Blackwell v. Early Light Academy et al

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
ANTONIA BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
EARLY LIGHT ACADEMY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION FOR DISMISSAL
ORDER
Case No. 2:25-cv-00689-RJS-DBP
District Judge Robert J. Shelby
Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
Before the court are Plaintiff Antonia Blackwell’s Objections1 to Magistrate Judge
Dustin B. Pead’s Report and Recommendation,2 as well as Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis (IFP),3 Emergency Motion for Asset Freeze and Preservation Order,4
Emergency Motion for Relief from Defendants’ Obstruction of Federal Proceedings,5 Motion for
Expedited Criminal Referral and Supplemental Evidence of RICO Enterprise,6 and Motion for
Expedited Ruling on Pending Objections.7 Blackwell proceeds pro se. For the reasons stated
1 Dkt. 19, Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation and Request for De Novo Review by
District Judge Shelby (Objection); Dkt. 21, Plaintiff’s Supplemental Objections to Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation (Supplemental Objection); Dkt. 27, Second Supplemental Objections to Magistrate Judge Pead’s
Report and Recommendation (Second Supplemental Objection).
2 Dkt. 18, Report and Recommendation (Report).
3 Dkt. 2, Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP Motion).
4 Dkt. 3, Emergency Motion for Asset Freeze and Preservation Order.
5 Dkt. 8, Emergency Motion for Relief from Defendants' Obstruction of Federal Proceedings.
6 Dkt. 11, Motion for Expedited Criminal Referral and Supplemental Evidence of RICO Enterprise.
7 Dkt. 25, Motion for Expedited Ruling on Pending Objections.
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below, Blackwell’s Objections are OVERRULED, the Report is ADOPTED, and Blackwell’s
remaining Motions are DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND8
It is difficult to ascertain the alleged factual basis for this case. So far as the court can
discern, Blackwell’s son suffers from disabilities and was previously enrolled at Early Light
Academy (the School).9 Sometime prior to January 2023, Blackwell emailed the School
advocating for her child.10 In September 2023, Blackwell sent an email to the School requesting
that the School refrain from contacting her.11 Blackwell alleges the School made false
allegations about Blackwell’s son and/or her and expelled her son without adhering to a legally-
mandated process.12 Although it is not clear, the court infers the School’s reports prompted an
8 The court is aware that Blackwell has filed at least two other lawsuits arising from the same operative facts. See
Blackwell v. S. Jordan Just. Ct., No. 250904073 (Utah 3d Dist. Ct. filed May 21, 2025) (asserting, among other
things, multiple violations of Utah and federal law, violations of the rules of civil procedure, and judicial
misconduct); Blackwell v. Boehm, No. 2:25-cv-00465-TS (seeking a writ of habeas corpus, warrant recall, and other
declaratory relief). Case No. 2:25-cv-00465-TS was dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and the Younger doctrine,
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Younger doctrine applied and denied a certificate of appealability. See Case No.
2:25-cv-00465-TS, Dkt. 11, Memorandum Decision and Order; id., Dkt. 26, Order Denying Certificate of
Appealability. The following background is based on Blackwell’s Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 16, Second
Amended Complaint for Damages Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (Civil RICO) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (SAC).
9 See SAC ¶ 37.
10 Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
11 Id. ¶ 34.
12 See id. ¶¶ 14, 28 (alleging Defendant Bird secretly recorded the child, created fake evidence, and filed false police
reports, Defendant Preston called the child a “terror,” Defendant Pizarro “[g]ave . . . impossible testimony,” and the
School filed false police reports which caused criminal prosecution against Blackwell); id. ¶ 16 (alleging Defendant
Trout filed false police report); id. ¶ 18 (alleging Defendant Hyatt filed a false witness statement); id. ¶ 36
(discussing the involvement of the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS)); id. ¶ 37 (stating the School
“expelled Plaintiff’s child with a disability without conducting the Manifestation Determination Review (MDR)
required by federal law . . . .”); id. ¶ 44 (stating “DCFS investigated [Blackwell] based on false allegations from
Early Light Academy”).
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investigation and criminal charges.13 Blackwell contacted legislators informing them she was
“facing 2.5 years in jail for advocating for [her] son’s right to an education.”14
Blackwell also alleges facts regarding what the court assumes to be the ensuing criminal
case against Blackwell. Specifically, the police “[f]iled charges 40 days after all contact
ended;”15 prosecutors “[p]ursued charges despite State Board validation;”16 Tangaro Law
employed and supervised her defense attorney, Defendant Faas, “who sabotaged her defense”
and abandoned her case;17 Defendant Judge Boehm issued a warrant that included false
information and continued to adjudicate her case while disqualified;18 and the courts “[r]efused
to file exculpatory evidence.”19
On August 18, 2025, Blackwell filed a Complaint against Defendants for, among other
things, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), civil rights
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA).20 The Complaint asserts “damages for a conspiracy to criminalize [her] federally
protected advocacy for her child with a disability’s [sic] education through coordinated actions
by school officials, law enforcement, prosecutors, legislators, and [Blackwell’s] own attorney.”21
13 See id. ¶¶ 36, 38–40 (discussing an email conversation between Blackwell and a police detective, alleging the
School contacted the police, and stating the South Jordan Police filed criminal charges after contact with the School
had ceased); id. ¶ 53 (discussing harassment in the context of prosecution).
14 Id. ¶ 40.
15 Id. ¶ 46.
16 Id.
17 Id. ¶¶ 25–28, 51.
18 Id. ¶ 43.
19 Id. ¶ 46.
20 Dkt. 1, Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief Under Civil RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1964), Civil Rights
(42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985), and Related Claims (Complaint).
21 SAC ¶ 1.
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With the Complaint, Blackwell filed the IFP Motion.22 The case was referred to
Magistrate Judge Pead pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Judge Pead temporarily granted
Blackwell’s IFP Motion pending screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and Local Civil Rule
DUCivR 3-2(b).23 Before the court was able to screen the case, Blackwell filed an Amended
Complaint.24 The Amended Complaint added several defendants and asserted additional
damages for the RICO Conspiracy claim.25 The Amended Complaint also included additional
factual allegations pertaining to legislative retaliation, legal representation, and the conduct of
judicial and law enforcement officers.26
On September 9, 2025, Judge Pead issued an Order outlining deficiencies in the
Amended Complaint and granted leave for Blackwell to file a Second Amended Complaint
(SAC).27 The Order extended Blackwell’s temporary IFP status and stated the Amended
Complaint “does not state plausible and specific claims for relief.”28 Specifically, it “fails to
make allegations regarding each Defendant’s alleged actions, or indicate how each Defendant
violated her rights,” fails to connect specific claims for relief to specific facts or Defendants, and
fails to identify any exception to the Eleventh Amendment immunity the City of South Jordan is
22 IFP Motion.
23 Dkt. 12, Order Temporarily Granting Motion to Proceed Without Paying the Filing Fee and Notice of Screening
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (IFP Order); see DUCivR 72-1(a)(2)(A) (authorizing a magistrate judge to grant
applications to proceed IFP); 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) (stating the court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case “at any
time if the court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief”).
24 Dkt. 14, Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief Under Civil RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1964), Civil
Rights (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985), and Related Claims (Amended Complaint).
25 The Amended Complaint added Ed Montgomery, Sergeant Eric Anderson, Ben Rasmussen, and the South Jordan
City Police Department as defendants. Compare Complaint ¶¶ 40–57, 131, with Amended Complaint ¶¶ 40–57, 131.
26 Compare Complaint ¶¶ 78–79, 115, 117–18, with Amended Complaint ¶¶ 78–79, 115, 117–18.
27 See generally Dkt. 15, Memorandum Decision and Order Permitting Amended Complaint and Temporarily
Granting Motion to Waive Filing Fee (Order).
28 Id. at 6, 9.
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entitled to.29 Despite these deficiencies, the court permitted another amendment and stated the
SAC “must: (1) explain what each Defendant [did] to violate Plaintiff’s rights; (2) indicate when
and where the violation(s) occurred; (3) explain how Plaintiff was injured as a result of each
Defendants’ actions; and (4) clearly state the relief sought from each Defendant.”30 The Order
also provided additional guidance, stating the SAC should:
(1) state [the] claims as simply and clearly as possible and remove any extraneous
information not relevant to the specific claims;
(2) provide the names of any “unknown” court clerks, warrant processing staff and
police officers; and
(3) only join claims against multiple defendants in a singular action where the
claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences” and raise “a question of law or fact common to all defendants.”31
On September 12, 2025, Blackwell filed the SAC. The SAC asserts four claims against
all Defendants: (1) civil RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1964; (2) Conspiracy Against Rights under
42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and
(4) Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice under 18 U.S.C. § 241.32 Like the Amended Complaint, these
claims are asserted against the School, individuals associated with the School, legislators, the
City of South Jordan, the South Jordan Police Department, an employee of the South Jordan
Police Department, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and Judge Michael Boehm.33
29 Id. at 7–8.
30 Id. at 8.
31 Id. at 8–9 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)).
32 SAC ¶¶ 65–73.
33 See SAC ¶¶ 1, 7–8. The individual Defendants associated with the School include Executive Director Stephanie
Schmidt, Principal Amy Bird, Principal, Attorney Erin Preston, Special Education Director Anne Trout, Instructor
Marison Pizarro, and Behavioral Specialist Sarah Hyatt. The named legislators are Utah State Representative Jordan
Teuscher and Utah State Senator Kirk Cullimore Jr. The named employee of the South Jordan Police Department is
Sergeant Eric Anderson.
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The SAC includes an “Immunity Summary Table” listing Defendants by category and
abbreviated statements as to why those Defendants are not immune from suit:34
Defendant Type Claimed
Immunity Why It Fails 	Key Case
Judge Boehm
Absolute
Judicial
Acted without jurisdiction; conspired
with others
Stump v.
Sparkman, 435
U.S. at 356-57;
Dennis v.
Sparks, 449
U.S. at 28
Legislators 	Legislative Criminal conspiracy outside legislative
sphere
United States v.
Brewster, 408
U.S. at 526
Prosecutors 	Prosecutorial Investigative/administrative
functions; bad faith
Kalina v.
Fletcher, 522
U.S. at 129
South Jordan
Police Department Qualified Enforcing facially illegal warrant
with 1,470 excessive bail
Groh v.
Ramirez, 540
U.S. at 565
City 	Municipal 	No immunity for municipalities
Owen v. City of
Independence,
445 U.S. at 638
School/Preston 	None (Private) Private parties in conspiracy with
state actors
Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S.
at 28
Faas/Tangaro 	None (Private) Private attorneys have no immunity 	N/A
The SAC also includes a “Defendant-Specific Acts Table” to “demonstrate[] each
[D]efendant’s specific unlawful acts and resulting harm:”35
Defendant 	Specific Unlawful Acts 	Date Constitutional/Lega
l Violation
Harm Caused
to Plaintiff
Early Light
Academy
Filed false police reports
after being told to stop
contact
Sept-Nov
2023
First
Amendment
retaliation
Initiated
criminal
prosecution
leading to
34 Id. ¶10J.
35 Id. ¶ 28.
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warrant
Stephanie Schmidt
Directed false reports;
characterized FERPA
requests as "threats"
Sept 2023-
Jan
2024 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Created false
criminal record
destroying
reputation
Amy Bird
Secretly recorded minor
with disability; filed false
reports
Oct-Nov
2023
FERPA violation;
false reporting
Violated child's
privacy;
supported false
charges
Erin Preston
Admitted coordinating
prosecution before
investigation complete;
called 6-year-old "terror";
manipulated child to "talk
into camera"
Oct 2023 	18 U.S.C. § 1503
(obstruction)
Ensured
prosecution
despite lack of
evidence;
dehumanized
disabled child
Anne Trout
Filed false reports despite
zero email contact (per
her statement) Nov 2023 Utah Code § 76-8-504
Added false
weight to
prosecution;
Created false
pattern of
multiple
victims despite
no contact
Marisol Pizarro
Gave mathematically
impossible testimony at
expulsion hearing
Jan 12,
2024 Perjury
Enabled illegal
expulsion of
disabled child
Sarah Hyatt
Filed false statements
while admitting wasn't
aware of events 	Nov 2023 	False statements
Provided false
evidence for
prosecution;
Manufactured
victim despite
admitting no
knowledge
Jordan Teuscher
Co-sponsored HB464
after receiving plea for
help
Jan-May
2024 First Amendment
retaliation
Increased
criminal
penalties faced
Kirk Cullimore Jr. Co-sponsored HB464
while father sued Plaintiff
Jan-May
2024
18 U.S.C. § 241
(conspiracy)
Legislative
persecution
while facing
eviction
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Judge Boehm
Issued warrant while
disqualified; refused
habeas corpus
May 2025 Due process;
Suspension Clause
Created illegal
warrant
preventing
employment/ho
using
City of South
Jordan
Maintained policies
enabling school/landlord
weaponization
Ongoing 	Monell liability
Systematic
denial of civil
rights
Snow/Montgomery Prosecuted despite
exculpatory evidence
Jan
2024-
present
Brady violation
Ongoing
prosecution
despite
innocence
Sgt. Anderson
Overruled Palmer; filed
charges 40 days after
contact ended
Jan 9,
2024 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Created
criminal
charges from
protected
speech
South Jordan
Police Dept
Enforcing facially illegal
warrant with 1,470%
excessive bail;
Institutional policy of
betraying crime victims
who seek help
May
2025-
present
Fourth/Eighth
Amendment; 42
U.S.C.
§ 1983
Ongoing threat
of illegal
arrest; Cannot
drive, work, or
secure housing
Cara Tangaro
Supervised Faas's
sabotage; collaborated
with Cullimore
2023-
2024 RICO conspiracy
Ensured
ineffective
defense
Tangaro Law
Employed Faas during
sabotage; institutional
oversight failure
Feb-
May
2024
Vicarious liability
Denied
effective
counsel
Nicole Faas
Sabotaged defense via
Gmail; false legal advice;
took retainer for sabotage
Feb-
May
2024
18 U.S.C. § 1343
(wire
fraud)
Prevented valid
defenses;
ensured
conviction;
financial fraud
The prayer for relief requests, among other things, a criminal referral to the United States
Attorney’s Office; compensatory, hedonic, treble, and punitive damages; expungement of
Blackwell’s criminal record; an order requiring the South Jordan Police Department to cease
enforcement of facially illegal warrants; an order requiring DCFS to correct false claims about
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Blackwell; prohibiting Defendants from coordinating any future prosecutions; prohibiting Early Light
Academy from filing criminal complaints against parents without court approval; creation of
whistleblower protections for parents reporting the abuse of disabled children; investigation of
disciplinary actions against children with disabilities at school; freezing of Defendants’ assets; and a
weekly accounting of Defendants’ expenditures.36
After screening the SAC under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Judge Pead issued the Report,
concluding the SAC does not cure the Amended Complaint’s deficiencies and recommending
dismissal.37 Specifically, Judge Pead found the SAC “fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, fails to meet standard pleading requirements and raises claims that lack an arguable
basis in law or in fact.”38 The Report analyzes why each claim fails, concludes further
amendment would be futile, and recommends dismissing the action with prejudice.39
The next day, Blackwell filed an Objection, a Supplemental Objection on December 19,
2025, and a Second Supplemental Objection on January 29, 2026.40 The Objection includes
several sections asserting Judge Pead exceeded his authority, misapplied legal standards, acted
with improper motive, ignored evidence and motions, and incorrectly reversed Blackwell’s IFP
status.41 Although Blackwell’s Objections are not clear, at bottom, she asserts Judge Pead acted
improperly and erred in concluding the SAC is frivolous and fails to state a claim.42 The
Supplemental Objection states Blackwell has newly-obtained documents that “prove coordinated
36 See id. at 29–32; Report at 4–5.
37 See generally Report.
38 Id. at 18.
39 Id. at 10–19.
40 Objection; Supplemental Objection; Second Supplemental Objection.
41 Objection.
42 See generally id.
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misconduct,” discusses legal precedent, lists issues for appeal, and requests additional relief.43
The Second Supplemental Objection asserts proposed bills in the 2026 Utah legislative session
demonstrate Blackwell’s RICO allegations and further support her Objections to Judge Pead’s
Report.44
LEGAL STANDARDS
Blackwell is a pro se litigant. Pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than
parties formally represented by lawyers, and their pleadings “are to be construed liberally.”45
Nevertheless, a litigant’s pro se status “does not excuse the obligation . . . to comply with the
fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil . . . Procedure.”46 At the pleading stage,
a pro se plaintiff still has “the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal
claim could be based.”47 The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a
plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”48
The standard for reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation depends on
the sufficiency of the objection. To qualify as a proper objection that triggers de novo review,
the objection must be both timely—that is, made within fourteen days—and “sufficiently
specific to focus the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in
43 See generally Supplemental Objection. The additional relief requested includes a legal finding that the Younger
abstention doctrine does not apply, that the court rule on the other outstanding Motions in this case, vacate her
warrant, order expedited proceedings, and reinstate Blackwell’s IFP status. Id. at 9.
44 See generally Second Supplemental Objection.
45 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
46 Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th
Cir. 1994) (“This court has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
47 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
48 Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Lankford v. Wagner, 853 F.3d 1119,
1122 (10th Cir. 2017) (recognizing it is not the court’s role to act as a pro se litigant’s “attorney in constructing
arguments and searching the record” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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dispute.”49 “Thus, de novo review is not required where a party advances objections to a
magistrate judge’s disposition that are either indecipherable or overly general.”50
Under the Tenth Circuit’s firm waiver rule, an objector waives “review of both factual
and legal questions” if an objection is not timely and specific.51 A court may decline to apply
the firm waiver rule “when the interests of justice so dictate”—for example, if “the magistrate’s
order does not apprise the pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and
recommendations.”52 “[T]his court generally reviews unobjected-to portions of a report and
recommendation for clear error.”53
The standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is also relevant, as Judge Pead’s
Report evaluated Blackwell’s SAC under this framework.54 Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the claims asserted in a plaintiff’s complaint. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the complaint must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.55 However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”56 While a complaint
need not recite “detailed factual allegations,” “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
49 United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[O]bjections to the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the
district court or for appellate review.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de
novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”).
50 Tracy v. Simplifi Co., No. 2:21-cv-00444-RJS-CMR, 2022 WL 887294, at *3 (D. Utah Mar. 25, 2022) (citing One
Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at 1060).
51 One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)).
52 Moore, 950 F.2d at 659.
53 Zloza v. Indus. Co., No. 4:23-cv-17-RJS-PK, 2023 WL 2760784, at *1 (D. Utah Apr. 3, 2023) (first citing
Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999); then citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory
committee’s note to 1983 amendment).
54 See generally Report.
55 Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2021).
56 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.57
ANALYSIS
The court reviews Judge Pead’s Report in two steps. First, the court reviews de novo the
conclusions to which Blackwell has timely and specifically objected.58 Second, the court
reviews the remainder for clear error.
I. 	De Novo Review of Specific Objections
Construed liberally, Blackwell raises three specific objections: (1) Judge Pead applied the
wrong legal standards; (2) Judge Pead erred in determining the SAC’s allegations are
conclusory; and (3) Judge Pead deliberately manipulated the judicial process and acted with
improper motive. The court addresses each objection in turn.
A. 	Judge Pead Did Not Apply Incorrect Standards
The court understands Blackwell to contend Judge Pead denied “IFP status without
identifying any false statements or changed circumstances” and applied heightened rather than
pro se pleading standards.59 Blackwell also argues Judge Pead improperly made credibility
determinations and weighed evidence at the pleading stage60 while simultaneously contending
Judge Pead erred by ignoring evidence that proves her case.61 The court disagrees.
57 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified).
58 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 requires specific written objections to be filed within 14 days after being
served with a copy of the recommendation. Because Blackwell’s Supplemental Objections were filed over two
months after the Report was served, they are untimely. See Supplemental Objection (filed December 19, 2025);
Second Supplemental Objection (filed January 29, 2026). Accordingly, the court only considers the first Objection.
Further, although the Objection is not a model of clarity, the court nevertheless reviews the Report de novo for
Blackwell’s benefit.
59 Objection at 2.
60 Objection at 2, 7.
61 See SAC ¶ 7C (“Plaintiff is not asking for favoritism – she is asking the Court to look at the documentary evidence
already in its possession that proves every allegation.”); id. ¶ 29 (“The City of South Jordan’s prosecution despite
having ZERO contact with Plaintiff proves the conspiracy’s coordination . . . .”); id. ¶ 38 (stating “the conspiracy’s
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First, Judge Pead only temporarily granted IFP status pending screening the Complaint.62
Blackwell’s temporary IFP status was extended for her to file the SAC and remained in place
pending screening of the SAC.63 Judge Pead now recommends denying Blackwell’s IFP status
in conjunction with dismissal.64 IFP status would only be granted going forward should the SAC
survive dismissal.65 Accordingly, Judge Pead did not “reverse” Blackwell’s IFP status,66 rather
he recommends dismissing the SAC which would also terminate Blackwell’s IFP status.67
Further, the Report specifically addresses the standard for analyzing pro se pleadings.68
Judge Pead acknowledged that pro se litigants are “held to a less stringent standard than . . .
lawyers” and discussed a pro se litigant’s pleading burden.69 Specifically, the Report explained a
pro se plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief.70
The court sees no error in Judge Pead’s analysis. While Blackwell is correct in stating
the court may not weigh evidence at the pleading stage,71 the Report analyzes the SAC on its
face for sufficiency.72 As stated above, the court need not accept all allegations as true. Bare
true purpose” is “prove[d]” by the alleged fact that the school “escalat[ed]” the dispute by going “over Palmer’s
head to his supervisors”).
62 IFP Order.
63 See Order.
64 Report at 18 (stating the court recommends denial of the IFP Motion because the SAC fails to state a claim, fails
to meet the required pleading standards, and raises claims that lack an arguable basis in law or fact).
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (authorizing the court to permit a party to commence an action without prepayment of fees,
but requiring dismissal if, “at any time,” the court determines the action “fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”).
66 Objection at 5.
67 Report at 18.
68 Id. at 7–8.
69 Id. at 7 (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
70 See id.; Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
71 Objection at 2, 7.
72 Report at 9–18 (analyzing the SAC’s allegations for sufficiency and concluding the SAC, as alleged, does not
state a claim upon which relief may be granted).
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assertions are not entitled to the assumption of truth.73 This rejection is not “on the ground that
they are unrealistic or nonsensical;” rather, they are deficient because they are conclusory.74 For
example, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court found a complaint alleging
conspiracy deficient because it lacked “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made.”75 Allegations merely consistent with a complaint’s asserted claims are
insufficient.76 The threshold requirement of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
that the allegations must “show that the pleader is entitled to relief.”77 The court concludes
Judge Pead properly applied this standard and, as explained below, correctly concluded the SAC
falls short.
B. 	The SAC Fails to State a Claim
At bottom, Blackwell disagrees with Judge Pead’s determination that the SAC allegations
are conclusory. An allegation is conclusory if it states the outcome or the conclusion the court
should draw from the complaint.78 Blackwell argues the SAC sufficiently states a claim because
it “allege[s] predicate acts with particularity” and demonstrates Defendants are state actors.79
Specifically, Judge Pead “ignored Plaintiff’s detailed tables” that identified Defendants’ names,
roles, actions, “connected actions to specific legal violations,” and provided evidence.80 The
73 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
74 Id.
75 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 557 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
78 See Conclusory, OED. COM , https://www.oed.com/dictionary/conclusory_adj?tab=meaning_and_use#8662114
[https://perma.cc/3P3M-JB59] (last visited Jan. 29, 2026) (“[r]elating or tending to a conclusion; conclusive”);
Conclusive, OED. COM , https://www.oed.com/dictionary/conclusive_adj?tab=meaning_and_use#8661825
[https://perma.cc/WW7Y-KX6T] (last visited Jan. 29, 2026) (defining “conclusive” as a statement that “decides the
question”).
79 Objection at 5.
80 Id. at 9.
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court disagrees. The allegations do not identify specific actions. Instead, the SAC alleges legal
conclusions and fails to support the asserted claims.
1. 	Count I: civil RICO Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
To state a conspiracy claim under RICO, the SAC must plausibly allege Defendants:
“(1) conducted the affairs (2) of an enterprise [whose actions affect interstate commerce]
(3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”81 The Act defines “racketeering activity” to
mean at least one of several specifically identified criminal acts.82 To allege a pattern, Blackwell
must allege each Defendant committed at least two racketeering acts within ten years of each
other.83
The SAC alleges the elements of a RICO conspiracy claim.84 However, it does not
contain sufficient allegations to support this claim. The SAC does not identify an enterprise or
any racketeering activity Defendants engaged in, let alone two acts for each Defendant.85 The
acts listed in the SAC tables include legal conclusions.86 For example, the Specific Acts Table
states Early Light Academy “[f]iled false police reports,” and the City of South Jordan
“[m]aintained policies enabling school/landlord weaponization.”87 The SAC does not state what
81 Johnson v. Heath, 56 F.4th 851, 858 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting George v. Urb. Settlement Servs., 833 F.3d 1242,
1248 (10th Cir. 2016)); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (permitting a “person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation” of the 18 U.S.C. § 1962 RICO statute); id. § 1962(a) (prohibiting a person from profiting through a
pattern of racketeering activity though “any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce”).
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The specified criminal acts include, among other things, murder, kidnapping, arson,
trafficking in firearms, the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers, passport forgery, slavery, and copyright
infringement. See id.
83 Johnson, 56 F.4th at 858 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)).
84 SAC ¶ 66.
85 See generally SAC.
86 Id. ¶ 28.
87 Id.
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the police reports aver or information that gives rise to an inference the reports are false.88 Nor
does the SAC identify any City of South Jordan policies or how those policies were
“weaponized” or otherwise relate to the asserted claims. Instead, these allegations ask the court
to assume or conclude the reports were false and the City’s policies enabled “school/landlord
weaponization.” Allegations should provide enough information to put Defendants on notice of
the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why” of the asserted claims.89 Stating a party filed a
false report, acted while disqualified, or committed sabotage are conclusions about the party’s
actions, not statements that give the information from which those conclusions might arise.
Further, the SAC is devoid of any allegations of how Defendants’ conduct affected interstate or
foreign commerce.90 And the court may not “supply additional factual allegations to round out a
plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on [her] behalf.”91
2. 	Count II: Conspiracy Against Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
The SAC asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), alleging “Defendants conspired to
deprive Plaintiff of equal protection and due process based on race and advocacy for [a] disabled
child,” and the “conspiracy involved two or more persons, including state actors and private
parties acting under color of state law.”92 Section 1985(3) provides a civil right of action
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
88 See generally SAC.
89 See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating the Supreme Court “was particularly
critical of complaints that ‘mentioned no specific time, place, or person involved in the alleged [claim]’” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 n.10)).
90 See generally SAC; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (listing establishing or operating an enterprise engaged in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce as an element for a RICO violation).
91 Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1173–74.
92 SAC ¶¶ 68–69.
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preventing or hindering the constituted authorities . . . from giving or securing to
all persons . . . the equal protection of the laws.93
Section 1985(3) specifically concerns conspiracies to deprive persons of equal protection of the
laws that are motived by racial or other class-based animosity.94 “To state a claim under
§ 1985(3), a plaintiff must show: (1) a conspiracy, motivated by racially-discriminatory animus;
(2) to deprive plaintiff of equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
and (4) a deprivation of rights resulting therefrom.”95
The SAC does not sufficiently allege racial discrimination or other animus toward a
protected class. The SAC alleges DCFS acted with “institutional bias” by investigating a “Black
mother based on false allegations with false claims about her cooperation, but refus[ing] to
investigate documented abuse of a disabled child by the school.”96 But DCFS is not a defendant,
and the SAC does not include any allegations that give rise to a plausible inference Defendants’
actions were related to her. The SAC also includes allegations of “differential treatment”
between Blackwell and a “white/connected” family in what the SAC characterizes as legislative
responses to their respective criminal cases.97 Specifically, the SAC alleges the legislature
changed the law to help the Caucasian family after a family member was charged with child
rape, and the legislature “expanded penalties” for Blackwell who advocated for her child with
disabilities, which Blackwell argues proves racial discrimination.98 However, as the Report
notes, Blackwell’s “child may be a member of a protected class based on his disability,” but the
93 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
94 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
95 Paris v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 94 Fed. App’x 810, 815 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686
(10th Cir. 1993)).
96 SAC ¶ 44A.
97 See id. ¶¶ 49–50.
98 See id.
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SAC is also devoid of any allegations that Defendants’ actions were motivated by discrimination
against the disabled.99
Additionally, the SAC does not include any allegations of any agreement between
Defendants to support a conspiracy claim. “[A]n allegation of parallel conduct and a bare
assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest
conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply
facts adequate to show illegality.”100 Although the SAC alleges “attorney Preston admitted to
police she was coordinating with prosecutors before investigation was complete” and Governor
Cox stated “groups were working together” to review a bill, there are no allegations from which
the court can infer a discriminatory agreement between Defendants.101 Law enforcement
investigation often requires ongoing cooperation from involved individuals. Indeed, “[i]t is an
act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid
in law enforcement,”102 and there are no allegations to suggest the attorney cooperated in an
improper way.103 Additionally, the allegation that Governor Cox stated “groups were working
together” does not identify what groups were involved. There is nothing from which to infer any
involvement in a conspiracy by any Defendants.
3. 	Count III: Section 1983 Violations
The SAC also asserts “[e]ach defendant violated specific constitutional rights under color
of state law” as detailed in the Specific Acts Table.104 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
99 Report at 13. See generally SAC.
100 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57.
101 SAC ¶ 8 (emphasis removed).
102 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477–78 (1966).
103 See generally SAC.
104 Id. ¶¶ 28, 70.
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the SAC must plausibly allege that Defendants (1) deprived Blackwell of a federally protected
right by (2) an actor acting under color of state law.105 The statute creates a civil action against
persons acting under color of law.106 In this case, the SAC does not state a § 1983 claim. Other
than Defendants City of South Jordan and Anderson, Defendants are not persons, not persons
acting under color of law, or entitled to immunity.107 As to the City of South Jordan and
Anderson, the SAC is insufficient.
i. 	Non-Individual Defendants
First, Early Light Academy and Tangaro Law entities are not persons and therefore not
subject to a § 1983 claim. Similarly, “governmental sub-units are not separate suable entities
that may be sued under § 1983.”108 Accordingly, the South Jordan Police Department is also not
subject to a § 1983 claim.
ii. 	Private Parties
Section 1983 “protects against acts attributable to a State, not those of a private
person.”109 As the SAC states, Preston, Faas, and Tangaro are private parties not acting under
color of law.110 Additionally, the SAC does not allege Defendants Schmidt, Bird, Trout, Pizarro,
105 Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016).
106 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitutions and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .”).
107 The SAC states any immunity Defendants may be entitled does not apply because Defendants conspired and
those who conspire to violate constitutional rights “lose immunity protection.” SAC ¶ 10A. However, as discussed
supra, the SAC does not state a claim for conspiracy.
108 Hinton v. Dennis, 362 Fed. App’x 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444
(10th Cir. 1985) (“The City of Denver Police Department is not a separate suable entity . . . .”).
109 Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024).
110 SAC ¶ 10J.
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and Hyatt “engaged in state action.”111 These Defendants are also private parties that cannot be
subjected to a § 1983 claim.
iii. 	Defendants Entitled to Immunity
As the Supreme Court has explained, its “decisions have looked to . . . common law
protections in affording either absolute or qualified immunity to individuals sued under
§ 1983.”112 This is “based on the reasoning that ‘the public good can best be secured by
allowing officers charged with the duty of deciding upon the rights of others, to act upon their
own free, unbiased convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehensions.’”113 Under this principle,
some government entities and actors are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity and
Defendants Boehm, Snow, Montgomery, Teuscher, Cullimore, and Anderson fall into these
categories.
Defendant Boehm is entitled to judicial immunity. Judges “are absolutely immune from
suit unless they act in ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction,’ meaning that even erroneous or
malicious acts are not proper bases for § 1983 claims.”114 The SAC alleges Boehm acted
without jurisdiction because he “[i]ssued a warrant while disqualified” and “refused habeas
corpus.”115 But Boehm was not disqualified when the warrant was issued,116 and deciding
habeas corpus petitions, issuing warrants, and setting bail are all typical duties of a judicial
111 See Lindke, 601 U.S. at 196.
112 Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012).
113 Id. at 383 (explaining this reasoning in common law which has “not been abrogated ‘by covert inclusion in the
general language’ of § 1983” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976))).
114 Segler v. Felfam Ltd. P'ship, 324 F. App'x 742, 743 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)); see also Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (“It is well
established that absolute immunity bars suits for money damages for acts made in the exercise of prosecutorial or
judicial discretion.” (citation modified)).
115 SAC ¶ 28.
116 See id. ¶ 43 (stating the disqualification motion was pending when the warrant was issued).
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officer. Because Boehm was acting in his judicial capacity as a judge, his actions are entitled to
absolute immunity.117
Montgomery and Snow are also entitled to absolute immunity. They are named as
defendants because of their alleged prosecutorial acts.118 “State prosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity against suits brought pursuant to § 1983 for activities intimately associated
with the judicial process, such as initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions.”119 Prosecutors
command this immunity even when a “genuinely wronged criminal defendant” may be left
“without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of
liberty.”120 Thus, Mongomery and Snow are also immune from the § 1983 claim.
Defendants Teuscher and Cullimore are also entitled to immunity. Legislators “enjoy[]
absolute immunity for their official actions” “[r]egardless of any unworthy purpose animating
their actions.”121 Although the SAC alleges Teuscher and Cullimore “conspir[ed] outside [their]
legislative sphere,” the SAC is totally devoid of any allegations to that effect.122 Rather, the
SAC alleges they co-sponsored HB464—a legislative activity that enjoys immunity.123 In sum,
Defendants Teuscher, Cullimore, Boehm, Montgomery, and Snow are all thus entitled to
absolute immunity.
117 See Doran v. Sanchez, 289 F. App'x 332, 332 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (holding state court judge absolutely
immune for action done in his judicial capacity).
118 See SAC ¶ 23 (“Defendants Snow and Montgomery are prosecutors who pursued charges despite exculpatory
evidence.”); id. ¶ 28 (listing Snow and Montgomery “specific unlawful acts” as “prosecut[ing] despite exculpatory
evidence”).
119 Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation modified).
120 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
121 Id. at 417–18.
122 SAC ¶ 10J.
123 Id. ¶ 28.
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iv. 	Sergeant Anderson
City officials sued in their official capacity are also entitled to immunity in some
circumstances.124 “[P]ublic officials enjoy qualified immunity in civil actions that are brought
against them in their individual capacities and that arise out of the performance of their
duties.”125 This is because “individuals working for the government in pursuit of government
objectives are ‘principally concerned with enhancing the public good,’” and “[w]hether such
individuals have assurance that they will be able to seek protection if sued under § 1983 directly
affects the government’s ability to achieve its objectives through their public service.”126
Accordingly, officials have a presumption of this immunity that is only overcome if a plaintiff
shows the “public official violated the plaintiff’s constitutional (or . . . federally protected)
rights” and the “rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”127
The SAC appears to address qualified immunity by alleging “Anderson overruled
Detective Palmer and filed charges 40 days after all contact ceased”128 and:
No reasonable officer would believe: (1) prosecuting someone 40 days after all contact
ended was lawful; (2) reversing from treating someone as victim to defendant without
new evidence was proper; or (3) filing charges based on State Board-validated advocacy
was constitutional. . . . [B]ad faith prosecution targeting constitutionally protected
activity without reasonable expectation of valid conviction eliminates qualified
immunity. 129
124 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized immunity for firefighter department officials acting in the course
of their official duties. Filarsky, 566 U.S. 377, 381–83 (2012) (identifying a city fire department chief and two fire
department officials as immune from suit under § 1983).
125 Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638
(1987)).
126 Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 392 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992)).
127 Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1227.
128 SAC ¶ 24.
129 Id. ¶ 10D; see also id. ¶ 10J (stating qualified immunity for police “fails” because “[n]o reasonable belief in
lawfulness of charges 40 days after contact ended”).
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But it is not clear from the SAC what constitutional or federally protected right Anderson is
alleged to have violated or that the right was clearly established,130 and the court may not read in
facts to salvage a complaint.131 Accordingly, the court concludes the SAC does not sufficiently
allege Anderson committed acts for which he is not entitled to qualified immunity.
v. 	The City of South Jordan
While “a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983” and immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment,132 municipalities “can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief” when the alleged constitutional tort was caused by an
official municipal policy.133 However, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an
injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.”134 While the SAC alleges the City
“[m]aintained policies enabling school/landlord weaponization,”135 it contains no allegations that
state what any of the City’s policies were, or how any policies were executed in such a way to
deprive Blackwell of a constitutional right. This is a conclusory allegation “without further
factual enhancement that stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
130 See generally SAC. “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable officer
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. . . . The dispositive question is whether the violative
nature of the particular conduct is clearly established.” Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
131 Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1173–74 (stating the court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a
plaintiff’s complaint”); see also Lankford, 853 F.3d at 1122 (recognizing it is not the court’s role to act as a pro se
litigant’s “attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
132 Will v. Mich. Dept. of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 67 (1989).
133 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91; see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 (1980) (stating a local
government may be sued under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [constitutional]
injury”).
134 Owen, 445 U.S. 622 at 633; see also Monell, 436 U.S.at 691 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable [under
§ 1983] solely because it employs a tortfeasor . . . .”).
135 SAC ¶ 28; see also ¶ 22 (“Defendant City of South Jordan is the municipal corporation whose policies enabled
the conspiracy by allowing schools and landlords to weaponize the court system.”).
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entitlement of relief.”136 The only other allegation regarding the City is that it “[e]mploys police;
has school coordination protocols; [and] prosecutes despite NO contact with Plaintiff.”137 Again,
this is deficient. A city may not be liable under § 1983 merely for employing an alleged
tortfeasor, and the SAC does not identify any protocols or provide any details that support this
conclusory allegation.138 Accordingly, the SAC fails to assert a plausible § 1983 claim against
the City of South Jordan and none of Blackwell’s § 1983 claims withstand dismissal.
4. 	Count IV: Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice (18 U.S.C. § 241)
The SAC asserts a claim for conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. § 241, but this
statute is part of the criminal code. Criminal statutes “do not provide for a private right of action
and are thus not enforceable through a civil action.”139 Accordingly, Count IV is not a viable
claim.
C. 	There Is No Indication Judge Pead Acted Improperly
Blackwell contends the chronology of the case “reveals improper motive, deliberate
manipulation, and rush to judgment” on the part of Judge Pead.140 Specifically, Blackwell points
to the timeline of events of October 14, 2025, when she submitted a motion for expedited review
of the warrant141 and Judge Pead issued the Report and Recommendation.142 Blackwell argues a
series of delays of 35, 91, and 96 minutes between when she submitted the motion, the court
136 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quotation modified).
137 SAC ¶ 54.
138 See Glaser v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 557 Fed. App’x 689, 702 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (holding
plaintiff’s “allegations that the City and County of Denver implemented an unconstitutional policy to defame his
reputation and failed to properly train employees are conclusory”).
139 Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1076 (citing United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546, 547 (1878)).
140 Objection at 5.
141 Dkt. 17, Emergency Motion for Status and Expedited Review of Warrant Vacation.
142 Objection at 5.
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informed her of the need for redaction, resubmission of the motion, and the publishing of the
Report “proves deliberate obstruction.”143 But the logistics of docketing within a few hours does
not demonstrate any improper conduct. Further, the Report concerns Judge Pead’s conclusions
from screening the SAC under the IFP statute; it does not concern any of Blackwell’s other
motions. Blackwell may strongly disagree with Judge Pead’s Report, but the record does not
support any allegation of improper bias or action on his part.144
II. 	Clear Error Review
Having addressed Blackwell’s specific objections, the court now turns to the remainder
of the Report, which it reviews for clear error. After careful consideration, the court finds no
clear error in any of Judge Pead’s unobjected-to conclusions.
And the court agrees that further amendment would be futile. Some of the claims are not
possible to cure.145 Additionally, Blackwell has already amended the Complaint twice, including
once with the benefit of the Judge Pead’s detailed review and guidance regarding the
deficiencies.146 “In every case, there must be a ‘point in time when litigation shall be at an
end.’”147 The court finds this case has reached that point.
143 Id.
144 See United States v. Stilley, No. 24-5133, 2025 WL 2718277, at *2 (10th Cir. 2025) (unpublished) (“Ordinarily,
when a judge’s words or actions are motivated by events originating within the context of judicial proceedings, they
are insulated from charges of bias. Thus, adverse rulings cannot in themselves form the appropriate grounds for
disqualification.” (quoting United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005)) (citation modified)).
145 See supra.
146 See Order; see also Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1207 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate where a plaintiff’s amended pleadings fail to cure the deficiencies of her claims).
147 Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C., 595 U.S. 267, 292 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing
Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Blackwell’s Objection to Judge Pead’s Report and
Recommendation is OVERRULED. Judge Pead’s Report is ADOPTED148 and this case is
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,149 Emergency Motion
for Asset Freeze and Preservation Order,150 Emergency Motion for Relief from Defendants’
Obstruction of Federal Proceedings,151 Motion for Expedited Criminal Referral and
Supplemental Evidence of RICO Enterprise,152 and Motion for Expedited Ruling on Pending
Objections153 are all DENIED as moot. The clerk of court is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED this 12th day of February 2026.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________
ROBERT J. SHELBY
United States District Judge
148 Dkt. 18. Although the court does not consider the City of South Jordan as immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment, the court agrees the SAC fails to state a claim against it. Accordingly, the court adopts the
recommendation for dismissal as to the City of South Jordan.
149 Dkt. 2.
150 Dkt. 3.
151 Dkt. 8.
152 Dkt. 11.
153 Dkt. 25.
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