USA v. Hardison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No.: 	3:25-CR-48-TAV-DCP
)
BRYAN HARDISON, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This criminal matter is before the Court for consideration of the Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) entered by United States Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin on
January 28, 2026 [Doc. 145]. The R&R addresses defendant’s pro se Motion to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [Doc. 73], Motions for Leave to File Late-Filed
Pretrial Motions to Suppress [Docs. 114, 119], and the proposed late-filed Motions to
Suppress [Docs. 115, 118]. 	Defendant filed objections to the R&R [Doc. 150], the
government responded [Doc. 154], and defendant replied [Docs. 159, 162]. Accordingly,
this matter is now ripe for the Court’s review. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a). Also before the
Court are defendant’s “Supplemental Motion to Suppress Identification” [Doc. 180] and
“Addendum and Supplemental Motion to Suppress” [Doc. 181], which are not addressed
by the R&R but raise related legal arguments.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will OVERRULE defendant’s objections
[Doc. 150], ACCEPT and ADOPT the R&R [Doc. 145] in whole, and DENY defendant’s
motions [Docs. 73, 114, 115, 118, 119, 180, 181].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 1 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

2
I. 	Background
The superseding indictment charges defendant with possession with intent to
distribute 280 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Count One) and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count Two) [Doc.
193].1 	These charges are based on evidence discovered during the execution of a search
warrant at 5205 Skyline Drive, Knoxville, Tennessee, on May 5, 2025 [Doc. 1, p. 3].
The Court presumes familiarity with the background set forth in the R&R [See Doc.
145, pp. 2–8]. Neither party appears to object to the background set forth in the R&R.
Therefore, the Court adopts that background, in relevant part:
On May 5, 2025, officers with the Knoxville Police Department’s (“KPD”)
Organized Crime Unit (“OCU”) executed a search warrant at Defendant
Hardison’s address. 	Based upon the affidavit of KPD Detective Brandon
Stryker (“Detective Stryker”), which lists controlled substances seized from
Defendant’s residence, [Judge Poplin] issued a Criminal Complaint charging
Defendant with possession of 280 grams or more of cocaine base with intent
to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).
On May 7, 2025, a Grand Jury charged Defendant Hardison by Indictment
with possession with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(A) (Count One) and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine (Count Two) in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).
1 The superseding indictment in this case was filed after Judge Poplin issued the R&R [See
Docs. 145, 193]. The superseding indictment changed Count Two from charging possession with
intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B),
to charging only the lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) [Compare Doc. 8 with Doc. 193; see also Doc. 195].
The superseding indictment also dropped the forfeiture allegations contained in the original
indictment [Id.].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 2 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

3
At Defendant’s May 6, 2025[,] initial appearance on the Criminal Complaint,
the 	[magistrate 	judge] 	appointed 	Assistant 	Federal 	Defender 	Jonathan
Moffat . . . as counsel, and entered an Order of appointment on May 14, 2025,
at Defendant’s initial appearance and arraignment on the Indictment. At that
time, the Court set a deadline for pretrial motions of June 10, 2025. On June
10, 2025, Attorney Moffatt moved to continue the trial and pretrial motion
deadline . . . . The [magistrate judge] granted this motion and extended the
pretrial motion deadline to July 17, 2025 . . . . In mid-July 2025, Defendant
retained 	Attorneys 	Gregory 	P. 	Isaacs 	and 	Ashlee 	B. 	Mathis 	. 	. 	.
who . . . subsequently withdrew their Motion for Substitution of Counsel due
to their discovery of a potential conflict of interest. Attorney Moffatt, who
remained counsel of record, moved to reopen and extend the pretrial motion
deadline for four weeks . . . . The Court granted this motion and reopened
and extended the pretrial motion deadline to August 14, 2025.
On July 23, 2025, Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting substitute
counsel . . . . On August 6, 2025, Attorneys Wade V. Davies and Georgia A.
Miller . . . entered a notice of Appearance as counsel of record for Defendant
Hardison . . . .
On August 7, 2025, the Court substituted Attorneys Davies and Miller as
Defendant’s counsel of record. 	Just days later, on August 11, 2025,
Defendant filed a pro se motion seeking a Franks hearing and suppression of
evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant for his residence . . . . The
Court denied the motion, instructing Defendant that he must file all motions
through counsel and directing counsel to confer with Defendant about his pro
se filing. The Court also granted a trial continuance and extended the pretrial
motion deadline to September 15, 2025.
On August 17, 2025, Attorneys Davies and Miller filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel, which the Court granted after hearing on August 25, 2026. 	At
the August 25 hearing, Defendant initially expressed his desire to represent
himself, but the Court asked that he accept appointed counsel to further
discuss his case and take time for thoughtful consideration of his request to
proceed pro se. The Court appointed . . . attorney Laura Davis as counsel of
record for Defendant.
Shortly after this substitution, Attorney Davis filed an Unopposed Motion to
Continue Trial and All Associated Deadlines and a Motion for Faretta
Hearing. 	Following 	a 	Faretta 	hearing 	on 	September 	11, 	2025, 	the
[magistrate judge] . . . permitted Defendant Hardison to represent himself.
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 3 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

4
The Court also extended the pretrial motion deadline to October 9, 2026. On
October 1, 2025, Defendant moved to again extend his pretrial motion
deadline to allow him to complete review of discovery with his investigator
and to prepare pretrial motions. The Court . . . extended the [pretrial motion]
deadline to October 23, 2025. On October 16, 2026, Defendant moved for a
sixty-day extension of his pretrial motion deadline to complete review of the
pole camera video footage, to review “digital copies of content of four cell
phones,” and to prepare pretrial motions. The [magistrate judge] denied this
sixth request to extend the motion deadline . . . . Throughout the proceedings,
the Court extended the pretrial motion deadline five times at Defendant’s
request. The last deadline for pretrial motions expired on October 23, 2025.
On October 23, 2025, Defendant timely filed a pro se motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing his case is improperly before this
Court . . . .
On December 5, 2025, Defendant file a Motion to Leave to File Late Filed
Pre-Trial Motion along with his proposed Motion to Suppress Evidence
Seized in Violation of the Fourth Amendment in Addition the Defendant
Requests for a Franks Hearing . . . .
Finally, on December 11, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Leave and File
Late Filed PreTrial Motion to Suppress Statements Due to Violation of the
McNabb Rule Pursuant to Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure . . . along with his proposed Motion to Suppress Statements Due
to Violation of the McNabb Rule . . . .
[Doc. 145, pp. 2–8 (footnotes and citations omitted)].
Upon consideration of the record and the parties’ arguments, Judge Poplin has
recommended that defendant’s motions [Docs. 73, 114, 115, 118, 119] be denied.
II. 	Standard of Review
The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which a defendant has
objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). Accordingly, the Court considers
defendant’s motions, the government’s responses, the R&R, and defendant’s objections,
all in light of the applicable law.
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 4 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

5
Objections to any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition “must be clear enough to
enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” See
Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
147 (1985) (stating that the purpose of the rule is to “focus attention on those issues . . . that
are at the heart of the parties’ dispute”). 	Each objection to a magistrate judge’s
recommendation should describe how the analysis is wrong, why it was wrong, and how
de novo review warrants a different result on a particular issue. 	See Howard v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). 	A general objection that
merely restates an argument previously presented or simply voices a disagreement with a
magistrate judge’s suggested resolution “has the same effect[] as would a failure to object.”
Austin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-cv-2380, 2021 WL 1540389, at *4 (N.D. Ohio,
Apr. 19, 2021) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Dawson, No. 4:19-cr-206, 2020
WL 109137, at *1 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 9, 2020) (citations omitted) (“[T]he Court is under no
obligation to review de novo objections that are merely an attempt to have the district court
reexamine the same arguments set forth in the petition and briefs.”).
III. 	Analysis
A. 	Jurisdiction
In the R&R, Judge Poplin summarized defendant’s jurisdiction arguments by stating
that “[d]efendant contends that because state officials initiated the search and investigation
leading to his arrest, his charges should be adjudicated in state court” [Doc. 145, p. 9]. In
addressing this argument, Judge Poplin determined that the Court has subject matter
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 5 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

6
jurisdiction over defendant because his indictment charges violations of federal law [Id. at
11]. Judge Poplin noted that district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction
over all offenses against the laws of the United States [Id. at 9]. 	Further, Judge Poplin
stated that the indictment in this case charges defendant with conspiring to distribute
controlled substances in violation of federal law, and drug trafficking is an activity that the
federal government may regulate [Id.]. 	Thus, Judge Poplin concluded that “[t]his Court
unquestionably has jurisdiction over this case” even though state officials conducted the
investigation and search leading to defendant’s charges [Id. at 9–10].
Next, Judge Poplin addressed defendant’s argument that “the state law enforcement
officers who arrested [defendant] should have complied with Tennessee criminal procedure
and taken him before a state magistrate judge after his arrest” [Id. at 10]. 	Judge Poplin
concluded that federal criminal procedure, not state law, applies in this case because a
federal criminal complaint initiated defendant’s prosecution [Id.]. 	Finally, Judge Poplin
found that defendant’s “argument that the federal indictment divested his right to challenge
the search warrant authorizing the search of his residence” is without merit because
defendant and his counsel received notice of the pretrial motion deadline at defendant’s
May 14, 2025, initial appearance and arraignment [Id.].
In his objections to the R&R, defendant asserts that “[t]he magistrate judge is very
aware of the clear violation of due process” but misconstrued his argument [Doc. 150, pp.
25, 27]. Defendant contends that he was never charged in state court, which denied him
“the opportunity to be heard to contest the probable cause to search the residence” [Id.].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 6 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

7
As such, defendant maintains that he was denied the fundamental right of due process [Id.].
Defendant further submits that the affiant “breached” defendant’s “rights of equal
protection under the 14th Amendment never having a chance to challenge the state search
warrant” [Id.]. He asserts that no United States Codes were implicated in the state search
warrant, and a state proceeding was still pending at the time that jurisdiction was “usurped”
into federal court without due process [Id. at 27].
The government responds that Judge Poplin properly concluded that this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction in this case because “[a] federal district court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over ‘all offenses against the laws of the United States’” [Doc. 154, p.
5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3231)]. 	Further, the government responds that the Court has
afforded defendant due process, and Tennessee criminal procedure does not apply in
federal prosecutions [Id.].
In his reply, defendant appears to contend that this Court does not have jurisdiction
because the Younger2 abstention doctrine applies [Doc. 159, pp. 3–4]. 	Specifically,
defendant states that “[w]hen a court determines that Younger abstention applies, it may
not retain jurisdiction over the case[,]” and “[t]he district court improperly retained
jurisdiction in this case, even though it had subject-matter jurisdiction” [Id. at 3]. Further,
defendant continues to argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction because “the warrant was
under state statutes and the warrants w[ere] executed for misdemeanor purposes under
[Tennessee Code Annotated] statutes” [Id. at 5]. Defendant also maintains that the Court
2 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 7 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

8
lacks jurisdiction until it files a proper writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, which did
not occur, to ensure that transfers are lawfully documented [Id. at 2]. He states that removal
of prosecution from state to federal court is unauthorized, rendering this case “illegal and
void” [Id. at 6]. At the same time, however, defendant argues that he was never charged
in state court, which denied him the opportunity to challenge the search warrant [Id. at 5].
As a threshold matter, “Younger abstention requires a federal court to abstain from
granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial
proceedings.” O’Neil v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger, 401
U.S. at 40–41). Although the Younger abstention doctrine “permits abstention when there
is an ongoing state criminal prosecution[,]” defendant explicitly stated that he “was never
charged in the state denying [him] the opportunity to be heard to contest the probable
cause” [Id.]. 	Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the record shows that a federal criminal complaint was filed [Doc. 1], resulting
in defendant’s arrest on May 5, 2025, by authority of a federal arrest warrant [Doc. 2].
Since there is no indication in the record that defendant was charged with an ongoing state
criminal prosecution, the Court finds that abstention under the Younger doctrine is not
applicable here.
Moreover, the Court finds that Judge Poplin correctly determined that this Court has
jurisdiction over a criminal case involving a violation of federal law. 	“Federal district
judges have jurisdiction over federal criminal cases.” 	Carpenter v. Goldsmith, No.
25-10940, 2025 WL 1316479, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 6, 2025) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3231);
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 8 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

9
see also 13D C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT & A RTHUR R. M ILLER, F ED. P RACTICE AND
P ROCEDURE § 3575 (3d ed. 2025) (“Thus district courts always have jurisdiction when a
federal offense is charged”). 	“The federal indictment of [defendant] and his presence in
the United States conferred personal jurisdiction in” a criminal case. 	Jerdine v. United
States, No. 1:18-CV-1613, 2019 WL 626136, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2019); see also
United States v. Sankey, Nos. 3:15-CR-92, 3:07-CR-83, 2016 WL 4253985 at *2 (E.D.
Tenn. July 13, 2016) (Guyton, J.) (“Because the Defendant is alleged to have violated a
federal law, in this district, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee unquestionably has jurisdiction over this case.”).
Contrary to defendant’s argument that state law enforcement officers should have
complied with Tennessee criminal procedure, state law does not apply in this case. 	See
United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1434 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The fact that Tennessee law
‘may . . . require greater protection against searches and seizures than the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment is of no avail to a defendant in federal court, under prosecution for a federal
crime.’”) (quoting United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985)).
Additionally, the Court agrees with Judge Poplin’s determination that the federal
indictment did not divest defendant’s right to challenge the state search warrant because
defendant retained the right to challenge the warrant in federal court after the indictment
was filed. 	Cf. United States v. Abernathy, 843 F.3d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 2016) (“A ‘state
search warrant being challenged in a federal court must be judged by federal constitutional
standards.’”) (quoting United States v. McManus, 719 F.2d 1395, 1397 (6th Cir. 1983)).
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 9 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

10
Federal courts routinely review state search warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin,
284 F. App’x 266, 271 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a state search warrant was valid in
federal court); United States v. Walton, 68 F. App’x 591, 593 (6th Cir. 2003) (examining
the validity of a state search warrant in a federal prosecution); United States v. Rogers, No.
1:06-CR-56, 2006 WL 8439709, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 6, 2006) (finding “no fatal infirmity
in the [state] search warrant at issue” in a federal prosecution). Since federal courts have
the power to review state search warrants, the filing of the federal indictment did not strip
defendant of his right to file a pretrial suppression motion.
Moreover, 	defendant 	obtained 	notice 	of 	the 	pretrial 	motion 	deadline 	at 	his
appearance and arraignment on May 14, 2025, giving him ample time to file a pretrial
suppression motion challenging the search warrant up until the deadline on October 23,
2025 [See Docs. 10, 62]. 3 	See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1) (“A party may raise by pretrial
motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on
the merits.”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h) (“A defendant may move to suppress evidence
in the court where the trial will occur[.]”). Thus, the Court finds that the federal indictment
did not divest defendant’s right to challenge the state search warrant.
For these same reasons, defendant’s argument that his due process and equal
protection rights were violated due to an inability to contest the state search warrant is
without merit [See Doc. 150, pp. 25, 27]. Defendant has received due process, having been
3 	The filing of the superseding indictment on April 15, 2026, does not change this
conclusion [See Doc. 193].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 10 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

11
given approximately 5 months to file suppression motions challenging the search warrant
[See Docs. 10, 62].
Defendant also contends that jurisdiction is improper because the state search
warrant involved state statutes “for misdemeanor purposes,” and no United States Codes
were implicated [Doc. 150, p. 27; Doc. 159, p. 5]. However, the issuance of a state search
warrant including state statutes does not bar jurisdiction in federal court. See United States
v. Beals, 698 F.3d 248, 263 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that “federal, not state, law governs the
question of the validity of a [state-issued] search warrant in a federal criminal proceeding”)
(quoting United States v. Shields, 978 F.2d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Eneff,
No. 7-200-1-CR-W-FGJ, 2009 WL 188531, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2009) (declining to
suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant based on the fact that the warrant was
issued by a state court during a joint state-federal criminal investigation).
Next, defendant’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction until it files a proper
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum appears to misconstrue the law related to federal
jurisdiction. “A federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a court order directing
the production of a prisoner to stand trial in federal court.” Ridgeway v. United States, 558
F.2d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 1977). Moreover, “[a] writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is
necessary to remove a prisoner in order to prosecute him in the proper jurisdiction wherein
the offense was committed.” United States v. Cooke, 795 F.2d 527, 530–31 (6th Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 11 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

12
And although defendant asserts that the removal of prosecution from state to federal
court is unauthorized, there is no evidence in the record that this case was removed from
state to federal court. 	Rather, the record shows that defendant was arrested on May 5,
2025, pursuant to a federal arrest warrant [Doc. 2]. 	In other words, there is no evidence
that defendant was transferred from an improper jurisdiction or that he was imprisoned
outside the territorial limits of the district. See Cooke, 795 F.2d at 530 (noting that a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum “orders the production of a prisoner outside the
territorial limits of the district”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). As previously
mentioned, defendant conceded that he was never charged in state court, which he alleged
denied him the opportunity to challenge the search warrant [Doc. 159, p. 5]. 	For these
reasons, the Court maintains proper jurisdiction over this matter because the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus prosequendum is improper.
Accordingly, 	defendant’s 	objections 	to 	the 	R&R’s 	conclusions 	regarding
jurisdiction are OVERRULED.
B. 	Timeliness
In the R&R, Judge Poplin summarized defendant’s arguments related to the
timeliness of his pretrial motions as follows:
On December 5 and 11, 2025, Defendant filed two motions for leave to file
motions to suppress evidence beyond the deadline. Defendant asserts good
cause exists to permit the untimely suppression motions because at the time
the motion deadline expired, he was still reviewing discovery. He asserts the
failure to permit the late suppression motions would greatly prejudice him
because he raises issues of constitutional import and suppression of the
evidence would eviscerate the Government’s case against him. 	He alleges
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 12 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

13
no other party would suffer prejudice from litigation of the motions at this
juncture, nor would the April 21, 2026[,] trial date be affected.
[Doc. 145, p. 12 (citations omitted)].
Ultimately, Judge Poplin concluded that defendant has not shown good cause for
the untimely filing of his pretrial motions to suppress [Id.]. 	Specifically, Judge Poplin
stated that “the deadline for filing pretrial motions expired on October 23, 2025[,]” and
defendant’s proposed suppression motions were filed on December 5, 2025, and December
11, 2025, which is more than a month after the expiration of the pretrial motion deadline
[Id. at 9]. Moreover, Judge Poplin observed that the initial pretrial motion deadline was on
June 10, 2025; however, she granted 5 requests by defendant for an extension, twice while
defendant was representing himself [Id. at 11–12]. In denying defendant’s sixth request to
extend the pretrial motion deadline, Judge Poplin informed defendant that “if [d]efendant
discovered a pretrial motion he could not have previously filed by the deadline, he may
move for leave and show good cause for the belated filing” [Id.]. 	Additionally, Judge
Poplin stated that the Court informed defendant that the rules would not be relaxed due to
his pro se status [Id. at 13].
Further, Judge Poplin noted that defendant’s argument that he needed to complete
his review of discovery to determine whether he could file a motion to suppress does not
establish good cause [Id.]. In particular, Judge Poplin stated that defendant acknowledged
that he reviewed pole camera footage with his investigator beginning on September 22,
2025, and although he had not finished reviewing the footage before the pretrial motion
deadline expired, he seeks to challenge the affidavit providing the basis for the issuance of
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 13 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

14
the search warrant that led to his arrest [Id.]. She found that the search warrant affidavit is
not new information to defendant discovered after the pretrial motion deadline expired
[Id.]. Judge Poplin also pointed to defendant’s pro se Motion for a Franks Hearing filed
in August 2025, as evidence that defendant was aware of and had access to the search
warrant affidavit well before the pretrial motion deadline [Id. at 13–14]. 	She found that
defendant acknowledged that he received the search warrant affidavit and documents from
elbow counsel prior to September 24, 2025 [Id. at 14]. Judge Poplin determined that, based
on his motion for a Franks hearing, defendant had all the information he needed to file a
motion to suppress challenging the search warrant before the pretrial motion deadline [Id.].
In the R&R, Judge Poplin also addressed defendant’s argument that “he came to the
realization that the delay in presentment was a basis for suppressing his statements, while
reviewing pole camera footage with his investigator after the expiration of the motion
deadline” [Id.]. She determined that defendant had all the information needed to file this
motion before he began representing himself, and he showed “an awareness of the law
relating to this issue . . . because he quoted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1) in
the supplement to his pro se Motion for a Franks Hearing, filed on August 11, 2025” [Id.
at 15]. Judge Poplin held that defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice amounting to good
cause because Rule 12(c)(1) permits the Court to set the pretrial motion deadline, and the
Court has an interest in enforcing scheduling deadlines [Id.].
In his objections to the R&R, defendant argues that he showed good cause in filing
a timely request for an extension of the pretrial motion deadline in October 2025, which
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 14 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

15
was denied [Doc. 150, pp. 1–2].4 	Defendant alleges that he had insufficient time after
electing to proceed pro se to properly prepare [Id. at 2–3], and the magistrate judge is
incorrect in insinuating that he had ample time to investigate his case [Doc. 159, p. 2]. He
further alleges that this case was “in limbo” for approximately three weeks, while he
awaited a ruling on his requests for an extension of the pretrial motion deadline [Id.].
Defendant asserts that the magistrate judge’s reliance on his filing of a prior Franks motion
is erroneous because, under local rules, he could not have filed pro se suppression motions
while represented by counsel [Id.]. 	Finally, he suggests that the denial of a “justified
request for a continuance to raise constitutional issues is a violation if the denial is based
on [the Court’s] unreasoned and arbitrary need for expediency” [Id.].
In its response, the government contends that defendant did not show good cause
because he had more than five months between his arraignment on May 14, 2025, and the
motion deadline on October 23, 2025, to file his untimely motions to suppress [Doc. 154,
p. 6]. The government states that defendant had access to the relevant discovery supporting
his motion to suppress during that time, primarily the state search warrant affidavit and
pole camera footage [Id.]. 	The government highlights that defendant has first-hand
knowledge of the timing of his arrest, statements, and initial appearance, which form the
basis for his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements [Id. at 6–7]. 	The government
also argues that defendant showed knowledge of the relevant law by citing Federal Rule of
4 In deference to defendant’s pro se status, and for clarity, the Court includes all arguments
from defendant’s objections [Doc. 150], reply [Doc. 159], and sur-reply [Doc. 162] in this section.
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 15 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

16
Criminal Procedure 5(a), a legal ground for his motions to suppress, in his pro se filings
on August 11, 2025, two months before the pretrial motion deadline expired [Id. at 7].
Pursuant to Rule 12(c), the Court may “set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial
motions,” and a motion is untimely if a party “does not meet the deadline.” 	See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 12(c)(1), (3). However, the Court may consider the pretrial motion “if the party
shows good cause.” Id. “Good cause is a flexible standard heavily dependent on the facts
of the particular case as found and weighed by the district court in its equitable discretion.”
United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2010); see United States v.
Trujillo-Molina, 678 F. App’x 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Good cause is a ‘flexible
standard’ requiring an explanation for both the delay and the potential prejudice.”) (citation
omitted) (emphasis in original). 	At bottom, “it requires [defendant] to articulate some
legitimate explanation for the failure to timely file.” Walden, 625 F.3d at 965.
Here, the Court set a pretrial motion deadline for October 23, 2025, after extending
the deadline 5 times, twice while defendant was representing himself [Docs. 18, 27, 37, 51,
62]. The initial pretrial motion deadline was on June 10, 2025 [Doc. 14, p. 4]. In denying
defendant’s sixth request for an extension on November 14, 2025, the Court informed
defendant that if he “discovers a pretrial motion that he could not have previously filed by
the deadline, he may move for leave to file the motion” [Doc. 96, p. 4]. Further, the Court
ordered that defendant “must show good cause for the belated filing and must attach a copy
of the proposed pretrial motion to his motion for leave” [Id.].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 16 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

17
Defendant filed two motions for leave [Docs. 114, 119] on December 5, 2025, and
December 11, 2025, to file untimely suppression motions [See Docs. 115, 118]. 	Upon a
careful review of these motions and defendant’s objections to the R&R, the Court agrees
with Judge Poplin’s finding that defendant has not shown good cause for his untimely filing
of the motions to suppress [Doc. 145, p. 12]. 	Specifically, defendant’s argument that he
had insufficient time after electing to proceed pro se to properly prepare does not support
the finding of good cause because the Court informed defendant that the rules would not
be relaxed due to his pro se status and advised defendant of the role of his elbow counsel
[Doc. 51, pp. 3–5].
Moreover, the Court granted defendant’s “Motion to Proceed Pro-Se to Allow
Defendant to Represent Himself” [Doc. 46] on September 15, 2025, giving defendant
ample time to prepare and investigate his case prior to the expiration of the pretrial motion
deadline on October 23, 2025. 	And under Trujillo-Molina, the Court must consider the
reason for the delay. 678 F. App’x at 337. Defendant’s assumption that this case was “in
limbo” while his extension request was pending does not constitute good cause for failing
to meet the pretrial motion deadline [Doc. 159, p. 2]. See id. The filing of a motion for an
extension is not a free pass to ignore existing deadlines; thus, defendant has not stated a
“legitimate explanation for the failure to timely file.” See Walden, 625 F.3d at 965.
Further, although defendant submits that he does not have the information necessary
to file a suppression motion, defendant acknowledged that he has reviewed the pole camera
footage with his investigator, and on September 24, 2025, he stated that he had received
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 17 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

18
the search warrant affidavit and documents from his elbow counsel [Doc. 55, p. 1; Doc.
68, p. 2]. 	Thus, it appears that defendant has had ample time to prepare and file a
suppression motion.
As Judge Poplin pointed out, defendant also showed that he could raise suppression
issues when he improperly filed a pro se motion for a Franks hearing while represented by
counsel several months prior [See Doc. 35; Doc. 145, p. 14]. 	Defendant showed an
awareness of the law relating to this issue before he began representing himself when he
quoted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1), a legal ground for his motions to
suppress, in the supplement to his motion for a Franks hearing, filed on August 11, 2025
[See Doc. 35-1, p. 1; Doc. 145, p. 15].
Additionally, in defendant’s proposed motion to suppress evidence, he argues that
the pole camera footage does not support the affidavit’s statements that people would come
and go from the residence and collect items from the grill before leaving, that he placed
items in the grill, or that he left the residence and traveled to the controlled buy and back
[Doc. 115, pp. 20, 31]. Defendant acknowledged that he began reviewing the pole camera
footage by September 22, 2025, forming the basis for his suppression arguments [See Doc.
81, p. 2]. Thus, the Court agrees with Judge Poplin’s determination that defendant could
have made these arguments prior to the pretrial motion deadline without completing his
review of the pole camera footage [See Doc. 145, p. 14].
Defendant’s argument that he could not file suppression motions while represented
by counsel appears to relate to Judge Poplin’s denial of a pro se motion filed by defendant
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 18 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

19
while he was represented by counsel [See Doc. 36], in which the Court stated that the local
rules prohibit a party from acting on his own behalf in a case when he is represented by
counsel. 	E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.4(c). 	In Judge Poplin’s order, she reminded defendant that
he “must make all filings through counsel” [Id. at 2]. 	She did not state that he was
prohibited from filing a suppression motion or a motion for a Franks hearing [See id.].
Nevertheless, a lawyer’s decision not to file a pretrial motion is insufficient to
establish good cause. See Walden, 625 F.3d at 965 (“Generally, if the failure to timely file
occurred as a result of a lawyer’s conscious decision not to file a pretrial motion before the
deadline, the party seeking a waiver will not be able to establish good cause.”); see also
United States v. Turner, 602 F.3d 778, 787 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming a district court’s
decision that an attorney’s failure to file a motion as requested by a defendant is not good
cause). In fact, neither a change in counsel nor a defendant’s decision to represent himself
is sufficient to establish good cause for filing an untimely pretrial motion. 	See United
States v. Gulley, 780 F. App’x 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2019). 	Accordingly, defendant’s
argument that he was unable to file a timely suppression motion is without merit.
Finally, the Court turns to defendant’s argument that the Court’s denial of his
request for an extension is a violation based on the Court’s “unreasoned and arbitrary need
for expediency” [Doc. 159, p. 2]. The Court has discretion to consider an untimely pretrial
motion to suppress if defendant shows good cause. 	See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3). 	The
Court also has “a legitimate interest in the enforcement of scheduling deadlines, both to
manage a pending case and to retain the credibility of these deadlines in future cases.”
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 19 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

20
United States v. Trobee, 551 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Court granted
5 extensions of the pretrial motion deadline to permit defendant to file a motion to suppress
challenging the search warrant [Docs. 18, 27, 37, 51, 62]. 	Accordingly, the denial of
defendant’s sixth request for an extension was reasonable in light of the Court’s interest in
managing its docket and ensuring that this case reaches a final resolution. There is no basis
for defendant’s allegation that the Court exercised a need for expediency at the expense of
denying his sixth extension request.
Therefore, the Court agrees that defendant’s motions to suppress are untimely, and
defendant has not shown good cause to allow these motions. Nevertheless, the Court will
address the merits of all of defendant’s motions for completeness.
C. 	Merits of Suppression Arguments
Judge Poplin summarized defendant’s suppression arguments as follows:
Defendant seeks to suppress evidence seized during the execution of a search
warrant at his residence because the affidavit in support of the search warrant
fails to provide probable cause. Specifically, he alleges the affidavit fails to
provide a nexus between the alleged drug trafficking and the residence. He
also contends that the affidavit does not contain information on the reliability
and credibility of the two confidential informants, nor does it contain
independent police corroboration of the information from the informants.
Defendant also requests a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978), asserting that the affiant intentionally or recklessly included false
information or omitted information that is material to probable cause.
Defendant contends the affidavit contains the following false statements: that
he put a small item or items on a grill and that officers showed the informant
a six-photo lineup. He enumerates the following alleged material omissions:
that the confidential informant was untested and biased to avoid criminal
liability; that the integrity of the controlled buys was compromised because
a female officer was not present to search the confidential informant, whom
he surmises was a female; that Defendant lived at the residence; that Officer
Jinks, who was involved in the investigation, previously presented false
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 20 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

21
information in a prior affidavit; that the pole camera does not show customers
entering and exiting the residence or Defendant leaving the residence before
the two controlled buys; that the officers did not see Defendant carrying
items from the residence or placing items in a charcoal grill; the exact dates
and times that officers received information from a human source, began
electronic surveillance, and conducted the traffic stop of CS-1; information
about the training of the drug dog at the traffic stop; and that the pole camera
shows CS-1’s vehicle leaving the residence and the officers were dispatched
to stop it.
[Doc. 145, pp. 16–17 (footnotes and citations omitted)].
1. 	Credibility of the Confidential Informant
Judge Poplin first addresses defendant’s probable cause challenge related to the
credibility and reliability of the confidential informants and the alleged lack of police
corroboration of the information provided by the informants [Doc. 145, pp. 19–20].
Specifically, Judge Poplin stated that a search warrant affidavit does not need to include
information about an informant’s reliability if the affidavit sufficiently details a controlled
buy supporting the informant’s credibility [Id. at 19]. Ultimately, Judge Poplin found that
“law enforcement conducted multiple controlled buys of crack cocaine from [d]efendant,
which substantially corroborates CS-1’s information that he or she bought crack cocaine
from [d]efendant that was subsequently seized from CS-1’s car at the time of the traffic
stop” [Id. at 19–20].
In his objections to the R&R, defendant raises numerous arguments about the
reliability and veracity of the informant’s information [Doc. 150, pp. 5, 7, 8, 22].
The government responds that Judge Poplin correctly determined that the affidavit
supporting the search warrant in this case demonstrated probable cause because it discussed
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 21 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

22
controlled buys during which an informant bought cocaine from defendant, “including at
least one in which [defendant] traveled directly from the residence . . . to the location of
the controlled buy” [Doc. 154, pp. 4, 7].
In his reply, defendant repeats his argument that there was no probable cause to
support the affidavit in part due to a lack of informant reliability and independent
corroboration of the information provided by the informant [See Doc. 159, pp. 11–14].
“Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability, given the totality of the
circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). 	Probable cause “requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby,
583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (citation omitted). 	Moreover, “[a] magistrate’s determination of
probable cause is afforded great deference by the reviewing court,” United States v.
Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2001), and the “warrant must be upheld as long as the
magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing[,]” 	United States v. Lee, 48 F. App’x 184, 186 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted, cleaned up); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (noting that
“[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity” are not required in evaluating probable
cause in a search warrant).
Specifically, “[a]n affidavit is sufficient ‘where a known person, named to the
magistrate, to whose reliability an officer attests with some detail, states that he has seen a
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 22 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

23
particular crime and particular evidence, in the recent past, [such that] a neutral and
detached magistrate may believe that evidence of a crime will be found.” United States v.
Jackson, 470 F.3d 299, 307 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970,
976 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original)). 	Thus, “an affidavit that supplies little
information concerning an informant’s reliability may support a finding of probable cause,
under the totality of the circumstances, if it includes sufficient corroborating information.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 927 (6th Cir. 2004)). “[E]ven a single
controlled purchase can be sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that evidence
of drug trafficking is present at the purchase location.” United States v. Moore, 999 F.3d
993, 997 (6th Cir. 2021).
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Judge Poplin’s determination that the
search warrant affidavit does not need to include information about the informant’s
credibility or reliability since it sufficiently details controlled buys supporting the
informant’s reliability [Doc. 145, pp. 19–20]. See id. at 998 (“[A] warrant affidavit need
not include such attestations [of the informant’s reliability] if it sufficiently details a
controlled buy that supports the informant’s credibility.”); see also United States v. Gunter,
266 F. App’x 415, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the affidavit established the
reliability of a confidential informant when the informant participated in controlled
purchases away from the residence to be searched).
Nevertheless, the affidavit demonstrates that the informant and defendant likely had
previous dealings, supporting the finding of probable cause for the warrant [Id. at 18].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 23 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

24
Specifically, the affidavit alleges that officers conducted a traffic stop, which led to the
discovery of a glass crack pipe in the car and a small amount of crack cocaine on the driver
[Doc. 115-1, p. 9]. The affiant submits that the driver, who is referred to as “CS-1” in the
affidavit, stated that he or she bought the crack cocaine from a “light-skinned, heavyset
black male who resides at 5205 Skyline Drive” [Id.]. The affiant showed CS-1 a six-person
photo lineup including defendant’s most recent driver’s license photo, and CS-1 identified
defendant as the person who he or she bought crack cocaine from and who resided at 5205
Skyline Drive [Id.]. 	Additionally, the affidavit alleges that the affiant was familiar with
defendant “from his prior contacts in law enforcement” and knew that defendant “ha[d] a
criminal history that includes convictions for cocaine distribution[,]” further supporting a
finding that the information from CS-1 was reliable [Id. at 8]. See United States v. Martin,
526 F.3d 926, 937 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the defendant’s drug history provided
indicia of reliability for the informant’s tip). Thus, although the controlled buys eliminate
the need for statements supporting the informant’s reliability, the informant’s identification
of defendant from a photo line-up and the affiant’s familiarity with defendant’s criminal
history provide additional evidence of the informant’s credibility.
Moreover, despite Judge Poplin’s reliance on the controlled buys, defendant argues
that these “purported controlled buys lacked fundamental safeguards” which significantly
dimmish the reliability of any evidence obtained [Doc. 150, p. 4]. However, the affidavit
states that CS-1 “has made at least two controlled and directed crack cocaine purchases
from [defendant]” [Doc. 115-1, p. 9]. On both occasions, law enforcement searched CS-1
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 24 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

25
and his or her car for contraband and/or money before and after the buy, told CS-1 to call
defendant to set up a meeting to buy crack cocaine, followed CS-1 to the meeting where
CS-1 exchanged governmental funds with defendant for a rock-like substance, and then
followed CS-1 to another location to obtain the substance [Id.]. Throughout the duration
of the controlled buys, law enforcement officers “maintain[ed] constant visual surveillance
of [defendant] from the time he left the residence at 5205 Skyline Drive until he arrived at
the agreed upon location for the crack cocaine transaction” [Id.].
On both instances, the rock-like substance tested positive for cocaine base, and CS-1
identified defendant as the person who sold him or her the crack cocaine [Id.]. Within 72
hours of applying for the search warrant, the affiant conducted another controlled purchase
of crack cocaine from defendant using CS-1 and the same process as previous controlled
buys [Id. at 9–10]. 	Thus, just as in Moore, where “the affidavit carefully described the
steps taken by officers to ensure the [controlled] buy occurred,” the affidavit in this case
explained the steps officers took to ensure that the controlled buys with CS-1 occurred.
See Moore, 999 F.3d at 997. 	Accordingly, the search warrant affidavit in this case
“sufficiently details a controlled buy that supports the informant’s credibility.” Moore, 999
F.3d at 998.
Lastly, the fact that CS-1 is unnamed in the affidavit is immaterial. 	See United
States v. May, 399 F.3d 817, 824 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a tip from an unnamed
informant could support a finding of probable cause when “the issuing judge had before
him ‘additional evidence [that] buttressed the informant’s information’”) (quoting United
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 25 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

26
States v. Williams, 224 F.3d 530, 532–33 (6th Cir. 2000)). 	Defendant has also not
demonstrated that Judge Poplin’s conclusion, analysis of the relevant case law, or
application of the law to the facts of this case is erroneous. 	Accordingly, defendant’s
objections on this ground are OVERRULED.
2. 	Nexus
Judge Poplin also concluded that the affidavit established a connection between the
residence and drug trafficking because officers maintained visual surveillance of defendant
as he traveled from the residence to the drug transaction and then back to the residence
[Doc. 145, p. 20]. 	Judge Poplin found that a single instance of a defendant leaving a
residence to complete a drug transaction and returning to the residence is enough to find
probable cause [Id.].
In defendant’s objections to the R&R, he argues that the “mere observation that a
defendant left his home and later engaged in drug activity is insufficient” to establish a
nexus between the residence and the alleged criminal activity [Doc. 150, p. 18]. Defendant
also cites United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that
while a nexus may be inferred if officers observe a person leave a residence and
immediately conduct a drug transaction, “this inference weakens if there [is] no observation
of the person returning with the contraband or no other supporting facts” [Id.]. 	But,
according to defendant, there is no nexus when officers are alleged to have seen a person
leave the residence, immediately conduct a drug transaction, but never return to the
residence [Id. (citing United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518)]. Defendant alleges that
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 26 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

27
the affidavit “vaguely references short-term visits to the residence as suggestive of drug
activity, but it fails to describe any specific behavior linked to contraband or exchanges”
[Id. at 21]. Defendant also argues that officers never observed him carrying objects from
the residence to the car that would indicate drug sales, and the observation of a defendant
traveling between his purported residence and the location of a drug transaction, without
evidence that drug-related items were transported, does not establish a sufficient nexus [Id.
at 10 (citing Westley, 22-3356)].
The government responds that Judge Poplin properly concluded that the affidavit
supports a finding of a nexus in this case, in part due to a controlled buy “in which officers
observed the defendant travel directly from the residence to the location where he met a
confidential informant and sold cocaine” [Doc. 154, p. 4]. The government further notes
that probable cause to search a residence is present where an individual leaves a residence
and engages in a drug sale, supporting the finding of a nexus in this case [Id. at 7].
In his reply, defendant largely restates his argument that the nexus between the
residence and the evidence of criminal activity is vague in part because CS-1 “never stated
how long they knew [defendant]” and “[t]he officer did not see [defendant] carrying any
objects in his hands from the home to the car that would indicate contraband would be
located at the residence” [Doc. 159, p. 8]. 	Additionally, defendant submits that the pole
camera footage does not show him leaving and directly returning to the residence but
rather, it shows him returning four hours and 57 minutes later [Id. at 9–10].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 27 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

28
As an initial matter, defendant appears to raise the same arguments he made in
support of his suppression motion, in which he argued that the informant did not state that
he saw drugs in the residence or saw defendant selling drugs to other people at the residence
[Doc. 115, pp. 18–19; Doc. 150, pp. 8, 18]. To the extent he attempts to reargue these same
issues addressed in the R&R, his objections are considered general objections that do not
sufficiently identify alleged errors in the R&R and will be overruled. 	See Howard, 932
F.2d at 509.
An affidavit in support of a search warrant “must contain facts that demonstrate ‘a
fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed
search.’” 	United States v. Grant, No. 21-3686, 2023 WL 119399, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 6,
2023) (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005)). 	The
connection—or “nexus”—“between the residence and the evidence of criminal activity
must be specific and concrete, not ‘vague’ or ‘generalized.’” United States v. Brown, 828
F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th
Cir. 2004)). “If the affidavit does not present sufficient facts demonstrating why the police
officer expects to find evidence in the residence rather than in some other place, a judge
may not find probable cause to issue a search warrant.” Id. (citing Carpenter, 360 F.3d at
595). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[e]vidence that one leaves a ‘residence,
engage[s] 	in 	a 	drug 	transaction, 	and 	then 	return[s] 	into 	the 	residence’ 	‘plainly
demonstrate[s] a sufficient nexus’ with the location.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th
455, 463 (6th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). 	There, “the officers’ observation of [the
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 28 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

29
defendant] leaving his residence, completing a single drug transaction, and returning to a
residence was enough for the [Sixth Circuit] to find probable cause to search [the]
residence.” United States v. Florence, 150 F.4th 773, 778 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Sanders,
106 F.4th at 463) (emphasis in original)).
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the affidavit identifies a sufficient
nexus between the drug transaction and the residence in this case. As discussed previously,
law enforcement conducted at least two controlled buys to confirm that defendant was
selling drugs. For both controlled buys, officers “maintain[ed] constant visual surveillance
of [defendant]” as he left the residence, drove to the location where the drugs were
exchanged, and then drove directly back to the residence [Doc. 115-1, p. 9]. The officers’
observation of defendant driving to and from the location of the drug transaction and
directly back to the residence, with no stops in between, supports Judge Poplin’s finding
that there is reliable evidence connecting defendant’s drug activity to the residence. 	See
United States v. Allen, No. 21-4029, 2023 WL 34235, *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2023) (finding a
sufficient nexus where a detective surveilled the residence and saw the defendant, who was
a known drug dealer, leave in an SUV and drive to the controlled buy, and later observed
the same SUV outside the residence); see also United States v. Coleman, 923 F.3d 450,
457 (6th Cir. 2019) (finding a sufficient nexus where “agents had conducted three
controlled buys of cocaine from [the defendant] and observed him drive directly from his
condo to the site of the most recent buy”).
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 29 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

30
Defendant attempts to distinguish Sanders on the grounds that there is no showing
of him leaving and returning to the residence in this case; however, the affidavit details the
officers’ observations of defendant traveling directly to and from the controlled buys [Doc.
115-1, p. 9]. Thus, defendant’s argument that the pole camera footage does not show him
leaving and directly returning to the residence is immaterial [See Doc. 159, pp. 9–10].
Moreover, the affidavit asserts that the affiant “was familiar with [defendant] from
his prior contacts with law enforcement and knows that [defendant] has a criminal history
that includes convictions for cocaine distribution” [Id. at 8]. 	The affiant’s knowledge of
defendant’s prior involvement in drug trafficking also supports the finding of a nexus
between defendant’s drug dealing and the residence. See United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d
472, 481 (6th Cir. 2009) (determining that multiple cocaine purchases made it reasonable
to infer that evidence of drug trafficking would be at the defendant’s residence). Finally,
the affidavit in this case detailed the affiant’s training and experience, demonstrating the
basis for his conclusion that evidence of drug trafficking would be at the residence [Id. at
8, 10]. United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1193 (6th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, the facts contained in the affidavit provide probable cause establishing
a sufficient connection between the residence and drug trafficking. 	Thus, defendant’s
objections on this ground are OVERRULED.
3. 	Franks Challenge
Additionally, Judge Poplin determined that defendant’s Franks allegations lack
merit [Doc. 145, p. 20]. 	Specifically, Judge Poplin stated that the information in the
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 30 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

31
affidavit about controlled buys was sufficiently detailed to show a “fair probability” that
drug trafficking evidence would be present at the residence [Id. at 20–21]. 	Moreover,
Judge Poplin concluded that defendant did not make “the required substantial, preliminary
showing that the affidavit contains material omissions to warrant a Franks hearing” [Id. at
21]. 	In addressing defendant’s Franks argument, Judge Poplin asserted that none of the
alleged false statements or omissions offered by defendant are critical to the probable cause
finding regarding multiple controlled buys [Id.].
Throughout his objections to the R&R, defendant contends that there are false
statements in the search warrant. 	Specifically, defendant states: (1) “[t]he pole camera
does not show the defendant putting anything in a grill or the exact time and dates of the
defendant being observed several times placing small items in a grill”; (2) “[t]ime stamps
of observation on video of individuals pulling up and retrieving small items from a grill”;
and (3) “[the affiant] put in the affidavit false and misleading statements of what took place
at the traffic stop and what was showed to [the informant] [h]e never showed or had a 6
photo-line-up-array” and “there was . . . no K-9 dog at the scene” [Doc. 150, p. 20].
Defendant also alleges that the affidavit omits several facts material to probable cause [Id.
at 11, 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 33, 34]. 	Defendant argues that Detective Phil Jinks is “Giglio
impaired” and has presented false and misleading statements in a previous affidavit [Id. at
7 (citing United States v. Knox, No. 3:19-cr-63)].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 31 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

32
The government responds that Judge Poplin properly determined that any allegedly
false statements or omissions raised by defendant are immaterial because they do not
undermine the facts showing probable cause [Doc. 154, p. 7].
In his reply, defendant largely re-raises his argument that the pole camera footage
does not show him leaving or returning to the residence before and after the controlled buys
[Doc. 159, p. 10]. Defendant alleges that the purposed six-photo array is “fabricated” and
Detective Stryker is “bringing fraud upon the Court” [Id. at 9]. 	Defendant states that he
“knows” that no six-photo lineup was shown at the traffic stop, and there was no K-9 at the
scene [Id.]. Later, however, defendant states that “there [sic] has never been a six-photo
array and if you look at the (13) spread its [sic] singling the defendant out and it has a
picture of my brother on it if you look at the other people they look nothing like the
defendant; also the identified box is not checked” [Id. at 17–18]. Defendant also states that
“due diligence” disproves the existence of a K-9 at the traffic stop, as there are no
audio/video records, dash cam or body cam records, k-9 handler logs, certifications, etc.
[Id. at 20].
As a threshold matter, defendant has made similar, if not the same arguments in his
suppression brief, which Judge Poplin considered and addressed in the R&R [Compare
Doc. 115, p. 34 (“The pole camera does not show the [defendant] placing something in a
charcoal grill.”) with Doc. 150, p. 20 (“The pole camera does not show the [d]efendant
putting anything in a grill or the exact time and dates of the [d]efendant being observed
several times placing small items in a grill.”)]. 	See Dawson, 2020 WL 109137, at *1
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 32 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

33
(“[T]he Court is under no obligation to review de novo objections that are merely an
attempt to have the district court reexamine the same arguments set forth in the petition
and briefs.”). 	But defendant does not point to any specific portion of Judge Poplin’s
analysis of those issues or explain why they are erroneous. See Miller, 50 F.3d at 380.
Instead, defendant now continues to fixate on what is allegedly missing from the
search warrant. However, the Sixth Circuit has clearly stated that the Court should “value
the affidavit as we might those around us . . . [and] ask what good qualities it contains, not
‘what it lacks.’” 	Sanders, 106 F.4th at 463 (quoting Allen, 211 F.3d at 975) (explaining
that “affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or
on what a critic might say should have been added”)). 	And the Court may “not [to]
scrutinize a warrant affidavit in a ‘hypertechnical’ or ‘line-by-line’ manner.” Id.
Here, the R&R considers the affidavit wholistically and adequately, ultimately
concluding that “the information . . . in the affidavit about the controlled buys was
sufficiently detailed to suggest that there was a ‘fair probability’ that evidence of drug
trafficking would be found at the residence” [Doc. 145, pp. 20–21].
As the R&R points out, defendant has also failed to make the substantial,
preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing. Under the Franks test, the defendant
must (1) make a substantial preliminary showing that specified portions of the affiant’s
statements are deliberately or recklessly false, and (2) demonstrate that the challenged
statements are necessary to a finding of probable cause. 	Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 	To
require a hearing on this issue, “the challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory.”
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 33 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

34
Id.; United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990). “There must be allegations
of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be
accompanied by an offer of proof . . . . Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are
insufficient.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
In this case, defendant has not demonstrated that any of the allegedly false
statements or omissions are necessary to support a finding of probable cause. Notably, as
the R&R points out, defendant’s allegation that the pole camera footage does not show
defendant returning to the residence before and after the controlled buys is not material
because the affidavit provides that the law enforcement officers “maintain[ed] constant
visual surveillance of [defendant] from the time he left the residence . . . until he arrived at
the agreed upon location for the crack cocaine transaction” and while he returned to the
residence [Doc. 115-1, p. 9; Doc. 145, pp. 21–22].
Regarding the six-photo array, defendant has provided no basis for his assertion that
it was never shown at the traffic stop or that it was fabricated [See Doc. 159, pp. 9, 17–18].
It is also unclear how the alleged inclusion of defendant’s brother in the photo-array has
prejudiced defendant in any way [See id. at 17–18]. And even if the affidavit included an
incorrect statement about the inclusion of the photo-array, the Court finds that there is still
probable cause for the search warrant based on the controlled buys discussed supra.
Defendant also argues that there was no K-9 dog at the scene of the traffic stop
involving the informant, and this fabricated information violated Franks and misled Judge
Poplin [Doc 150, p. 3]. Defendant argues that there are no audio/video records, dash cam
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 34 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

35
or body cam records, k-9 handler logs, certifications, etc. showing that there was a K-9 at
the scene [Doc. 159, pp. 9, 20].
On April 18, 2026, the government filed a supplement to its response to defendant’s
motion in limine to exclude testimony from Giglio-impaired officers [Doc. 203], in which
the government stated that it learned that the affidavit contained an incorrect statement.
Specifically, the government submits that the affidavit incorrectly stated, “A subsequent
K9 sniff of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of a glass crack pipe in the vehicle and a
small amount of crack cocaine on the person of the driver[,]” and instead of a K-9 sniff,
the search was based on consent [Id. at 1].
Notwithstanding the incorrect statement in the affidavit, the Court agrees with Judge
Poplin’s conclusion that probable exists even if details about the traffic stop were removed
from the affidavit [Doc. 145, p. 21]. Thus, defendant’s argument regarding the K-9 does
not provide a meritorious basis for a Franks hearing.
Lastly, defendant’s argument that Detective Phil Jinks is “Giglio impaired” and has
presented false and misleading statements in a previous affidavit does not have any bearing
on the present case or on the accuracy of the statements contained in Stryker’s affidavit
[See Doc. 150, p. 7]. 	Furthermore, any challenge to the officer’s credibility is properly
addressed through impeachment at trial rather than a motion to suppress.
For all these reasons, defendant’s objections on these grounds are OVERRULED.
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 35 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

36
4. 	Post-Arrest Statements
Lastly, Judge Poplin summarized defendant’s arguments regarding the suppression
of his post-arrest statements as follows:
Defendant also moves to suppress his statements he made to law enforcement
more than six hours after he was arrested on the morning of May 5, 2025,
during the execution of the search warrant at his residence and before his
initial appearance on his federal charges on May 6, 2025. 	He argues this
delay in presentment violates 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and the McNabb-Mallory
rule. Defendant contends the twenty-eight hours between his arrest and his
initial appearance was “unreasonable” delay because the arresting officers
could have taken Defendant before a county court at 2:00 p.m. on May 5.
[Doc. 145, p. 22 (citations omitted)].
Ultimately, Judge Poplin found that defendant’s motion to suppress his post-arrest
statements to law enforcement lacks merit because defendant waived his Miranda rights
during an interview after the execution of the search warrant [Id. at 23].
In his objections to the R&R, defendant alleges that he was detained for more than
28 hours before appearing before a magistrate judge, and this delay was “unreasonable and
unnecessary” requiring “exclusion of confessions or statements obtained during the delay”
[Doc. 150, p. 28]. Defendant further states that “under the rule announced in the McNabb
Mallory Rule . . . [d]istance was reasonable . . . [t]ransportation was available . . . and a
magistrate was available that day” [Id.]. Defendant suggests that the reason for the delay
was “the pre-notification policy” [Id.]. 	Defendant argues that “an internal policy agreed
upon by prosecutors and magistrate judges cannot trump the requirements of a federal
statue and the Fed. R. Crim. P.” [Id. at 30].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 36 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

37
The government responds that Judge Poplin properly concluded that defendant’s
“motion to suppress his post-arrest statements based on the timing of his initial appearance”
is without merit because defendant waived his Miranda rights [Doc. 154, p. 7].
In defendant’s supplemental reply, he again asserts that the “McNabb Rule” was
violated and thus, evidence and testimony should be suppressed [Doc. 162, p. 3]. 	He
continues to state that there was no reason for the delay between his arrest and his
appearance before a magistrate judge [Id. at 3–4]. Defendant also alleges that, during his
interrogation, he invoked his rights, but he still was not taken before a judge without
unnecessary delay [Id. at 2].
Under Rule 5(a)(1)(A), “[a] person making an arrest within the United States must
take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge . . . .” 	Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(A). 	“[D]efendants’ confessions [will] be deemed inadmissible at trial
‘when obtained during unreasonable presentment delay.’” United States v. Woodley, 713
F. App’x 449, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 307
(2009)). 	“The principle that ‘generally rendered inadmissible confessions made during
periods of detention that violated the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(A)’ [is
known] 	as 	the 	McNabb-Mallory 	rule.” 	Id. 	at 	456 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v.
Alvarez-Sanchez, 	511 	U.S. 	350, 	354 	(1994)). 	Section 	3501(c) 	modifies 	the
McNabb-Mallory rule and creates a six-hour safe harbor under which any delay of six hours
or less between arrest and presentment is admissible “if ‘made voluntarily and if the weight
to be given the confession is left to the jury.’” Woodley, 713 F. App’x at 456 (quoting 18
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 37 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

38
U.S.C. § 3501). 	If the defendant confesses more than six hours after arrest and before
presentment, the Court examines whether the delay in bringing the defendant in front of a
judge was “unreasonable or unnecessary” and whether the confession must be suppressed.
Id. (citing Corley, 556 U.S. at 332).
Here, defendant’s statements to law enforcement were made more than six hours
after his arrest on May 5, 2025, and before his initial appearance on May 6, 2025 [Doc.
118, pp. 2–3]. However, “‘waiver of one’s Miranda rights also constitutes a waiver under
McNabb-Mallory,’ meaning that ‘[a] valid Miranda waiver also waives the prompt judicial
warning of one’s constitutional rights.’” 	Id. (quoting United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d
954, 959 (6th Cir. 1982)). The affidavit in support of the criminal complaint in this case
states that after the search warrant was executed, “defendant was transported to the KPD
OCU office for an interview[,]” defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and “he
agreed to speak without legal representation” [Doc. 1, p. 3]. 	The affidavit further states
that during the interview, defendant admitted that 5205 Skyline Drive is his primary
residence [Id.]. Thus, based on defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights and the applicable
law, the Court agrees with Judge Poplin’s determination that defendant’s motion to
suppress his post-arrest statements lacks merit. See Woodley, 713 F. App’x at 456.
Moreover, defendant’s argument that an “internal policy” caused a presentment
delay is conclusory, and defendant does not explain what he means by a “pre-notification
policy” [See Doc. 150, pp. 28, 30]. 	The Court finds that defendant’s objections on this
issue are vague as the Court cannot discern to which part of the R&R defendant objects or
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 38 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

39
the basis for his arguments. See Miller, 50 F.3d at 380. Therefore, the Court declines to
address these objections in this context.
Accordingly, defendant’s objections on this ground are OVERRULED.
D. 	Remaining Issues
Next, the Court will address a few lingering assertions in defendant’s objections to
the R&R. First, defendant makes several references to discovery-related issues throughout
his objections to the R&R [Doc. 150, pp. 7; Doc. 159, p. 9]. However, these objections are
vague and do not offer further analysis or identify any specific alleged error in the R&R,
which does not appear to address any discovery-related issues [See id.; Doc. 145]. As such,
the Court cannot discern to which portion of the R&R defendant objects, or why he believes
the magistrate judge’s analysis or conclusions are incorrect. 	See Miller, 50 F.3d at 380.
Therefore, the Court declines to address these objections in this context.
Second, defendant contends that in the affidavit, “[t]he affiant avers that in late 2024
a human source gave him information that the defendant was selling drugs from the
residence[,] which gave him a right to put a pole camera up without judicial authorization
or a warrant” [Doc. 150, pp. 3, 13; Doc. 159, p. 14]. 	Defendant argues that the affiant
provides no specific date of when the pole camera was installed [Id.]. 	He states that the
pole camera “was able to view into the home in a way not otherwise observable by the
public, and installed and set up without a warrant[,]” and it is an unreasonable and
unconstitutional violation of his Fourth Amendment rights [Doc. 159, pp. 13–14].
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 39 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

40
However, any alleged false statement in the affidavit related to the pole camera
footage is not critical to the finding of probable cause. As discussed supra, the controlled
buys support a finding of probable cause for the search warrant irrespective of the pole
camera footage information contained in the affidavit.
Third, 	defendant 	contends 	that 	there 	“has 	been 	intentional 	misconduct 	and
deliberate indifference” as proof of “vindictiveness” against defendant [Doc. 150, p. 23].
Defendant also alleges that he was targeted due to another investigation that had nothing
to do with him, and the affiant confirmed that defendant’s conduct would not have been on
his radar if it was not for this other investigation [Id.]. As such, defendant alleges that there
is “investigative bias; selective prosecution; and vindictive prosecution” [Id.].
The Court finds that defendant’s objections in this regard are vague, and defendant
does not identify any specific portion of the R&R supporting his position. See Miller, 50
F.3d at 380. Moreover, defendant has not provided any analysis demonstrating how officer
motive is an appropriate ground for the suppression of evidence [See id.].
For 	all 	of 	these 	reasons, 	defendant’s 	objections 	on 	these 	grounds 	are
OVERRULED.
E. 	Supplemental Motions to Suppress
The Court also notes that defendant has supplemental motions to suppress pending
that are not encompassed in the R&R [Docs. 180, 181]. The Court has fully reviewed each
of these filings and concludes that each raises the same issues as the motions addressed in
this R&R [See id.]. 	Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the R&R and this
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 40 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>

41
memorandum 	opinion 	and 	order, 	defendant’s 	“Supplemental 	Motion 	to 	Suppress
Identification” and “Addendum and Supplemental Motion to Suppress” [Docs. 180, 181]
are also DENIED.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court finds that the recommendations contained in the
R&R are correct. 	Defendants’ objections [Doc. 150] are OVERRULED. 	The Court
ACCEPTS in whole the R&R [Doc. 145] and DENIES defendant’s motions [Docs. 73,
114, 115, 118, 119, 180, 181].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cr-00048-TAV-DCP Document 213 Filed 04/30/26 Page 41 of 41
PageID #: <pageID>