversary proceeding,
and to require Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to contain allegations solely related to his student
loan obligations.
On May 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Jurisdictional
Discovery, together with a brief [Docs. 31, 32], both of which were amended on May 11, 2026
[Docs. 37, 38] (collectively, “Discovery Motion”). Through the Discovery Motion, Plaintiff asks
the Court for a twenty-day discovery period to determine, inter alia, ownership of his student
loans. Plaintiff also filed an Objection to ECMC’s Motion on May 14, 2026 [Doc. 39], arguing
that the ECMC Motion improperly seeks to dismiss AES and that his Discovery Motion should
be granted to allow discovery to ascertain ECMC’s standing to intervene and AES’s role in
administering his student loans. ECMC and AES each filed responses in opposition to the
Discovery Motion on June 1, 2026 [Docs. 45, 46], arguing that allowing the requested discovery
would be a waste of resources because they have provided Plaintiff with documentation
evidencing that ECMC has been assigned Plaintiff’s loans and confirming that AES no longer
holds any interest in the loans.
For the reasons stated herein, the Discovery Motion will be denied, and the ECMC
Motion will be (1) granted to the extent ECMC seeks to intervene as a party, (2) denied to the
extent ECMC requests a more definite statement, and (3) held in abeyance to the extent ECMC
seeks dismissal of AES.
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I. ANALYSIS
A. Intervention Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 241 and Request to Conduct
Limited Jurisdictional Discovery
Rule 24 provides that a party may intervene as a matter of right in a lawsuit if the party
“claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is
so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s
ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The party seeking to intervene satisfies the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) by
establishing each of the following: “(1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed
intervenor has a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) the proposed
intervenor’s ability to protect that interest may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and
(4) the parties already before the court may not adequately represent the proposed intervenor’s
interest.” United States v. Jankowski, No. 25-1920, 2026 WL 2047045, at *2 (6th Cir. July 15,
2026) (quoting Kirsch v. Dean, 733 F. App’x 268, 274 (6th Cir. 2018); Blount-Hill v. Zelman,
636 F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Here, ECMC satisfies the requirements of Rule 24. Unquestionably, the ECMC Motion,
which was filed only one month after the Complaint, was timely. Further, ECMC is a proper
party-defendant with respect to Plaintiff’s federally guaranteed Subsidized Federal Family
Education Loans, because it is the assignee of all right, title, and interest in two of Plaintiff’s
loans (totaling $8,591.00 in the principal balance) from Ascendium Education Group
(“Ascendium”), which is a guaranty agent for the federally guaranteed loans, with whom AES –
the servicer of the loan – appropriately filed a claim as required by the federal regulations. [Docs.
24 at ¶¶ 2-6; 38 at 9-10 (Mem. in Supp. of Disc. Mot., Ex. A); 45 at 1-2; 46 at 4.] See also 34
1 Rule 24 applies in adversary proceedings under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7024.
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C.F.R. § 682.402(f)(5)(i)(C) (“The lender shall file a bankruptcy claim on the loan with the
guaranty agency in accordance with . . . this section, if . . . [t]he borrower has begun an action to
have the loan obligation determined to be dischargeable on grounds of undue hardship.”); 34
C.F.R. § 682.402(h)(1)(ii) (“[I]n the case of a bankruptcy claim, the guaranty agency shall, upon
receipt of the claim from the lender, immediately take those actions required under paragraph (i)
of this section to oppose the discharge of the loan by the bankruptcy court.”); 34 C.F.R. §
682.402(i)(1)(iv) (“The guaranty agency must use diligence and may assert any defense
consistent with its status under applicable law to avoid discharge of the loan.”).
In his objection to ECMC’s request to intervene, Plaintiff states that it was filed “in an
abundance of caution” and that his Discovery Motion “tolls the running of deadlines” on motions
filed by AES and ECMC. [Doc. 39 at 1.] In his Discovery Motion, Plaintiff argues that
discovery is required before ECMC can be allowed to intervene so that he can confirm ECMC’s
standing. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “the parties must determine the owner of the loans
serviced by AES before this Court enjoys jurisdiction to enter any declaration.” [Doc. 38 at 6.]
In support of his argument that courts “enjoy[] broad discretion to grant discovery into Article III
standing and [their] jurisdiction over a proposed intervenor,” [id. at 5], Plaintiff cites to Anwar v.
Dow Chemical Co., 876 F.3d 841, 854 (6th Cir. 2017), and “Hohman v. United States, 2018 WL
3239725, at *10-11 (6th Cir. July 5, 2018)”.2 [Id.]
Unquestionably, Anwar confirms that “a plaintiff should have access to information
necessary to establish [his] claim, but . . . a plaintiff may not be permitted to ‘go fishing’; the
2 Plaintiff’s citation to Hohman v. United States, 2018 WL 3239725, at *10-11 (6th Cir. July 5, 2018), is erroneous.
That citation is In re T.G., No. 1939, 2018 WL 3239725 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 2, 2018). The Sixth Circuit’s
opinion that was issued on July 5, 2018, is Hohman v. Eadie, 894 F.3d 776, 787 (6th Cir. 2018), through which the
court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the plaintiff to take limited discovery to
address jurisdictional issues concerning claims of sovereign immunity, ownership of bank accounts subject to a John
Doe Summons, and whether the Internal Revenue Service obtained documentation under a second John Doe Summons
for bank records in a claim against the government for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act.
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trial court retains discretion.” 876 F.3d at 854 (citing Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007)). Here, however, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s
argument that discovery is required for him to ascertain whether ECMC has standing to intervene
[see Doc. 39], based in large part on Exhibit A attached to his own brief in support of the
Discovery Motion, which expressly shows that Ascendium assigned “its rights, title, and interest
in those student loans in the enclosure to this letter” to ECMC, including loans of Anthony S.
Hearn incurred on November 14, 2005. [Doc. 38 at 9, 10.]
On the other hand, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that ECMC’s request that AES be
dismissed from the Complaint is premature without additional proof or documentation to support
that it no longer holds any interest in Plaintiff’s student loan obligations. That said, the Court
declines to open discovery at this point of the adversary proceeding, and Plaintiff’s Discovery
Motion will be denied. As provided in the Memorandum and Order entered on August 18, 2026,
striking Debtor’s First Amended Complaint [Doc. 81 at 7], ECMC’s Motion will be stayed to the
extent it seeks to dismiss AES as a defendant to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to seek leave
from the Court to amend his Complaint.
B. Motion for More Definite Statement
The ECMC Motion also asks the Court to require Plaintiff to file a more definite statement
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), and “echoes and incorporates the argument of
the United States of America, on behalf of the United States Department of Education, as to a more
definite statement.” [Doc. 24 at 3.] 	In the Memorandum and Order on Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for More Definite Statement Filed by the United States entered on August 17, 2026 [Doc.
78], the Court denied the motion filed by the United States on April 13, 2026. 	For the same
reasons, which the Court incorporates herein by reference [see Doc. 78 at 6-10], the request by
ECMC for a more definite statement also will be denied.
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II. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court directs the following:
1. To the extent it requests to intervene as a party-defendant in this adversary proceeding,
the Amended Motion to Intervene, to Dismiss American Education Services, and for More Definite
Statement filed by ECMC on April 30, 2026 [Doc. 23], is GRANTED.
2. To the extent it seeks a more definite statement, the Amended Motion to Intervene, to
Dismiss American Education Services, and for More Definite Statement filed by ECMC on April
30, 2026 [Doc. 23], is DENIED.
3. 	To the extent it seeks dismissal of AES as a defendant, the Amended Motion to
Intervene, to Dismiss American Education Services, and for More Definite Statement filed by
ECMC on April 30, 2026 [Doc. 23], is STAYED to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to seek leave to
amend his Complaint, after which ECMC may supplement its motion within twenty-one days of
any order that authorizes the filing of an amended complaint. If Plaintiff does not seek leave to
amend, or if such request is denied, the Court will adjudicate the dismissal aspect of the ECMC
Motion without further briefing.
4. 	Debtor/Plaintiff’s 	Revised 	Corrected 	Motion 	for 	Leave 	to 	Conduct 	Limited
Jurisdictional Discovery filed on May 11, 2026 [Doc. 37], is DENIED.
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