Dooley v. Harrison

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
TERRANCE L. DOOLEY, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-02612-SHL-cgc
)
WARDEN C. HARRISON, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET, GRANTING RESPONDENT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS, DISMISSING § 2241 PETITION WITH PREJUDICE,
DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL, CERTIFYING THAT APPEAL
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
Before the Court is the pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (“§ 2241 Petition”) filed by Petitioner Terrance L. Dooley.1 (ECF No. 2.) Respondent
1 At the time Petitioner filed his § 2241 Petition, he was an inmate at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Memphis, Tennessee (“FCI-Memphis”). (ECF No. 2 at PageID 2.)
Petitioner is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution in Marion, Illinois (“FCI-
Marion”). See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Find an Inmate (Register No. 02327-025) (last
accessed Feb. 10, 2026). Petitioner’s transfer to FCI-Marion does not deprive this Court of
jurisdiction under § 2241’s “immediate custodian” provision because at the time Petitioner filed
his petition, he was confined within this district. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a); 2242; see also
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004) (explaining that “when the Government moves a
habeas petitioner after [he] properly files a petition naming [his] immediate custodian, the
District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction
who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release”).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket to update Petitioner’s address and to send
this order to:
Terrance L. Dooley
Register No. 02327-025
FCI Marion
P.O. Box 1000
Marion, IL 62959
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Warden C. Harrison filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment
(“Motion to Dismiss”). (ECF No. 6.) Petitioner did not file a response. He instead filed a
motion for the appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 7.)
For the reasons that follow, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the
§ 2241 Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Petitioner’s motion for the appointment
of counsel is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2023, Petitioner pleaded guilty and was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (United States v. Dooley, No. 22-
cr-30058 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2023), ECF Cr. No. 50.) He was sentenced to 56 months of
imprisonment. (Id. at PageID 115.)
The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) completed Petitioner’s offense review in 2024 to
determine his eligibility for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) for successful
completion of the Residential Drug Treatment Program (“RDAP”).2 (ECF No. 6-1 at PageID
146-47.) The BOP determined that, under 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii)-(iii), Petitioner was not
eligible for early release because his current conviction for being a felon in possession of a
firearm was a violent offense.3 (Id.)
2 Under § 3621(e)(2)(B), the BOP has discretion to reduce an inmate’s sentence by up to
one year if the inmate was convicted of a nonviolent offense and has successfully completed a
substance abuse treatment program. That statutory provision “categorically denies early release
eligibility to inmates convicted of violent offenses.” Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 238 (2001).
3 The BOP’s regulation sets out the categories of inmates that are ineligible for early release
under § 3621(e)(2)(B), including inmates with a “current felony conviction” for violent offenses.
§ 550.55(b)(5). 	The BOP has defined “violent offense” as one that, among other things,
“involve[s] the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives”
or “by its nature or conduct, presents a serious potential risk of physical force against the person
or property of another.” § 550.55(b)(5)(ii)-(iii).
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On June 16, 2025, Petitioner filed this § 2241 Petition. (ECF No. 2.) He contends that
the BOP has wrongfully deemed him ineligible for a one-year sentence reduction under
§ 3621(e)(2)(B) for successfully completing the RDAP based on his § 922(g)(1) conviction,
which he contends is not a violent offense. (Id. at PageID 7.)
On July 21, 2025, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the § 2241 Petition under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).4 (ECF No. 6.) Respondent’s motion is supported by
the Declaration of Alice Castillo, a BOP Paralegal Specialist with access to Petitioner’s official
records, including the BOP’s offense review, which is also attached. (ECF No. 6-1 at PageID
96-101, 146-47.)
Respondent argues that the § 2241 Petition should be dismissed because the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenge to the BOP’s discretionary denial of a
sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B).5 (ECF No. 6 at PageID 86-87) Alternatively,
Respondent argues that the § 2241 Petition should be denied on the merits because the BOP
properly exercised its discretion when it deemed Petitioner ineligible for early released under
§ 3621(e)(2)(B) based on his current federal conviction. (Id. at PageID 88-90.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a claim may be dismissed for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
4 Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts permit a respondent to file a pre-answer motion to dismiss a petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and those rules may be applied to § 2241 petitions. See Rule
1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
5 Respondent does not challenge Petitioner’s assertion in his § 2241 Petition that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies. (See ECF No. 2 at PageID 3-4.) Respondent concedes that
Petitioner has “fully exhausted his administrative remedies concerning early release pursuant to
§ 3621(e).” (ECF No. 6-1 at PageID 101.)
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dismiss, the petition must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). When considering the motion,
courts accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and construe the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732 F.3d 645, 649
(6th Cir. 2013).
“A district court is not permitted to consider matters beyond the complaint” when
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Mediacom Se. LLC v. BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc., 672 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 2012). If a court considers material
outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss must be converted into a motion for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “and all parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all material pertinent to the motion.” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of
Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2011). A court may, however, consider exhibits attached
to the petition as well as exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are referred
to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein,” without converting the
motion to one for summary judgment. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426,
430 (6th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
Respondent argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BOP’s discretionary
decision that Petitioner is ineligible for early release under § 3621(e). (ECF No. 6 at PageID 86-
87.) There is a general presumption that an agency action is subject to judicial review unless
Congress has specifically precluded review by statute or committed agency action to discretion
by law. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). Judicial review of administrative action
should not be withheld absent “clear and convincing evidence” of Congress’ intent to restrict
judicial review. Id. at 830 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Section 3621(e), the statutory provision providing for both the RDAP and the BOP’s
discretionary authority to determine whether a prisoner is eligible for early release upon
successful completion of the RDAP, was enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
Rea v. Sniezek, No. 06-cv-2424, 2007 WL 427038, *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2007). “The issue of
jurisdiction arises because” 18 U.S.C. § 3625, also part of the Sentencing Reform Act, provides
that “sections . . . 701 through 706 of [the Administrative Procedures Act (‘APA’)] do not apply
to the making of any determination, decision, or order under this subchapter,” which includes
§ 3621(e). Id. (quoting § 3625.) “[S]ections 701 through 706 [of the APA] govern judicial
review of agency action.” Id. Therefore, § 3625 explicitly provides “that the APA does not
apply to decisions made under [§] 3621(e).” Id.
Where Congress has exempted an agency’s decision-making from judicial scrutiny, the
Court’s review is limited to “whether the agency acted outside its statutory limits or violated the
[C]onstitution.” Id. Petitioner does not allege that the BOP has acted “beyond the scope of
discretion granted by Congress.” Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1542. Therefore, the Court agrees with
Respondent that it lacks jurisdiction to review the BOP’s discretionary decision that Petitioner is
ineligible for early release under § 3621(e) based on his § 922(g)(1) conviction.
The Court’s holding is in accord with decisions from other district courts in this circuit.
See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, No. 01-cr-38, 2022 WL 5212859, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 5,
2022) (holding that “this Court has no authority to order the BOP to grant [Petitioner] a one-year
reduction of the sentence imposed [for completing the RDAP]”); Smotherman v. Joyner, No. 19-
cv-00053, 2020 WL 9071441, at *2 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020) (“[A]n inmate’s ability to
participate in RDAP—and whether or not that participation ultimately results in a reduction to
the inmate’s sentence—are matters solely committed to the BOP’s discretion.”); Cooper v. Zych,
No. 09-cv-11620, 2009 WL 2711957, *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2009) (explaining that under
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§ 3625, “[d]ecisions made with reference to [a] Petitioner’s eligibility for early release” under
§ 3621(e) are exempt from judicial review).
Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenge to the BOP’s
determination that he is ineligible for early release under § 3621(e), Respondent’s motion is
GRANTED, and the § 2241 Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.6 Petitioner’s
motion for the appointment of counsel is DENIED.
APPELLATE ISSUES
A federal prisoner seeking relief under § 2241 need not obtain a certificate of
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to challenge the denial of his petition. See Witham v.
United States, 355 F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that § 2253 “does not require a
certificate of appealability for appeals from denials of relief in cases properly brought under
§ 2241, where detention is pursuant to federal process”).
A habeas petitioner seeking to appeal must pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1913 and 1917. To appeal in forma pauperis in a § 2241 proceeding, the petitioner must
obtain pauper status under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a). Kincade v. Sparkman,
117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997). Rule 24(a) provides that a party seeking pauper status on
appeal must first file a motion in the district court, along with a supporting affidavit. Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a)(1). If the district court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, or
otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the petitioner must move to proceed in forma
pauperis in the appellate court. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(4)-(5).
6 Because the Court has determined that dismissal is appropriate on jurisdictional
grounds, the Court need not address Respondent’s alternative argument that the § 2241 Petition
should be denied on the merits because the BOP properly determined that Petitioner’s firearm
offense renders him ineligible to receive a sentence reduction under § 3621(e). (ECF No. 6 at
PageID 88-94.)
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Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenge to the BOP’s
discretionary determination that he is ineligible for early release under § 3621(e), the Court finds
that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Court therefore CERTIFIES under Rule
24(a) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and DENIES leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 11th day of February, 2026.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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