Lindsey et al v. Waverly Police Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MASHEKA LINDSEY AND 	)
JERRY RIDLEY, 	)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. 3:25-cv-00247
) 	Chief Judge Campbell/Frensley
)
WAVERLY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 	)
ET AL., 	)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Masheka Lindsey and Jerry Ridley brought this pro se action alleging violations
of 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Waverly Police Department, Officer Amanda Jerman, Detective
Michael Hubbs, Police Chief Grant Gillespie, City of Waverly, and the State of Tennessee
(collectively, “Defendants”). Docket No. 1. As relief, the Complaint requests that the Court “award
compensatory damages in an amount 56 million to be determined at trial,” as well as punitive
damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney’s fees and cost of the action. Id. at 10.
This matter is now before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 	12(b)(6). Docket No. 15. Defendants have also filed a Memorandum of law and
supporting exhibits. Docket No. 16. Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ Complaint falls woefully
short of alleging any cognizable claims against the Defendants.” Id. at 11. Defendants state that
Plaintiffs do not present a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for two key reasons: (A) the
Complaint does not adequately allege a constitutional violation, and (B) the Complaint does not
sufficiently allege the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Id. at 5-9. Defendants
argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
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or alternatively that Plaintiffs’ “. . .Tennessee statutory claims fail on the merits” because Tenn.
Code Ann. §8-8-302 does not apply to cities and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602 does not provide
a private cause of action. Id. at 9-10. Lastly, Defendants argue that “Police Misconduct” is not a
cause of action. Id. at 11. Defendants aver that the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.
Id.
Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ Motion that essentially restated what was alleged
in the Complaint. Docket No. 36. The Plaintiffs contend that they have video evidence of
Defendant Hubbs pointing a gun “at their heads” while the traffic stop was ongoing. Id. The
Plaintiffs sought leave which was granted to file iPhone video evidence in support of their
allegations for the Court’s consideration. Docket No. 110
For the reasons set below, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss (Docket No. 15) be GRANTED.
II. 	BACKGROUND
According to the Complaint, Ms. Lindsey was driving when she noticed a police vehicle
following her. After parking at the Cannons Body, Plaintiffs noticed that the police vehicle had
parked in a parking lot facing their car. Eventually, the police vehicle, driven by Officer Amanda
Jerman, initiated a traffic stop and inquired about expired tags. Ms. Lindsey admitted to having no
insurance.
While Officer Jerman processed Ms. Lindsey’s documents, Plaintiffs reportedly noticed a
white Ford F-150 pickup truck approach the police vehicle. Officer Michael Hubbs reportedly
stepped in front of Officer Jerman’s patrol vehicle and pointed a gun towards the back of the
Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Officer Jerman returned with a citation, and Plaintiffs accepted it
After the traffic stop, Plaintiffs drove to the police precinct to file a complaint, where Chief
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Gillespie reportedly did not document their complaint in writing.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Motions to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). 	The Supreme Court has clarified the Twombly standard, stating that
“[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	A complaint that pleads facts “‘merely consistent with’
defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility’ of ‘entitlement
to relief.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal brackets omitted).
When ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court must “construe the complaint
liberally in the plaintiff’s favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences
therein.” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). In contrast, the Court
does not have to accept unsupported legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The court should allow “a well-pleaded complaint [to] proceed even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. But a “plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions.” 	Id. at 555. 	“‘[A] legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’ need not be
accepted as true on a motion to dismiss.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722
(6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 	Mere recitation of the elements of a cause of action or an
“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” will not do. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
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citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The court must “accept as true all non-conclusory allegations in
the complaint . . . .” Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009).
Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally. Dotson v. Collins, 317 F. App’x 439, 443
(6th Cir. 2008), citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But “the less stringent standard
for pro se plaintiffs does not compel the courts to conjure up unpleaded facts . . . .” Grinter v.
Knight, 532 F. 3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
1. 	Legal Standard
Plaintiffs’ Complaint states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in part,
that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...
Thus, in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988), citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101
S. Ct. 1908, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981) (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 330-331, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986)); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 155, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978)). The traditional definition of acting under color
of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power “possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
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state law.” Id. at 49, 108 S. Ct. 2255, quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.
Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1941).
2. 	Proper Defendants
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs can only sue the municipality, as claims against officials
and police departments are seen as claims against the municipality. Docket No. 16, p. 5-6, citing
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Sisson v. City of Memphis, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 252272, *7 (W.D. Tenn. July 9, 2020). Because the Defendants are named in only
their official capacities (Docket No. 1, pp. 2-3), the Court agrees with the Defendants that the
claims should be construed as only against the municipality.
The Supreme Court has held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “a suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's
office.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Further, “. . . federal district
courts in Tennessee have frequently and uniformly held that police departments and sheriff's
departments are not proper parties to a § 1983 suit.” Mathes v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville &
Davidson Cty., No. 3:10-cv-0496, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87862, 2010 WL 3341889, at *5 (M.D.
Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010). Claims against a police department are ordinarily interpreted as claims
against its parent municipality. Sisson v. City of Memphis, No. 2:20-cv-02201-JTF-cgc, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 252272, 2020 WL 9264594, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. July 9, 2020).
Plaintiffs assert the 42 U. S. C § 1983 claims against Chief Gillespie, Officer Hubbs, and
Officer Jerman in their official capacities, and these claims will be treated as claims against the
city itself. Further, claims against the Waverly Police Department will be interpreted as a claim
against the City of Waverly. Therefore, Plaintiffs must establish municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
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3. 	Municipal Liability Standard
The Supreme Court determined in Monell v. Department of Social Services that a local
government can be held liable under § 1983 “when execution of a government's policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury[.]” 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).
To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, the Sixth Circuit requires that a litigant show “(1) that they
suffered a constitutional violation and (2) that a municipal policy or custom directly caused the
violation.” Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 	690-92). A 	plaintiff 	can 	show 	such constitutional deprivation 	“through 	reference 	to:
(1) the municipality's legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by
officials with final decision-making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision;
or (4) a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Agema v. City of Allegan,
826 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th
Cir. 2005)).
4. 	Constitutional Violation
In Count I, Plaintiffs state that “[t]he actions of Defendants, including unjustified
surveillance, excessive and potentially threatening behavior, and failure to address complaints,
constitute violations of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.” Docket No. 1, p. 10. Further, Plaintiffs broadly assert that “civil rights” is the
constitutional right being violated by federal officials. Id. at 4. In light of Plaintiffs’ pro se status,
the Court will liberally construe the Complaint to allege three potential constitutional violations:
(1) unconstitutional surveillance (2) excessive force and (3) failure to investigate. See Id. at 10.
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged a constitutional
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violation sufficient to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore the 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)1 .
a. 	Unconstitutional Surveillance
The Court construes that Plaintiffs allege “unjustified surveillance” because Officer Jerman
followed them “despite there being no apparent cause for the stop,” “monitored their activities,”
and eventually initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 9. Defendants argue that “. . . Plaintiffs traveled [sic]
on public streets (with expired tags) and were parked in a lot open to public view. . . [and] the
constitution does not prohibit surveillance of activities in public view.” Docket No. 16, p. 5-6,
citing See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
Unconstitutional surveillance allegations are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment which
states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280.
To allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiffs must “claim a ‘justifiable,’
‘reasonable,’ or ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by government action.”
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280. However, “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.” Id. at 281.
“An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, lawfully stop a motorist whom he or she
has probable cause to believe committed a traffic violation, including driving with expired tags,
1 Because the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a constitutional violation, it need
not reach the issue of whether a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind such a
violation.
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regardless of the officer's actual motivation for doing so.” United States v. Marshall, 233 F. App'x
436, 439 (6th Cir. 2007)
Officer Jerman merely following Plaintiffs’ vehicle while they drove on a “public
thoroughfare” does not amount to a violation of the 4th amendment under Knotts. Further, Officer
Jerman had probable cause and lawfully stopped Plaintiffs due to the presence of expired tags on
the vehicle. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs do not allege that unconstitutional surveillance occurred due
to the Defendant's actions, which resulted in a violation of a constitutional right.
b. 	Excessive Force
The Court construes the Complaint to allege that Defendants engaged in excessive force
based on the allegation that “Plaintiff Ridley captured a live image showing Officer Micheal [sic]
Hubbs a white male pointing a gun towards the back of the Plaintiffs’ vehicle from the front of
Officer Amanda’s patrol vehicle, raising concerns of police misconduct.” Docket No. 1, p. 9-102 .
Plaintiffs further allege that “[i]n the videos Jerry Ridley filmed . . . Detective Michael Hubbs
while he was standing in front of Sergeant Amanda Jerman vehicle and behind our vehicle aiming
a deadly weapon in the back of both our heads unprovoked.” Id. at 73 .
Defendants deny that their conduct amounted to excessive force. Docket No. 16, p. 7. They
urge the Court to view the dash camera footage (Ex. 1, Jerman Dash Camera Footage) and body
camera footage (Ex. 2, Body Camera Footage) of the traffic stop, arguing that “video evidence
submitted with a motion to dismiss may be considered when the videos ‘blatantly contradict’ or
‘utterly discredit’ the plaintiff’s version of events.” Id., citing Bell v. City of S.field, 37 F. 4th 362,
2 Plaintiffs did not submit the live image as an exhibit to the Court.
3 Although the allegations appear on page 7 of the Complaint rather than within the designated
“Factual Allegations” section on page 9, the Court will treat them as factual allegations in light of
Plaintiffs’ pro se status.
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365 (6th Cir. 2022) 4 . According to Defendants, the Body Camera footage shows “Det. Hubbs is
visible standing to the side of Sgt. Jerman’s patrol vehicle… not pointing a gun at Plaintiffs’
vehicle. Docket No. 16, p. 8, citing Ex. 2, Time Stamp 9:00-9:03. Similarly, they assert that the
dash camera footage shows that “[a]t no point did Det. Hubbs stand in front of Sgt. Jerman’s Patrol
vehicle and point a gun at Plaintiffs’ vehicle.” Docket No. 16, p. 8, citing Ex. 1, Jerman Dash
Camera Footage, 02:33-11.07. Defendants conclude that “[a]s the video evidence discredits
Plaintiffs’ allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ claim for excessive force (to the extent that they
have asserted a claim for excessive force) must be dismissed.” Docket No. 16, p. 8.
In an effort to bolster their claim that Det. Hubbs stood in front of Sgt. Jerman’s patrol car
and pointed a gun at the Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiffs sought and were granted leave to file iPhone
video recordings of what they purport to be the alleged conduct by Det. Hubbs. Docket No. 112.
An excessive force claim will be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Wright v. City of
Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 865 (6th Cir. 2020). A traffic stop by a police officer is a “seizure” under
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2008), citing Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). The 6 th Circuit has held that “. . .an officer must have probable
cause to make a stop for a civil infraction. . . .” Blair, 524 F.3d at 748. “Probable cause is a
reasonable ground for belief supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere
suspicion.” Id. When analyzing Excessive Force in relation to the 4th amendment, the Court
analyzes “whether the officers' actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Wright,
962 F.3d at 865.
4 Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Video Exhibits Manually (Docket No. 17) was granted by
the Court (Docket No. 18).
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Generally, when analyzing a motion to dismiss, the Court will take the well-pled
allegations as true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. However, the 6 th Circuit has held that:
… exhibits attached to a motion to dismiss can be considered if referenced in the
complaint and central to the plaintiff's claims. See Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Ath.
Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). The Sixth Circuit has applied this rule to
video exhibits, including body cam footage. See Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860
F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2017) (approving consideration of video evidence
on motion to dismiss where the video “cover[ed] the whole [incident]” and “utterly
discredit[ed]” plaintiff's version of events); Reynolds v. Szczesniak, No. 21-2732,
2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 23215, 2022 WL 3500191, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 2022)
(affirming this Court's consideration of dash cam and body cam footage on motion
to dismiss where "the complaint reference[d] the video,” the video “captured the
central events upon which the [plaintiff's] claims rely,” and “neither party contested
the inclusion of the videos”).
Black v. City of Royal Oak, No. 23-12371, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167469, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich.
Sep. 17, 2024). At the motion to dismiss stage, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s version of
events if video evidence clearly contradicts the complaint’s central allegations and renders them
implausible, and should instead rely on the facts shown in the video. See Osberry v. Slusher, 750
F. App’x 385, 390 (6th Cir. 2018).
In this case, Plaintiffs explicitly reference the Body Camera and Dash Camera footage in
their Complaint. Docket No. 1, p. 7. Further, the footage is central to the Plaintiffs’ claims that
Officer Hubbs engaged in excessive force. Therefore, the Court will consider the Dash Camera
Footage (Ex. 1, Jerman Dash Camera Footage) and Body Camera Footage (Ex. 2, Body Camera
Footage) in its analysis of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
After reviewing both the Body Camera Footage and Dash Camera, the Court agrees with
Defendant that the “dash and body camera footage of the traffic stop blatantly contradicts or utterly
discredits Plaintiffs’ allegations that Det. Hubbs stood in front of Sgt. Jerman’s patrol vehicle and
pointed a gun at Plaintiffs’ vehicle.” See Docket No. 16, p. 8. No where in the dash camera footage
does Officer Hubbs step in front of Officer Jerman’s vehicle and point a gun at the Plaintiffs’
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vehicle. Compare Ex. 1 with Docket No. 1. 	Further, the Body Camera footage shows Officer
Hubbs standing at the side of Officer Jerman’s patrol vehicle with no gun in hand. Exh 2. Time
Stamp 8:30-9:00.
The Court has also reviewed the iPhone video provided by the Plaintiffs in this matter.
Docket No. 112. The video in question is a phone recording made by Mr. Ridley from the
passenger seat of the vehicle. The entire duration of the video clip is one (1) second. The recording
is taken from the mirror of the sun visor on the passenger side of the vehicle. While it clearly shows
Det. Hubbs he is not standing in front of Jerman’s vehicle as alleged and more importantly he is
not pointing or even possessing a firearm in the image. As a result, the video recordings filed by
the Plaintiffs do not support the allegations set forth in the complaint. While it is unclear why the
Plaintiffs filed such a short videoclip, it is clear that video does not support the allegations made
in the Complaint.
Body camera footage establishes that Officer Jerman had probable cause to initiate a
Traffic Stop over the expired tags. Exh 2. Time Stamp 0:00-0:40. Given that the gun was not pulled
on the Plaintiffs and the Officers had probable cause to initiate a traffic stop, the Complaint does
not establish a plausible excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Plaintiffs
cannot establish that Defendants utilized excessive force to cause a constitutional violation under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
c. 	Failure to Investigate
The Court construes the Complaint to allege a “failure to investigate claim” because “Chief
Gillespie at the precinct only provided a verbal response to Plaintiffs’ concerns and did not
document their complaint in writing.” Docket No. 1, p. 9-10. While the 6 th Circuit has recognized
that a failure to investigate could amount to a constitutional violation, “because municipal liability
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requires 	an 	unconstitutional 	“policy” 	or 	“custom,” 	we 	have 	held 	that 	an 	allegation 	of
a single failure to investigate a single plaintiff’s claim does not suffice.” Pineda v. Hamilton Cty.,
977 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). To amount to a constitutional violation, the
failure to investigate must be a persistent and continuous problem within the Police Department.
Id.
Plaintiffs have not only failed to allege that Chief Gillespie’s verbal response constituted a
failure to address their complaint, but also failed to allege any facts suggesting multiple instances
of a failure to investigate. See Docket No. 1, p. 9-10. Further, Plaintiffs do not point to how Chief
Gillespie’s response establishes a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore,
Plaintiffs cannot allege that a failure to investigate constitutes a constitutional violation that
establishes municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. 	Plaintiffs’ Tennessee State Law Claims
The Defendants argue that in the event the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ federal claims, it
should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining supplemental state law claims. Docket
No. 16, p. 9. Defendants argue in the alternative, if the federal claims are not dismissed the state
law claims fail on their merits. Id.
Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs asserted claim under T. C. A. § 8-8-302
applies only to counties and thus does not apply to any of the Defendants in this matter. Id. at p.
10. They further argue that Tennessee’s official oppression statute, T. C. A. § 39-16-602 does not
provide a private cause of action and “police misconduct” is not a proper cause of action. Id. at pp.
10-11. In response, while the Plaintiffs assert that “Defendants actions may constitute violations
of Tennessee State Laws” they do not address the specific arguments asserted by the Defendants
with regard to the state law claims asserted. Docket No. 36.
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Since the Parties to this action are non-diverse, the Court does not have independent
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims; they are in this Court only by virtue of supplemental
jurisdiction. Having recommended that all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims be dismissed, the
undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to recognize supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. See 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (c)(3)(the Court may decline to
exercise supplement jurisdiction if ‘the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.’” Brooks v Rothe, 577 F. 3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009)(“’if federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the state claims should generally be dismissed as well.’”) (quoting Wojnicz
v Davis, 80 F. App’x 382, 384-385 (6 th Cir. 2003)).
Because the undersigned recommends that the Defendants’ motion to dismiss all federal
claims asserted against them be granted, it is further recommended that the Court decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the alleged state law claims and they should be dismissed
without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that Defendants’ Motion
(Docket No. 15) be GRANTED.
All claims except for Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the Defendants should be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the Defendants and that those claims be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days
from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this
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Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen
(14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said
objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report
and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY
United States Magistrate Judge
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