Canada v. The Queen's Medical Center

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
26-SEP-2025
08:03 AM
Dkt. 64 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

KAREN CANADA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTER; CLAYTON D.K. CHONG, M.D.,
Defendants-Appellees; and DOES 1-50, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CC181001735)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant Karen Canada (Canada) appeals from

the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's (circuit court)

"Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)], and

Order Granting Defendant[-Appellee] The Queen's Medical Center's

[(QMC)] Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed March 17,

2022" (Summary Judgment Order), filed on October 10, 2022, and

"Judgment," filed August 29, 2023.1

1 The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

This appeal arises out of a Complaint filed against

QMC and Defendant-Appellee Clayton D.K. Chong, M.D. (Chong),

alleging claims related to medical treatment provided to Canada.

In March 2021, the circuit court granted QMC's first motion for

summary judgment, dismissing all claims against QMC except

"[Canada's] claim for apparent authority, arising from [Chong's]

conduct."2

Canada entered into a settlement agreement with Chong,

and the circuit court entered an order granting Chong's Petition

for Finding of Good Faith Settlement (Good Faith Order).3

Following the entry of the Good Faith Order, QMC filed its

second motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the

sole remaining claim premised on QMC's alleged apparent

authority. The circuit court heard the matter and entered the

Summary Judgment Order in favor of QMC. The circuit court made,

2 Canada asserts a claim premised on an agency relationship between
QMC and Chong created through apparent authority. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court
has held that apparent authority,

arises when the principal does something or permits the
agent to do something which reasonably leads another to
believe that the agent had the authority he was purported
to have. The critical focus is not on the principal and
agent's intention to enter into an agency relationship, but
on whether a third party relies on the principal's conduct
based on a reasonable belief in the existence of such a
relationship.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pac. Rent-All, Inc., 90 Hawaiʻi 315, 326-27, 978
P.2d 753, 764-65 (1999) (cleaned up).

3 Chong was dismissed pursuant to a stipulation entered on
October 13, 2021, and is a nominal appellee.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

inter alia, the following FOFs4 and COLs that are challenged by

Canada:

[FOF] 11. The settlement agreement between [Canada]
and [Chong], accounted for a full resolution of all damages
allegedly caused by [Chong].

[FOF] 12. [Canada], as part of the settlement,
agreed that there would be no finding of liability against
[Chong].

. . . .

[COL] 10. Given that [Canada's] remaining claim
against [QMC] is a claim for apparent authority arising
from the conduct of [Chong], and given that [Canada], as
part of her settlement agreement with [Chong], has been
fully compensated for her injuries allegedly caused by
[Chong], the element of damages against [QMC] has been
extinguished, as there are no independent claims remaining
against [QMC].

[COL] 11. Given that the element of damages has
been extinguished, there is no genuine issue of material
fact on the issue of damages and summary judgment is
warranted.

. . . .

[COL] 13. Without the ability to obtain an adverse
finding of liability as to [Chong's] conduct, there is no
genuine issue of material fact, as [Canada] is unable to
meet her burden of proof with respect to her claim for
apparent authority against [QMC].

(Emphasis added.)

On appeal, Canada contends that the circuit court

erred in entering the Summary Judgment Order and, specifically,

in: (1) "finding that the settlement agreement entered into

between [Canada] and [Chong] fully compensated [Canada] and

extinguished any claim for damages against QMC"; (2) "finding

4 We note that a circuit court deciding a motion for summary
judgment does not make FOFs. To the extent the circuit court was construing
the terms of the settlement agreement in FOFs 11 and 12, FOFs 11 and 12
appear to be COLs.

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

that [Canada's] release of [Chong's] liability in the settlement

agreement precluded [Canada] from further litigating [Chong's]

conduct in her claim against QMC for vicarious liability"; and

(3) "equat[ing] a factual finding of fault with a legal finding

of liability." (Formatting altered.)

Upon careful review of the record, briefs, and

relevant legal authorities, and having given due consideration

to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties,

we resolve Canada's points of error, collectively, as follows.

We review the circuit court's grant of summary

judgment de novo, applying the following standard,

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the
effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential
elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the
parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. In other words, we must
view all of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawaiʻi 46, 55-56, 292 P.3d 1276, 1285-86

(2013) (citation omitted).

Canada contends the circuit court erred in finding

that the settlement agreement between Canada and Chong

"extinguished" Canada's apparent authority claim against QMC,

and that genuine questions of material fact remain.

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

The summary judgment record reflects that Chong agreed

to a monetary settlement with Canada in exchange for the release

of Canada's legal claims against him. The settlement agreement,

by its express terms, released Chong; it did not release

Canada's apparent authority claim against QMC.5 Canada is

therefore not barred from pursuing her remaining apparent

authority claim against joint tortfeasor QMC for damages in

excess of what she received from the settlement with Chong.6 Cf.

Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawaiʻi 1, 4, 889 P.2d 685, 688 (1995)

(holding that "the common law rule that the release of an

employee automatically releases the employer from vicarious

liability has been abrogated in Hawaiʻi by the adoption of our

version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act")

(citation omitted).

5 Settlement agreements are contracts, Exotics Haw.-Kona, Inc. v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 116 Hawaiʻi 277, 288, 172 P.3d 1021, 1032
(2007), and the "[i]nterpretation and construction of a contract is reviewed
de novo," Pub. Access Trails Haw. v. Haleakala Ranch Co., 153 Hawaiʻi 1, 21,
526 P.3d 526, 546 (2023) (citation omitted).
In interpreting a contract, the court "will look no further than
the four corners of the contract to determine whether an ambiguity exists."
Hawaiian Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Wong, 130 Hawaiʻi 36, 45, 305 P.3d
452, 461 (2013) (citation omitted). If no ambiguity exists, "[t]he parol
evidence rule precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict
the terms" of the contract. Id. (cleaned up).

6 The Good Faith Order states that "[t]he settlement [between
Canada and Chong] shall reduce the claims against any other joint tortfeasor
or co-obligor not released in the amount stipulated by the release,
dismissal, or covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is greater."

5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Whether Canada has been fully compensated for her

alleged injuries, such that "the element of damages has been

extinguished," is a disputed question of fact. We conclude that

the circuit court was wrong in finding that Canada's settlement

agreement with Chong, which does not release QMC from liability,

necessarily "extinguished" Canada's claim against QMC for

general, special, and punitive damages.

We further conclude that the settlement agreement does

not bar Canada from pursuing a claim against QMC that requires

proof of Chong's negligence. Rather, the settlement agreement

bars Canada from pursuing such a claim against Chong. The

settlement agreement releases Chong from legal liability to

Canada; it does not release joint tortfeasor QMC.

We therefore conclude that the circuit court erred in

entering summary judgment in favor of QMC, and we vacate the

circuit court's Summary Judgment Order and Judgment. We remand

for further proceedings consistent with this summary disposition

order.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, September 26, 2025.

On the briefs: /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Presiding Judge
Denise M. Hevicon,
for Plaintiff-Appellant. /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge
Saori Takahashi,
for Defendant-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
26-SEP-2025
08:03 AM
Dkt. 64 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

KAREN CANADA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTER; CLAYTON D.K. CHONG, M.D.,
Defendants-Appellees; and DOES 1-50, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 1CC181001735)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Wadsworth, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant Karen Canada (Canada) appeals from

the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's (circuit court)

"Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)], and

Order Granting Defendant[-Appellee] The Queen's Medical Center's

[(QMC)] Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed March 17,

2022" (Summary Judgment Order), filed on October 10, 2022, and

"Judgment," filed August 29, 2023.1

1 The Honorable Dean E. Ochiai presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

This appeal arises out of a Complaint filed against

QMC and Defendant-Appellee Clayton D.K. Chong, M.D. (Chong),

alleging claims related to medical treatment provided to Canada.

In March 2021, the circuit court granted QMC's first motion for

summary judgment, dismissing all claims against QMC except

"[Canada's] claim for apparent authority, arising from [Chong's]

conduct."2

Canada entered into a settlement agreement with Chong,

and the circuit court entered an order granting Chong's Petition

for Finding of Good Faith Settlement (Good Faith Order).3

Following the entry of the Good Faith Order, QMC filed its

second motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the

sole remaining claim premised on QMC's alleged apparent

authority. The circuit court heard the matter and entered the

Summary Judgment Order in favor of QMC. The circuit court made,

2 Canada asserts a claim premised on an agency relationship between
QMC and Chong created through apparent authority. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court
has held that apparent authority,

arises when the principal does something or permits the
agent to do something which reasonably leads another to
believe that the agent had the authority he was purported
to have. The critical focus is not on the principal and
agent's intention to enter into an agency relationship, but
on whether a third party relies on the principal's conduct
based on a reasonable belief in the existence of such a
relationship.

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pac. Rent-All, Inc., 90 Hawaiʻi 315, 326-27, 978
P.2d 753, 764-65 (1999) (cleaned up).

3 Chong was dismissed pursuant to a stipulation entered on
October 13, 2021, and is a nominal appellee.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

inter alia, the following FOFs4 and COLs that are challenged by

Canada:

[FOF] 11. The settlement agreement between [Canada]
and [Chong], accounted for a full resolution of all damages
allegedly caused by [Chong].

[FOF] 12. [Canada], as part of the settlement,
agreed that there would be no finding of liability against
[Chong].

. . . .

[COL] 10. Given that [Canada's] remaining claim
against [QMC] is a claim for apparent authority arising
from the conduct of [Chong], and given that [Canada], as
part of her settlement agreement with [Chong], has been
fully compensated for her injuries allegedly caused by
[Chong], the element of damages against [QMC] has been
extinguished, as there are no independent claims remaining
against [QMC].

[COL] 11. Given that the element of damages has
been extinguished, there is no genuine issue of material
fact on the issue of damages and summary judgment is
warranted.

. . . .

[COL] 13. Without the ability to obtain an adverse
finding of liability as to [Chong's] conduct, there is no
genuine issue of material fact, as [Canada] is unable to
meet her burden of proof with respect to her claim for
apparent authority against [QMC].

(Emphasis added.)

On appeal, Canada contends that the circuit court

erred in entering the Summary Judgment Order and, specifically,

in: (1) "finding that the settlement agreement entered into

between [Canada] and [Chong] fully compensated [Canada] and

extinguished any claim for damages against QMC"; (2) "finding

4 We note that a circuit court deciding a motion for summary
judgment does not make FOFs. To the extent the circuit court was construing
the terms of the settlement agreement in FOFs 11 and 12, FOFs 11 and 12
appear to be COLs.

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

that [Canada's] release of [Chong's] liability in the settlement

agreement precluded [Canada] from further litigating [Chong's]

conduct in her claim against QMC for vicarious liability"; and

(3) "equat[ing] a factual finding of fault with a legal finding

of liability." (Formatting altered.)

Upon careful review of the record, briefs, and

relevant legal authorities, and having given due consideration

to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties,

we resolve Canada's points of error, collectively, as follows.

We review the circuit court's grant of summary

judgment de novo, applying the following standard,

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the
effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential
elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the
parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. In other words, we must
view all of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawaiʻi 46, 55-56, 292 P.3d 1276, 1285-86

(2013) (citation omitted).

Canada contends the circuit court erred in finding

that the settlement agreement between Canada and Chong

"extinguished" Canada's apparent authority claim against QMC,

and that genuine questions of material fact remain.

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

The summary judgment record reflects that Chong agreed

to a monetary settlement with Canada in exchange for the release

of Canada's legal claims against him. The settlement agreement,

by its express terms, released Chong; it did not release

Canada's apparent authority claim against QMC.5 Canada is

therefore not barred from pursuing her remaining apparent

authority claim against joint tortfeasor QMC for damages in

excess of what she received from the settlement with Chong.6 Cf.

Saranillio v. Silva, 78 Hawaiʻi 1, 4, 889 P.2d 685, 688 (1995)

(holding that "the common law rule that the release of an

employee automatically releases the employer from vicarious

liability has been abrogated in Hawaiʻi by the adoption of our

version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act")

(citation omitted).

5 Settlement agreements are contracts, Exotics Haw.-Kona, Inc. v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 116 Hawaiʻi 277, 288, 172 P.3d 1021, 1032
(2007), and the "[i]nterpretation and construction of a contract is reviewed
de novo," Pub. Access Trails Haw. v. Haleakala Ranch Co., 153 Hawaiʻi 1, 21,
526 P.3d 526, 546 (2023) (citation omitted).
In interpreting a contract, the court "will look no further than
the four corners of the contract to determine whether an ambiguity exists."
Hawaiian Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Wong, 130 Hawaiʻi 36, 45, 305 P.3d
452, 461 (2013) (citation omitted). If no ambiguity exists, "[t]he parol
evidence rule precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict
the terms" of the contract. Id. (cleaned up).

6 The Good Faith Order states that "[t]he settlement [between
Canada and Chong] shall reduce the claims against any other joint tortfeasor
or co-obligor not released in the amount stipulated by the release,
dismissal, or covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it,
whichever is greater."

5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Whether Canada has been fully compensated for her

alleged injuries, such that "the element of damages has been

extinguished," is a disputed question of fact. We conclude that

the circuit court was wrong in finding that Canada's settlement

agreement with Chong, which does not release QMC from liability,

necessarily "extinguished" Canada's claim against QMC for

general, special, and punitive damages.

We further conclude that the settlement agreement does

not bar Canada from pursuing a claim against QMC that requires

proof of Chong's negligence. Rather, the settlement agreement

bars Canada from pursuing such a claim against Chong. The

settlement agreement releases Chong from legal liability to

Canada; it does not release joint tortfeasor QMC.

We therefore conclude that the circuit court erred in

entering summary judgment in favor of QMC, and we vacate the

circuit court's Summary Judgment Order and Judgment. We remand

for further proceedings consistent with this summary disposition

order.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, September 26, 2025.

On the briefs: /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Presiding Judge
Denise M. Hevicon,
for Plaintiff-Appellant. /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Associate Judge
Saori Takahashi,
for Defendant-Appellee. /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

6