Millrock Investment Fund 1 v. Healthcare Solutions Management Group et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
MILLROCK INVESTMENT FUND 1, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS
MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
2:23-cv-00157-RJS-DAO
District Judge Robert J. Shelby
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Before the Court is Defendant Justin Smith’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Summary Judgment Out of Time.1 Smith asks the court for leave to file a Motion for Summary
Judgment.2 The Motion for Summary Judgment was previously filed on February 9, 2026.3 The
court struck the filing as untimely, explaining:
Smith does not sufficiently show excusable neglect. He filed the
Motion over three months late, but fails to reference the original
October 2025 deadline or attempt to explain its untimeliness. The
Motion provides no information concerning Smith’s efforts to meet
the original deadline. No explanation for the delay is wholly
inadequate to meet Smith’s burden of showing excusable neglect.
Because excusable neglect is not satisfied, the higher good cause
standard is also not satisfied.4
On March 25, 2026, Smith filed the pending Motion to cure these defects.5
1 Dkt. 200, Defendant Justin Smith’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment Out of Time (Motion
for Leave).
2 Id.
3 Dkt. 188, Defendant Justin Smith’s Motion for Summary Judgment (and, in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings) (Motion for Summary Judgment).
4 Dkt. 191, Memorandum Decision and Order (Order Striking Motion for Summary Judgment) at 2.
5 Motion for Leave at 1. Plaintiff Millrock Investment Fund 1, LLC did not file an opposition. See Docket.
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LEGAL STANDARD
This court has wide discretion in regulating pretrial matters.6 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6 provides “the court may, for good cause,” extend a deadline after it has passed “if
the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”7 Excusable neglect requires Smith “to
show the deadline [could not] be met despite [his] diligent efforts.”8 “Inadvertence, ignorance of
the rules, and mistake construing the rules” are insufficient to satisfy excusable neglect.9
Instead, the court considers “all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission,”
including (1) “the danger of prejudice” to the nonmoving party; (2) “the length of the delay and
its potential impact on judicial proceedings;” (3) “the reason for the delay, including whether it
was within reasonable control of the movant;” and (4) “whether the movant acted in good
faith.”10 “The most important factor is the third; an inadequate explanation for delay may, by
itself, be sufficient to reject a finding of excusable neglect.”11 Good cause is a higher standard
than excusable neglect.12
6 See Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990).
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (b)(1)(B).
8 Utah Republican Party v. Herbert, 678 F. App'x 697, 701 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells
Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014)).
9 Quigley v. Rosenthal, 427 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005).
10 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).
11 Perez v. El Tequila, LLC, 847 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159,
1163 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining the reason for delay is “a very important factor—perhaps the most important
single factor—in determining whether neglect is excusable”).
12 In re Kirkland, 86 F.3d 172, 175 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Without attempting a rigid or all-encompassing definition of
good cause, it would appear to require at least as much as would be required to show excusable neglect, as to which
simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice, and some showing of
good faith on the part of the party seeking the enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the
time specified is normally required.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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Because Smith proceeds pro se, the court liberally construes his pleadings.13 But Smith
is subject to the same rules of procedure that govern represented litigants.14 The court may not
act as his counsel.15
ANALYSIS
Smith asks the court to consider a Motion for Summary Judgment five months after the
deadline to file dispositive motions and six weeks before trial is set to begin. The dispositive
motions deadline was October 20, 2025.16 The Motion for Summary Judgment was first filed on
February 9, 2026.17 The court struck the Motion for Summary Judgment three days later.18 The
Motion for Leave was filed over six weeks later, on March 25, 2026.19 A two-day bench trial is
scheduled to begin on May 12, 2026, and the pretrial conference is scheduled for May 5, 2026.20
Nonetheless, Smith argues the excusable neglect and good cause standards have been met.21 The
court disagrees.
The court begins with the most important excusable neglect consideration: the reason for
delay. Smith explains the delay was caused by (1) ongoing settlement negotiations, (2) the
change in Plaintiff’s counsel in December 2024, and (3) the complexity of the case.22 Smith
“does not deny that he should have separately tracked and acted on the October 20, 2025
13 Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
14 Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
15 Id.
16 Dkt. 148, Second Amended Scheduling Order at 2.
17 Motion for Summary Judgment.
18 Order Striking Motion for Summary Judgment
19 Motion for Leave.
20 Dkt. 186, Trial Order at 1.
21 Motion for Leave at 3–11.
22 Id. at 3–5. Smith attaches to the Motion evidence of the ongoing settlement discussions in August and September
2024. See Dkt. 200-3, Exhibit B (August 30, 2024 email); Dkt. 200-4, Exhibit C (September 16, 2024 email).
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deadline,” but proffers these other obligations caused him to fail to meet the deadline.23 It was
not a “strategic decision” to disregard the court’s order.24 But it is well-established that
inadvertence does not establish excusable neglect, and the Motion for Leave fails to provide a
sufficient justification beyond mere mistake.25 The delay was within Smith’s control. This is
especially the case where the delay spanned an extended period; the Motion for Leave comes
five months after the deadline.26 Courts have rejected motions for leave for much briefer
periods.27
Further, the other factors weigh against granting leave here. Trial is imminent. Contrary
to Smith’s representations, permitting leave will disrupt the proceedings.28 Under the local rules,
a nonmovant has twenty-eight days to file an opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and
a movant has fourteen days thereafter to file their reply.29 Trial is scheduled in a mere six weeks.
The court could delay trial or order expedited briefing, but both options prejudice Plaintiff
Millrock Investment Fund 1, LLC. Accordingly, the court concludes Smith fails to meet his
burden.
This matter is scheduled for a bench trial. Smith may raise the arguments advanced in
the Motion for Summary Judgment and may introduce the evidence contained therein at trial.
23 Motion for Leave at 4.
24 Id. at 3.
25 Quigley, 427 F.3d at 1238.
26 Smith “acknowledges the delay was substantial.” Motion for Leave at 6.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 664 F. App'x 713, 716 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (affirming district court
denying leave sought seven days after deadline); Autry v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Grady Cnty., No. CIV-22-00054-
JD, 2024 WL 6937002 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 2024) (denying leave sought ten days after deadline because
inadvertent docketing error does not satisfy excusable neglect).
28 Motion for Leave at 6.
29 DUCiv.R. 7-1(a)(4)(B).
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For the reasons explained above, the Motion is DENIED.30
SO ORDERED this 10th day of April, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge
30 Dkt. 200.
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