Martin v. Putman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ERVIN D. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC PUTMAN et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3:24-cv-00711
Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Alistair E. Newbern
To: 	The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of pro se Plaintiff Ervin
D. Martin’s alleged arrest and detention by Defendants Greenbriar Police Department Lieutenant
Allen and Officer Michael Jones. (Doc. No. 1.) On November 5, 2025, the Court found that Martin
had not complied with the Court’s September 8, 2025 order requiring Martin to file a notice
informing the Court of his plans to prosecute this action. (Doc. No. 27.) The Court ordered Martin
to show cause why the Magistrate Judge should not recommend that the Court dismiss this action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). (Id.) In response, Martin has filed two motions asking
for more time before he pursues his claims in this action. (Doc. Nos. 28, 29.) The defendants still
have not appeared in this action and have not responded to Martin’s complaint or his most recent
motions.
For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that the Court dismiss
this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b) and deny Martin’s motions (Doc. Nos. 28, 29).
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I. 	Relevant Background
Martin initiated this action on June 10, 2024, by filing a complaint against Allen, Jones,
and Defendant Greenbriar Police Department Deputy Chief Eric Putman. (Doc. No. 1.) The Court
granted Martin’s application to appear in forma pauperis and screened his complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), finding that Martin has stated colorable false arrest claims against Allen
and Jones and colorable malicious prosecution claims against Allen, Jones, and Putman. (Doc.
No. 8.) The Court allowed these claims to proceed for further development, but dismissed all other
claims and defendants in Martin’s complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state claims on
which relief can be granted. (Id.) The Court referred this action to the Magistrate Judge for case
management and to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Id.)
On September 8, 2025, the Court found that, despite the United States Marshals Service’s
efforts to serve Allen, Jones, and Putman with summonses and copies of Martin’s complaint on
Martin’s behalf (Doc. Nos. 14, 15, 21, 22), Allen, Jones, and Putman still had not appeared in this
action or responded to Martin’s complaint. (Doc. No. 25.) The Court explained to Martin that it
remains his “responsibility to prosecute his claims in this action” and ordered Martin “to file a
notice by September 29, 2025, informing the Court of his plans to prosecute this action, including
any plans to file a motion for entry of default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).” (Id. at
PageID# 88.) The Court warned Martin that failure to comply with its order “may result in a
recommendation that his claims be dismissed under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute.” (Id.)
On September 26, 2025, Martin filed a motion asking the Court “to allow [him] mor[e]
time to 	complete [his] 	mission 	or 	bring 	[his] 	p[e]rpetrators 	to 	justic[e].” (Doc. 	No. 26,
PageID# 92.) Martin stated that, on September 22, 2025, “[a]n investi[g]ation” “for intimidation”
“was taken out on behalf of Thistle Farm,” whose owner or property manager Martin “hold[s]
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responsible for having [him] arrested by Greenbriar Police officers,” and Martin is “hoping it will
lead up to having the officers also investigated . . . .” (Id.) Martin stated that he “need[s] enough
time until the investigation is completed.” (Id.)
The Court found that Martin’s motion was “not responsive to the Court’s order” because,
“[i]nstead of informing the Court about his plans to prosecute this action, Martin state[d] that he
wants to wait to pursue his claims against Allen, Jones, and Putman until an investigation Martin
hopes will expose the officers is completed.” (Doc. No. 27, PageID# 97.) The Court found that
“Martin’s speculation in this regard is not a sufficient basis to delay progress of the claims Martin
alleged against these defendants when he filed this case in June 2024.” (Id.) The Court therefore
denied Martin’s motion and ordered him to show cause “by November 17, 2025, why the
Magistrate Judge should not recommend that the Court dismiss this action under Rule 41(b) for
Martin’s failure to prosecute his claims.” The Court warned Martin that failure to comply with its
show-cause order would “likely result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.” (Id. at
PageID# 98.)
On November 14, 2025, Martin filed a motion again asking the Court “for more time”
“while the (T.B.I.) Tennessee Bureau of Investigation[ ] do[es] a full investigation on the
defendants[.]” (Doc. No. 28, PageID# 99.) On December 15, 2025, Martin filed a second motion
for more time, again addressing his attempts to initiate an investigation of the defendants. (Doc.
No. 29.) Martin also addressed his attempts to find a lawyer to assist him and his inability to work.
(Id.) Allen, Jones, and Putman still have not appeared in this action and have not responded to
Martin’s complaint or his motion for more time.
II. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “confers on district courts the authority to dismiss
an action for failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the claim or to comply with the Rules or any order
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of the court.” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t, 529 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Knoll v. AT&T, 176 F.3d 359, 362–63 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630 (1962) (recognizing “the power of courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their
calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties
seeking relief”); Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled
that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a lawsuit for failure to prosecute.”).
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a tool for district courts to manage their dockets and avoid
unnecessary burdens on opposing parties and the judiciary. See Schafer, 529 F.3d at 736. The Sixth
Circuit therefore affords district courts “‘substantial discretion”’ regarding decisions to dismiss for
failure to prosecute. Id. (quoting Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363).
Courts look to four factors for guidance when determining whether dismissal under
Rule 41(b) is appropriate: (1) the willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the plaintiff; (2) whether the
defendant has been prejudiced by the plaintiff’s conduct; (3) whether the plaintiff was warned that
failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) the availability and appropriateness of other,
less drastic sanctions. Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363 (citing Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Schs., 138 F.3d 612,
615 (6th Cir. 1998)). Under Sixth Circuit precedent, “none of the factors is outcome dispositive,”
but “a case is properly dismissed by the district court where there is a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct.” Id. (citing Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980));
see also Muncy v. G.C.R., Inc., 110 F. App’x 552, 555 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that dismissal with
prejudice “is justifiable in any case in which ‘there is a clear record of delay or contumacious
conduct on the part of the plaintiff’” (quoting Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 591
(6th Cir. 2001))). Because dismissal without prejudice is a relatively lenient sanction as compared
to dismissal with prejudice, the “controlling standards should be greatly relaxed” for Rule 41(b)
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dismissals without prejudice where “the dismissed party is ultimately not irrevocably deprived of
his [or her] day in court.” Muncy, 110 F. App’x at 556 (citing Nwokocha v. Perry, 3 F. App’x 319,
321 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also M.D. Tenn. R. 41.01 (dismissal of inactive cases) (allowing Court
to summarily dismiss without prejudice “[c]ivil suits that have been pending for an unreasonable
period of time without any action having been taken by any party”).
III. 	Analysis
Dismissal of this action is appropriate under Rule 41(b) because the four relevant factors,
considered under the “relaxed” standard for dismissals without prejudice, show a record of delay
by Martin.
A. 	Bad Faith, Willfulness, or Fault
A plaintiff’s actions demonstrate bad faith, willfulness, or fault where they “‘display either
an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [plaintiff’s] conduct
on those proceedings.’” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Mulbah, 261 F.3d at 591). There is no indication that Martin’s failure to prosecute his claims and
to comply with the Court’s orders is a result of bad faith. However, the Court explained to Martin
that his hope that state authorities will investigate Allen, Jones, and Putman “is not a sufficient
basis to delay progress of the claims Martin alleged against these defendants when he filed this
case in June 2024.” (Doc. No. 27, PageID# 97.) And the Court ordered Martin to show cause why
his claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Doc. No. 27.) In response, Martin has
repeated his request to wait for a state investigation before pursuing his claims in this action. (Doc.
Nos. 28, 29.)
Martin’s motions for more time are not responsive to the Court’s order to show cause. Once
again, instead of informing the Court of his plans to prosecute his claims, Martin states that he
wants to wait to pursue his claims against Allen, Jones, and Putman until an investigation Martin
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hopes will expose the officers is completed or his financial circumstances improve. (Id.) Martin is
therefore “at fault for failing to comply with the Court’s Orders.” Ibrahim v. Marriot Hotels, Inc.,
Case No. 3:15-cv-01147, 2018 WL 6978105, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 10, 2018) (quoting Malott v.
Haas, Civ. Action No. 16-13014, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2017)), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 120810 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2019). And Martin’s continued failure to prosecute
his claims against Allen, Jones, and Putman displays a disregard for the effect of his conduct on
these proceedings. See Wu, 420 F.3d at 643; cf. Washington v. CCA, Civ. No. 3:13-0113, 2013
WL 2477287, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 2013) (“Waiting an indefinite amount of time to see if
the Plaintiff ever decides to . . . [prosecute his claims] is simply not a reasonable solution.”). This
factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal.
B. 	Prejudice
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] defendant is prejudiced by a plaintiff’s dilatory conduct
if the defendant is ‘required to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the
plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide.’” Carpenter, 723 F.3d at 707 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also
Schafer, 529 F.3d at 739 (same). Such prejudice typically arises in the discovery context. See, e.g.,
Harmon, 110 F.3d at 368 (finding prejudice where plaintiff failed to respond to defendant’s
interrogatories and a related motion to compel); Wright v. City of Germantown, No. 11-02607,
2013 WL 1729105, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2013) (finding prejudice where defendant
“expended time and money pursuing [plaintiff’s] required initial disclosures and deposition
testimony”). Notably, time and effort spent on “typical steps in the early stages of litigation[,]”
such as answering a complaint or filing pretrial motions to advance the defendant’s position, are
not actions “necessitated by any lack of cooperation” and therefore do not weigh in favor of
dismissal for failure to prosecute. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 739. The Sixth Circuit explained in Schafer
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v. City of Defiance Police Department that “[i]f such efforts . . . [were] alone sufficient to establish
prejudice,” for the purpose of Rule 41(b), “then every defendant who answers a complaint and
responds even minimally to a lawsuit would be able to claim prejudice[,]” a “result [that] would
defy common sense.” Id. at 740.
Because the defendants in this action have not appeared, this factor weighs against
dismissal. Jefferson v. CoreCivic, Case No. 3:21-cv-00776, 2022 WL 4280489, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Sept. 15, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17365247 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 1,
2022).
C. 	Prior Notice
Whether a party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal “is a ‘key
consideration’” in the Rule 41(b) analysis. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 740 (quoting Stough, 138 F.3d at
615). The Court twice warned Martin that failure to comply with the Court’s orders and to
prosecute his claims could result in a recommendation of dismissal. (Doc. Nos. 25, 27.) This factor
weighs in favor of dismissal.
D. 	Appropriateness of Other Sanctions
The less-drastic sanction of dismissal without prejudice is available and appropriate here.
Dismissal without prejudice balances the Court’s interest in “sound judicial case and docket
management” with “the public policy interest in the disposition of cases on their merits . . . .”
Muncy, 110 F. App’x at 557 n.5; see also Mulbah, 261 F.3d at 590–91. Such a sanction is
particularly appropriate in cases of prolonged inactivity and where, as here, the plaintiff appears
pro se. See Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737 (noting that courts apply the four-factor test “‘more stringently
in cases where the plaintiff’s attorney’s conduct is responsible for the dismissal’” (quoting
Harmon, 110 F.3d at 367)).
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IV. 	Recommendation
Considering the relevant factors, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that this action be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Rule 41(b) for Martin’s failure to prosecute his
claims and to comply with the Court’s orders and that Martin’s motions for more time (Doc.
No. 28, 29) be DENIED.
Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to
file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt
of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).
A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after
being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Entered this 2nd day of January, 2026.
____________________________________
ALISTAIR E. NEWBERN
United States Magistrate Judge
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