USA v. Hardison

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No.: 	3:25-CR-48-TAV-DCP
)
BRYAN HARDISON, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This criminal case is before the Court on defendant’s Objection to Memorandum
and Order [Doc. 108], in which he objects to United States Magistrate Judge Debra C.
Poplin’s order [Doc. 96] denying his Motion to Extend Pre-trial Motion Deadline [Doc.
68] and Motion for Appointment and Funding of Digital Forensics Expert [Doc. 77]. The
government has responded in opposition [Doc. 127], defendant replied [Doc. 135], and this
matter is now ripe for review. 	See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a). 	For the reasons below,
defendant’s objection [Doc. 108] is DENIED.
For this Court to overturn a magistrate judge’s decision on non-dispositive pretrial
matters, the party seeking reversal must show that the magistrate judge’s decision was
“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). 	A factual finding is
clearly erroneous if the Court “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Bisig v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 940 F.3d 205, 219 (6th Cir. 2019)
(internal citations omitted). 	A legal conclusion is contrary to law if “it fails to apply or
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misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” 	Id. (internal citations
omitted).
Extension of the Pretrial Motion Deadline
On October 16, 2025, defendant filed his Motion to Extend Pretrial Motion
Deadline, in which he sought to extend the pretrial motion deadline by 60 days [Doc. 68].
In support, defendant stated that he “needs additional time to investigate due to [the]
voluminous amount of pole camera recording[]s and digital copie[]s of content of four
cellphone[]s” [Id. at 1]. Additionally, defendant submits that he has reviewed some of the
footage 	with 	his 	private 	investigator 	who 	allegedly 	made 	an 	“oral 	report 	and
recommendation” [Id. at 2].
Judge Poplin denied the motion and found that defendant failed to show good cause
for extending the pretrial motion deadline [Doc. 96, p. 3]. 	Judge Poplin stated that she
extended the initial pretrial motion deadline five times, twice while defendant was
representing himself [Id. at 3]. Moreover, Judge Poplin noted that defendant had access to
the pole camera video recording for approximately four months while represented by
counsel, and defendant acknowledged that he began reviewing the footage with his
investigator on September 22, 2025 [Id.]. 	Judge Poplin also observed that defendant
obtained the search warrant affidavit and documents from his elbow counsel before
September 24, 2025 [Id.]. Finally, Judge Poplin stated that defendant argued that he could
not file a suppression motion due to the government’s failure to provide information, yet
he “demonstrated his ability to file a pretrial suppression motion . . . by improperly filing
a motion for a Franks hearing on August 11, 2025, while represented by counsel” [Id. at
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3–4]. As a result, Judge Poplin concluded that defendant “had ample time to file a pretrial
suppression motion” [Id. at 4].1
Defendant objects, arguing that his request for an extension was timely, occurring
one week before the pretrial motion deadline [Doc. 108, p. 2]. 	Moreover, defendant
maintains that he has only asked for two extensions of the pretrial motion deadline while
pro se, and all other extensions occurred through his prior counsel [Id. at 2]. 	Defendant
argues that “[w]hen the defendant is litigating and filing for extensions in a timely manner
the district court’s job is to give both partys [sic] a fair and timely opportunity to raise
they’re [sic] evidentiary issues” [Id. at 4]. Moreover, defendant contends that “[d]enying
a pro se defendant a justified request for a continuance is a constitutional violation when
the denial is based on the district court[’]s unreasoned and arbitrary need for expediency”
[Id. at 5].
Further, defendant submits that “[t]he due diligence of production and exculpatory
endeavors to file a timely motion to suppress has been a hinderance” due to the intricacies
of the case [Id. at 2]. Specifically, defendant blames the “government[’]s failure to provide
and produce . . . things in a timely manner,” as well as elbow counsel’s failure to “provide
technical assistance when desired by the litigant” [Id. at 7, 9]. Moreover, defendant alleges
that he was “forbidden” from previously filing a suppression motion [Id. at 7 (citing Docs.
1 Judge Poplin did, however, note that defendant claimed he had not reviewed all of the
evidence with his investigator [Doc. 96, p. 4]. Judge Poplin stated that defendant did not assert
that this evidence related to any intended suppression motion [Id.]. However, Judge Poplin stated
that, if defendant subsequently discovered a pretrial motion that he could not have previously filed
by the deadline, he could move for leave to file such motion, but must show good cause for the
belated filing and attach a copy of the proposed pretrial motion [Id.].
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35, 36)]. Defendant contends that he will suffer significant prejudice if the Court does not
permit him to challenge the search warrant [Id. at 4].
Essentially, defendant appears to argue that Judge Poplin’s denial of a motion
deadline extension is erroneous because his request for such extension was timely. 	But
defendant is not entitled to an extension of any deadline simply because he timely requested
an extension. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(2) (indicating that the Court “may extend or reset
the deadline for pretrial motions” (emphasis added)); Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1) (indicating
that a deadline may be extended on a party’s motion upon a showing of good cause); United
States v. Moss, 73 M.J. 64, 68 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (“Ordinarily, ‘may’ is a permissive rather
than a mandatory term” (citing United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983))). And
contrary to defendant’s assertion that Judge Poplin’s denial was based on an “unreasoned
and arbitrary need for expediency” [Doc. 108, p. 5], the need for expediency in this case
stems from balancing defendant’s need to prepare for trial with his assertion of his speedy
trial rights [See, e.g., Docs. 52, 76, 120, 175].
Moreover, Judge Poplin has extended the pretrial motion deadline five times, twice
while defendant was representing himself [Docs. 18, 27, 37, 51, 62]. 	And the Court agrees
with Judge Poplin’s determination that defendant did not show good cause for further
extension of the deadline [Doc. 96, p. 3]. 	See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(2), (3). 	Further,
contrary to defendant’s argument that he does not have the information necessary to file a
suppression motion, defendant acknowledged that he has reviewed the pole camera footage
with his investigator, and on September 24, 2025, he stated that he received the search
warrant affidavit and documents from his elbow counsel [Doc. 55, p. 1; Doc. 68, p. 2].
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And as Judge Poplin pointed out, defendant also showed that he could raise suppression
issues when he improperly filed a pro se motion for a Franks hearing while represented by
counsel [See Doc. 35; Doc. 96, p. 3–4]. Moreover, defendant has not identified any part
of Judge Poplin’s order denying his motion for an extension of the pretrial motion deadline
that was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Thus, defendant’s objection on this ground
[Doc. 108] is DENIED.
Appointment and Funding of a Digital Forensics Expert
On October 24, 2025, defendant filed his Motion for Appointment and Funding of
Digital Forensics Expert, in which he requests authorization and funding to hire an expert
in digital forensics [Doc. 77]. 	In support, defendant states that he is indigent and the
government’s discovery consists mainly of 	“digital 	video 	and electronic evidence,
including pole-camera footage, body-worn camera recording, and related digital files” [Id.
at 2]. He submits that “[a] preliminary review [of the government’s pole camera footage
and body camera recordings] by a licensed private investigator revealed significant
discrepancies suggesting potential issues with authenticity, continuity, and completeness
of the digital evidence” [Id. at 2]. 	Defendant further asserts that the “investigator
documented 	multiple 	timestamp 	inconsistencie[]s 	between 	overlay 	and 	embedded
metadata, sometime[]s differing by minute[]s or hour[]s” and “certain segments appear
visually 	inconsistent, 	raising 	concerns 	of 	video 	splicing 	or 	compression 	artifacts
inconsistent with continuous recording” [Id. at 4]. Defendant attached an unsigned report
purporting to be from his investigator, Eddie McCarter [Docs. 77-1, 77-2]. 	The report
states that the investigator and defendant reviewed “pole camera footage, body-worn
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camera videos, and related digital discovery stored on a thumb drive” [Doc. 77-1]. 	The
report further alleges that the review led to concern that “certain video evidence may have
been digitally altered or inconsistently timestamped” [Id.]. 	The report includes the
following alleged issues with the evidence: timestamp discrepancies, potential digital
alteration, and unrelated footage of an apartment complex unrelated to defendant’s
residence [Id.; Doc. 77-2]. The investigator’s report states that he could not determine if
the evidence was altered and this determination “requires specialized forensic software,
checksum validation, and expert testimony” [Doc. 77-2].
Judge Poplin denied this motion and found that although defendant is indigent, he
has failed to show that a digital forensic expert’s services are necessary to his defense [Doc.
96, p. 6]. 	Judge Poplin observed that defendant does not explain where the thumb drive
came from or who copied the video footage onto the thumb drive [Id.]. Moreover, Judge
Poplin notes that the investigator stated that he is not qualified to discern if the evidence
was altered, and the attached report of the investigator was unsigned and unsworn [Id.].
Judge Poplin recognized that defendant does not explain how the requested forensics expert
would help his defense or how he would be prejudiced if the expert was not provided [Id.].
As a result, Judge Poplin determined that defendant’s request was speculative and
amounted to a “fishing expedition” [Id.]
Defendant now objects, rearguing of the alleged inconsistencies observed by the
private investigator [Doc. 108, p. 6]. Defendant further submits that additional funding is
necessary to raise and address these issues [Id. at 7]. Additionally, defendant states that he
“is not gaming the system to fund a speculative fish[ing] expedition” [Id. at 8].
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Apart from defendant’s general disagreement with Judge Poplin’s ruling, defendant
again has not pointed to any part of Judge Poplin’s order that was clearly erroneous or
contrary to law [See id.]. 	Defendant does not appear to object to any of Judge Polin’s
factual findings [See id.]. And defendant has not presented the Court with grounds to rule
that the Judge Poplin “fail[ed] to apply or misapplie[d] relevant statutes, case law, or rules
of procedure.” Bisig, 940 F.3d at 219.
Regardless, the Court agrees that defendant has not shown that the services of a
digital forensic expert are necessary to his defense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (noting
that a defendant requesting the Court to fund expert services must show “that the services
are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them”). 	Rather, the
investigator’s report stated that he was not qualified to discern if evidenced was altered, it
was unsigned and unsworn, and it is unclear where the thumb drive originated [See Docs.
77, 77-1, 77-2]. 	These observations support Judge Poplin’s finding that defendant’s
request amounts to a mere “fishing expedition” [Doc. 96, p. 6]. 	See United States v.
Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 447 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (“An indigent criminal
defendant may not use § 3006A(e)(1) to find a speculative ‘fishing expedition’”). 	Thus,
the Court finds that Judge Poplin’s denial of defendant’s motion for an extension of the
pretrial motion deadline was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Thus, defendant’s
objection on this ground [Doc. 108] is DENIED.
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Conclusion
For the reasons explained, defendant’s objections [Doc. 108] to Judge Poplin’s order
are OVERRULED, and Judge Poplin’s well-reasoned decision [Doc. 96], which is hereby
incorporated by reference, remains in effect as the ruling of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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