Reguli v. Woodruff et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
CONNIE REGULI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOSEPH A. WOODRUFF, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-cv-00694
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pending before the Court is a motion (Doc. No. 154) by Defendants Emily Layton
(“Layton”) and Williamson County CASA, Inc. (“CASA”) for sanctions against pro se Plaintiff,
Connie Reguli (“Reguli”), for failure to comply with the Court’s July 17, 2026 order (Doc. No.
140) compelling her to respond to Interrogatory number 1. Reguli filed a response in opposition
(Doc. No. 161), and Layton and CASA replied. (Doc. No. 165.) For the reasons below, the motion
is granted in part.
I. 	Background
The Court1 presumes familiarity with the facts summarized in Judge Trauger’s opinions
issued on March 28, 2025 (Doc. No. 52) and on February 4, 2026 (Doc. No. 117), as well as the
Court’s Memorandum Order issued on August 12, 2026. (Doc. No. 155). The background will be
summarized herein only to the extent necessary to provide context for the pending motion.
A material issue to the pending litigation is whether Reguli paid a $3,145.50 state-court
sanction to CASA as she claimed during the state-court proceedings before Judge Woodruff on
1 	References to the Court as set forth herein relate to the undersigned Magistrate Judge.
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April 26, 2022. This statement by Reguli prompted a series of events that led to her prosecution
for aggravated perjury; an order of nolle prosequi, in turn, prompted Reguli’s malicious-
prosecution claims against the Defendants here. (Doc. No. 155 at 3–4.)
Layton and CASA served Reguli with written discovery requests. Among those requests,
Interrogatory number 1 asked Reguli to
Identify every financial institution, including but not limited to banks, credit
unions, 	savings 	institutions, 	and 	online 	financial 	platforms, 	at 	which 	you
maintained an account of any type at any time from December 3, 2014 through the
present. For each institution, state its full name and current or last known address
and describe all accounts you have held at the institution, including the account
number, the type of account, and the dates the account was opened and closed.
(Doc. No. 128-2 at 4.) Reguli objected on multiple grounds including that “[t]he question of
payment is not the issue in the federal lawsuit. The issue is the false affidavit / statement /
fabricated evidence of Emily Layton and Dana McLendon intended to cause the false prosecution
of Plaintiff Reguli.” (Doc. No. 128-2 at 5.) Objections aside, Reguli responded that she “no longer
has access to financial records prior to her 2022 testimony and financial records after April 26,
2022 are irrelevant.” (Id. at 6.)
On June 19, 2026, the parties filed a motion for a discovery dispute conference and a joint
discovery dispute statement devoted to their respective positions on Interrogatory number 1. (Doc.
No. 128.) The parties appeared for a telephonic discovery dispute conference on July 17, 2026.
(Doc. No. 140.) During the conference, the Court heard extensive argument from the parties. The
Court carefully considered the basis for Reguli’s objections. To address her objections, the Court
asked Reguli several questions to assess her arguments regarding relevance and undue burden.
However, Reguli was unable or unwilling to provide any information to assist the Court in
narrowing the scope of the interrogatory. Ultimately, the Court determined that no further
argument or briefing was necessary and ruled that the interrogatory, as written, was too broad. The
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Court narrowed the time frame of the interrogatory to December 3, 2014 through May of 2022.2
(Id.) As narrowed, the Court found that the interrogatory was both relevant and proportional to the
needs of the case and ordered Reguli to respond to Interrogatory number 1 within 14 days of the
entry of the order. (Id.)
Reguli timely filed an objection to the order. (Doc. No. 143.) On August 7, 2026, after the
court-imposed deadline to respond to the interrogatory had passed, Reguli filed a motion
requesting a stay of the order pending a ruling on her objection. (Doc. No. 148.) Her motion to
stay and her objection remain pending before Judge Trauger.
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 37 gives courts the authority to impose sanctions when parties fail to cooperate with
a court order, including discovery orders and other orders under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a). Failure
to obey a discovery order may lead to sanctions including an order:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken
as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination.
2 	This period of time includes when the sanction was ordered and when Reguli claimed in
state court that she paid the sanction.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). While the sanctions ordered “may include any of the orders listed in
Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi) . . . , the court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising
that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure,
unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3) (emphasis added).
When considering the appropriateness of sanctions, the Court must consider four factors.
Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997). “The first factor is whether the party’s
failure to cooperate in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; the second factor is
whether the adversary was prejudiced by the party’s failure to cooperate in discovery; the third
factor is whether the party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to the sanction; and the
fourth factor in regard to a dismissal is whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or
considered.” Id. (citations omitted).
III. 	Analysis
On August 10, 2026, Layton and CASA filed their motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule
37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 154.) They argue that Reguli should
be sanctioned for “her willful violation of the Court’s Order.” (Id. at 1.) As to the form of sanctions,
Layton and CASA seek an order directing Reguli to respond to Interrogatory number 1 within 24
hours or designate the fact as established that she never paid her prior $3,145.50 sanction to CASA.
(Id. at 4.) They further request that the Court warn Reguli that further discovery violations could
result in more severe sanctions, including dismissal of her complaint. (Id.)
Reguli does not contest the fact that she failed to comply with the Court’s discovery order.
She, instead, argues that her failure to comply was justified because she filed an objection to the
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order and is awaiting a ruling from the District Judge.3 (Doc. No. 161.) The Court finds Reguli’s
justification for not complying with the Court’s discovery order unavailing. Instead, it illustrates
that she made a “conscious and intentional” decision not to comply with the discovery order.
Cornelius v. Aspen Constr., Inc., No. 5:25-CV-00175, 2026 WL 262195, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 14,
2026) (“[a] willful violation occurs whenever there is a conscious and intentional failure to comply
with the court order”) (alteration in original) (quoting Bass v. Jostens, Inc., 71 F.3d 237, 241 (6th
Cir. 1995)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:25-CV-175, 2026 WL 259625 (E.D. Ky.
Jan. 30, 2026).
Courts across the circuits “uniformly impose[] the rule that objecting to a Magistrate
Judge’s pretrial order does not automatically stay execution of the order.” Cruz v. Nike Retail
Servs., Inc., 346 F.R.D. 107, 112 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (collecting cases). Likewise, “[i]n the context
of an order entered by a magistrate judge, neither filing objections to the order nor filing a motion
to stay enforcement of the order relieves a party of its duty to comply with the order.” Holly v.
UPS Supply Chain Sols., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-980, 2015 WL 2446110, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 20,
2015) (citations omitted). Keeping in step, this Court’s Local Rules provide that “[t]here shall be
no stay of an order entered by a Magistrate Judge, absent a stay granted by the Magistrate Judge
3 	As a justification for her failure to comply with the order, Reguli argues that her objection
warrants a “de novo” determination of the report and recommendation” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 161 at 2.) However,
in 	this 	instance, 	the 	Court 	entered 	a 	nondispositive 	discovery 	order, 	not 	a 	report 	and
recommendation subject to de novo review. Therefore, “[t]he proper procedure for obtaining
review is set for[th] in Rule 72(a).” Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Walker, 142 F.R.D. 450, 452 (S.D. Ohio
1992). “A magistrate judge’s decision on a nondispositive matter will be reversed only if it is
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Goldblum v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:19-CV-398, 2020
WL 4345024, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2020); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a).
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or the District Judge.” LR 72.01(c). No stay has been granted, and the rule is clear.4 Reguli’s
willful defiance of the Court’s order compelling her to answer Interrogatory No. 1 is not excused
merely because she objected to the order and later filed a motion to stay the order after the time
had passed for her to comply.
The Court also finds that Layton and CASA have been prejudiced by Reguli’s failure to
respond to discovery. First, they are being deprived of the information they sought, which
effectively prevents them from preparing their case for trial. Secondly, they were forced to spend
time and resources seeking redress from the Court due to Reguli’s failure to comply with the
discovery order.
Reguli, however, has not been warned that the failure to comply with discovery could result
in sanctions such as dismissal of her complaint or that her failure to answer Interrogatory number
1 could result in the Court deeming as established the fact that she never paid her prior $3,145.50
sanction to CASA. Likewise, the Court has not yet had the opportunity to consider less drastic
sanctions as a means to right the ship before disaster befalls her.
The fact remains, Reguli willfully failed to comply with the Court’s discovery order. See
Victor v. Reynolds, 649 F. Supp. 3d 499, 514 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (“The Court cannot ‘recompel’
the production of discovery—sanctions are the exclusive vehicle through which the Court may
enforce a prior order compelling discovery.”). In this instance, the only appropriate sanction at this
time is to award Layton and CASA their reasonable expenses incurred from litigating the instant
motion. The Court finds that this sanction adequately assures Reguli’s future compliance with
discovery and sufficiently punishes her failure to comply with the Court’s order. See City of
4 	The Court’s scheduling order mandates that Reguli familiarize herself with the Local Rules
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 54.)
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Gallatin v. Gallatin Data Centers, LLC, No. 3:24-CV-00868, 2026 WL 816028, at *4 (M.D. Tenn.
Jan. 9, 2026) (“The purpose of imposing sanctions is to assure both future compliance with the
discovery rules and to punish past discovery failures, as well as to compensate a party for expenses
incurred due to another party’s failure to properly allow discovery.”) (quoting Jackson v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 888 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir. 1989)). The Court will not resort to more severe sanctions
at this time; however, Reguli is warned that further violations could result in dismissal of her
complaint, or as was requested by Layton and CASA, an order establishing the fact that she never
paid her prior $3,145.50 sanction to CASA.
IV. 	Conclusion
Layton and CASA’s motion for sanctions (Doc. No. 154) is GRANTED IN PART. Reguli
shall immediately comply with the Court’s discovery order (Doc. No. 140) to avoid more severe
sanctions. The Court orders monetary sanctions against Reguli. Counsel for Defendants Layton
and CASA shall file a fee declaration setting forth the total amount of fees and costs incurred
related to this motion no later than fourteen (14) days after the date of entry of this order. Any
objection to the amount of expenses requested shall be filed within fourteen (14) days after the
date when Defendants’ declaration is filed.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
LUKE A. EVANS
United States Magistrate Judge
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