USA v. Haney, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-CR-113-TAV-JEM
)
TIFFANY HANEY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the undersigned on the United States’ Motion to Quash [Doc. 257] and
the Non-party Express Scripts, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena [Doc. 268], both referred to the
undersigned by United States District Judge Thomas A. Varlan [Docs. 258, 270]. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b).
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Government moves to quash subpoenas that Defendant Tiffany Haney served on
Express Scripts, Inc.; Humana, Inc.; and Optum, Inc., which seek, among other things, “[a]ll
documents relating to audits and monitoring of Rocky Hill Pharmacy” for a seven-year period and
“[a]ll correspondence regarding Rocky Hill Pharmacy, Tiffany Haney, or Anne Warren, with any
government agency” [Doc. 257 p. 1 (citing Express Scripts subpoena [Doc. 257-1], Humana
subpoena [Doc. 257-2], & Optum subpoena [257-3])]. The Government also seeks to quash
subpoenas that Defendant Haney served on Safeguard Services, LLC, and Pain Medicine of the
South, which seek “[a]ll medical and pharmacy claims billing data” for specified providers for a
seven-year period” [Id. (citing Safeguard Services subpoena [Doc. 257-4] & Pain Medicine of the
South subpoena [Doc. 257-5])]. The Government asserts that these subpoenas do not seek “specific
admissible evidence” but are instead a “fishing expedition” for additional discovery [Id.]. In
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addition, the Government requests that the Court direct Defendants to produce for review by the
Court and the Government any similar subpoenas served on third parties [Id.].
Defendant Tiffany Haney opposes the motion, asserting the Government misstates both the
law and the facts in support of its request [Doc. 262 pp. 1–2]. More specifically, she asserts that
the Government lacks standing to quash the subpoenas because it does not assert any personal
right, privilege, or proprietary interest in the materials sought [Id. at 2]. And she argues the
Government is not a “gatekeeper over the defense’s exercise of compulsory process” [Id. at 3].
Defendant Haney also asserts that the Government informed Judge Varlan that she sought early
return of the subpoenaed materials; but she explains the subpoenas command appearance and
production at the federal courthouse on the first day of trial [Id. at 4]. In addition, Defendant Haney
asserts that the subpoenas comply with Rule 17(c) and satisfy the standard articulated in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974) [Id.]. Finally, Defendant Haney contends the
Government’s request for disclosure of other defense subpoenas is improper and unsupported by
the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 and Sixth Circuit law [Id. at 6].
On January 29, 2026, nonparty Express Scripts, Inc., one of the subpoenaed entities, moved
to quash Defendant Haney’s trial subpoena [Doc. 268]. Express Scripts joins in the arguments
raised by the Government [id. at 1–2] and argues the subpoena is improper in form, vague, and
overly broad [id. at 2–3]. Specifically, Express Scripts asserts that the subpoena should be quashed
because Defendant does not subpoena a person to testify but, instead, subpoenas a corporation
[Id. at 2]. Express Scripts also contends that the subpoena’s requests are unclear and not limited to
a particular Medicare or Blue Cross Blue Shield plan [Id. at 2–3]. Moreover, the subpoena seeks
production of documents related to audits and monitoring of Rocky Hill Pharmacy, which Express
Scripts has already produced to the Government and which the Government represents it has
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provided to Defendant Haney [Id. at 3]. Express Scripts contends that this request for duplicate
production violates Nixon’s requirement that the subpoenaed information be otherwise unavailable
before trial [Id.].1
II. 	ANALYSIS
Rule 17 permits a defendant to “order [a] witness to produce any books, papers, documents,
data, or other objects the subpoena designates.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). It “implements a criminal
defendant’s constitutional right ‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor’
by providing a means to subpoena witnesses and documents for a trial or a hearing.” United States
v. Llanex-Garcia, 735 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2013). The Court retains discretion to “direct the
witness to produce the designated items in court before trial or before they are to be offered in
evidence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). Upon motion, the Court may also “quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2).
A. 	Standing
“[T]here is a lingering question within this Circuit as to whether the Government has
standing 	to 	oppose 	subpoenas 	directed 	towards 	third 	parties.” 	United 	States 	v. 	You,
No. 2:19-CR-14, 2024 WL 14004378, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2024) (citation omitted). Courts
finding the government lacks standing to challenge a subpoena to a nonparty have required that
the Government show some injury or claim a privilege or personal right in the information sought
to challenge the subpoena. United Staes v. D’Anna, No. 13-20119, 2015 WL 1954490, at *9
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2015) (observing that the government lacks standing to challenge a
1 	Due to the nearness of the February 3, 2026 trial date, and the overlapping nature of the
issues in the two motions, the Court rules without awaiting the response of Defendant Haney to
Express Scripts’s motion. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2 (“Under exceptional circumstances, the Court
may act upon a motion prior to the expiration of the response time.”).
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defendant’s subpoena to a nonparty unless it can show a claim of privilege or a proprietary interest
in the subpoenaed material or an “injury in fact” from the subpoena). Nevertheless, “[t]he court
may control the use of Rule 17(c) . . . by its power to rule on motions to quash or modify.” You,
2024 WL 14004378, at *5 (citation omitted); see also Llanex-Garcia, 735 F.3d at 499 (holding that
district courts have discretion to supervise subpoenas under Rule 17(c) using the “mechanisms for
exercising oversight as they see fit”). In You, Judge Greer declined to require the subpoenaed
parties to respond to Defendant’s motion seeking the subpoenas and, instead, said the companies
could move to quash the subpoenas once served, if they objected. You, 2024 WL 14004378, at *5.
“The party seeking to quash a subpoena has the burden of proving that it has standing to
move to quash the subpoena.” D’Anna, 2015 WL 1954490, at *9 (citing United States v. Tomison,
969 F. Supp. 587, 596 (E.D. Cal. 1997)). Here, the Government has not carried that burden. The
Government asserts injury due to violation of the discovery rules [Doc. 257 p. 5], but it points to
no authority that this provides standing. Nor does it claim that the subpoenaed materials are
privileged or proprietary to it. Thus, on the record before it, the undersigned deems the Government
lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas. As the subpoenaed party, however, Express Scripts may
properly move to quash.
B. 	Validity
Express Scripts asserts that Defendant’s trial subpoena is invalid because it fails to name a
witness to appear before the Court. Upon review, the Court agrees. The plain language of
Rule 17(a) provides that “[a] subpoena must . . . command the witness to attend and testify at the
time and place the subpoena specifies[.]” Crim. R. Fed. P. 17(a). Accordingly, the Court quashes
the subpoena for Express Scripts because it is facially invalid. Although the remaining corporations
(Humana, Optum, Safeguard Services, and Pain Medicine of the South) have not filed motions to
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quash, the Court exercises its supervisory powers to also quash those facially invalid subpoenas.2
Llanex-Garcia, 735 F.3d at 499; see also United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 230 (6th Cir. 1990)
(discussing court’s discretion to strike trial subpoenas); United States v. Pate, No. 3:09-00106,
2024 WL 1773996, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 24, 2024) (discussing the court’s discretion with respect
to both Rule 17(a) subpoenas and Rule 17(c) subpoenas duces tecum).
C. 	Production of Documents
The five subpoenas direct the subpoenaed entities to produce numerous documents that
Defendant Haney characterizes as business records [See Doc. 262 pp. 3, 5]. Express Scripts objects
to the requested production as “vague, ambiguous, and extraordinarily broad” [Doc. 268 p. 3]. It
argues that the heart of the Defendant’s request are audit and investigation files and the
“credentialing files for Rocky Hill Pharmacy,” which it has already produced to the Government
and which the Government represents it has disclosed to Defendant Haney [Id.]. On January 29,
2026, the Government filed a Notice, affirming that it has produced all documents provided from
Express Scripts to Defendant Haney [Doc. 273 p. 1].3 Express Scripts contends the Court should
not permit duplicate production of these documents, which Defendant Haney has obtained from
the Government [Doc. 268 p. 3].
2 	With respect to the Government’s request to identify any similar subpoenas served on third
parties [Doc. 257 p. 5], the Government cites no authority for this request, nor is the Court aware
of any such authority. Moreover, parties in a criminal case are not required to provide a witness
list absent an agreement or Court order. See United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1190
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. McCullah, 745 F.2d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 1984); see also United
States v. Turner, 91 F. App’x 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a “defendant in a non-capital
case . . . is not entitled to know in advance of trial who will testify for the government”).
3 	The Notice states that following the prosecutor’s conversation with counsel for Express
Scripts, the Government undertook to “double-check” that all materials from Express Scripts had
been provided to Defendants [Doc. 273 p. 1]. During this review, Government’s counsel “learned
that two spreadsheet files had been inadvertently omitted from the production” [Id.]. The
Government states it has since produced these to the Defendants [Id.].
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As stated above, Rule 17 permits the Court to “quash or modify [a subpoena directing
production of documents] if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
17(c)(2). “When evaluating a motion to quash a subpoena ad testificandum, courts frequently draw
on principles analogous to those used when deciding a motion to quash a subpoenas duces tecum.”
Pate, 2024 WL 1773996, at *1 (citing United States v. Santistevan, No. 11-cr-00406-CMA,
2012 WL 2875949, *1 (D. Colo. July 12, 2012)). Considerations of relevancy and materiality apply
equally 	to 	subpoenas 	for 	a 	witness’s 	testimony. 	Id. 	(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	Peavler,
No. 3:15-CR-14, 2017 WL 1018304, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 10, 2017)). And “[t]he same general
standard [for subpoenas duces tecum] applies to subpoenaed production of documents at the time
of trial.” Peavler, 2017 WL 1018304, at *2 (citations omitted). Applying the same principles, the
Court may quash a subpoena ad testificandum if compliance with the subpoena would be
“unreasonable and oppressive.” Pate, 2024 WL 1773996, at *1.
Here, the Court finds requiring Express Scripts to reproduce voluminous and duplicative
documents relating to Rocky Hill Pharmacy is unreasonable. In United Staes v. Nixon, the Supreme
Court set out four factors for evaluating the propriety of a Rule 17(c) subpoena:
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they
are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by
exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly
prepare for trial without such production and inspection in
advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may
tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (4) that the application
is made in good faith and is not intended as a general “fishing
expedition.”
418 U.S. 683, 699 (1974); see also United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1146 (6th Cir. 1990)
(listing the Nixon factors); United States v. You, 2024 WL 1404378, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2024)
(“The four factors established by United States v. Nixon must be met to enforce the subpoena and
‘require production’ of subpoenaed documents.”).
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Both Express Scripts and the Government state that Defendant Haney already has the
documents she seeks from Express Scripts. Defendant asserts that the Government’s discovery
disclosures “were incomplete as key/documents, records, and/or communications were not
provided” 	[Doc. 	273]. 	Defendant, 	however, 	fails 	to 	show 	that 	these 	materials, 	such 	as
communications between the Government and Express Scripts [see Doc. 268 p. 1–2], are
discoverable. Nor is Rule 17(c) intended to serve as a discovery device.4 United States v. Vassar,
346 F. App’x 17, 24 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Justice, 14 F. App’x 426, 432 (6th Cir. 2001).
Additionally, in adopting all arguments asserted by the Government, Express Scripts
contends that the subpoena violates Rule 17(c) because the cover letter invites Express Scripts to
produce documents at an unspecified date directly to defense counsel’s address in New Jersey or
via email to defense counsel’s email address [Doc. 268 p. 1; Doc. 257 p. 3]. The cover letter is not
a model of clarity. It first directs that the subpoena requests appearance and production of
documents as outlined in the subpoena, which provides that the place of appearance is at the federal
courthouse on the first day of trial [See, e.g., Doc. 257-1 pp. 4–5]. The cover letter then notes that
the appearance of the custodian of records may be excused upon receipt of the records and the
executed Declaration of Custodian of Records, enclosed with the subpoena, to defense counsel’s
New Jersey office or to his email [Id. at 4]. The plain language of Rule 17(c)(1) requires
subpoenaed materials to be returned to the Court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(1). To the extent that the
cover letter suggests that the documents could be returned to defense counsel, that suggestion was
improper. 	United 	States 	v. 	Al-Amin, 	No. 	1:12–CR–50, 	2013 	WL 	3865079, 	at 	*9–10
4 	To the extent Defendant has raised discovery issues, Judge Varlan has addressed those
concerns [Doc. 269].
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(E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2013) (observing that materials obtained through a subpoena duces tecum
may not be returned to counsel’s office).5
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, the Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) the United States’ Motion to Quash [Doc. 257] is DENIED
because 	the 	Government 	lacks 	standing 	to 	challenge
Defendant’s trial subpoenas;
(2) Non-Party Express Scripts, Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena
[Doc. 268] is GRANTED;
(3) Defendant Haney’s trial subpoenas to Express Scripts, Inc.;
Humana, Inc.; Optum, Inc.; Safeguard Services, LLC; and Pain
Medicine of the South are QUASHED; and
(4) counsel for Defendant Haney is ORDERED to notify counsel
or other representative for Express Scripts, Inc.; Humana, Inc.;
Optum, Inc.; Safeguard Services, LLC; and Pain Medicine of the
South that her subpoenas are quashed and to provide a copy of
this Memorandum and Order to those five entities within
twenty-four hours of the entry of this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
__________________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
5 	The Government contends that the subpoenas do not satisfy the requirements set forth by
Judge Collier in United States v. Al-Amin, No. 1:12–CR–50, 2013 WL 3865079, at *9–10
(E.D. Tenn. July 25, 2013), because Defendant did not seek preauthorization of production of
documents from the Court [Doc. 257 pp. 2–3]. Relying on United States v. Llanez-Garcia,
735 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2013), Judge Greer has disagreed that Rule 17(c) requires authorization
prior to issuance in all cases. You, 2024 WL 1404378, at *4. Neither this Court nor Judge Varlan
has a requirement that a party seek authorization prior to issuance of a Rule 17 subpoena duces
tecum beyond what is required by the Rule itself. Hence, the Court declines to quash the subpoenas
because defense counsel did not seek authorization prior to issuance.
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