State of Iowa v. Randol Andrew Garcia

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0141
Filed January 9, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RANDOL ANDREW GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,

Rustin T. Davenport, Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence, alleging the district court abused its

discretion in failing to consider specific mitigating factors. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria R. Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge

Randol Garcia appeals his sentence, alleging that the district court abused

its discretion in sentencing him to a term of incarceration. Garcia, a juvenile at the

time of the commission of the offense, alleges the court failed to fully consider

mitigating factors when formulating his sentence. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In June 2023, a juvenile court transport officer was driving Garcia to the

Eldora juvenile detention center. Garcia was handcuffed, and his legs were

shackled in the backseat of the vehicle. Enroute, Garcia asked the transport officer

to stop to use the restroom; his request was denied. Garcia then complained about

being ill. The driver pulled over to assist Garcia. Once the driver opened the door,

Garcia assaulted the driver. With the driver on the ground, Garcia took control of

the vehicle and drove from the scene. The transport driver had significant bleeding

from the head.1 Because the transport officer’s cellphone remained in the vehicle,

the location of the vehicle was traceable. Law enforcement initiated a pursuit.

Garcia lost control of the vehicle and was taken into custody.

Garcia was charged by trial information with first-degree robbery. He later

entered into a plea agreement which included a guilty plea to second-degree

robbery and an open sentence, with each side free to make sentencing

recommendations. The State recommended incarceration, while Garcia

requested a deferred judgment, or in the alternative, a suspended sentence and

1 Garcia stipulated to limited facts contained in the minutes of testimony as a basis

for his guilty plea.
3

probation.2 Following a hearing, which included arguments of counsel, a victim

impact statement, and a statement of allocution from Garcia, the district court

ordered Garcia to serve an indeterminate ten-year period of incarceration. The

court rejected the State’s request for a mandatory minimum period of incarceration,

and consequently, Garcia was immediately eligible for parole. Garcia appeals.3

II. Standard of Review

The sentence imposed is within the statutory limits. As such, we review for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385 (Iowa 2020).

“Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption

in their favor.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2018). “[O]ur task on

appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to

determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” State v. Seats,

865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720,

724–25 (Iowa 2002)). But we do not “rubber-stamp” the district court’s decision

2 Even though Garcia pleaded guilty to an offense defined as a forcible felony, see

Iowa Code § 702.11(1) (2023), because he was a juvenile at the time of committing
the offense, he was eligible for a deferred judgment or a suspended sentence—
sentencing options for which he would not be eligible had he been an adult at the
time the crime was committed. Compare id. § 907.3 (making a defendant who has
committed a forcible felony ineligible for a deferred judgment, deferred sentence,
or suspended sentence), with id. § 901.5(13) (making a defendant eligible for a
deferred judgment, deferred sentence, or suspended sentence if the defendant
was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense even if the defendant
would be ineligible for such sentencing options if the offense were committed as
an adult).
3 Because Garcia challenges only his sentence, he has established good cause to

appeal despite his guilty plea. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa
2020) (holding that good cause to appeal following a guilty plea within the context
of Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) exists “when the defendant challenges his or
her sentence rather than the guilty plea”).
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when imposing an adult sentence on a juvenile offender; even a discretionary

sentencing may be suspect if the court

fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received
significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or
irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but
nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a
sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the
facts of the case.

State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 138 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted).

III. Analysis

Garcia argues the district court failed to consider mitigating factors including

his age and his features of youthful behavior, specifically, immaturity, impetuosity,

and failure to understand risks and consequences; the circumstances of the crime

relating to his youth that may have played a part; his family and home environment;

the trouble he may have in navigating the criminal justice system; and his possible

rehabilitation. As part of this argument, he alleges that the district court abused its

discretion by giving only “lip service” to the required sentencing factors and that it

placed too much emphasis on the nature of the crime and protection of the

community from the defendant.

With those challenges in mind, we look to the district court’s recitation at

Garcia’s sentencing hearing. After acknowledging review of the presentence

investigation report, the court stated, in relevant part:

In deciding the sentence, the Court considers the defendant’s
age, attitude, prior criminal history, employment, financial and family
circumstances, nature of the offense, use of weapon or force, the
recommendation of the parties, and the ability to be rehabilitated
through community services.
We haven’t talked about the PSI, which recommended a
suspended sentence with placement at a residential facility, another
matter—another option that is before the Court.
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My concern with the defendant’s proposal regarding a
deferred judgment or suspended sentence, or even the PSI
recommendation for place—for a suspended sentence with
placement at a residential facility, is the Court’s concern regarding
the possible danger of the defendant to others in the—in society.
I—I appreciate Mr. Garcia’s comments that he has—has a
realization that he cannot continue on his present path. My fear,
though, is that there’s not been the history demonstrated at this point
that he is not a danger to others. Given the nature of the crime and
the situation, considering all the factors, the Court finds that a—
imposition of a prison sentence is appropriate in this case.
The Court has also considered the State’s recommendation
for a requirement, pursuant to a forcible felony, that he serve fifty
percent of that sentence. The Court finds that given the defendant’s
young age, the fact that there has been showings that undeveloped
brains are more risky and that there’s good reasons for treating
persons under eighteen different than persons over eighteen, that
the proposal of a mandatory fifty percent should be rejected.
I think the department of corrections will be in the best position
to consider and determine when it would be appropriate for the
defendant to be considered for parole.
So for those reasons, I’m going to sentence the defendant to
ten years in prison with an indeterminate sentence.

Under the sentence imposed, Garcia is immediately eligible for parole, so

the court was not required to hold a hearing on the Miller/Lyle factors. See Crooks,

911 N.W.2d at 173. But even when a Miller/Lyle hearing is not required, the court

is still obligated to consider any mitigating circumstances, including applicable

Miller/Lyle factors. Id. Those factors are:

(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such
as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”; (2) the particular “family and home environment”
that surround the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular crime
and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played a role
in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful
offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and (5) the
possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.

Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 379 (quoting State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa

2014)); accord Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012)).
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That said, the court is not required to specifically examine and apply each

factor on the record at this point. It considers all relevant factors in exercising its

discretion to select the proper sentencing option. We may find an abuse of

discretion “[i]f a sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have

received significant weight.” Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 385 (quoting Roby, 897

N.W.2d at 138). But “the failure to acknowledge a particular sentencing

circumstance does not necessarily mean it was not considered.” State v. Boltz,

542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).

Here, the court stated it considered Garcia’s youth, family circumstances,

and need for rehabilitation when imposing sentence, along with other relevant

sentencing factors. The court further indicated it had reviewed the presentence

investigation report, which detailed Garcia’s past placement history and family

dynamics. We find the court’s decision was not “unreasonable or based on

untenable grounds.” See Majors, 940 N.W.2d at 387. And while brief, “a terse

and succinct statement may be sufficient, so long as the brevity of the court’s

statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing

discretion.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (cleaned up).

IV. Conclusion

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s sentencing decision and

affirm.

AFFIRMED.