West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MADISON A. WEST, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 3: 24-cv-01219
) 	Judge Trauger / Frensley
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NA., 	)
et al., 	)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This pro se action is before the court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket
No. 36) and other matters. The motion for summary judgment is briefed and ready for disposition.
After reviewing the record and the briefs, the undersigned recommends the motion for summary
judgment be granted and the complaint be dismissed.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Madison West originally filed suit against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”)
and others in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, Case No. 24-CV-2231.
Defendants removed to this court based on diversity. Docket No. 1.
Plaintiff alleged the following in her state court complaint. Docket No. 1-1. In February
2024, she opened the first of five total accounts with Chase - three checking accounts, one savings
account, and one installment loan. 	Id. at p. 3. In June 2024, she was approached by a “Crypto
Currency Certified Advisor” via Facebook. Id. at p. 4. In July 2024, pursuant to an offer to trade
with this advisor, she initiated several transfers ranging from $500 to $12,000. Id. On or about
August 20, 2024, she attempted to transfer $87,000.00, which she intended to use to purchase “a
trading signal to complete trades and withdraw,” but Chase declined the transfer because it was
unable to confirm the banking information. Id.
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On or about August 21, 2024, Chase informed Plaintiff that it had restricted her checking
and savings accounts. Id. at p. 5. She responded by contacting Elga Duarte, Chase investigator,
who informed her that she had been flagged for “suspicious” activity and that the bank would be
closing her accounts. Id. Duarte accused her of having “suspicious” bank accounts, of opening
bank accounts solely to “move money,” and of appearing “suspicious” for traveling outside the
country the day after a wire was declined, even though Plaintiff had informed Duarte that the
purpose of her travel was to attend her son’s wedding in Jamaica. Id. Duarte informed Plaintiff
that the bank would only release funds to her in-person at its branch in East Nashville, Tennessee,
around August 27, 2024. Id.
From August 21 to September 6, 2024, Plaintiff had thirty interactions with Chase and filed
grievances with its Executive Office, as well as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Id. at
pp. 6-7.
On August 30, 2024, she spoke with Jacob Smith, a Global Security Supervisor with Chase.
After a series of detailed questions, Smith informed her that she had been the victim of a fraudulent
crypto currency scheme. Id. at p. 6. 	On September 5, 2024, Chase returned the money from
Plaintiff’s frozen accounts in the amount of $93,709.45. Id. at p. 8.
Plaintiff asserted four claims: wrongful closure of her bank accounts (Count I); defamation
of character and slander (Counts II and III); and “criminal profiling” (Count IV). 	Id. at pp. 9-10.
She seeks “up to $1,000,000.000” in damages. Id. at p. 11. Plaintiff names the bank as a defendant,
as well as Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO; Ashley Bacon, Chief Risk Officer; and Elga Duarte.
The district judge dismissed Counts II, III and IV. Docket No. 27. Defendants now move
for summary judgment on the remaining claim for wrongful closure of her bank account.
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s accounts were properly closed in compliance with the Deposit
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Account Agreement (“DAA”) that governed the accounts. Docket Nos. 36, 37. They argue in the
alternative that the individual defendants are not proper parties to the action. Docket No. 36, p. 1.
In support of their motion, defendants attached the declaration of Halie Williams, Chase Vice
President and Senior Product Manager, as well as copies of the DAA and of the Personal Electronic
Signature Cards for the accounts owned by Plaintiff. Docket No. 36-1.
Plaintiff responded, opposing the motion. Docket No. 39. She argues genuine issues of
material fact exist, specifically whether defendants complied with all terms of the DAA, including
notice requirements; whether the closure was arbitrary, discriminatory, retaliatory, or in bad faith;
and the extent of involvement and liability of individual defendants in the decision to close her
account. Docket No. 39, p. 1. She reiterates the allegations in her complaint that she received no
prior notice or insufficient notice prior to closure of her accounts contrary to the agreement, that
defendants’ stated reason for closure was pretextual, and that the closure resulted in significant
damage, including denial of access to essential funds. Id. at p. 2. She argues there is a genuine
dispute as to whether the closure was arbitrary, discriminatory, or retaliatory. Id. She argues she
was not “provided a meaningful opportunity to review or understand the referenced agreements.”
Docket No. 40, p. 2. 	In support, she submitted her sworn declaration and a copy of the DAA.
Docket No. 40-1-5.
Defendants replied, contending Plaintiff has not genuinely disputed any of the material
facts presented by them and that her dispute rests on her argument that she was not provided a
“meaningful opportunity” to review the DAA. Docket No. 43, p. 1.
Plaintiff moved for leave to file a sur-reply, contending it is necessary to address new
arguments and factual assertions by defendants, including references to her status as a victim, new
arguments regarding the DAA and purported lack of notice, and assertions that discovery has not
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started.1 Docket No. 44, p. 1.
The evidence proffered by the parties reveals the following. For each of her checking and
savings accounts, Plaintiff entered into a DAA. Section VIII of the DAA, titled “Closing Your
Account,” provides that Chase “may close [an] account (other than a CD) at any time for any
reason or no reason without prior notice.” Docket No. 36-1, p. 37. Each of the signature cards for
Plaintiff’s deposit accounts states the following: “ACKNOWLEDGEMENT – “I’ve read and agree
to the Online and Mobile E-Sign Disclosure and Consent Agreement, Digital Services Agreement,
and Deposit Account Agreement and Tax info.” Docket No. 36-1, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 10-11, 13-14.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The movant must show through “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits ... that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party.” Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006). The court
must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quoting United States v. Diebold,
1 Defendants do not raise any new arguments or factual assertions. Accordingly, the undesigned
in its discretion will deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply and exclude from its
consideration those arguments raised in Plaintiff’s unauthorized sur-reply. 	See McGruder v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., No. 3:17-CV-01547, 2020 WL 4586171, at
*3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2020) (neither the Federal or Local Rules allow for or even contemplate
sur-replies). Such filings are “highly disfavored,” especially when they fail to “raise any new legal
arguments or introduce new evidence.” Liberty Legal Found. v. Nat’l Democratic Party of the
USA, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (W.D. Tenn. 2012).
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Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, [however,] one
of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, [we
need] not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
Once the moving party points out that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case, the trial court is not required to scour the record to establish that “it is
bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford &Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80
(6th Cir. 1989) 	Rather, the nonmoving party must affirmatively come forth with specific facts
showing there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary should be granted unless a court finds “there is sufficient evidence
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Brown v. Chapman,
814 F.3d 447, 464 (6th Cir. 2016).
Count I – Wrongful Closure of Bank Account
In Count I, Plaintiff asserts defendants acted wrongfully and without justification in closing
her accounts, causing her financial and emotional distress. Docket No. 1-1, p. 9. The undisputed
evidence shows Plaintiff’s accounts were closed pursuant to the contract governing the accounts,
the DAA. Section VIII of the DAA, titled “Closing Your Account,” provides that Chase “may
close [an] account (other than a CD) at any time for any reason or no reason without prior notice.”
Docket No. 36-1, p. 37. 	Each of the signature cards for Plaintiff’s deposit accounts states the
following: “ACKNOWLEDGEMENT – “I’ve read and agree to the Online and Mobile E-Sign
Disclosure and Consent Agreement, Digital Services Agreement, and Deposit Account Agreement
and Tax info.” 	Docket No. 36-1, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 10-11, 13-14. 	Plaintiff’s electronic signature is
binding. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-10-107(a)-(d).
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In a factually similar case, Wheat v. Chase Bank, No. 3:11-CV-309, 2014 WL 457588, at
*24-25 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2014), the court granted summary judgment to defendants after they
pointed to undisputed evidence that the contracts governing Plaintiff’s accounts gave them the
right to close them for any reason. 	The court found the evidence showed that defendants were
exercising rights that the contracts explicitly granted to them when they closed Plaintiff’s checking
and savings accounts and froze his investment account. 	Similarly, here Chase was explicitly
authorized to close Plaintiff’s accounts pursuant to the DAA.
Plaintiff admits she had an opportunity to read the DAA, but “disputes that she was
provided a meaningful opportunity to review or understand the referenced agreements at the time
of signing.” Docket No. 40, pp. 1-2. This argument fails. See Moody Realty Co., Inc. v. Huestis,
237 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted) (“One who signs a contract cannot
later plead ignorance of its contents if there was an opportunity to read it before signing.”; “The
law will not allow a party to enter a contract and then seek to avoid performance because he did
not read the agreement or know its contents. . . . Otherwise, written contracts would be worthless.
. . . In general, the law holds parties responsible for what they sign.”)
In sum, Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence to demonstrate a genuine dispute over the fact
that defendants acted in accordance with their contractual right to close her accounts. 	No
reasonable jury could conclude that defendants breached the contracts by terminating Plaintiff’s
accounts. Defendants should be granted on Count 1 and the complaint be dismissed. In light of
this holding the court need not address the alternative that the individual defendants are not proper
parties to the action.
Miscellaneous Motions
Also before the court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration. Docket No. 24. 	Plaintiff
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filed her motion during the interim period after the undersigned issued its R&R recommending
dismissal and before the district judge rendered a ruling. Plaintiff now seems desirous of adopting
the terms of the DAA. She asserts her claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement as
they are directly from the DAA. Docket No. 24, p. 3. She states she has made repeated attempts
to resolve the matter amicably but defendants either ignored or refused to respond to arbitrate and
she was therefore compelled to proceed with litigation. Id. She seeks a stay of these proceedings
pending arbitration. Id. at p. 1.
Defendants oppose the motion, arguing Plaintiff waived arbitration. Docket No. 25.
Plaintiff filed an untimely reply and a supplemental memorandum in support of her motion.
Docket Nos. 26, 29. Defendants oppose a sur-reply and move to strike the supplemental
memorandum. Docket No. 30.
Waiver is not to be lightly inferred, and mere invocation of the judicial process is
insufficient to constitute waiver. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985)
(citations omitted). 	Courts asking whether a party has waived a right to arbitrate should apply
ordinary waiver rules, looking for the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.
Schwebke v. United Wholesale Mortgage LLC, 96 F.4th 971, 974 (6th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). See
also Lee Constr., LLC v. Bratton, No. 1:22-CV-196, 2023 WL 5805848, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. July
28, 2023)(the 	general test for waiver of a contractual right under Tennessee law requires the
“intentional, voluntary relinquishment of a known right” as demonstrated by “clear, unequivocal
and decisive acts of the party.”) (quoting Am. Bank, FSB v. Cornerstone Cmty. Bank, 733 F.3d
609, 615 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Plaintiff’s actions in this case demonstrate a waiver. 	Plaintiff commenced the action in
state court in September 2024, seeking relief on the merits without mentioning or reserving her
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right to arbitrate. 	Docket No. 1-1, pp. 2-11. 	Plaintiff did not assert her right to arbitration in
response to removal nor did she raise the issue of arbitration in responding to the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff did not raise the issue of arbitration until after the undersigned issued its R&R
recommending dismissal and more than nine months after she filed suit. In other words, only after
a recommended adverse ruling did Plaintiff seek to stay the litigation in favor of arbitration.
Finally, Plaintiff did an about-face, initially arguing that she was not aware of the DAA and then
asserting the parties have entered into a valid and enforceable agreement under the DAA. Docket
No. 24, p. 3.
The court concludes that taken together, Plaintiff’s conduct demonstrates an intentional
relinquishment of the right to arbitrate. Plaintiff’s conduct is also inconsistent with any reliance
on the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration should be
denied. Defendants’ remaining motions to strike should be denied as moot. Docket Nos. 30, 45.
III. CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Docket No. 40) be GRANTED, and this action be DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s
motion to compel arbitration should be DENIED. Docket No 24. Defendants’ motions to strike
should be DENIED as moot. Docket Nos. 30, 45. 	Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply
is DENIED. Docket No. 44.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
after service of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days after service of any objections filed to this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of service of this Report
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and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
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