Kinman v. Saraya USA Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
VALERIE KINMAN, individually and on behalf 	)
of all others similarly situated, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	Case No. 	25 C 7539
)
v. 	)
) 	Judge Robert W. Gettleman
SARAYA USA, INC. d/b/a Lakanto, a Utah 	)
corporation, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Valerie Kinman filed a complaint in this court (the “Illinois Action”) against
defendant Saraya USA, Inc., alleging that defendant made misleading statements on the labels of
its “Lakanto Monkfruit Sweetener” product, which plaintiff alleges she purchased in Illinois at a
time when she “resided in Illinois.” 	Plaintiff brought the case as a class action under the Class
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)) on behalf of: herself; a multi-state class of
consumers who purchased defendant’s products in Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington; and an Illinois subclass of consumers who purchased
defendant’s products in Illinois. 	Plaintiff alleges that by making misleading statements on its
product labels, defendant violated the laws of those states (including consumer-protection laws).
Roughly an hour before plaintiff filed the Illinois Action, plaintiff’s counsel filed a
similar class action against defendant on behalf of a California plaintiff and a California class in
the Northern District of California (the “California Action”). 	The California Action alleges that
defendant violated several California laws based on the same product labeling.
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Defendant has moved to dismiss, or alternatively to transfer, the Illinois Action. 	As for
transfer, defendant argues that the court should transfer the Illinois Action under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) to the District of Utah, where defendant is incorporated and has its principal place of
business. 	In response, plaintiff filed its own motion to transfer the Illinois Action under §
1404(a) to the Northern District of California, where, she asserts, the case can be consolidated
with the California Action. 	The court is thus faced with dueling transfer motions. 	As a result,
the court stayed briefing on defendant’s motion to dismiss pending the court’s ruling on the
transfer motions. 	For the reasons below, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to transfer, and
grants defendant’s motion to transfer.
DISCUSSION
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or
to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 	Transfer
under § 1404(a) is appropriate when: “(1) venue is proper in the transferor district, (2) venue and
jurisdiction are proper in the transferee district, and (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of
the parties, the convenience of the witnesses, and the interest of justice.” 	Hirst v. SkyWest, Inc.,
405 F. Supp. 3d 771, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer to the Northern District of California
Plaintiff hinges her motion to transfer on the “interest of justice” factor. 	She asserts that
transferring this case to the Northern District of California (a district defendant has not consented
to litigating this case in) would serve the interests of justice because, by transferring there, the
court would be placing the Illinois Action in the same district as the California Action—where
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the two cases could be consolidated. 	Putting aside that plaintiff’s counsel is the one who filed
the two cases in two different districts to begin with, plaintiff’s motion fails for a threshold
reason: She fails to show that this case might have been originally brought in California.
“As used in § 1404(a), the phrase ‘district where it might have been brought’ means ‘the
district where plaintiff has a recognized right to bring his case under the Venue Act and that this
right was unqualified and absolute, not depending upon consent of the defendant, evidenced by
waiver, entry of appearance, or otherwise.’” 	BRH-Garver Constr., LLC v. BankFinancial, N.A.,
No. 22-CV-1449, 2023 WL 5334610, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2023) (quoting Blaski v.
Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1958), aff’d, 363 U.S. 335 (1960)). 	Thus, “if for any
reason the plaintiff's exact same case could not be brought as a matter of right in the transferee
district (e.g., due to a lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants or a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in the transferee district) then the transferee district would not be a district ‘where it
might have been brought’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” 	Holman v. AMU Trans, LLC, No. 14 C
04407, 2015 WL 3918488, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2015) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to show that defendant would have been subject to personal
jurisdiction in California, and has therefore failed to show that this exact case could have been
brought as a matter of right in the Northern District of California. 	Plaintiff’s complaint pleads
only state—not federal—claims. 	The Illinois Action is thus based on diversity jurisdiction.
That is so, even though plaintiff filed it as a class action under CAFA. 	See Sloan v. Gen.
Motors LLC, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (explaining that even if CAFA
provides a basis for jurisdiction, it is merely an “expansion of diversity jurisdiction” and “does
not, on its own, purport to establish federal question jurisdiction”). 	So although plaintiff need
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not show that the court in California would have personal jurisdiction over defendant for the
claims of the unnamed class members, plaintiff, as the “named representative[ ],” must “be able
to demonstrate . . . personal jurisdiction” for her claim. 	Vanegas v. Signet Builders, Inc., 113
F.4th 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also LeGrand v. Abbott Lab’ys, 655 F.
Supp. 3d 871, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“California district courts considering the issue have largely
determined that named, out-of-state, class-action plaintiffs in cases based on diversity
jurisdiction must establish personal jurisdiction.”).
To determine if defendant would have been subject to personal jurisdiction as to
plaintiff’s claim in California, the court looks to California’s long-arm statute. 	Cf. Cont’l
Illinois Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chicago v. Lopez, No. 85 C 8372, 1986 WL 4434, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 7, 1986) (looking to Nevada’s long-arm statute for motion to transfer to the District of
Nevada). 	California’s long-arm statute extends jurisdiction as far as the due process clause of
the federal constitution allows. 	LeGrand, 655 F. Supp. 3d at 882 (citing Cal. Civ. P. Code §
410.10). 	So the issue here merges into whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
defendant comports with federal due process. 	Id.
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to
the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or
relations.’” 	Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 	The Supreme Court has translated this notion
into a “minimum contacts” test. 	Under that test, courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant that is “not present within the territory of the forum” if “he ha[s] certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
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play and substantial justice.’” 	Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court’s focus on a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum has led
it to “recognizing two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes called all-purpose)
jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked) jurisdiction.” 	Ford Motor Co. v.
Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021). 	A court “may exercise general
jurisdiction”—that is, jurisdiction over “‘any and all claims’ brought against a defendant”—
“only when [that] defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the State.” 	Id. (citation omitted). 	For a
corporation, that generally means “its place of incorporation and principal place of business.”
Id. at 359. 	“Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with
a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” 	Id. 	For specific jurisdiction, the defendant
“must take some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State,” and the “plaintiff’s claims . . . must arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts” with that forum. 	Id. (cleaned up).
Here, plaintiff has established neither general nor specific jurisdiction in California. 	As
for the former, there is no evidence that defendant—a Utah corporation with a principal place of
business in Utah—is essentially “at home” in California. 	Nor does plaintiff meaningfully argue
otherwise. 	As for the latter, even though defendant may have availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in California by selling its sweetener product there, plaintiff has not shown
that her claim arises out the defendant’s activities there. 	As defendant states (without any
meaningful response from plaintiff):
The product labels were designed in Utah. . . . Plaintiff . . . purchased the product
in Illinois and allegedly suffered harm in Illinois. [Plaintiff] asserts claims under
Illinois law and other states, but not the laws of California. And [plaintiff] purports
to represent classes of individuals residing in Illinois and other states, but not
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California.
In fact, defendant further notes, “the word ‘California’ is not even mentioned in Plaintiff’s
Complaint.”
Plaintiff’s claim’s connection to California, then, is just as tenuous as the plaintiffs’
claims’ connections were to California in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California,
San Francisco Cnty., 582 U.S. 255 (2017)—where the Supreme Court found that California
courts did not have specific jurisdiction for non-California-resident plaintiffs’ misleading
advertising claims against Bristol-Myers over its pill, Plavix. 	In Bristol-Myers, “both the
[California-]resident and nonresident plaintiffs’ claims [were] based on the same allegedly
defective product and the assertedly misleading marketing . . . of that product.” 	582 U.S. at 260
(citation omitted). 	But the nonresident plaintiffs had not been prescribed Plavix in California,
had not purchased Plavix in California, had not ingested Plavix in California, and had not
sustained their injuries in California. 	Id. at 264. 	So the California forum, and Bristol-Myers’
activities there, lacked a sufficient connection to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims—even though
“other [resident] plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California . . . and
allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the nonresidents.” 	Id. at 265 (emphasis in original).
Here, like there, both plaintiff’s and the California plaintiff’s claims are based on the
same product labeling. 	But plaintiff here, like the nonresident plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers, is not
a resident of California, did not purchase defendant’s product in California, and did not sustain
an injury in California. 	So just as in Bristol-Myers, the California forum, and defendant’s
activities there, lack a sufficient connection to plaintiff’s claims for the court in California to
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant. 	And that “remains true even” though the
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California plaintiff has asserted “claims similar to those brought by” plaintiff here. 	Id.1
Perhaps sensing this, plaintiff argues that even if specific jurisdiction were lacking, it
would not matter here because the California court could still exercise “pendent personal
jurisdiction” over defendant. 	The court disagrees. 	There are two “forms” of pendent
jurisdiction: “pendent claim and pendent party personal jurisdiction.” 	Vanegas, 113 F.4th at
727 (citation omitted). 	Pendent claim personal jurisdiction “permits courts asserting personal
jurisdiction over one claim to extend that jurisdiction to another related claim by the same
plaintiff.” 	Id. 	Pendent party personal jurisdiction “is similar, except the two claims come from
two different parties.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff here relies on pendent party jurisdiction.
But her reliance on it is misplaced. 	First, “nearly every court considering the issue has
concluded [that] pendent party jurisdiction cannot be exercised by a federal court sitting in
diversity.” 	Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 16-CV-07244-EMC, 2019 WL 6612221, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019). 	And, as explained above, any federal court in this case would be
“sitting in diversity.” 	Second, even if the court in California could exercise pendent party
jurisdiction over defendant, it would do so only as a matter of discretion. 	See Action
Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that
the actual exercise of personal pendent jurisdiction in a particular case is within the discretion of
the district court.”). 	That means that even if pendant party jurisdiction could be applied,
1 	Although Bristol-Myers involved the exercise of jurisdiction by a state court, and the Court
left “open the question of whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court,” id. at 265, any federal court in this case
would be sitting in diversity, and thus looking to state law. 	So Bristol-Myers applies here.
LDGP, LLC v. Cynosure, Inc., No. 15 C 50148, 2018 WL 439122, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16,
2018)
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plaintiff would still lack “a recognized,” “unqualified and absolute” right to bring her case in the
Northern District of California that is required for a transfer. 	BRH-Garver, 2023 WL 5334610,
at *3 (citation omitted).
Because plaintiff has failed to show that defendant would have been subject to personal
jurisdiction in California, the Northern District of California is not a district in which this case
might have been brought. 	As a result—and as much as it might make sense to transfer this case
to California for consolidation with the California Action—the court cannot do so. 	See Hirst,
405 F. Supp. 3d at 776 (“[W]here venue is improper in the transferee court, the action may not
be transferred even if the interest of justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses would
favor transfer.”). 	The court therefore denies plaintiff’s motion to transfer.
Defendant’s Motion to Transfer to the District of Utah
Unlike with plaintiff’s motion, there is no dispute that this case could have been brought
in the District of Utah, where defendant is incorporated and has its principal place of business.
There is also no dispute that venue is proper here, in the Northern District of Illinois. 	So the
question is whether it is in the interest of party-convenience and justice to transfer this case to
Utah. 	Defendant argues that it plainly is because Utah is “where [defendant]’s headquarters is
located, [where] key witnesses and relevant documents are located, and where the vast majority
of the alleged wrongful acts occurred.” 	In response, plaintiff filed a brief that merely
“incorporate[d] by reference” plaintiff’s own motion to transfer and her memorandum and
declaration in support thereof. 	But arguments “incorporated by reference” are “waived.” 	Kove
IO, Inc. v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 685, 701 (N.D. Ill. 2024); see also Parker
v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910, 924 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[B]riefs may not
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incorporate other documents by reference.”). 	Regardless, the court agrees with defendant that
transfer to Utah will best serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of
justice.
Starting with convenience, courts consider: “(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (2) the
situs of material events; (3) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the convenience of
the witnesses; and (5) the convenience to the parties of litigating in the respective forums.”
Hirst, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (citation omitted). 	As for plaintiff’s choice of Illinois as the
forum, her choice is entitled to little or no weight. 	For one thing, plaintiff purports to represent
a multi-state class involving the laws of seven states, “and a plaintiff’s choice of forum is
afforded less deference when the plaintiff represents a class.” 	Id. at 777 (cleaned up). 	For
another thing, plaintiff herself has moved to transfer this case out of Illinois. 	She thus
“recognizes that her choice of forum of Illinois is not entitled to deference.”
Turning to the other four convenience factors, they all favor transfer. 	As for the situs of
material events, “the conduct which is the focus of this suit is decisions by Defendant[ ] to
market and sell” Lakanto Monkfruit Sweetener “with allegedly misrepresented” information on
the labels—“not the purchases by Plaintiff[ ].” 	Jaramillo v. DineEquity, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d
908, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (granting motion to transfer class action that alleged that the defendants
misrepresented the Weight Watchers POINTS® content in certain Applebee’s menu items); see
also Jasper v. Danone N. Am. Pub. Benefit Corp., No. 22 C 7122, 2023 WL 4492354, at *3
(N.D. Ill. July 12, 2023) (“Where a claim revolves around large-scale misrepresentations or
statements to consumers, the situs of material events is where the defendant made the underlying
business decisions.” (cleaned up)). 	And those “decisions would have been made by employees
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of defendant[ ],” who are located in Utah. 	Jaramillo, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 914. 	Utah is also
where defendant and its witnesses and documents are located. 	For her part, it is not clear where
plaintiff currently resides, and no doubt many unnamed class members will come from the
several different states that form the multi-state class, and so they must travel whether this case
stays here or is transferred to Utah. 	Plaintiff, moreover, has not identified any witnesses based
in Illinois who would be inconvenienced by transfer to Utah. 	And again, she was content to
litigate this case in California.
Moving on to the interests of justice, courts generally consider “docket congestion and
likely speed to trial in the transferor and potential transferee forums,” “each court’s relative
familiarity with the relevant law,” “the respective desirability of resolving controversies in each
locale,” and “the relationship of each community to the controversy.” 	Research Automation,
Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2010). 	These factors favor
transfer or are neutral.
As for congestion and speed, the District of Utah appears to be less congested than this
district, and has far fewer trials than this district, where the median time to trial for civil jury
cases is 61 months. 	See U.S. District Courts—Median Time From Filings to Trial for Civil
Casses in Which Trials Were Completed (March 31, 2025), available at:
https://www.uscourts.gov/data-news/data-tables/2025/03/31/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/t-
3. 	Both this court and the District of Utah, moreover, can handle class actions. 	What is more,
although Count I alleges a claim under Illinois law, “federal courts have experience applying the
law of foreign states.” 	Jaramillo, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 917. 	And because Counts II-V allege
claims under the laws of states other than Illinois, the presiding court will have to apply foreign
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state law anyway—regardless whether this case remains here or is transferred to Utah. 	See
Jasper, 2023 WL 4492354, at *7 (“Since Jasper’s complaint invokes the consumer fraud acts of
various states, this case would likely require any federal court to explore unfamiliar terrain.”).
Finally, the court finds that Utah has a greater connection to this multi-state class action than
Illinois, because the majority of witnesses will likely be in Utah, the relevant alleged acts or
omissions giving rise to the litigation took place in Utah, and Utah has an interest in adjudicating
controversies involving a Utah corporation that employs many Utah residents.
In short, the court finds that this case should be transferred to the District of Utah for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court denies plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue to the
Northern District of California [26], and grants defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the
District of Utah [22]. 	The Clerk is directed to transfer this case to the United States District
Court for the District of Utah forthwith.
So ordered.
ENTER:
_________________________________________
Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge
DATE: January 21, 2026
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