USA v. Sullivan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	3:24-CR-80-KAC-JEM
)
KHALID SULLIVAN, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING RELEVANT PORTIONS OF REPORT
This action is before the Court on Defendant Khalid Sullivan’s “Objections to the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge” [Doc. 46]. 	Defendant objects to United States
Magistrate 	Judge 	Jill 	E. 	McCook’s 	September 	26, 	2025 	Report 	and 	Recommendation
(“Report”) [Doc. 36]. The Report recommends that the undersigned deny Defendant’s underlying
“Motion to Suppress Search of 5401 Asheville Highway On July 9, 2024” [Doc. 29] [See Doc. 36
at 21-22]. 	For the below reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections [Doc. 46],
ADOPTS 	relevant 	portions 	of 	the 	Report 	[Doc. 	36], 	and 	DENIES 	the 	Motion 	to
Suppress [Doc. 29].
I. 	Background1
On July 5, 2024 law enforcement applied for; and the Honorable Hector Sanchez, Knox
County Criminal Court Judge issued; a warrant to search the residence at “5101 Asheville
Highway, apartment unit 24, Knoxville,” Tennessee (“Unit 24”) [See Docs. 29-1, 29-2]. 	The
1 Defendant does not object to any of the Report’s factual findings [See Doc. 46]. So, the Court
generally adopts the findings with slight modifications herein and summarizes the key relevant
facts below. See 28 U.S.C. § 636.
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 1 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

2
affidavit in support of the warrant stated that Unit 24 “is on the 2nd floor” of an apartment complex
on Asheville Highway in Knox County, Tennessee (“Apartment Complex”) [Id.].
The affidavit provided that in “mid-January 2024,” a “reliable confidential informant”
(“CI”) advised law enforcement that a “black male” known as “Khalid Sullivan was selling heroin
in the Knoxville area” [Doc. 36 at 2]. 	Further investigation “linked this individual with Khalid
Kari Sullivan,” the Defendant [Id.]. The CI also advised that Defendant typically “deals drugs out
of rental cars in various parking lots in the area” [Id.]. And the CI “provided” law enforcement “a
phone number” he or she knew Defendant to use [Id.].
On April 24, 2024, law enforcement used that phone number to conduct a controlled
purchase of “heroin/opiate” [Id.]. An unknown “male” “directed” the CI to meet “at the Walgreens
on Magnolia Avenue,” which is located “on Asheville Highway less than one mile from” the
Apartment Complex [See id.]. Upon arriving at the Walgreens, the CI purchased a “substance”
which “field tested presumptively positive” for “fentanyl” and “Xylazine” [Id. at 2-3]. “Based
on . . . training and experience,” law enforcement knew Xylazine to be a common “cutting agent
for fentanyl” that is “known to mask results of fentanyl on certain field tests” [Id. at 3]. 	And
Xylazine is itself a “Schedule II” controlled substance [Doc. 29-3 at 6 ¶ 9]. 	The CI identified
Defendant as the individual who sold the drugs [Doc. 36 at 3].
The affidavit further provided that “during” the April 24 controlled purchase, law
enforcement observed Defendant “operating a white Dodge Durango” [Id. at 3]. Law enforcement
confirmed that the Durango was a rental vehicle [Id.]. On May 5, the same “Dodge Durango” was
parked at the Apartment Complex [Id.]. “On May 8” the Durango “was replaced by” another rental
vehicle, a “Toyota 4Runner,” until “June 6, 2024” [Id.]. 	On “June 6” the Toyota 4Runner was
“replaced by” another rental vehicle—a “Dodge Hornet” [Id.]. 	Based on law enforcement’s
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 2 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

3
“training and experience,” drug dealers “commonly utilize rental vehicles and trade them out often
in attempts to” evade detection [Id.].
On June 6, while surveilling the Apartment Complex, law enforcement observed Defendant
“operating” a “Chevrolet Impala with tinted windows” [Id.]. 	Officers saw Defendant exit the
Impala, enter the “second floor” of the Apartment Complex, “walk toward the far-right” side of
the building, and “enter an unknown apartment” [See id.; see also Doc. 29-3 at 5 ¶ 6]. 	A “law
enforcement database” confirmed that the Impala was “registered to Khalid Sullivan with an
address of 5101 Asheville Hwy, apt. unit 24” [Doc. 29-3 at 5 ¶ 7].
On “June 7, 2024” law enforcement was conducting surveillance on the Dodge Hornet
rental and the Impala [Doc. 36 at 4]. Officers observed a “black male leav[e] the second floor” of
the Apartment Complex, enter the Impala, and drive to the “parking lot” of the Asheville Highway
Walgreens where the April 24 controlled buy had taken place [Id.; Doc. 29-3 at 5 ¶ 7]. There, law
enforcement observed an interaction of between the “driver of the . . . Impala” and the “driver of
a silver van” [Doc. 36 at 4]. 	The interaction, which lasted “only . . . a few seconds,” 	was
“consistent with a hand-to-hand drug transaction” [Id.; Doc. 29-3 at 5 ¶ 7]. 	The driver of the
Impala then “returned” to the Apartment Complex and “entered the second floor of the . . .
building” “on the right side” before he was no longer visible [Id.].
The affidavit further provides that at some point the same day, law enforcement observed
Defendant “leave the courtyard area” of the Apartment Complex and enter the Impala [Doc. 29-3
at 5 ¶ 8]. Law enforcement followed Defendant as he drove to the “parking lot” of a Starbucks
[Doc. 36 at 4]. There, officers witnessed a “hand-to-hand transaction” between Defendant and
the driver of a “Chevrolet Cruz” [Id.]. 	After Defendant left the parking lot, law enforcement
“approached” the Chevrolet Cruz and observed “in plain view” the occupants “cutting up a gray
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 3 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

4
powder,” which appeared to be “ heroin/opiate mixture” [Doc. 29-3 at 5-6 ¶ 8]. The occupants
“admitted” to law enforcement that they had “just purchas[ed] heroin” [Id. at 6 ¶ 8].
On “June 21,” law enforcement used a reliable CI to conduct a second controlled buy from
Defendant [Doc. 36 at 4]. The CI called the phone number known to be used by Defendant and
“ordered a quantity of suspected heroin/opiate” [Id.]. Law enforcement observed Defendant leave
the “area of” Unit 24 and “drive directly to the arranged location” [Id. at 4-5]. The CI purchased
from 	Defendant 	a 	substance 	that 	then 	“tested 	presumptively 	positive 	for 	Xylazine 	and
Diphenhydramine” [Id. at 5; Doc. 29-3 at 6 ¶ 9].
“[O]n June 25” law enforcement observed Defendant exit the Impala at the Apartment
Complex and “walk directly to the door of” Unit 24 “with an unknown” female [Doc. 36 at 5].
Defendant “manipulate[d] the lock on the door” and entered the apartment [Id.].
“[O]n 	July 	3, 	2024,” 	law 	enforcement 	conducted 	a 	third 	controlled 	buy 	from
Defendant [Id.]. 	A CI called the phone number for Defendant and “ordered a quantity of
heroin/opiate” [Id.]. Law enforcement watched Defendant “leave the area of” Unit 24 and “drive
directly” to the arranged meet location [Id.; Doc. 29-3 at 6 ¶ 12]. The CI purchased a substance
from an individual the CI identified as Defendant [Doc. 36 at 5]. Upon “inspection,” and based
on “training and experience,” law enforcement believed the purchased substance to be consistent
with “heroin/opiates” [Doc. 29-3 at 6-7 ¶ 12]. The affidavit stated that “during each” of the three
(3) “controlled buy[s]” involving Defendant, law enforcement corroborated the information from
the applicable CI “through real-time surveillance and review of the audio and/or video recording”
of the transaction [Doc. 29-3 at 6 ¶ 10]. 	And law enforcement searched the CI for drugs and
contraband “before and after each buy” [Id. ¶ 9].
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 4 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

5
From his “training and experience,” the affiant-officer “kn[ew] that persons involved in the
storage, use, sale, delivery, or exchange of controlled substances, commonly keep and maintain,
especially within their residences” “items that they use to conduct or facilitate those activities” [Id.
at 4 ¶ 2]. So, he believed that a search of Unit 24 would uncover evidence of drug possession and
distribution [See id. at 3].
The officer was right. 	The search of Unit 24 on July 9, 2024 yielded quantities of
“methamphetamine, 	suspected 	fentanyl, 	three 	loaded 	handguns, 	[and] 	$12,290 	in 	[U.S.]
currency” [See Doc. 36 at 6].
Defendant filed a motion to suppress “all evidence collected [at] or arising out of” the July
9, 2024 search [Doc. 29 at 21]. After a hearing on the Motion, Judge McCook issued the Report
[Doc. 36]. The Report recommends that the undersigned deny the Motion [See Doc. 36 at 21-22].
As relevant here, the Report specifically concluded that (1) the affidavit in support of the warrant
established probable cause to search Unit 24 and (2) even if probable cause was lacking, “officers
searched the apartment in good faith reliance on the search warrant” [Id. at 21].
Defendant filed two objections. First, he argues that the Report erred in concluding that
the affidavit established a probable cause “nexus” to search Unit 24 for evidence of Defendant’s
drug trafficking; second, he argues that the “good faith exception” does not apply [See Doc. 46
at 6]. 	The United States did not object to the Report. 	It did, however, oppose Defendant’s
objections [See Doc. 47].
II. 	Analysis
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provides that the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The Court considers timely objections de novo. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Crim
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 5 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

6
P. 59(b)(3). When the district court is tasked with reviewing “the issuing judge’s probable cause
determination,” “[t]he terms of review are settled.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 461
(6th Cir. 2024) (en banc). 	The reviewing court “must afford ‘great deference’ to the issuing
judge’s” probable cause determination. United States v. Long, 155 F.4th 829, 834 (6th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Sanders, 106 F.4th at 461). Here, the Court’s role is “simply to ensure” that the issuing
judge “‘had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed’ when he issued the
warrant.” United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 777, 777 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
Probable cause depends on “ the totality of the circumstances.” Long, 155 F.4th at 834
(quotation omitted). The “critical question” is whether, considering all the circumstances, “there
was a fair probability” that law enforcement “would find evidence of criminal wrongdoing” in a
“particular place.” Florence, 150 F.4th at 777 (citation omitted); Sanders, 106 F.4th at 461. The
term “probable cause nexus” is a term of art “reflect[ing] the requirement that [the] affidavit in
support of a search warrant sufficiently show that the specific things to be searched for are located
on the property” law enforcement seeks to search. Sanders, 106 F.4th at 460-61 (cleaned up). The
Court reads a search warrant affidavit “reasonably . . . [and] holistically,” “employing a healthy
dose of common sense.” United States v. McCoy, 905 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation
omitted); see also United States v. Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th 432, 437, 439 (6th Cir. 2025).
Here, United States v. Sanders2 and its progeny make clear that the affidavit established a
probable cause nexus. And even if probable cause were lacking, the good faith exception would
apply. Starting with Sanders, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en
2 106 F.4th 455 (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 6 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

7
banc explained that when a “search warrant affidavit” “adequately establishes both where a
defendant resides as well as . . . [his] active engagement in” drug dealing, “an inference can
reasonably be made (especially when aided by an affiant-officer’s experience) that the [defendant]
keeps the ‘instrumentalities and fruits’ of his [drug dealing] in his residence.” Sanders, 106 F.4th
at 462 (quotations and citations omitted). 	United States v. Simmons 3 continues along that path.
There, the Court noted that “even if no direct evidence ties drug dealing to a home, a nexus exists
based on circumstantial evidence if a suspect’s drug dealing is ‘ongoing’ at the time the police
seek the warrant.” See United States v. Simmons, 129 F.4th 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up).
These published precedents control and doom Defendant’s argument regarding a probable
cause nexus. 	The affidavit established that Defendant was a “known drug dealer” engaged in
uninterrupted and ongoing drug-dealing as late as July 3, 2024. See Simmons, 129 F.4th at 387
(“An affidavit can [] show ongoing drug activity through the repeated nature of the transactions
independent surveillance or witness accounts corroborated by an affiant’s experience and training”
(cleaned up)). The affidavit also sufficiently established that Defendant resided in Unit 24 during
the relevant time. Most notably, the Impala Defendant drove was specifically registered to him
“with an address of 5101 Asheville Hwy, apt. unit 24” [Doc. 29-3 at 5 ¶ 7]. And on June 25,
law enforcement saw Defendant exit the Impala, “walk directly to the door of” Unit 24,
“manipulate the lock on the door,” and then enter Unit 24 [Doc. 36 at 5]. For good measure, the
affiant-officer confirmed that his training and experience suggested that drug dealers “commonly
keep and maintain” “certain items” “used to conduct or facilitate” drug dealing and storage “within
their residences” [Doc. 29-3 at 3]. Thus, Sixth Circuit precedent forecloses Defendant’s argument.
3 129 F.4th 382 (6th Cir. 2025)
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 7 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>

8
Even if a probable cause nexus did not exist, a hypothetical hard to square with existing
precedent, the good faith exception would apply. 	Under the good faith exception, the
“exclusionary rule” does not apply “when officers conduct a search in good faith reliance on a
judicially authorized warrant.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 468 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 909, 922 (1984)). Defendant argues that the affidavit was “bare bones,” that is “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”
[Doc. 46 at 14 (quoting United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 385 (6th Cir. 2016)]. It is not.
The “moniker,” “bare-bones” is generally “reserved” for an affidavit that is “either
completely devoid of any nexus between the illegal activity and the place to be searched” or that
“merely 	states 	suspicions, 	or 	conclusions, 	without 	providing 	some 	underlying 	factual
circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 468
(cleaned up). Here, as described in detail above, the facts in the seven (7) page affidavit easily
clear that threshold. And law enforcement justifiably relied on the warrant. See id. Accordingly,
even if the affidavit did not establish probable cause, the good faith exception applies.
III. 	Conclusion
As set forth above, the Court (1) OVERRULES Defendant’s “Objections to the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge” [Doc. 46], (2) ADOPTS relevant portions of
United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Jill 	E. 	McCook’s 	September 	26, 	2025 	Report 	and
Recommendation [Doc. 36], and (3) DENIES Defendant’s “Motion to Suppress Search of 5401
Asheville Highway On July 9, 2024” [Doc. 29].
SO ORDERED.
KATHERINE A 	YTZER
United States District Judge
KA	KA	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	K	KA	A	A	A	A	A	A	K	KA	A	A	A	A	K	KA	A	A	A	A	K	KA	A	ATHERINE A. CRY	Y	RY	RY	RY	RY	RY	RY	Y	RY	RY	RY	RY	RY	Y	RY	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	RY	RY	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	R	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	R	RY	R	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	R	R	RY	Y	R	R	RY	Y	RY	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	RY	Y	Y	R	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	R	RY	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	RY	Y	YTZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	TZ	TZ	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	TZ	TZ	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	T	TZ	Z	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	TZ	Z	Z	Z	Z	T	TZ	Z	Z	T	T	T	TZ	Z	Z	Z	TZER
United States Districtt	ct	ctttt	ctttt	ct	cttt	cttt	cttttttt	cctt	cttt	ctttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJud	ud	ud	ud	ud	ud	udd	udd	ud	ud	udd	ud	ud	ud	ud	uudddddd	ud	udddd	ud	uddddddd	uddddd	ud	ud	uudd	uddddd	udddd	uuuudddddd	ud	uud	uuddddddddddd	uuudddddddddddddd	uuuuddd	uuuddddddddddddddge	g
Case 3:24-cr-00080-KAC-JEM Document 49 Filed 01/27/26 Page 8 of 8 PageID
#: <pageID>