White v. Wesson et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MICHAEL WHITE # 00388508,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE WESSON, TBI, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:24-cv-01426
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael White, an inmate of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Complex in Hartsville,
Tennessee, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of his civil rights. (Doc. Nos. 1, 6). Recently, he filed a “First Amended Complaint”1
(Doc. No. 11), a Motion to Ascertain Status of Case (Doc. No. 12), and a Motion to File
Supplemental Complaint (Doc. No. 13).
I. MOTIONS
Plaintiff’s Motion to Ascertain Status of Case (Doc. No. 12) is GRANTED insofar as the
Court rules on all pending motions and conducts the required screening of the Second Amended
Complaint herein. (See supra n.1).
Plaintiff’s Motion to File Supplemental Complaint (Doc. No. 13) also is GRANTED. The
Court will consider the allegations raised in the Supplemental Complaint, but the operative
pleading in this case remains the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 11). Notably, the
1 The document entitled “First Amended Complaint” by Plaintiff is actually a Second Amended
Complaint as Plaintiff previously filed a First Amended Complaint. (See Doc. Nos. 7, 10). The
Court therefore will refer to the operative pleading in this case as the Second Amended Complaint.
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Supplemental Complaint does not allege claims against any individuals who were not named as
Defendants in the Second Amended Complaint.
II. SCREENING OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 11) is before the Court for an initial review
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
A. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520121 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
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B. SECTION 1983 STANDARD
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color
of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . .
. .” 	To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that
he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that
the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d
527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
C. ALLEGED FACTS
The allegations of the Second Amended Complaint are assumed true for purposes of the
required PLRA screening.
The affidavit of complaint to procure the arrest warrant against Plaintiff given by Wayne
Wesson, TBI employee, did not meet all the procedural and constitutional requirements. On April
27, 2004, Defendant Elina B. Foster, Clerk of Court, issued the warrant to arrest Plaintiff. On May
8, 2004, Defendant Carol Jean, Detective, executed the arrest warrant.
On June 30, 2004, Defendant Michael McCown, District Attorney, signed an indictment
against Plaintiff. Defendant Judge Charles Lee presided over the hearing in which Plaintiff was
arraigned on a sixteen-count indictment.
On September 22, 2004, Judge Lee, “in an attempt to ‘cover up’ the void indictment alleged
during the initial arraignment, ‘incorporated all fillings in the original case number 16177 into the
matter involving case number 16303 See (Appendix-F) which was a ‘supplemental indictment’
See (Appendix-c) that’s what the prosecutor for the State called it on April 26, 2005 at the
sentencing hearing when amending the number 16177.” (Doc. No. 11 at 3) (internal quotation
marks and italics in original).
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On March 15-16, 2005, Defendant Judge Franklin Lee Russell presided over Plaintiff’s
trial. The prosecutor was Defendant Weakley Eddie Bernard.
On February 10, 2006, Judge Russell “dismissed/nolle prosequi on all charges in case
number 16177 . . . .” (Id. at 5).
As relief, Plaintiff asks for admissions by Defendants that they violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, compensatory damages, and the “revers[al” of 	Plaintiff’s “wrongful
restraint.” (Id. at 5).
D. ANALYSIS
The Second Amended Complaint alleges Section 1983 claims against Defendants Wayne
Wesson, Elina B. Foster, Carol Jean, Charles Lee, Weakley Eddie Bernard, W. Michael McDown,
and Franklin Lee Russell.
First, the Second Amended Complaint alleges false arrest claims against Detective Carol
Jean. The Fourth Amendment requires that a law enforcement official have probable cause for an
arrest. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The probable cause necessary to justify an arrest is defined as
“whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.” Radvansky v. City of Olmsted,
496 F.3d 609, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The probable
cause determination is limited to the “totality of the circumstances” known to the officer at the
time of arrest, including all facts known to the officer at the time. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d
303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000).
To state a false arrest claim, when a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a warrant, the plaintiff
must show “that in order to procure the warrant, [the officer] knowingly and deliberately, or with
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reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that created a falsehood and
such statements or omissions were material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Sykes
v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)). A facially valid warrant is not
always sufficient to merit dismissal of a false arrest claim brought pursuant to Section 1983 when
evidence exists that a defendant intentionally misled or intentionally omitted information at a
probable cause hearing for an arrest or search warrant if the misleading or omitted information is
critical to the finding of probable cause. See Mays v. City of Deyton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir.
1998); United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997).
District courts apply state statutes of limitations to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harris
v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005). Tennessee applies a one-year statute of
limitations to Section 1983 actions. Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). However, federal law determines “[t]he date on which the statute of
limitations begins to run in a § 1983 action.” Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs.,
510 F.3d 631, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516,
520 (6th Cir. 1997)). For claims of false arrest, the statute of limitations begins to run at the time
the plaintiff becomes detained pursuant to legal process—when he is bound over by a magistrate
or arraigned on the charges. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 397 (2007).
The statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff was detained pursuant to legal
process. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that date was June
30, 2004. Plaintiff filed this action over twenty years later. Thus, Plaintiff’s false arrest claims
against any Defendant are time barred because the claims were filed more than one year after
Plaintiff’s arrest.
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Next, the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Wayne Wesson, Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation employee, obtained an arrest warrant against Plaintiff without probable cause. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence dictates that for a search or seizure of a person or property to be
considered reasonable, it must be supported by a warrant premised upon probable cause, absent
exceptional 	circumstances. Probable cause for 	a search 	warrant 	exists “if the facts 	and
circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person would be warranted in believing that an
offense had been committed and that evidence thereof would be found on the premises to be
searched.” Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996). Probable cause sufficient to
support an arrest warrant requires a showing “that the police have ‘reasonably trustworthy
information . . . sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [defendant] had committed
or was committing an offense.” Id. (quoting Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587,
592 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The Second Amended Complaint does not explain why Plaintiff believes Wesson acted
without probable cause. There are no allegations that the warrant was improperly secured because
of a factual omission, for example, or that Wesson “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless
disregard for the truth” made “false statements” that were “material, or necessary, to the finding
of probable cause.” Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing with approval
Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)). The allegations therefore fail to state a
Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 upon which relief can be granted. In any event, the
claim against Wesson was filed beyond the governing statute of limitations for Fourth Amendment
claims. That claim must be dismissed.
The Second Amended Complaint also alleges that Defendant Elina B. Foster, Clerk of
Court, issued an arrest warrant against Plaintiff without probable cause. “It is well-settled in this
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Circuit that the issuance of an arrest warrant is a judicial act for judicial immunity purposes.”
DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 784 (6th Cir. 1999). Absolute judicial immunity “has
been extended to non-judicial officers, such as a clerk of court, who is performing judicial
functions.” Leppla v. Kagel, No. 3:19 CV 2487, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157774, 2020 WL
5106841, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2020). There are no allegations that anything “clearly
deprived” Foster “of subject matter jurisdiction to issue” an arrest warrant. Norfleet v. Renner, 924
F.3d 317, 320 (6th Cir. 2019). Therefore, the Court finds that absolute judicial immunity is
warranted with respect to the claims made against Foster. See id.; Helton v. Dixon, No. Civ. A.
05CV377KKC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11791, 2006 WL 751239, at *9-10 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 21,
2006) (conduct of the trial commissioner, who was vested with the power to issue an arrest warrant,
was protected by judicial immunity and, therefore, not actionable under § 1983, even though the
complaint alleged that she signed the arrest warrant without any probable cause and acted
maliciously toward the plaintiff by signing the arrest warrant); Leppla, 2020 WL 5106841, at *4
(“[a] court clerk’s involvement with the issuance of arrest warrants is a judicial act and is protected
by absolute immunity” and “[a] clerk’s involvement in failing to recall an executed or invalid
warrant is likewise a judicial act”). And, in any event, the claims against Foster were brought
beyond the governing statute of limitations period. These claims must be dismissed.
Next, the Second Amended Complaint alleges malicious prosecution claims under Section
1983 against prosecutors Weakley Eddie Bernard and W. Michael McCown. Under federal law, a
plaintiff must prove four elements to establish a malicious prosecution claim: (1) a criminal
prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff, and the defendant made, influenced, or participated
in the prosecution decision; (2) there was no probable cause to support the charges; (3) as a result
of the legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure;
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and (4) the criminal proceedings ended without a conviction. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36
(2022); Miller v. Maddox, 866 F.3d 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2017); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294,
308-09 (6th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff fails to state colorable malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth
Amendment because he does not allege that the criminal proceedings arising from his 2004 arrest
ended without a conviction. Indeed, the Court’s own research reveals that Plaintiff was convicted
in Marshall County Circuit Court of multiple counts of rape. See State v. Michael White, No.
M2005-01659-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 13, 2006). He was sentenced to a
total effective sentence of 55 years’ incarceration. Id. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the convictions and accompanying sentences on direct appeal. See Michael White v.
Washburn, No. M2018-01815-CCA-R3-HC, 2019 WL 2207478, at *1 (May 22, 2019). White later
made unsuccessful bids for post-conviction relief, see Michael White v. State, M2007-02157-
CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Sept. 8, 2008) (affirming denial of post-conviction
relief), and Rule 36.1 relief, see Michael White v. State, M2017-02039-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim.
App., Nashville, July 23, 2018) (affirming denial of relief).
“One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is
termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” Sykes v, 625 F.3d 294, 309
(citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)); see King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578-
79 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that, unlike claims for false arrest or false imprisonment, “a malicious-
prosecution claim is not available before the favorable termination of criminal proceedings, nor
does the limitations period for such a claim begin until the favorable termination of criminal
proceedings”). Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims therefore fail to state claims under Section
1983 upon which relief can be granted, and those claims will be dismissed.
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Plaintiff’s remaining Section 1983 claims are against Judges Charles Lee and Franklin Lee
Russell. A judge has absolute immunity from suit both from money damages and injunctive relief
for his judicial acts. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978), Kipen v. Lawson, 57 F.
App’x 69, 692 (6th Cir. 2003). Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just immunity from
the assessment of money damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Because a
plaintiff’s allegations of bad faith, malice, or corruption against a judge cannot overcome absolute
judicial immunity from suit, a judge is entitled to have a suit accusing him or her of acting in bad
faith, maliciously, or corruptly dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity. See id.
Judicial immunity from suit can be overcome in two situations, neither of which is
applicable here. A judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not
taken in the judge's judicial capacity, or for actions, though judicial in nature, which are taken in
the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12; Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978). Neither of these exceptions to judicial immunity is applicable because the alleged
acts of Judges Lee and Russell clearly were judicial acts taken in the course of their judicial
capacity and were not committed in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s primary
complaint against the judges appears to be that he was tried on a superseding indictment.2 The
2 In affirming the denial of habeas relief to White, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals found:
The documents attached to the petition for writ of habeas corpus belie the
petitioner’s claim that he only recently became aware of both the superseding
indictment and the fact that he was convicted of the charges contained in that
indictment. All the judgments of conviction and transcripts of evidence bear the
superseding indictment number, and the direct appeal proceeded on that docket
number. This court evaluated the propriety of the petitioner’s convictions based
upon the offenses charged in the superseding indictment. The exhibits to the
petition show that the State utilized that docket number at the sentencing hearing.
Moreover, as the State points out, the superseding indictment is valid on its face,
and the petitioner does not contend otherwise. The language in the original and
superseding indictments is nearly identical. Finally, a claim that the petitioner was
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Second Amended Complaint makes no allegations that would subject either judge to liability in
his individual capacity. Therefore, Judges Lee and Russell are absolutely immune from this civil
suit, and Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official and individual capacities must be
dismissed.
Finally, with respect to the Plaintiff’s request for the Court to release him from
confinement, the law is well established that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state
prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim may
come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973)). A Section 1983 claim challenging
confinement must be dismissed even where a plaintiff seeks only injunctive or monetary relief.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90 (claim for damages is not cognizable); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90 (claim
for injunctive relief is only cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Additionally, a state prisoner does
not state a cognizable claim under Section 1983 where a ruling on his claim would imply the
invalidity of his conviction and/or confinement, unless and until the conviction has been favorably
terminated, i.e., reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512
U .S. at 486-87; Ruff v. Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). The United States Supreme
Court extended Heck to bar Section 1983 actions that do not directly challenge confinement, but
instead challenge the procedures that imply unlawful confinement. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 648 (1997).
not arraigned on a specific indictment is not a cognizable ground for habeas corpus
relief.
White, 2019 WL 2207478, at *2.
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Plaintiff’s request for relief directly challenges his continued confinement. This request is
barred by Heck and its progeny.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court has screened the prisoner complaint pursuant to the PLRA and finds, for the
numerous reasons set forth above, that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against all named
Defendants cannot proceed. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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