Matheus-Hernandez v. Bullock

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
YORGENIS JOSÉ MATHEUS HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
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No. 2:26-cv-03199-SHL-cgc
v.
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK, New Orleans
Field Office Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and
Removal Operations,
Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
On September 19, 2026, Petitioner Yoegenis José Matheus Hernandez filed his Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) He challenges his continued detention
without an individualized bond hearing. (Id. at PageID 4.) He seeks immediate release from
Respondent’s custody. (Id. at PageID 3.) Respondent responded on September 30. (ECF No. 10.)
Petitioner replied on October 3. (ECF No. 11.) Respondent concedes that “this case is covered by
the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision” in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026).
(ECF No. 10 at PageID 46.)
For the reasons stated below, the Petition is GRANTED and Respondent is ORDERED to
immediately release Petitioner from custody.
BACKGROUND
Mattheus Hernandez, a citizen of Venezuela, has resided in the United States continuously
since August 2022. (ECF No. at PageID 3.) He was taken into ICE custody on September 14, after
he appeared for a Credible Fear Interview in Nashville. (Id.) 	He was held in the West Tennessee
Detention Facility until he was transferred to Natchez, Mississippi on September 19. 	(ECF No. 11 at
PageID 60.) On September 24, Respondent was ordered to “immediately transfer Petitioner back to
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the Western District of Tennessee, and not transfer him out of the West Tennessee Detention Facility
during the pendency of the Petition.” (ECF No. 6 at PageID 40.) However, Petitioner was not
transferred back to this District until October 1.1 (ECF No. 11 at PageID 63.) At the time of
Petitioner’s Reply, on October 3, he remained detained at the West Tennessee Detention Facility.
(ECF No. 11 at PageID 63.) He seeks immediate release from Respondent’s custody. (Id. at PageID
64.)
ANALYSIS
Respondent concedes that Lopez-Campos governs this matter. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 46.)
Respondent maintains that “the Court should require Petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies”
before granting relief. (Id.) Specifically, according to Respondent, Petitioner should be required to
first request a bond hearing in immigration court before seeking habeas relief in federal court.2 	(Id.)
However, as the Court has ruled in recent immigration habeas petitions, e.g., Lopez Soza v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-CV-02224, 2026 WL 1104329, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 23,
2026), Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies is EXCUSED. The legal questions
presented by the Petition are fit for prompt resolution, and exhaustion would be futile because
Petitioner cannot seek meaningful and timely administrative relief. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S.
140, 144 (1992) (explaining that where a statute is silent as to exhaustion, requiring exhaustion is
within a court’s discretion).
Petitioner “rightfully state[s] that [he has] a liberty interest to be free from detention.”
1 Petitioner missed his scheduled bond hearing in Memphis due to Respondent’s delay in
transferring him back to Memphis. (ECF No. 11 at PageID 60–63.)
2 Notably, Petitioner tried to do just that, but his efforts were thwarted by Respondent’s lack
of urgency in complying with court orders. Respondent is cautioned to immediately comply with
court orders. Unreasonable delay in the transfer of a petitioner will be considered a violation of this
Court’s order, and be handled in contempt proceedings. Not transferring Habeas petitioners in the
first place will aid in immediate compliance with court orders.
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Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 734. ICE’s decision to detain him without a bond hearing violated that
liberty interest, which cannot be casually tossed aside. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to immediate
release. See Villafranca Lara v. Ladwig, No. 26-CV-02079, 2026 WL 401204, at *10 (W.D. Tenn.
Feb. 12, 2026) (quoting Cardona v. Ladwig, No. 25-cv-01451, 2025 WL 3722009, at *7) (reasoning
that “because Petitioner’s rights to a bond hearing under §1226(a)” were denied, a bond hearing after
the fact “‘would not and cannot cure that constitutional violation,’” and while Petitioner’s release
today cannot cure his prior loss of liberty, “‘this remedy, relative to the procedural one of ordering a
bond hearing, is the one that comes closest to doing so.’”) (quoting Yao v. Almodovar, No. 25 CIV.
9982, 2025 WL 3653433, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025.)).
Therefore, consistent with Lopez-Campos and this Court’s decision in Villafranca Lara, and
after consideration of the record, the Petition is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondent is ORDERED to
immediately release Petitioner from custody, and immediately return to Petitioner any property
seized by the Government, including, but not limited to any documentation in the possession of
Petitioner at the time of his arrest and detainment. Respondent is further ORDERED to file a Status
Report with this Court within two business days, to certify compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of October, 2026.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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