Reeners v. Jouvence et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
PATRICK JAYSON REENERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELE LANDRY JOUVENCE, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
NO. 3:23-cv-00401
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is a “Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 107, “Motion”) filed by
Michele 	Landry 	Jouvence 	(“Defendant 	Michele 	Jouvence”) 	and 	Pascal 	Claude 	Jouvence
(“Defendant 	Pascal 	Jouvence,” 	and 	collectively 	with 	Defendant 	Michele 	Jouvence,
“Defendants”).1 Via the Motion, Defendants seek to dismiss the “Fifth Amended Complaint”
(Doc. No. 106, “Complaint”), of Plaintiff, Patrick Jayson Reeners. Defendants have filed an
opening brief (Doc. No. 108, “Opening Brief”) in support of the Motion. Plaintiff has filed a
response (Doc. No. 109, “Response”) in opposition to the Motion, and Defendants have filed a
reply (Doc. No. 110, “Reply”), in further support of the Motion.
1 The Court notes that Defendant Pascal Jouvence and Defendant Michele Jouvence are not the only two
defendants to have ever been party to this action. Plaintiff initially brought claims against Mary Guneug,
Randy Lucas, and various John and Jane Doe individuals and entities (collectively, “Terminated
Defendants”), in addition to the claims Plaintiff brought (and continues to bring) against Defendant Pascal
Jouvence and Defendant Michelle Jouvence. Ultimately, the Terminated Defendants were terminated from
this suit either via Rule 21 (Doc. No. 103) or through the filing of Plaintiff’s Fifth Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 106). As also relevant here, via the Fifth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims only against
Defendant Pascal Jouvence and Defendant Michele Jouvence, and so the Court will refer to them
collectively as “Defendants” even though there were other defendants (the Terminated Defendants)
previously named in this action who have since been terminated.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 1 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

For the reasons described herein, the Court will GRANT the Motion.
ALLEGED FACTS2
1. 	The Parties3
Plaintiff is “an adult resident of Sumner County, Tennessee,” (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 2), and “a
51-year-old self-described ‘activist’ who devotes much of his time to attempting to make his
community a better place through political expression.” (Id. at ¶ 6).
Both Defendants are also adult residents of Sumner County, Tennessee. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4).
Defendant Pascal Jouvence is (as of the time of the filing of the Complaint) an “elected
representative on the Gallatin, Tennessee City Council” (id. at ¶ 4)—specifically holding Gallatin,
Tennessee’s Alderman District 3 City Council seat4 (id. at ¶¶ 12-13)—although, as explained in a
footnote below, he did not hold this position at the time the events underlying the Complaint took
place.
2 The facts herein are taken from the Complaint. For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts in the
Complaint are accepted as true, except to the extent that they are qualified herein (as, for example, by
“Plaintiff alleges”) to denote that they are not being taken as true but instead are set forth merely to make
clear what a party claims to be true. Throughout this opinion, the Court forgoes any such qualifiers for any
fact that it is accepting as true, stating those facts without qualification even though it is aware that any
such (alleged) fact ultimately might not prove to be true.
The Court at times quotes from the Complaint herein. For clarity, the Court notes that unless indicated
otherwise, as for example, by the use of single quotation marks nested within a portion of the Complaint
quoted using double quotation marks, it is quoting the Complaint and not directly quoting some statement
(made during the underlying alleged events at issue) that the Complaint quoted or paraphrased.
3 When citing to a page in a document filed by one of the parties, the Court endeavors to cite to the page
number (“Page __ of __”) added by the Clerk’s Office as part of the pagination process associated with
Electronic Case Filing if such page number differs from the page number originally provided by the
author/filer of the document. In addition, where the Complaint is cited herein without including a paragraph
symbol, the citation is not to a paragraph number but rather to a page that contains the cited content outside
the boundaries of any paragraph.
4 The Court notes that Gallatin, Tennessee is in, and is indeed the county seat of, Sumner County, Tennessee.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 2 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

2. 	Factual Background
“On November 8, 2022, an election was held in Tennessee,” (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 11), and
“one of the seats at issue in the election was Gallatin, Tennessee’s Alderman District 3 [C]ity
[C]ouncil seat.” (Id. at ¶ 12). Defendant Pascal Jouvence “ran for, and ultimately won, the District
3 Alderman seat.” (Id. at ¶ 13). Plaintiff opposed Defendant Pascal Jouvence’s campaign. (Id. at ¶
15).
To that end, in August 2022, Plaintiff “created several political signs depicting the word
‘Pascal’ with a circle around it and a line running through it as a way of expressing his opposition
to [Defendant Pascal Jouvence’s] candidacy.” (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff subsequently placed these
signs near city hall (id. at ¶ 17), but Defendant Michele Jouvence took the signs down and
“disposed of them.” (Id. at ¶ 18). On October 1, 2022, Plaintiff then “prepared two additional
political signs to be displayed at the Fall Square Fest.” (Id. at ¶ 19).5 “One of the signs read ‘Pascal
the Deceiver’, while the other read ‘Pascal = Liar.’” (Id. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff put his signs up at the
Fall Square Fest, “putting the ‘Deceiver’ sign on the wall of a brick building and the ‘Liar’ sign
between two vendors, after getting their consent.” (Id. at ¶ 21). However, Defendant Pascal
Jouvence, Defendant Michele Jouvence, and an unidentified woman “happened upon the Fall Fest
scene.” (Id. at ¶ 22). The unidentified woman took6 the “‘Deceiver’ sign from the brick building.”
(Id.). Defendant Michele Jouvence also “attempted to persuade the vendors to take [the] ‘Liar’
5 Plaintiff does not specify what the Fall Square Fest is, but the Court assumes that it must have been a sort
of annual fall festival in Gallatin, Tennessee.
6 The Court accepts as true the allegation that the unidentified woman took the sign. Plaintiff refers to this
taking essentially as a theft (a stealing). (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 22) (alleging that the unidentified woman “stole”
the sign). To the extent that this allegation thus portrays the taking, it amounts to a mere verbal
characterization and perhaps also a legal conclusion and therefore is not accepted as true. When describing
Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court uses variations of the word “taking” where Plaintiff has used words like
“theft” or “stealing” and the Court is treating as true the allegations of taking.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 3 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

sign down,” while Defendant Pascal Jouvence “threatened [to] call the police on [Plaintiff] if he
did not leave the area, which [Plaintiff] eventually did out of fear.” (Id.). Plaintiff later reported
the taking “of his political signs to the Gallatin Police Department [hereinafter, “GPD”] – however,
the police took no action to punish the [Defendants] . . . or otherwise stop [Defendants] from
relying on [allegedly] criminal methods to [allegedly] suppress [Plaintiff’s] political speech.” (Id.
at ¶ 23).7
As election day neared, on “October 19, 2022, at approximately 4 pm, [Plaintiff] positioned
himself with an anti-Pascal sign at a private property next to a polling place during early voting
hours, expressing his opposition to [Defendant Pascal Jouvence’s] candidacy.” (Id. at ¶ 24).
Defendant Pascal Jouvence, while driving an SUV, approached Plaintiff and blocked Plaintiff and
Plaintiff’s sign “from being viewed from the perspective of the polling place.” (Id. at ¶ 25).
Defendant Michele Jouvence filmed this encounter. (Id. at ¶ 26). Although Plaintiff “repositioned
himself several times in order to make his sign viewable from the polling place,” Defendant Pascal
Jouvence continuously “repositioned his SUV to block [Plaintiff] from view.” (Id. at ¶ 27). As
Plaintiff continued to try to reposition himself, Defendant Pascal Jouvence “aggressively drove up
to [Plaintiff] as if he was going to run him over, and revved his engine several times.” (Id. at ¶ 28).
“In fear for his life, [Plaintiff] fled, went home, and called the police.” (Id. at ¶ 29).8 “[GPD] patrol
officers responded to [Plaintiff’s] call, and took his statement. [Plaintiff] explicitly told them that
7 Consistent with a footnote above, the Court here uses the term “alleged” to refer to these acts because the
statements that someone “stole” a sign or otherwise “suppressed” Plaintiff’s speech—if intended in a legal
sense—are legal conclusions. As such, they are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
8 Based on the entire content of the Complaint (notably in paragraph 41, where Plaintiff refers specifically
to the GPD) as well as the briefing on the Motion (where the parties focus extensively on the GPD), the
Court understands that this is a reference to the GPD.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 4 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

he was in fear for his life when [Defendant Pascal Jouvence] drove up on him as if he was going
to run him over.” (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff also gave the GPD video evidence of the October 19
encounter. (Id. at ¶ 31).9
Subsequently, on October 31, 2022, Plaintiff “sat on his riding lawnmower in a field next
to a roadway and spoke out against [Defendant Pascal Jouvence’s] candidacy as cars drove by.”
(Id. at ¶ 32). Defendant Michele Jouvence “stood nearby for several minutes, videorecording
[Plaintiff],” and subsequently made a phone call. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34). The call was to the GPD Chief
of Police, who took the call and discussed Plaintiff with Defendant Michele Jouvence. (Id. at ¶¶
35-36). On the call, Defendant Michele Jouvence stated to the GPD Chief of Police, “‘Well I’m
calling you because I know you. I guess I could get some other . . .[.]’” (Id. at ¶ 37). Subsequently,
as noted above, on November 8, 2022, Defendant Pascal Jouvence “won the election for the
District 3 Alderman seat.” (Id. at ¶ 40).
“At some point the [GPD] police detective assigned to [Plaintiff’s] assault complaint spoke
with [Defendants] about the incident, and [Defendant Michele Jouvence] provided her video –
which corroborated [Plaintiff’s] allegations – to the police.” (Id. at ¶ 39).10 However, “[a]fter
9 A video of this incident may be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vuQGfqnvUXQ. It is
unclear to Court whether this is the video that the Complaint mentions Plaintiff gave to the GPD or whether
this is the video that the Complaint mentions Defendant Michelle Jouvence recording. Irrespective of what
the video does or does not show, the Court will not consider it herein both because it is not necessary to the
Court’s analysis of the Motion and because although the video (whichever of the two aforementioned videos
it is) is referred to in the Complaint, it is not integral to the claims underlying the Complaint. Hardyway v.
McDonough, No. 3:22-CV-00037, 2022 WL 3702094, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2022) (“As stated above,
in a motion to dismiss, the Court may not consider documents outside of the complaint unless they are
explicitly referred to and integral to the complaint.”).
10 The Complaint is unclear whether this allegation is referring to the October 31, 2022 incident or the
October 19, 2022 incident. Ultimately whether the Complaint is referring to the October 19 or October 31
incident is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis herein, but the Court notes that the reference would seem to be
to the October 19 incident, because that incident (in comparison to the October 31 incident) is far more
conducive to someone claiming it involved an assault.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 5 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

completing [the] investigation of [Plaintiff’s] assault complaint, the [GPD] did not arrest
[Defendant Pascal Jouvence] or file any charges against him.” (Id. at ¶ 41). Plaintiff “spoke with
the assigned [GPD] detective, and asked him to explain the decision to not charge [Defendant
Pascal Jouvence]. The detective told [Plaintiff] that [Defendant Pascal Jouvence] did not intend to
put Plaintiff in fear.” (Id. at ¶ 42).11 Plaintiff alleges, in contrast to the GPD detective, that “the
information provided by [Plaintiff], corroborated by the video evidence, established that
[Defendant Pascal Jouvence] had intentionally driven his SUV up to [Plaintiff] in an aggressive
manner and revved his engine multiple times, intimidating [Plaintiff] and frightening him into
believing that [Defendant Pascal Jouvence] was about to run over and kill [Plaintiff]. Thus,
[Plaintiff alleges,] the [GPD] detective had probable cause for a case of Aggravated Assault
11 It is unclear from the Complaint whether the decision not to charge Defendant Pascal Jouvence—or
indeed whether certain other events underlying the Complaint—occurred before or after Defendant Pascal
Jouvence’s swearing in as a Gallatin City Council member—and thereby his elevation to a (municipal)
government official. Whether Defendant Pascal Jouvence was actually serving as a Gallatin City Council
member is important for the analysis of Plaintiff’s claims, because if he was serving as a Gallatin City
Council member at the time the events underlying the Complaint took place, then that might (or, conversely,
might not) provide another basis (beyond those discussed below) to conclude that Defendant Pascal
Jouvence was a state actor for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim. Cf. Rodriguez v. Kaesman, No.
SACV070780DOCMLGX, 2008 WL 11411477, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2008) (“[o]fficials of
municipalities and local governments . . . are considered state actors for the purposes of Section 1983”);
Carlisle v. Normand, No. CV 16-3767, 2018 WL 4587725, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2018) (“Whether an
official is elected has no bearing on whether the official is a state actor for purposes of § 1983” and then
noting an elected sheriff is “undoubtedly . . . a state actor”), aff’d sub nom. Carlisle v. Klees, 786 F. App'x
493 (5th Cir. 2019); O'Neill v. Hernandez, No. 08CIV.1689(KMW), 2010 WL 1257512, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 2010) (noting that “[a] plaintiff may bring a Section 1983 claim against the municipal entity or a
public servant of the entity in his or her official capacity” thereby implying a public servant of a municipal
entity, such as a city council member, may be a state actor for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim).
Nevertheless, because the Complaint does not allege, explicitly or implicitly, that Defendant Pascal
Jouvence was serving as a member of the Gallatin City Council during any of the events underlying the
Complaint, and because Defendants in their Opening Brief assert, without later contradiction by Plaintiff,
that Defendant Pascal Jouvence “was not an elected official when the allegations in the Complaint
occurred” (Doc. No. 108 at 6), the Court assumes that he had not been sworn in as a member of the Gallatin
City Council at the time any of the events underlying the Complaint occurred—including at the time the
decision not to charge Defendant Pascal Jouvence was made—thereby meaning that Defendant Pascal
Jouvence was not a (municipal) government official at the time the events underlying the Complaint took
place and so the Court need not reach the issue of whether a city council member is (or can be) a state actor
for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 6 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

through intentional actions that put [Plaintiff] in fear of an imminent attack with a deadly weapon
(a vehicle).” (Id.).12 In sum, Plaintiff alleges that “the decision of the [GPD] to not file charges
against [Defendant Pascal Jouvence] was not based on a lack of probable cause – rather, it was
based 	on 	a 	combination 	of 	[Defendant 	Pascal 	Jouvence’s] 	position, 	the 	Department’s
communications with [Defendants], and [Plaintiff’s] reputation within the Department.” (Id. at ¶
43). At base then, Plaintiff alleges that “[i]n allowing the [Defendants] to [take Plaintiff’s] political
signs and [allegedly] assault [Plaintiff, allegedly] with impunity, the [GPD] effectively acted in
concert with [Defendants] to [allegedly] suppress [Plaintiff’s] political speech.” (Id. at ¶ 45).
3. 	Plaintiff’s Claims and Defendants’ Motion
Plaintiff brings three claims. Count I is comprised of 42 U.S.C § 1983 (hereinafter,
“Section 1983”) claims for “Suppression of Plaintiff’s Political Speech in Violation of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” (Id. at 7). Via Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
“suppressed Plaintiff’s political speech by stealing his political advocacy signs, intimidating him,
and committing a criminal assault against him.” (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 47). Plaintiff further alleges
that Defendants were “enabled in their efforts to suppress [Plaintiff’s] political speech by the
[GPD] who have allowed [Defendants] to suppress [Plaintiff’s] political speech through criminal
thefts and an assault without fear of consequence.” (Id. at ¶ 48). Plaintiff also alleges that
“[b]ecause of this cooperation with the police, [Defendants] effectively operated under color of
state law in taking [Plaintiff’s] signs and through [Defendant Pascal Jouvence’s] assault [of
12 The Court understands that Plaintiff here is referring to the October 19, 2022 incident when he discusses
an alleged assault, because that incident is the only incident that seems to actually involve any sort of
(alleged) assault.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 7 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

Plaintiff].” (Id.).13 Plaintiff also alleges in connection with Count I that “Defendants’ suppression
of Plaintiff’s political speech has been in blatant, reckless, and intentional disregard of Plaintiffs’
[sic] rights,” (id. at ¶ 49), and that “Defendants’ illegal suppression of Plaintiff’s political speech
has caused Plaintiff to suffer a deprivation of liberty and emotional harm.” (Id. at ¶ 50).
Plaintiff brings, in addition to his federal claims in Count I, two state-law claims.
Specifically, Count II is for conversion of property (id. at ¶¶ 51-56) and Count III is for assault.
(Id. at ¶¶ 57-61).14
Defendants bring their Motion predominantly on the ground that (according to them)
Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that the Defendants (as private individuals at the time the
events underlying the Complaint occurred) were state actors so as to permit Plaintiff to bring a
Section 1983 claim against them. (Doc. No. 108 at 4-12). In their Opening Brief, Defendants argue
predominantly that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants were involved in a
conspiracy with the GPD, meaning that Defendants cannot qualify as state actors for the purposes
of a Section 1983 claim. (Id. at 6-9). Via the Motion, Defendants also assert that if Plaintiff’s
federal claims in Count I are dismissed, “the Court should refuse to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction on the remaining state claims.” (Doc. No. 107 at 2). Plaintiff argues, by contrast (and
13 As above, the Court understands that Plaintiff here is referring to the October 19, 2022 incident, because
that incident is the only incident that seems to actually involve any sort of (alleged) assault.
14 Curiously, Plaintiff does not allege in the Complaint how the Court may exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction over these state-law claims. Instead, he states only that the “Court has federal question
jurisdiction over the federal claims in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 5)
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court assumes that Plaintiff intended for the Court to exercise
jurisdiction over these state law claims via supplemental jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367; the
alternative, diversity jurisdiction, appears inapplicable because there is no diversity inasmuch as all parties
appear to be residents of Tennessee, and thus diversity jurisdiction would not be a proper basis for the Court
to exercise jurisdiction over these state law claims. However, for the reasons described below, because the
Court ultimately determines that Plaintiff’s federal claims in Count I will be dismissed, the Court will also
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims and will thus dismiss this
entire action in an accompanying order.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 8 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

unsurprisingly), that Plaintiff need not have pled that Defendants “were in a full-blown civil
conspiracy with the GPD leadership in order to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Doc. No.
109 at 2). Plaintiff instead asserts that the Motion should be denied because the Complaint’s
allegations “are sufficient to plausibly demonstrate that the [Defendants] received ‘significant aid
from’ the GPD in their efforts to suppress [Plaintiff’s] First Amendment rights,” so as to qualify
Defendants as state actors for purposes of a Section 1983 claim. (Doc. No. 109 at 5). Plaintiff
further invokes (as will be explained in more detail below) the so-called “public function” test to
argue that Defendants’ conduct in taking Plaintiff’s political signs was a “public function” and
thus attributable to the State for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim. (Doc. No. 109 at 4).
LEGAL STANDARD
For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must take all
of the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. A legal conclusion, including one couched
as a factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations
of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id.; Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d
718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).
Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant’s liability do not satisfy
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 9 of 22 PageID #: <pageID>

the claimant’s burden, as mere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief
even if it supports the possibility of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its
predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it may be
appropriate to “begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such
allegations count toward the plaintiff’s goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such
allegations include “bare assertions,” formulaic recitation of the elements, and “conclusory” or
“bold” allegations. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining allegations—factual
allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter—plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not,
the pleading fails to meet the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and thus must be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.
DISCUSSION
The Court first will review the concept of state actors as it relates to claims under Section
1983 (such as Count I), and then examine and apply the relevant tests used by both the Supreme
Court and the Sixth Circuit for determining whether a (generally) private individual or entity is a
state actor for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim. Finally, the Court will address Plaintiff’s state-
law claims in Count II and Count III.
1. 	Section 1983 and State Actors
A plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 claim must plead two things to state a claim: “1) the
deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) [that] the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d
192, 194 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Simescu v. Emmet County Dept. of Social Servs., 942 F.2d 372,
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 10 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

374 (6th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added). See also Gmeiner v. Kent, No. 1:25-CV-00502, 2025 WL
2848543 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 3, 2025) (Section 1983 requires “plaintiffs to allege two things at the
pleading stage to state a claim. A plaintiff must first allege that they suffered a ‘deprivation’ of a
constitutional right. And they must further allege that the defendant acted ‘under color of’ state
law when inflicting this injury.” (internal citations omitted)). It follows that a “plaintiff may not
proceed under § 1983 against a private party ‘no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’ the
party’s conduct.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)). Instead, to state a Section 1983 claim, as noted above, “the plaintiff must
sue a person or entity who may fairly be said to be acting under color of state law or as a
state actor.” Norris v. Schauman, No. 3:13-CV-00542, 2013 WL 3224346, at *3. (M.D. Tenn. June
25, 2013) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Still, “there are circumstances under which
private persons may, by their actions, become ‘state actors’ for § 1983 purposes.” Tahfs, 316 F.3d
at 590.
One such circumstances is where the “conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a
federal right” is “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982). In Lugar, the Supreme Court recognized that its cases had generally adopted a “two-part
approach” to the question of “fair attribution” of private conduct to the State. Id. “First, the
deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a
rule of conduct imposed by the [S]tate or by a person for whom the State is responsible,”15 and
15 The phrasing here regarding causation—suggesting that it is not enough that there is a deprivation of a
right, and that instead there must be a deprivation specifically “caused by” the exercise of some state-
created right “or by” some state-created rule of conduct—strikes the Court as odd and somewhat difficult
to parse. However the Supreme Court went on to further explain the first prong of Lugar by reframing the
question it poses in terms of “whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939. In other words, to satisfy the first
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 11 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

“[s]econd, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor”—for instance “because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State.” Id.16 See also Kerns v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 762 F. App’x 289, 294-95 (6th Cir.
2019) (explaining the two-part framework laid out in Lugar and then noting that the Sixth Circuit
has “recognized several [other] tests to determine whether a defendant is a state actor.”). On the
other hand, “[a]ction taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State
is not state action” for purposes of a Section 1983 claim. Kurita v. State Primary Bd. of Tennessee
Democratic Party, No. 3:08-0948, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2008) (quoting
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52 (1999)), aff’d, 472 F. App’x 398 (6th Cir. 2012).
Beyond the framework elucidated in Lugar, the Sixth Circuit “has recognized as many as
four tests to aid courts in determining whether challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the State:
(1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; (3) the symbiotic relationship or nexus
test; and (4) the entwinement test.” Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2014).
“A plaintiff need only show state action under one of the tests in order to proceed with his claim.”
C.S. Sewell, M.D. P.C. v. Amerigroup Tennessee, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00062, 2018 WL 6591429,
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2018) (citing Wilcher v. City of Akron, 498 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir.
prong of Lugar, it seems to Court that there must have been some conduct having its source in state authority
that led to the deprivation of the right at issue.
16 To the extent that the second prong of the Lugar approach invites courts to examine whether a private
entity’s conduct is “fairly chargeable to the State” it seems to beg the very question that Lugar is attempting
to answer—i.e., whether a private entity’s conduct is fairly attributable to the State. In the event, Plaintiff
does not rely on the idea that the Defendants’ conduct is “fairly chargeable” to the State as conceived of in
the second prong of Lugar, choosing instead to argue that Defendants received significant aid from the
State, and so the Court declines to examine in more detail how to apply this portion of Lugar’s second
prong.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 12 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

2007)). However, the application of the public function test (among other tests) 17 is relevant when
analyzing “the conduct of a private entity . . . only in cases in which there are no allegations of
cooperation or concerted action between state and private actors.” Memphis, Tennessee Area Loc.,
Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 905 (6th Cir. 2004).18
As noted above, the question before the Court is whether Defendants were state actors for
the purposes of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims (Count I). Before proceeding to analyze this issue,
the Court finds it helpful to explain a handful of analytical points that will underly its analysis
below and to describe the frameworks on which Plaintiffs rely to argue that Defendants were acting
as state actors for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim. The Court finds it important to do so
17 As will become clear below, of the tests that the Sixth Circuit has endorsed, Plaintiff relies on just one:
the public function test.
18 This language is critical for another reason besides merely delineating the scenarios where courts may
apply the public function test. Sullivan stated that an “[a]ction taken by private entities with the mere
approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.” Kurita, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7 (quoting
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52) (emphasis added). But the quoted language from the Sixth Circuit in Am. Postal
Workers Union, AFL-CIO clearly suggests the opposite—that state action (for purposes of a Section 1983
claim) in some cases may be found even where the State is merely approving or acquiescing in private
action. At first blush the language of the Sixth Circuit here may appear to be in direct contradiction to the
statement from the Supreme Court in Sullivan, but the apparent conflict can be reconciled.
As this Court previously explained (and as will be explained in more detail below):
To satisfy the “public function” test, the private entity must exercise “powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352; Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). “This test is difficult to
satisfy[,]” and is interpreted narrowly. Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338,
341 (6th Cir. 2006). While many functions have been performed traditionally by
governments, very few have been exclusively reserved to the State. Id.
Kurita, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7. In other words, the public function test asks whether the private entity is
exercising powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, i.e., taking on the role of the State. To
answer that question, it is simply irrelevant whether a private actor is cooperating with the State (which is
enough to make the private actor a state actor) or whether instead the State was merely acquiescing in or
approving the private actor’s conduct (which is not enough). So in short, although action taken by private
entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State (i) is not state action merely because the State
approved or acquiesced in such action and (ii) is not state action under some of the recognized tests for state
action, it nevertheless (iii) can be state action under the public function test (provided of course that the
public function test is satisfied).
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 13 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

because of the myriad (and sometimes apparently conflicting) approaches courts utilize to
determine whether private conduct is fairly attributable to the State. First, although Plaintiff refers
in his Response to the public function test, the state compulsion test, and the nexus test noted
above, Plaintiff actually seems to rely solely on the public function test to establish that Defendants
were state actors for the purposes of his Section 1983 claims. (Doc. No. 109 at 4).19 Second,
Plaintiff also relies on the two-part framework explained in Lugar (which he invokes by quoting
the Sixth Circuit’s use of Lugar in Tahfs without citing Lugar directly), for determining when
private conduct is fairly attributable to the State. (Doc. No. 109 at 2, 5).
As far as the Court can discern from the somewhat confusing case law analyzing the
interplay of the various tests for determining when private conduct is fairly attributable to the State
(so as to make the private actor a state actor for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim), Plaintiff’s
approach here—relying on both the two-part test from Lugar and the public function test—is
permissible. As noted above, the Sixth Circuit has adopted various tests to assist district courts in
determining whether private conduct is attributable to the State, but these tests do not actually
seem to have displaced the two-part test elucidated by the Supreme Court in Lugar for determining
whether private conduct is fairly attributable to the State. Rather, these other tests—i.e., the public
function test, the state compulsion test, the nexus test, and the entwinement test—are only applied
in limited circumstances where, as discussed above, “there are no allegations of cooperation or
concerted action between state and private actors.” Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 361 F.3d
at 905. So, Plaintiff need prevail only under one of either the Lugar or public function tests to
19 Indeed, Plaintiff merely mentions the state compulsion and nexus tests in passing (in the context of a
quotation from the Tahfs case) and the public function test is the only of these three tests that Plaintiff
engages in any analysis under. And so, the public function test will be the only one of these three tests that
the Court will examine below. Cf. Roe v. Lowe, No. 3:24-CV-00368, 2024 WL 4778042, at *8 n.12 (M.D.
Tenn. Nov. 13, 2024) (“Ultimately, it is not the Court's role to construct a plaintiff’s legal arguments.”).
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 14 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

show that Defendants were state actors for the purposes of a Section 1983 claim, and the Court
will analyze Plaintiff’s Complaint under both tests below.
2. 	The Lugar Test
As explained above, the Supreme Court recognized in Lugar that its cases have adopted a
“two-part approach” to the question of “fair attribution” of private conduct to the State. Lugar, 457
U.S. at 937. “First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created
by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the [S]tate or by a person for whom the State is
responsible,” and “[s]econd, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor,” for instance “because he is a state official, because he has acted
together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is
otherwise chargeable to the State.” Id.
The Court will begin and end its analysis with the second requirement of the Lugar test,
because it is the only part of the Lugar test on which Plaintiff devotes any briefing.20 Plaintiff
argues that the allegations in the Complaint “are sufficient to plausibly demonstrate that the
[Defendants] received ‘significant aid from’ the GPD in their efforts to suppress [Plaintiff’s] First
Amendment rights” (and thus are sufficient to satisfy the second of the requirements within the
Lugar test discussed above). (Doc. No. 109 at 5). In support of this assertion, Plaintiff argues,
variously, that (1) Plaintiff “credibly alleges the GPD leadership’s longstanding belief that
[Plaintiff] is insane and its previous disregard for [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights, which in and
of itself sets out a plausible motive for the GPD to allow the [Defendants] to suppress [Plaintiff’s]
political speech” (Doc. No. 109 at 3) (citing Doc. No. 106 at ¶¶ 9-10); (2) a “reasonable inference
20 Indeed, Plaintiff’s failure to affirmatively argue that the first requirement of Lugar is satisfied here
provides another reason to dispense with Plaintiff’s argument that Lugar somehow shows that the
Defendants were state actors.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 15 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

[can be drawn] that [Defendant Pascal Jouvence’s] status as a political candidate on the verge of
winning the city alderman race would provide an additional incentive for the GPD leadership to
favor the [Defendants] over the political protests of a noisy, longtime agitator whom the GPD
leadership had long thought of as a ‘crank’” (Doc. No. 109 at 3) (citing Doc. No. 106 at ¶¶ 43-45);
and (3) Plaintiff “further bolsters the credibility of this particular inference with the fact that the
[Defendants] apparently had a direct line of communication to the GPD Chief during the campaign,
with the ability to call him on his cell phone at a moment’s notice.” (Doc. No. 109 at 3) (citing
Doc. No. 106 at ¶¶ 34-37). Plaintiff also points to “specific incidents in which the GPD allowed
the [Defendants] to act with impunity toward him,” and points specifically to (1) the incident in
August 2022 when “[Defendants] were able to take [Plaintiff’s] political signs from right outside
City Hall with impunity, disposing of them without interference from the GPD” (Doc. No. 109 at
3) (citing Doc. No. 106 at ¶¶ 16-18); (2) the incident at the Gallatin Fall Fest where Defendants
took Plaintiff’s signs (Doc. No. 109 at 3-4) (citing Doc. No. 106 at ¶¶ 19-23); and (3) the incidents
on October 19, 2022 and October 31, 2022 (detailed above), in response to which the GPD
“ultimately took no action against [Defendant Pascal Jouvence].” (Doc. No. 109 at 4) (citing Doc.
No. 109 at ¶¶ 24-44).
Even though the Court takes these allegations as true for purposes of the instant Motion,
Plaintiff’s argument still fails for a simple reason: case law is clear (as noted in a footnote above)
that an “[a]ction taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is
not state action,” at least when applying the Lugar test. Kurita, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7 (quoting
Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 52 (1999)) (emphasis added). All of Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the
State, in this case the GPD, concern the acquiescence or approval of the GPD to Defendants’
conduct. It is the failure of the GPD to prevent the Defendants’ actions affirmatively, or to
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 16 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

otherwise to punish Defendants after the fact—in other words, the acquiescence or approval of the
GPD to Defendants’ conduct—that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims in Count I,
and indeed, forms the basis for Plaintiff’s argument in his Response that Defendants were
somehow state actors. There are no well-pled allegations anywhere in the Complaint that support
the view that the GPD actually cooperated or took concerted action with Defendants,21 let alone
that the GPD actually provided significant aid to Defendants. In other words, the allegations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint have plainly failed to satisfy the second prong of the Lugar test, and Plaintiff
has not plausibly suggested as required that Defendants therefore are state actors under the Lugar
test.
3. 	Public Function Test
In his attempt to render Defendants state actors for purposes of Count I of the Complaint,
Plaintiff invokes as an alternative to the Lugar test, the public function test. That is, Plaintiff argues
alternatively that “the manner in which [Plaintiff’s] signs were displayed should have been handled
by the local government, not by [Defendants],” and that by “taking the law into their own hands
with the apparent tacit blessing of the GPD, the [Defendants] performed a public function.” (Doc.
No. 109 at 4).
As noted above, the Sixth Circuit has held that the public function test, among others, is
relevant only where “there are no allegations of cooperation or concerted action between state and
21 Indeed, although Plaintiff’s allegations contain a single characterization of the relationship between the
GPD and Defendants as one of “cooperation,” (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 48), all of Plaintiff’s allegations make
clear that this “cooperation” is simply GPD’s “acquiescence in or approval of” Defendants’ conduct—
something that, as repeatedly noted herein, cannot and does not support a finding that Defendants were
acting as state actors under the Lugar test for the purposes of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 17 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

private actors.” Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 361 F.3d at 905.22 It appears to the Court
that the public function test is applicable (not to say satisfied) in this action because, as noted just
above, the Complaint sets forth no allegations of cooperation or concerted action between the State
(in the form of the GPD) and Defendants. Satisfied that the public function test is at least applicable
to this action—such that the Complaint potentially could survive by virtue of that particular test—
the Court first will review the public function test below, and then will apply it to the instant case
to determine whether its outcome shows that Defendants were state actors for the purposes of a
Section 1983 claim.
To satisfy the public function test, “the private entity must exercise ‘powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State.’” Kurita, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7 (quoting Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). “This test is difficult to satisfy” because “‘[w]hile many
functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been exclusively
reserved to the State.’” Durante v. Fairlane Town Center, 201 F. App’x 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1456 (10th Cir.1995)). As the
Sixth Circuit has explained, the “public function test has been interpreted narrowly,” and “[o]nly
functions like holding elections, exercising eminent domain, and operating a company-owned
town fall under this category of state action.” Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 833-34 (6th
Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Importantly, for this analysis, the Court must conduct “a
historical analysis to determine whether the party has engaged in an action traditionally reserved
to the [S]tate, and the plaintiff bears the burden of making that showing.” Wittstock v. Mark A. Van
Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 593) (emphasis added). See
22 For the reasons explained more fully in the footnote above, the Court can discern no fault in examining
the public function test in this action even though it has already concluded above that the actions taken by
Defendants were carried out with nothing more than the “approval or acquiescence” of the GPD.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 18 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

also Marie, 771 F.3d at 362-63 (“simply alleging in a complaint that [a private actor] is a state
actor or that [certain conduct] is traditionally exclusively in the province of the State is no longer,
if it ever was, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. . . . [The plaintiffs] fail to provide any
historical 	argument 	or 	analysis 	that 	[the conduct 	at 	issue] 	is traditionally 	exclusively 	a
state function. Considering that plaintiff bears the burden on this issue, this failure alone renders
this test inapplicable.” (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). That a
plaintiff bears the burden under this test is crucial, and the Sixth Circuit has found that where a
plaintiff has failed “to provide any historical argument or analysis,” the public function test is
“inapplicable.” Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 593 (quoting Ellison, 48 F.3d at 196).
Here, Plaintiff has plainly not met his burden of alleging facts that plausibly suggest that
Defendants were engaged in conduct traditionally reserved exclusively to the State. Indeed,
Plaintiff’s argument that the public function test applies is limited to a single paragraph in his
Response:
Moreover, while the criminal assault [Defendant Pascal Jouvence] committed
against [Plaintiff] on October 31, 2022 is obviously not a “public function,” the
enforcement of Gallatin’s political sign ordinances is. (Ex. A [(Doc. No. 109-1)],
Gallatin Sign Ordinance ) (conveying authority to remove signs to the “Zoning
Administrator or designee”). Thus, whatever complaints the [Defendants] may
have had about the manner in which [Plaintiff’s] signs were displayed should have
been handled by the local government, not by them. By taking the law into their
own hands with the apparent tacit blessing of the GPD, the [Defendants] performed
a public function.
(Doc. No. 109 at 4). In arguing that Defendants performed a public function in removing Plaintiff’s
signs, Plaintiff relies on the city of Gallatin’s political sign ordinance. That ordinance (Doc. No.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 19 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

109-1)23 assigns authority to “the Zoning Administrator or designee . . . to remove or order the
removal of any sign” placed in certain locations. (Doc. No. 109-1 at 1).
Plaintiff’s reliance on a city ordinance, however, is misplaced and misses the thrust of the
public function test. It matters not whether a particular function is now assigned to the State (or
subdivision of the State,24 in this instance, the municipality of Gallatin, Tennessee)25 Rather, as
noted above, the relevant inquiry is whether Defendants were exercising powers “traditionally
exclusively reserved to the [S]tate,” and Plaintiff bears the burden to show—by putting forward
“historical argument or analysis”—that these powers were traditionally reserved exclusively to the
State. Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 593. See also Wittstock, 330 F.3d at 902 (“a historical analysis to
determine whether the party has engaged in an action traditionally reserved to the [S]tate, and the
plaintiff bears the burden of making that showing.” (emphasis added)). Plaintiff, who merely
references a contemporary municipal ordinance in his Response,26 has plainly not met this burden.
23 A copy of the Gallatin political sign ordinance was filed as an attachment to Plaintiff’s Response at
Docket No. 109-1.
24
In Tennessee, a municipality is considered a subdivision of the State. See, e.g., Clark v. Vaughn, 177
Tenn. 76, 146 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1941) (referring to “municipalities, as well as other subdivisions and arms
of the State government”); State v. Eayrs, No. E201402072CCAR3CD, 2015 WL 9311865, at *8 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Dec. 22, 2015) (quoting Tenn. R. Evid. 202(b)(3)).
25 The Court notes that for the purposes of whether a function is a “public function” traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State, courts also consider whether a particular function was traditionally exclusively carried
out by municipalities (as opposed to limiting their analyses to whether a particular function was traditionally
exclusively reserved to state governments). See e.g., Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d 1100, 1114 (6th
Cir. 1981) (applying the public function test and noting that “[m]any functions have been traditionally
performed by governments, but few have been exclusively reserved to the states, such as conducting
elections and providing all the municipal services of a town.”); Wright v. Richardson, 740 F. Supp. 3d 601
(E.D. Mich. 2024) (“The public-function test applies when a private entity performs a function that is
traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state, such as running elections or operating a municipality.”
(citing Ellison, 48 F.3d at 195))), aff’d, No. 24-1679, 2025 WL 2381708 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025).
26 Indeed, Plaintiff’s failure to make any mention of this ordinance (or conduct any sort of historical
analysis) in his Complaint is yet another reason why Plaintiff’s public function argument is unavailing.
Marie, 771 F.3d at 362 (finding that the burden is “on the [plaintiffs] to advance historical and factual
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 20 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly suggest as required that the public function
test is satisfied here so as to afford the Defendants state actor status (at least at the motion-to-
dismiss stage) for purposes of a Section 1983 claim. See Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 593 (finding that where
a plaintiff has failed to put forward any historical argument or analysis to show that defendants’
conduct was traditionally exclusively reserved to the State, that failure renders the public function
test inapplicable). For this reason, and because (as discussed above), Plaintiff also has failed to
plausibly suggest that Defendants are state actors under Lugar, Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint
must be dismissed with prejudice.
4. 	Plaintiff’s State-Law Claims: Counts II and Count III
That leaves Plaintiff’s state-law claims in Count II and Count III remaining before the
Court. As noted in a footnote above, Plaintiff does not allege in the Complaint how the Court may
exercise jurisdiction over his state claw claims in Count II and Count III of the Complaint. Rather,
Plaintiff merely states that the “Court has federal question jurisdiction over the federal claims in
this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” (Doc. No. 106 at ¶ 5). The Court assumes that Plaintiff
intended for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over these state-law claims via supplemental
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,27 as all parties appear to be residents of Tennessee, and thus
diversity jurisdiction would not be a proper basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over these
allegations in their complaint giving rise a reasonable inference that [certain functions are] traditionally
exclusively in the province of the State. (emphasis added)). This is especially true here because Plaintiff
identifies no case law, and the Court could locate none, holding that “sign removal” was somehow
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. See Nugent v. Spectrum Juv. Just. Servs., 72 F.4th 135, 141
n.1 (6th Cir. 2023) (interpreting Marie to require a “plaintiff to allege [in its complaint] the historical basis”
for the public function test where previous judicial precedent is not clear that a particular function is
traditionally exclusively in the province of the State).
27 That statute provides in relevant part that “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution,” and that where, as
here, “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” then a district court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3).
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 21 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>

state-law claims. The Court does not dispute that supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law
claims in Count II and Count III would be proper if Plaintiff’s federal claims in Count I were to
survive the instant Motion. However, now that the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s federal
claims in Count I will be dismissed, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state-law claims in Count II and Count III, will dismiss these claims without
prejudice, and will thus dismiss this entire action in an accompanying order. See e.g., Moon v.
Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court that has dismissed
a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims.”).
CONCLUSION28
Accordingly, for the reasons described herein, the Motion (Doc. No. 107) will be
GRANTED, and the Complaint (Doc. No. 106) will be dismissed in its entirety.
An appropriate accompanying order will be entered.
__________________________________
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
28 Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants’ arguments in its Motion and Opening Brief “are better suited to
Rule 56 or trial.” (Doc. No. 109 at 5). At base, Plaintiff’s argument is that “Plaintiff is not required to
conclusively prove his case in order to overcome Rule 12 and is entitled to ‘all reasonable inferences’ in
his favor.” (Id. at 5) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 396) (6th Cir. 2016)). This proposition
is true enough, but does nothing to avail Plaintiff, because even taking all the well-pled factual allegations
in the Complaint as true, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has plausibly suggested that Defendants were
state actors under any of the tests that he invokes in an effort to sustain his Section 1983 claims in Count I.
Case 3:23-cv-00401 Document 114 Filed 02/03/26 Page 22 of 22 PageID #:
<pageID>