Harris v. Vantell et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RAMSEY WILLIAM HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
VINCENT VANTELL et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-cv-00457
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans
To: 	The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Relevant Background
Pro se Plaintiff Ramsey William Harris is an inmate at the West Tennessee State
Penitentiary (WTSP) in Henning, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1.) Using the verified complaint form for
violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Harris initiated this action on April 16, 2024,
alleging that then-Deputy Warden Vincent Vantell and an unidentified Tennessee Department of
Corrections (TDOC) transport officer violated his rights when he was in TDOC custody and was
involved in an automobile accident. (Id.)
As a pro se and incarcerated plaintiff, Harris applied for and was granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (IFP), after which the Court screened Harris’s complaint consistent with the 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. (Doc. Nos. 2, 6.) After screening the complaint, the Court
dismissed all claims against Vantell and allowed Harris to proceed with an Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim against Defendant John Doe. (Doc. No. 6.) Since then, Harris has
been unable to learn the identity of Doe and effect service of process.
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Harris alleges that, on the morning of March 14, 2024, TDOC arranged to transport Harris
and other inmates from the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (TTCC) to the WTSP facility in
Henning. (Doc. No. 1.) Harris further states that, shortly after leaving the TTCC facility, the driver,
Doe, was distracted by his cellphone, following the lead transport van too closely, and speeding
as he approached an intersection. (Id.) As a result, Doe rear-ended the lead transport van and the
impact left Harris “slung partially over and partially into” another inmate and that his upper body
was thrust into the van’s “steel mesh cage at an awkward angle[.]” (Id. at PageID# 5.)
Harris alleges that the accident left him with significant bruising to his chest, head, and left
hand and that he and others “were denied medical attention at [the] scene” even though the impact
made breathing difficult. (Doc. No. 1.) Harris states that the inmates were not assessed or treated
until their arrival at WTSP. (Id.) These allegations give rise to colorable claim that Doe violated
Harris’s rights under the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to Harris’s safety.
After the Court permitted Harris to proceed, it allowed him to amend his complaint “to
clarify whether Doe acted negligently or with a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's health or
safety” and “to add the entity that transported Plaintiff on March 14, 2024, as a defendant to this
action, if the facts so warrant.” (Doc. No. 6.) Harris subsequently amended his complaint on May
8, 2024, and alleged that Doe was deliberately indifferent to the safety of Harris and the other
passengers. (Doc. No. 7.)
Harris also sought reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his request to appoint counsel
contained within his original complaint. (Doc. No. 8.) The Court denied the motion and referred
the matter to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) to, in part, oversee
service of process and dispose or recommend disposition of any dispositive motions. (Doc.
No. 10.)
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On July 16, 2024, a summons was returned executed reflecting that the U.S. Marshals
Service effected service on John Doe #1 on July 9, 2024. (Doc. No. 13.) However, the attached
summons reflects it was addressed to “John Doe Vincent Vantell[.]” (Id.) Consequently, Vantell
filed a motion deem the summons improperly served (Doc. No. 14), and the Court granted the
motion on March 6, 2025 and directed the Clerk’s Office to provide Harris with another blank
service packet to complete and return (Doc. No. 17).
There is no record of Harris returning a completed service packet and, instead, Harris filed
the instant motion on April 8, 2025, wherein he states, in relevant part, that he “requests the courts
to move forward and adhere to” his request to set aside because he “has at this time exhausted all
or any proceedings at this point to the best of his abilities” and “because Plaintiff is only 9 months
away from a possible parole release” whereafter “he’d be better equipped and in a financial
position to retain counsel to proceed . . . .” (Doc. No. 18.) Harris further argues that he is in no
position to learn the identity of the Doe Defendant. (Id.) Finally, Harris expresses concerns about
his ability to fairly litigate the matter, opining that, previously, WTSP has interfered by allegedly
failing or refusing to mail Harris’s communications with the court. (Id.)
In light of Harris’s pro se and IFP status, the Court liberally construes Harris’s motion to
set aside as a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice to refiling.
II. 	Discussion
“A plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss a suit without a court order by filing a notice of
dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”
Tate v. Perry, NO. 1:25-CV-00008, 2025 WL 1230443, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 28, 2025)
(Campbell, C.J.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i)). “[A] voluntary dismissal without prejudice
leaves the situation as if the action had never been filed.” Id. (citing Sherer v. Construcciones
Aeronauticas, S.A., 987 F.2d 1246, 1247 (6th Cir. 1993)).
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Here, Harris explains that he has advanced his case as far as possible as a pro se litigant
and appears to suggest he would rather engage legal counsel if he chooses to pursue an action upon
his release. (Doc. No. 18) As a result, the Court construes Harris’s motion to set aside as effectively
a motion for voluntary dismissal. And because the lone remaining defendant has not been served,
made an appearance, nor filed an answer or motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that
dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) is warranted.
III. 	Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Harris’s motion for
voluntary dismissal styled as a motion to set aside (Doc. No. 18) be GRANTED and Harris’s
amended complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt
of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after
being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Entered this 13th day of February, 2026.
____________________________________
LUKE A. EVANS
United States Magistrate Judge
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