USA v. Ortiz-Garcia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	3:26-CR-137-KAC-JEM
)
DAVID HUMBERTO ORTIZ-GARCIA, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION TO REVOKE DETENTION ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant David Humberto Ortiz-Garcia’s Motion to Revoke
Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order [Doc. 14]. 	For the reasons below, the Court denies
Defendant’s Motion [Doc. 14].
I. 	Background
Defendant is a citizen of Honduras, not a United States citizen, who has been found in the
United States multiple times without lawful authorization [See Doc. 14 at 2]. 	For example, in
2002, law enforcement encountered Defendant “near Hebbronville, Texas,” detained him, and
removed him to Honduras [See Doc. 1 at 2]. 	Undeterred, in May 2011, law enforcement
encountered Defendant again, this time near “Lake Charles, Louisianna,” and removed him to
Honduras [Id.]. And in 2019, law enforcement encountered Defendant in the “Sevier County Jail”
in Tennessee and removed him to Honduras [Id. at 3]. “On or about September 1, 2026, at or near
Blount County, Tennessee” law enforcement encountered defendant in the United States a fourth
time [See Doc. 8 at 1]. On September 16, 2026, the Grandy Jury indicted him for one count of
illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) [Id.].
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Defendant has an active Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detainer in
place [See Amended Pretrial Services Report (“PTR”) at 3].1 He says that when arrested, he was
living in Sevierville, Tennessee with his partner and adult daughter [Id. at 1]. He has been with
his partner “since 2004” [Id.]. By Defendant’s own count, he had been at that residence for a year
at the most [Id. at 2]. Defendant lived with four other individuals whose names “[h]e was unable
to provide” [Id.]. He is “unsure in these individuals ‘are lawfully in the United States’” [Id.]. And
he is self-employed in the construction industry [Id.]. 	His parents and one brother reside in
Honduras [See PTR at 1].
After a hearing, [see Doc. 10], the Honorable United States Magistrate Judge Debra C.
Poplin ordered that Defendant be detained pretrial, [see Doc. 12]. 	Defendant appealed the
detention order to the undersigned under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) [Doc. 14]. 	The United States
opposed [Doc. 16].
II. 	Analysis
If a magistrate judge orders a defendant detained pending trial, the defendant “may file,
with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment
of the [detention] order.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). 	The district court must generally review the
magistrate judge’s order de novo and may do so without holding a further hearing. See United
States v. Marcrum, 953 F. Supp. 2d 877, 880 (W.D. Tenn. 2013), aff’d, No. 13-6008 (6th Cir. Nov.
1, 2013); United States v. Romans, No. 00-5456, 2000 WL 658042, at *1 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000).
Here, both Parties recognize that the undersigned need not hold another hearing [See Doc. 14 at 1,
16 at 2]. And the undersigned agrees that no further hearing is necessary.
1 The PTR was made available to all Parties and is on file with the Court.
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18 U.S.C. § 3142 governs the release or detention of a defendant pretrial. Under Section
3142(f)(2), the Court must “hold a hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of
conditions . . . will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community” “upon motion of the attorney for the Government or upon
the judicial officer’s own motion in a case” that “involves (A) a serious risk that such person will
flee.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2).
Here, the United States met its burden to show that this case involves a “serious risk” that
Defendant 	“will 	flee.” 	See 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3142(f)(2). 	Defendant 	is 	not 	an 	American
Citizen [See PTR at 1]. Setting aside the present charge, he has entered this country in violation
of U.S. law at least three (3) times before, and each time he was removed to Honduras [See Doc.
1 at 1-2; PTR at 3]. But neither U.S. law nor physical removal was enough to keep Defendant out
of the United States. 	This time around, he is subject to criminal prosecution with significant
potential penalties [See Doc. 8]. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 	And Defendant has an active ICE
detainer in place and would likely be deported upon a conviction [See PTR at 3]. 	He also has
family who remain in Honduras, which may present the means to flee [See id. at 1]. 	This
combination 	of 	factors, 	well 	beyond 	just 	“the 	elements 	of 	the 	offense 	and 	its
consequences,” [see Doc. 14 at 1], presents a “serious risk” that Defendant will flee.
Then, under Section 3142(e), the Court must order pretrial detention if the Court “finds
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1)2 . 	The United States “must prove risk of flight by a
2 Judge Poplin also analyzed “the safety of any other person and the community” under Section
3142(e). 	But the undersigned need not address that alternative basis for detention because the
United States has met its burden on nonappearance. And that is sufficient alone to deny the appeal.
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preponderance of the evidence.” 	United States v. Hinton, 113 F. App’x 76, 77 (6th Cir. 2004).
Although the factors are not a precise fit, the Court considers “the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, (3) the defendant’s history
and characteristics, and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by the defendant’s release.” See United States v. Wagner, 187
F.4th 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2026) (cleaned up).
The United States has met its burden. First, the nature and circumstances of the offense
charged suggest a straightforward risk of nonappearance. Defendant is charged with illegal reentry
and has an active ICE detainer [See Doc. 8 at 1; PTSR at 3]. He is not a citizen of the United States
and is allegedly not authorized to be in the United States [See PTSR at 1]. 	He will likely be
deported to Honduras if convicted. But he has a partner of over twenty years here [Id. at 1]. He
has illegally reentered the United States on at least three prior occasions [See id. at 3]. And even
by his estimate, which differ from the United States’s, he may serve a term of imprisonment if
convicted [See Doc. 14 at 9]. 	The potential for a felony conviction also creates an incentive to
flee. Combined, these facts create a significant risk of nonappearance.
Second, the weight of the evidence of Defendant’s risk of nonappearance is strong. See 18
U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2). 	This 	second 	factor 	only 	goes 	to 	the 	likelihood 	of 	Defendant’s
nonappearance; it “is not a pretrial determination of guilt.” See United States v. Cobix-Espinoza,
655 F. Supp. 3d 584, 595 (E.D. Ky. 2023); United States v. Foster, No. 20-5548, 2020 WL
6791572, at *2 (6th Cir. July 20, 2020). Defendant has a documented history of disobeying U.S.
laws [See PTR at 3]. 	Even setting aside the allegations in the Indictment, after being removed
previously, Defendant was still able the reenter the United Staes at least twice—showing both the
willingness and skill to evade the law and law enforcement detection. And while in the United
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States illegally, Defendant committed several offenses, evidencing a wiliness to break the
law [See id.]. And Defendant has family in Honduras. The United States has shown motive and
means to flee—all Defendant would need is an opportunity.
Third, Defendant’s history and characteristics cut against him too. The Court has already
detailed Defendant’s history of evading and refusing to comply with the law, and the Court will
not repeat it here. Defendant relies on the presence of his partner and adult daughter in the U.S.
to seek to undo the magistrate judge’s order [See Doc. 14 at 15-16]. But he has left the Country
without them at least twice before [See PTR at 3]. To be sure, the Court’s analysis under Section
3142 is distinct from the analysis that would apply for removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. 	See United States v. Veloz-Alonso, 910 F.3d 266, 270 (6th Cir. 2018). 	But
Defendant’s history of failing to follow the law and illegally reentering the United States suggests
an unwillingness to follow the law and weighs against his release. 	See Cobix-Espinoza, 655 F.
Supp. 3d at 595.
Last, because the Court relies on the risk of nonappearance to support detention, it is
unclear how “danger” maps onto the legal inquiry. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(4). 	But defendant
has committed state crimes while in the United States illegally [See PTR at 2].
Defendant proposes conditions of release that he believes would mitigate the risk that he
would not appear [See Doc. 14 at 16]. But Defendant’s past willingness to violate federal law and
evade law enforcement suggests that he would not comply with conditions that this Court
imposed. See United States v. Cornish, 449 F. Supp. 3d 681, 684 (E.D. Ky. 2020) (“almost any
conditional release ultimately depends on a court’s assessment of a defendant’s good faith
intentions and predicted compliance with conditions imposed”). 	This record is not undone by
Defendant’s self-professed “desire to remain in the United States” or decision to “return[] to the
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same Sevier County community” “[a]fter each removal” [See Doc. 14 at 7, 10]. 	In fact,
Defendant’s desire to remain in the United States appears to be the impetus for his unlawful
actions. And paradoxically, avoiding prosecution may allow him to remain in the United States
longer, albeit unlawfully. At bottom, the proposed conditions would not “reasonably assure the
appearance of such person as required.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Defendant David Humberto Ortiz-Garcia’s
Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judge’s Detention Order [Doc. 14].
SO ORDERED.
KATHERINE A 	YTZER
United States District Judge
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