State of Iowa v. Matthew Dee Buford III

CourtListener 10350404Iowactapp05.03.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1296
Filed March 5, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MATTHEW DEE BUFORD III,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.

Lekar, Judge.

A defendant challenges his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder

and flight to avoid prosecution. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Sandy, JJ.
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TABOR, Chief Judge.

“What you gonna do, shoot me in my face? I don’t care, I’m not scared.”

From her upstairs bedroom, thirteen-year-old F.A. heard her mother say those

foreboding words before two gunshots rang out on the main floor. When she came

downstairs, F.A. saw her mother, Tamica Allison, and her mother’s friend, Andrea

Anderson, bleeding on the dining room floor. Both women died from gunshot

wounds. A jury convicted Matthew Buford of their murders. In this appeal, he

challenges the district court’s decision to allow those out-of-court statements into

evidence. Finding any hearsay violation harmless, we affirm Buford’s convictions.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In 2020, Buford lived with Allison and her teenaged children, F.A. and J.G.

On February 10, Anderson came over for drinks and dinner at their Waterloo home.

Anderson and Allison, as close as sisters, were reminiscing about a friend who

recently passed away. F.A. recalled that everything seemed normal when she and

her brother went upstairs to bed: “There wasn’t any kind of weird mood.” But

before falling asleep, F.A. heard her mother’s troubling statement and what

sounded like gunfire. She tried to wake her older brother, who said he did not hear

the shots and went back to sleep. F.A. then crept to the landing and saw Buford

turn on a light.

F.A. called out to him. And he responded: “Don’t come down here, don’t

come down here because I love you.” Ignoring his wishes, F.A. continued down

the stairs and onto the main floor where she saw her mother and Anderson on the

dining room floor surrounded by blood. Buford was sitting in a chair holding a gun.
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F.A. then returned to the second floor to wake J.G., telling him she thought their

mother and Anderson were dead.

Before J.G. could respond, Buford called upstairs: “Come on, y’all.” Buford

took the children from the home in their mother’s car, making several stops. First,

he took J.G. to a friend’s house. After dropping off J.G., Buford beckoned F.A. to

the front seat. Buford resumed driving, telling F.A., “I love you. Do you love me,

like, how a daughter’s supposed to love her dad?” and “You ain’t gonna love me

no more, you gonna hate me.”

Buford then visited the home where his children lived with their mother

because “he wanted to go hug his kids.” Buford remarked, “I’m dead after tonight.”

Buford made two more stops: his children’s grandmother’s house and F.A.’s

sister’s house. But nobody answered the door at either house. Tired of driving

around, F.A. told Buford that she just wanted to go to her friend F.G.’s house. F.G.

was Anderson’s daughter. As soon as Buford dropped her off there, F.A. told

Anderson’s family that she believed Buford shot both women. Anderson’s son,

M.A., ran to Allison’s house to see what happened. When he couldn’t get inside,

he called 911.

Responding officers found the bodies of Allison and Anderson. Two 9-

millimeter Luger bullet casings were recovered near the women’s bodies. The

state medical examiner determined that Allison died from a gunshot wound through

her nose, while Anderson died from a shot to her temple. Those wounds were

inflicted from less than five feet away.

Later that night, F.A. related what she had witnessed to investigating

officers, who issued a warrant for Buford’s arrest. But he was no longer in
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Waterloo. By tracking his movements and cellphone use, police suspected that

Buford fled to Peoria, Illinois.1 Two days later, Buford called the Waterloo police

to ask about turning himself in. Following the advice he received, Buford

surrendered to the Peoria police.

Six months later, Buford’s friend Donald discovered a handgun in his garage

that did not belong to him. He turned it over to the Waterloo police. Ballistics

testing showed that the two bullet casings recovered at the scene of the murders

were fired from that gun.

The State charged Buford with two counts of first-degree murder in violation

of Iowa Code section 707.2(1)(a) (2020) and one count of flight to avoid

prosecution in violation of section 719.4(4).

Before trial, the defense moved to exclude the statements that F.A. heard

her mother make, arguing they were inadmissible hearsay. The district court

waited to rule on their admissibility. At trial, the State made an offer of proof with

its first witness, F.A. She recalled that her mother “sounded upset” when she made

the statements. In urging their admissibility, the State asserted that Allison’s out-

of-court statements were not hearsay because they were not being offered to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.

In the prosecutor’s words:

[T]he State is not offering the statement, “What are you gonna do,
shoot me in the face? I don’t care, I’m not scared,” to prove that
Tamica Allison didn’t care whether she was shot in the face or

1 After dropping F.A. off at Anderson’s house, Buford went to the home of his friend,

Lorraine and asked to use her phone. Buford used her phone to contact Vernique,
whose cell phone was tracked leaving Peoria at roughly 3:00 a.m., and arriving in
Waterloo around 7:30 a.m. That cell phone was then tracked returning to Peoria
around four hours later.
5

whether or not she was scared. The factual matter and whether or
not that statement was true is irrelevant. The State is offering the
statements only to prove that somebody was there with a
firearm, . . . the defendant’s reaction to her statement and his
responsive conduct to that statement, and the fact that there was a
gun there.

Alternatively, the State argued that—because Allison’s statement was a reaction

to seeing a gun—the statement should be admissible because it would fall under

the present sense impression exception to hearsay. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(1).

But Buford insisted that the State was offering Allison’s statements because

the truth of the implied assertions helped its case. See State v. Dullard, 668

N.W.2d 585, 594–95 (Iowa 2003) (discussing implied assertions). For instance,

defense counsel urged that the first part of Allison’s statement, “What you gonna

do, shoot me in my face?” could be used to prove intent, premeditation, or malice

if Buford was threatening Allison with the gun before firing it. As for the present

sense impression exception, the defense argued that, because there was no way

to know what Allison witnessed, it was impossible to say her statement was a real-

time reaction to witnessing it.

The district court expressed “mixed feelings” about whether Allison’s

statements fit the definition of hearsay. But it found that the statements were

admissible under the exception for present sense impressions and allowed the

State to elicit Allison’s statements through F.A.

After hearing four days of testimony, the jury found Buford guilty as charged.

The court sentenced him to two consecutive life terms without the possibility of

parole for the murder convictions and a concurrent five-year term for the flight

conviction.
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Buford appeals, raising a solitary question: Did the district court err in

allowing the jury to hear Allison’s out-of-court statements?

II. Scope and Standard of Review

We review hearsay challenges to correct errors at law. State v. Skahill, 966

N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2021). Generally, hearsay is inadmissible. State v. Veverka,

938 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 2020). But it may be admitted if the out-of-court

statement fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. Inadmissible hearsay is

prejudicial to the objecting party unless the record “affirmatively establishes

otherwise.” State v. Thompson, 982 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Iowa 2022) (citation

omitted).

III. Analysis

Buford challenges the district court’s admission of Allison’s out-of-court

statements. He claims the statements fit the definition of hearsay and do not fall

under a recognized exception.

In response, the State reprises its two-part argument for admissibility from

trial. First, the State contends that Allison’s statements were not hearsay under

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.801(c). The rule defines hearsay as a statement, other

than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c). A

statement is an oral or written assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an

assertion. Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(a).

Second, the State argues that if Allison’s statements were hearsay, they

were admissible as present sense impressions. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(1). That

exception allows a party to offer a “statement describing or explaining an event or
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condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” Id. The

rationale behind the exception recognizes that the declarant has no chance to

fabricate a statement if it “is made during or ‘immediately’ after the event.” State

v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted).

The State adds a third alternative on appeal. It contends that the admission

of Allison’s statements, if improper, was harmless error. We can start and stop our

analysis with this alternative. We agree with the State’s position that any error in

admitting the statements does not require reversal. Assuming without deciding

that the statements were hearsay and did not qualify as present sense

impressions, we find their admission did not affect the jury’s finding of guilt. See

State v. Elliott, 806 N.W.2d 660, 669 (Iowa 2011). And error is harmless if the

State presents overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. State v. Parker,

747 N.W.2d 196, 210 (Iowa 2008).

Even without F.A.’s testimony recounting her mother’s statements, the

State presented powerful proof of Buford’s guilt. F.A. testified that she heard two

gunshots coming from the main floor of the house. When F.A. called to him, Buford

responded, “Don’t come down here, don’t come down here because I love you.”

Paying no heed, F.A. descended the stairs, where she saw both Allison and

Anderson lying in pools of blood.

What F.A. saw next was true “smoking gun” evidence.2 She saw Buford

sitting near the bodies holding a silver handgun. Both women were killed by single

2 The phrase “smoking gun” is attributed to Arthur Conan Doyle, author of the

Sherlock Holmes detective stories. In the story “The Adventure of the Gloria
Scott,” the ship’s chaplain is discovered standing over a dead body with a pistol in
hand, which is considered compelling evidence that he committed the murder. See
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gunshots fired two to five feet from their heads, according to their autopsies. It is

more than a fair inference that Buford—the only other person on the main floor of

the house—fired the weapon he was holding to kill Allison and Anderson.

And his post-shooting behavior bolstered that inference. Soon after F.A.

saw the bodies, Buford hurried her and J.G. out of the house and into Allison’s car.

Rather than call emergency services to aid the bleeding women, Buford’s instinct

was to flee the scene, evidencing a guilty conscience. See State v. Mong, 988

N.W.2d 305, 314 (Iowa 2023) (confirming that suspect’s flight may be introduced

as consciousness of guilt).

After dropping off J.G. at a friend’s house, Buford asked F.A. if she loved

him, but suggested she was not going to love him anymore. Buford also embarked

on a sentimental tour to see his children and their grandmother, making the cryptic

remark that he would be “dead after tonight.” His conduct displayed his awareness

of the impending consequences of the murders. What’s more, his decision to

abscond to Peoria reflected consciousness of guilt.

Other evidence connected Buford to the murder weapon. While

investigating the shootings, police searched vehicles at Allison’s home. A Buick

belonging to Buford was parked in the driveway. A cooler in the Buick’s backseat

contained a single magazine for a 9-millimeter pistol. The magazine was loaded

with ten 9-millimeter Luger cartridges.3 And it was consistent with the type of

magazine used with Jimenez-brand firearms. Then, a silver Jimenez-brand

Ben Panko, Thank Sherlock Holmes for the Phrase ‘Smoking Gun’, Smithsonian
Magazine (July 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/SF4B-H2ZJ.
3 Testimony established that firearms typically come with two magazines upon

purchase.
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handgun, along with a second magazine, turned up unexpectedly in a box in the

garage of Buford’s friend months after the shootings. Ballistics testing determined

that gun was the murder weapon.

The strength of the State’s case renders harmless any possibly erroneous

admission of hearsay. We will not reverse a conviction if the State can prove the

challenged evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict. State v. Rice, 543 N.W.2d

884, 887 (Iowa 1996). The State meets that burden here. The evidence against

Buford was overwhelming, and his conviction did not turn on Allison’s out-of-court

statements. Even if the district court did err in allowing the hearsay into the record,

the error was harmless. Buford is not entitled to a new trial.

AFFIRMED.

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