Grindstaff v. Wilson County, The et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
DONNA GRINDSTAFF 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-cv-00914
) 	Judge Richardson/Frensley
WILSON COUNTY, ROBERT BRYAN, )
MIKE HALE, and JOSEPH RILEY 	)
PIERCE 	)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants in this matter.
Docket No. 7. The Defendants have filed a supporting memorandum of law (Docket No. 8) and
the Plaintiff has responded in opposition (Docket No. 10). For the reasons set forth herein, the
undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss (Docket No. 7) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of the events following a report of domestic dispute between the
Plaintiff and Todd Dickinson on July 24, 2021. The Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint
in this Court on July 22, 2022, against Wilson County, Tennessee and Joseph Peirce. Donna
Dickinson v Wilson County, Tennessee and Joseph Peirce, 3:22-cv-00553. That action asserted
claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleging that there was no probable cause for her arrest, that she
was harmed during transport to the jail and that the jail failed to render medical care to her.
Dickinson v Wilson County, Tennessee and Joseph Peirce, 3:22-cv-00553. Docket No. 1.
While that action was pending, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint asserting the same
allegations from the earlier action and adding additional claims against Robert Bryan and Mike
Hale for inadequate training and “fail[ing] to fire and jail Defendant Pierce for his improper
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seizures, failure to investigate, conspiring to falsely arrest/imprison/extort Plaintiff, failure to arrest
the aggressor Todd Dickinson, excessive force with handcuffs and failure to render medical aid.”
Docket No. 1, p. 6. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant Peirce failed to render medical aid
during her transport to the jail. Id. at p. 8.
The Defendants Wilson County and Jospeh Pierce filed a motion for summary judgment
in the earlier filed case which was granted when the Court adopted the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation and that matter was dismissed with prejudice in its entirely. Donna Dickinson
v Wilson County, Tennessee and Joseph Peirce, 3:22-cv-00553, Docket No. 163. The Plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal (Docket No. 165), which remains pending in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Dickson v. Wilson County Sheriff’s Office, Civil Action No. 25-
5061. The Plaintiff sought to stay the later filed case in light of the appeal (Docket No. 16) which
was denied. Docket No. 18.
RELEVANT FACTS
While the Court must take all well pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true and construe
them in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff for purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss, the
Court finds that a recitation of the facts regarding the incident at issue found in the Court’s decision
granting the motion for summary judgment in the earlier filed case helpful to understanding the
allegations set forth in this matter.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 24, 2021, she was being harassed by her
husband, Todd Dickinson (“T.D.”), in their home in Mount Juliet, Tennessee,
because she would not “sign off on their marital property.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff asserts
that she was seeking a divorce from T.D. because she believed that he was
committing fraud regarding the refinancing and the anticipated sale of their
residence and that T.D. was threatening and intimidating her by throwing a paper
in her face, withholding the family automobile, destroying property, entering her
personal space, and repeatedly disrupting a telephone call she was having with her
parents. Id. At some point, T.D. contacted the Sheriff’s Department and Deputy
Pierce was dispatched to the residence. Id.
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Plaintiff asserts that she was asleep in an upstairs bedroom when she was
awakened by Pierce and, without any explanation or questioning, she was told that
she was under arrest. Id. She asserts that there was not a warrant for her arrest and
that Pierce did not “inquire about any relevant facts” and did not “investigate or
seek justice on behalf of the Plaintiff who is the victim of domestic violence both
physical and financial.” Id. at 2-3. 	She asserts that she was placed under arrest
while wearing “a skimpy nightgown,” and that Pierce ignored her request that a
female officer be present. Id. at 3. She alleges that she was handcuffed behind her
back in a very tight manner and that Pierce refused to loosen the handcuffs despite
her repeated complaints about the handcuffs being too tight, resulting in “swelling
and bruising to her wrists and other parts of her body.” Id. She also alleges that she
requested her purse after being placed in the back of the patrol car and that Pierce
went to retrieve the purse but did not bring it back with him. Id. Plaintiff alleges
that Pierce drove “fast around corners” and took his hands off the steering wheel to
put chewing tobacco in his mouth. Id. She asserts that Pierce’s conduct caused her
“to fall and bruise her shoulder and other extremities,” caused her to suffer
emotional stress, and caused her to become so scared that she hyperventilated, but
that Pierce did not offer her any assistance, aid, or medical care. Id. Plaintiff was
transported to the county jail by Pierce, where she was held for twelve hours before
being released. Id. She does not allege that she had any further interactions with
Pierce once she was detained at the jail.
Plaintiff alleges that she was told after booking that she “was suicidal,” that
she could not make an immediate telephone call, and that she would be “bound” if
she asked again for a telephone call. Id. at 4. She asserts that she had to wait six
hours to be examined by a nurse before she was permitted to make a telephone call
to her parents. Id. She asserts that she was denied a blanket or a shirt despite being
clothed in only a nightgown, that the cell in which she was detained was dirty and
cold, and that she was confined with five other women without any face masks to
protect her from COVID. 	Id. at 4-5. 	Plaintiff alleges that she was eventually
released from the jail onto the street, still in her nightgown, where she was pursued
by a man who tried to coax her into his residence. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that she contracted “COVID pneumonia and a pulmonary
embolism” two weeks after her detention, which she attributes to the conditions in
her jail cell. Id. at 4-5. She also alleges that T.D. continued to harass and threaten
her after her release and “conveyed through third parties” that he would drop the
charge if she “signed off on marital property.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff further alleges that
she attempted to report T.D.’s criminal activities to the “Wilson County authorities”
but they were not interested in investigating or prosecuting Dickinson. Id. She also
asserts that, despite providing evidence to the district attorney that the accusation
against her was false, she was required to travel from Alabama to Lebanon,
Tennessee for a hearing before the General Sessions Court where the charge was
dismissed and expunged. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, because of these events, she suffered financial harm in
the costs of a criminal defense attorney, the loss of a $1,400 check that was in her
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purse, and the loss of $4,000 in cash and personal belongings that were in her
marital residence and that she could not retrieve after her arrest. Id. at 5-6. 	She
further contends that she suffered pain and humiliation and damage to her good
name and reputation. Id.
Dickinson v Wilson County, et al , 3:22-cv-00553, Docket No. 156, pp. 2-4.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standards
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The Supreme Court has clarified the Twombly
standard, stating that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	A complaint that pleads facts “‘merely
consistent with’ defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility’ of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal brackets
omitted).
When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court must “construe the complaint
liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences
therein.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F. 3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). The court should allow
“a well-pleaded complaint [to] proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those
facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.” Id. at 555.
“‘[A] legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’ need not be accepted as true on a motion to
dismiss,” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F. 3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted),
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and mere recitation of the elements of a cause of action “or an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” will not do, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
While the court must accept “as true all non-conclusory allegations in the complaint,” Delay v.
Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, 585 F. 3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009), it does not have to accept
unsupported legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F. 3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pro se litigants, however, are not
exempt from the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Wells v. Brown, 891 F. 2d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life. Ins. Co., 518 F. 2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415
F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“a court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled
out in his pleading”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73
F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”). To demand otherwise would require the “courts to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F. 2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
For actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the statute of limitations is the limitations period for
personal injury claims in the State where the claim arose. 	Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387
(2007). 	In Tennessee, Section 1983 actions are governed by a one-year statute of limitations
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period. Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F. 3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a).
Although state law provides the statute of limitations, federal law governs when the statute of
limitations commences. 	Sevier v. Turner, 742 F. 3d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). 	The statute of
limitations period “‘commences to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of his action. A plaintiff has reason to know of his injury when he should have
discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.’” Roberson, 399 F. 3d at 794 (citation
omitted). The Sixth Circuit has added that “‘[i]n determining when the cause of action accrues in
section 1983 actions, we have looked to what event should have alerted the typical lay person to
protect his or her rights.’” Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F. 3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
Res judicata is a “[r]ule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of
action[.]” Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. Of Dentistry, 913 S. W. 2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995) (alteration in
original), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1172 (5th Ed. 1979). It is a claim preclusion doctrine
that prohibits a subsequent lawsuit between the same parties with respect to all issues that were or
could have been litigated in a previous suit. Massengill v. Scott, 738 S. W. 2d 629, 631 (Tenn.
1987).
As this Court has recently stated:
Collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of factual matters that were fully
considered and decided in an earlier proceeding. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 690 F. 2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982). 	Under Tennessee law, collateral
estoppel “bars the same parties or their privies from relitigating in a later proceeding
legal or factual issues that were actually raised and necessarily determined in an
earlier proceeding.” 	Mullins v. State, 294 S. W. 3d 529, 534 (Tenn. 2009). 	The
party that argues for collateral estoppel must show that (1) the issue to be precluded
is identical to an issue decided in an earlier proceeding, (2) the issue to be precluded
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was actually raised, litigated, and decided on the merits in the earlier proceeding,
(3) the judgment in the earlier proceeding has become final, (4) the party against
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party to the
earlier proceeding to contest the issue now sought to be precluded. Gibson v. Trant,
58 S. W. 3d 103, 118 (Tenn. 2001).
Wildasin v. Mathes, 176 F. Supp. 3d 737, 745 (M.D. Tenn. 2016) (Sharp, J.) (footnote in original).
B. 	The Motion to Dismiss
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). The Supreme Court has clarified the Twombly
standard, stating that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	Plausibility requires “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	A complaint that pleads facts “‘merely
consistent with’ defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility’ of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal brackets
omitted).
When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court must “construe the complaint
liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences
therein.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F. 3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). The court should allow
“a well-pleaded complaint [to] proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those
facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions.” Id. at 555.
“‘[A] legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’ need not be accepted as true on a motion to
dismiss,” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F. 3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted),
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and mere recitation of the elements of a cause of action “or an “unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” will not do, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
While the court must accept “as true all non-conclusory allegations in the complaint,” Delay v.
Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, 585 F. 3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009), it does not have to accept
unsupported legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F. 3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pro se litigants, however, are not
exempt from the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Wells v. Brown, 891 F. 2d
591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to create a claim for a plaintiff. Clark v. Nat’l
Travelers Life. Ins. Co., 518 F. 2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415
F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“a court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled
out in his pleading”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73
F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”). 	To demand otherwise would require the “courts to explore exhaustively all
potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its
legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F. 2d 1274, 1278
(4th Cir. 1985).
As noted above, both actions filed by the Plaintiff involve the same set of circumstances
from the same event arising at the exact same time. While the earlier action was dismissed on
summary judgment after the briefing in this matter; neither party has provided any supplemental
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briefing regarding the effect, if any, of the Court’s ruling granting summary judgment in the earlier
case on this matter.
The undersigned believes that the principles of res judicata and collateral estopple apply to
this case given the Court’s ruling on the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the
underlying case. While not addressed by the Parties, to the extent that the claims Plaintiff asserts
in this action are virtually identical to the claims asserted and found to be lacking in the underlying
action, there is no escaping the principles of res judicata and collateral estopple.
The Plaintiff argues almost exclusively that the claims she asserts in this action are not
untimely based on the discovery rule. Docket Nos. 9 and 10. The Plaintiff asserts that early on in
the underlying litigation she sought video evidence from the rear seat of the patrol car in which
she was transported but either did not receive or was otherwise able to access the video evidence
until December 2023, despite having been provided the information by July 27, 2023, at the latest.
Docket No. 10, pp. 2 and 10. The consequence of this delay according to the Plaintiff is that until
reviewing the evidence she did not know that she had become unconscious in the rear seat of the
vehicle and that Defendant Peirce had failed to render medical aid to her. Docket No. 10, pp. 2-3.
The problem with the Plaintiff’s argument is that the allegations in this action do not create
a new cause of action unknown to her at the time the original action was brought. Instead, there
are additional facts learned on the course of discovery that support the claim previously made in
the litigation. Therefore, they are subject to the statute of limitations based upon the date of the
events occurring which was July 24, 2021.
Plaintiff alleged in her complaint in the earlier filed action that she was not given any
assistance or aid by Peirce after hyperventilating in the back seat of his patrol car. Dickinson v
Wilson County, et al , 3:22-cv-00553, Docket No. 1 at p. 3. It is certainly not unusual for a party
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to discover additional facts that support their claims during the course of litigation. The discovery
of those facts related to an already pled claim does not create a new statue of limitations. It certainly
does not allow a party to refile a lawsuit based upon the same claims ultimately dismissed in a
previous lawsuit Dickinson v Wilson County, et al , 3:22-cv-00553, Docket No. 156, pp. 2-4.
That is exactly the situation present in the instant case with respect to Defendants Wilson
County, Tennessee and Pierce. Further, in the event that the Plaintiff had never filed the original
lawsuit Plaintiff’s review of the video materials in December of 2023 would not save her from the
statute of limitations. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims in this action against Defendants Wilson
County and Joseph Pierce fail and the motion to dismiss should be granted.
With regard to Plaintiff’s attempts to add claims against Robert Bryan and Mike Hale for
inadequate training, any such claims are barred by the statute of limitation. The Plaintiff was well
aware of any failure to train claims at the time she filed her original lawsuit. In fact, she asserted
claims for failure to train and supervise in her original lawsuit. As for her claims against Wilson
County, those failure to train and supervise claims were addressed by the Court in the underlying
action. Docket No. 156. In response to the motion dismiss, the Plaintiff makes no argument why
her claims against Hale or Bryant should survive and the Court is unable to find one. The Plaintiff’s
sole argument regarding her access to the rear seat video evidence has no impact on any claims
against these Defendants and the Plaintiff makes no argument as to why it would.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the Defendants’ motion
to dismiss (Docket No. 7) be GRANTED and this matter be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
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Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S. Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
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