State of Iowa v. Ellis Earl Houk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1691
Filed March 19, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ELLIS EARL HOUK,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County,

Patrick W. Greenwood, Judge.

A defendant convicted for setting fire to his ex-wife’s house challenges the

denial of his motion to strike two jurors for cause and the admission of cell tower

evidence linking him to the scene of the fire. AFFIRMED.

R. Tim Jeffrey of McGinn, Springer & Noethe PLC, Council Bluffs, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Telleen, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
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TELLEEN, Senior Judge.

Taylor County was the fourth least populous county in Iowa as of the 2020

census, with a population of just 5896. As one prospective juror put it, “people

know people.” It is therefore no surprise that empaneling a jury for Ellis Houk’s

trial was a difficult task. But after circulating written questionnaires, conducting two

days of voir dire, and sustaining more than two dozen strikes for cause, the district

court was satisfied with the panel of prospective jurors left for the parties to pick.

Houk was not.

In this appeal, Houk challenges the denial of his motion to strike two young

prospective jurors for cause after they admitted in voir dire that they would defer

to the majority view of other jurors, even if not personally convinced of Houk’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. He also contests the district court’s admission of cell

tower evidence that linked him to the scene of the fire. Because we find Houk

cannot show the necessary prejudice to secure a new trial on his jury-selection

claim, and because he failed to preserve his evidentiary objection, we affirm his

conviction and sentence.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 14, 2022, Houk’s forty-four-year marriage came to an end.

Following a contested dissolution trial, the district court entered a decree dividing

millions of dollars in marital assets between Houk and his ex-wife, Gayle. But

conflict continued to fester. On November 19, Gayle retrieved from Houk’s

residence a toolchest that had belonged to her son. Houk believed she took the

wrong tools. That evening, he made multiple calls to the Taylor County Sheriff’s

office, insisting that Gayle be charged for theft. He also drove to the sheriff’s office
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to plead his case in person. Houk was turned away fuming. The deputy on shift

saw Houk leave in a new, gray, mid-sized SUV.

Later that night, sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., Gayle awoke to the

sound of breaking glass. She got out of bed to find her front window shattered and

her curtains in flame. Gayle watched as a person “built like the shape of” her ex-

husband broke a second window and threw a yellow five-gallon bucket into the

house. When the bucket struck the ground, fire engulfed the room. Gayle escaped

with serious burns. She was transported by helicopter to a Nebraska hospital,

where she would spend months recovering from her injuries. Almost immediately,

police recovered surveillance images showing a gray, mid-sized SUV parked

outside Gayle’s home at 2:43 a.m., its rear hatch ajar. The deputy who met with

Houk earlier in the evening identified the vehicle as the “exact same SUV” that

Houk had driven to the sheriff’s office.

Police began looking for Houk. Using tower data provided by his cell phone

carrier, they learned he was headed south. Authorities in Hartley County, Texas

intercepted Houk driving a gray SUV without license plates. He told them he was

headed to Port Isabel, Texas for medical treatment, although his explanations

shifted. Houk would later allege he was on his way to Mexico. A search of Houk’s

vehicle turned up sleeping bags, work gloves, a handgun, and a copy of Houk’s

divorce decree. No passport, luggage, or toiletries were found inside.

The State charged Houk with first-degree arson, attempted murder, willful

injury, first-degree burglary, and criminal mischief. Trial commenced in July 2023.

From the outset, both parties acknowledged that picking a jury would be difficult.

Jury questionnaires suggested—and voir dire quickly confirmed—that many
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members of the venire were already familiar with the case. The court and counsel

conducted private interviews with each panel member who claimed prior

knowledge of Houk, Gayle, or the facts surrounding the fire. Over the course of a

two-day selection process, more than two dozen prospective jurors were excused

for cause.

On the second day of jury selection, the parties resumed their general voir

dire. Among other questions, Houk’s attorney asked the panel members how they

would respond to the pressure of deliberations if picked to serve on Houk’s jury—

specifically, whether they would follow the view of their fellow jurors or “hold firm

in [their] conviction” if not persuaded of Houk’s guilt. Two prospective jurors,

S.R.B. and B.H., acknowledged they would defer to a majority view. According to

S.R.B.:

S.R.B.: [T]o me, majority always rules. That’s how I was—
that’s how I was brought up, and so I feel like that’s how it was in
school. And obviously I’m just getting out of high school, so that’s
kind of what I’m used to, so whenever I’m in a group of 12 people
and I’m the one person that either thinks something is one way or the
other and the other people think the opposite, especially, I mean, in
the age range looking around the room, I don’t think that I would—I
don’t think I would be able to top somebody or me personally just
being by myself look at someone and say—look at 11 people and
say, “No. I think that this is how it’s supposed to be.”
...
Defense counsel: [T]his case requires a unanimous verdict,
the 12 persons all convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. If I’m
understanding you right, it sounds like you’re saying you don’t
necessarily need to be unanimously convinced if you’re on the jury if
the majority is convinced. Is that your position?
S.R.B.: Correct.

Eighteen-year-old B.H. shared a similar perspective:

B.H.: [B]eing younger than everyone else[,] I feel like it would
be harder to say my opinion and not knowing maybe more than they
do or understanding more than they do. Maybe they understood
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some phrase or something that was said, they understood it more
than I did and I’m—I don’t know. I don’t know.
...
Defense counsel: If it’s 11 people that are convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt and you are not and you just go with the majority,
that means that you weren’t convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.
So are you willing to require to be convinced on reasonable doubt,
or are you just going to agree with the rest of the panel if that’s what
happens?
B.H.: Just agree with them.

Houk moved to strike S.R.B. and B.H. for cause. In response, the district court

informed the panel that “the verdict has to be unanimous, 12 vote guilty, 12 vote

not guilty.” It then asked, “If I instruct you that that’s the law you have to follow, will

you follow that law?” S.R.B. and B.H. succinctly responded, “Yes.” The court

denied Houk’s challenge for cause.

After voir dire concluded, but before the parties exercised their peremptory

strikes, Houk’s counsel made the following request:

At this time, Defense is requesting three additional strikes. . . . I don’t
know the case off the top of my head, but procedurally in Iowa if a
defendant believes that they are denied a [challenge for cause], the
correct procedure is to request additional strikes for each juror that
Defense believes they were denied.

Counsel then renewed Houk’s argument that S.R.B. and B.H. were unqualified to

serve because they were willing to return a verdict contrary to their convictions.

Counsel also reasserted a challenge to a third panel member, G.V., who Houk

sought to excuse for cause on language-proficiency grounds. The Court denied

Houk’s request as to each of these jurors. The parties then proceeded to pick their

jury. Houk used two of his peremptory strikes to remove S.R.B. and B.H. The

State struck G.V.
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The jury picked to hear Houk’s case later found him guilty on all counts.

Following his conviction, Houk moved for a new trial, challenging the denial of his

motions to strike for cause. He also argued the district court erred by admitting

cell tower evidence that placed Houk near the crime scene and traced his path to

Texas. The court denied the motion and sentenced Houk to consecutive terms of

imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. Removal for Cause

Houk contends the district court erred by declining to strike S.R.B. and B.H.

for cause after “they openly admitted they might convict [Houk] without proof

beyond a reasonable doubt.”1 According to Houk, the court’s ruling “forced [him]

to use his peremptory challenges to ensure their removal, thus limiting his ability

to remove other potentially biased jurors.” We review denial of a challenge for

cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Jonas, 904 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Iowa 2017);

State v. Tillman, 514 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1994).

Our state and federal constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right

to a fair trial before an impartial jury. State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 661

(Iowa 2019) (citing U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Iowa Const. art. I, §§ 9, 10). That

right is denied “when a juror is unable to fairly engage in a determination of guilt or

1 The State argues Houk failed to preserve this claim of error because he “never

invoked Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(5)(k) by name or used the terms
‘impartial’ or ‘biased’” to explain his challenge for cause. But our error preservation
rules are not hypertechnical. Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Iowa 2017).
The legal basis for Houk’s argument was obvious, and the district court cited
rule 2.18(5) in finding S.R.B. and B.H. were qualified to serve. See State v.
Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 561 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]here a question is obvious and
ruled upon by the district court, the issue is adequately preserved.”). We find the
issue preserved and proceed to the merits.
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innocence based on the evidence at trial and the court’s instructions.” Id. For this

reason, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18 permits the parties to seek removal

of a prospective juror when, among other circumstances, the juror expresses an

opinion or predisposition that “would prevent the juror from rendering a true verdict

upon the evidence submitted.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.18(5)(k).

Ferreting out unqualified jurors is a tricky business, and district courts are

“vested with broad discretion” in resolving motions to strike for cause. Jonas, 904

N.W.2d at 570. Exercising that discretion is only more complicated in cases like

this, where widespread knowledge in a small community leaves many prospective

jurors subject to challenge. Still, it is a “trial judge’s responsibility to remove

prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions

and evaluate the evidence.” Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 730 (1992) (citation

omitted). Our supreme court has cautioned against “skirt[ing] the brink of error” by

resolving close questions in favor of a panel member’s retention. Jonas, 904

N.W.2d at 575 (citation omitted). Even where denial of a challenge for cause is

“technically right, . . . it is far better to give the accused the benefit of the doubt.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Such an approach would have been the better one here. “Unanimous jury

verdicts are ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice.’” Trane v. State, 16

N.W.3d 683, 695 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 2.22(1)

(requiring unanimous verdicts). Contrary to that bedrock principle, S.R.B. and B.H.

informed Houk’s counsel they were prepared to return a non-unanimous verdict,

so long as it matched the prevailing view of their fellow jurors. Although both said

“yes” when the district court asked if they could follow the law, we question whether
8

this was enough to cure their previous admissions.2 See Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at

571 (suggesting a potential juror who expresses unequivocal bias during voir dire

should be “disqualified for cause notwithstanding later, generalized statements the

potential juror could be fair”). Houk’s motions presented a close call. Granting

them would have been the more cautious path.3 See id. at 575.

However, we stop short of deciding whether the district court’s ruling was

an abuse of discretion, because the answer is not necessary to resolve this appeal.

S.R.B. and B.H. were removed by peremptory strike and did not serve on Houk’s

jury. “When [a challenged] juror did not serve in the case, it must be shown that

the jury that did serve was not impartial.” State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743,

747 (Iowa 1993). Thus, even assuming Houk’s peremptory strikes were wasted

on a pair of jurors who should have been removed for cause, he is only entitled to

a new trial if he can make a “factual showing” that an unqualified juror was seated

by result. Id. at 746.

2 The State argues there was nothing problematic about S.R.B. and B.H.’s
responses, citing our supreme court’s observation that “psychological pressure
and small-group dynamics” are “inherent in the jury process.” State v. Church, 997
N.W.2d 16, 24 (Iowa 2023). We do not disagree that persuasion is part of the
deliberative process. But here, S.R.B. and B.H. expressed more than readiness
to change their opinions about the evidence. Their voir dire responses indicate
they were prepared to return a verdict contrary to their opinions about the
evidence. That would be an abdication of their role as jurors, and it would leave
little meaning to the notion of a “unanimous” verdict.
3 We pause to acknowledge our privilege of hindsight. In ruling on Houk’s motions

to strike, the district court was asked to make a rapid decision under difficult
circumstances. Jury selection was nearing completion of its second day, and the
venire had already been depleted by two dozen strikes for cause. The prospective
jurors who might have replaced S.R.B. and B.H. had not yet been interviewed
about their knowledge of the case. To the extent these factors complicated the
district court’s analysis, they are not lost on our review.
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Houk argues that—had he not used his peremptory strikes on S.R.B. and

B.H.—he would have used one to remove a third juror, P.T., who had several

connections to the case.4 P.T.’s husband was acquainted with Houk through

“coffee shops and farm sales,” although she did not “remember any specifics” her

husband had shared about Houk. P.T. also said that once, while driving with some

friends who knew Gayle, she had “passed the road that would go up” to Gayle’s

house, which triggered a conversation about the “circumstances of the case.” This

was in addition to other “local talk” she had heard about the fire, including rumors

that Houk was involved. Additionally, P.T. had once been in a garden club with

the prosecutor’s mother, although she had never met the prosecutor.

During her individual interview, Houk’s counsel asked P.T. whether she

planned to consider anything she learned outside the courtroom when deliberating

Houk’s case. Without further prompting, P.T. responded:

Oh, I don’t know that I’ve ever heard any real particulars about what
went on, just that it happened and that was—but, no. I know right
from wrong. I think I could judge by what information is in the
courtroom because I really haven’t heard any particulars other than
the situation happened, we were concerned about Gayle, and that
type of thing.

She also confirmed that any opinion she had previously held regarding Houk’s guilt

or innocence was “not to be part of [her] opinion at the trial.” Houk did not

challenge P.T. for cause. But he argues on appeal that “her assertion of

impartiality is suspect” and that “no reasonable defendant would want a juror who

had pre-trial conversations” with other persons convinced of his guilt.

4 Although Houk contends the district court’s improper denial of his for-cause
challenges deprived him of two peremptory strikes, he points to only one
empaneled juror who he would have otherwise stricken.
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“Actual juror bias occurs when the evidence shows that a juror, in fact, is

unable to lay aside prejudices and judge a case fairly on the merits.” Smith v.

State, 7 N.W.3d 723, 731 (Iowa 2024) (citation omitted). P.T.’s attenuated

connections to Houk’s case do not support such a finding. “The mere fact a juror

has knowledge of parties or witnesses does not indicate actual bias or require juror

disqualification.” State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 238–39 (Iowa 2015). And in

cases of high publicity, it is not uncommon for jurors to arrive at trial having some

familiarity with the facts. “The most that could be expected” of such jurors is that

they “lay aside their conclusions and give both the state and the defendant the

benefit of their impartial consideration of the evidence.” State v. Beckwith, 46

N.W.2d 20, 25 (Iowa 1951), abrogated on other grounds by Neuendorf, 509

N.W.2d 743. P.T. denied having any knowledge or opinion strong enough to cloud

her objective evaluation of the trial evidence.

Because nothing in the record supports Houk’s allegation that P.T. was

biased, he cannot make the “factual showing” of prejudice necessary for relief.

See Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d at 746. Anticipating this problem, Houk asserts the

Neuendorf test does not apply here. Citing Jonas, he argues that “[p]rejudice is

presumed when a court improperly refuses to disqualify a potential juror if the

defendant identifies the juror which should have been disqualified and requests an

additional strike.” That is not quite right.

In Jonas, our supreme court surveyed trends in state and federal law after

Neuendorf and adopted a revised approach to evaluating prejudice in cases where

a defendant strikes a juror who should have been removed for cause. 904 N.W.2d

at 580–83. To avoid “downgrading the importance of disqualification for cause”
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and to protect a defendant’s right to exercise the number of strikes provided by the

rules of criminal procedure, the court recognized that prejudice must sometimes

be presumed. Id. at 583. But it declined to extend such a presumption to all

appeals. Instead, the court held that the presumption of prejudice will apply only

where the defendant takes certain steps to preserve it:

[I]n order to show prejudice when the district court improperly refuses
to disqualify a potential juror under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.18(5)(k) and thereby causes a defendant to expend a
peremptory challenge under rule 2.18(9), the defendant must
specifically ask the court for an additional strike of a particular juror
after his peremptory challenges have been exhausted. Where the
defendant makes such a showing, prejudice will then be presumed.

Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The purpose of this procedure—now

codified under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.18(11)—is to discourage a

defendant who is otherwise “satisfied with a jury . . . from engaging in a

sandbagging approach of awaiting the results of a jury verdict before crying foul.”

Id. It also avoids “another sandbagging scenario where the defense leaves an

unqualified juror on the panel, awaits the verdict, and then appeals.” Id.

Houk did not follow the Jonas procedure. Instead of exhausting his

peremptory strikes and then requesting extras, he asked for more strikes up front.

And while Houk identified the panel members he believed were errantly retained,

he did not name any other prospective jurors that he would have preferred to strike

instead.5 Consequently, we have no record to suggest that Houk was dissatisfied

5 Nor could he have. At the time Houk made his Jonas request, the panel had yet
to be winnowed down through the exercise of either party’s peremptory strikes. As
it turned out, one of Houk’s challenges became moot when the State struck G.V.
This illustrates why a defendant must wait until “after his peremptory challenges
have been exhausted” to make a Jonas request. 904 N.W.2d at 583.
12

with P.T. or that he would have stricken her in the event S.R.B. or B.H. were

excused for cause. This is precisely the scenario that Jonas sought to avoid. See

Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 582 (“[A] defendant ‘cannot stand by silently while an

objectionable juror is seated and then, if the verdict is adverse, obtain a new trial.’”

(quoting Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1990))).

Where a defendant fails to follow the Jonas procedure, there is no

presumption of prejudice, and Neuendorf’s test applies. Smith, 7 N.W.3d at 730;

accord Jonas, 904 N.W.2d at 583 (“Neuendorf remains good law where . . . the

defendant does not specifically ask for an additional peremptory challenge of a

particular juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges under the rule.”).

Because Houk cannot show prejudice, he is not entitled to a new trial.

III. Hearsay Objection

Houk also challenges the district court’s admission of two State exhibits.

The first exhibit consisted of records obtained from Houk’s cell phone service

provider, AT&T—including a list of cell towers pinged by Houk’s phone on the night

of the fire and the following day. The second exhibit was an annotated version of

the same cell tower list. It featured handwritten notes that translated the towers’

geographic coordinates into approximate street addresses in Iowa, Kansas, and

Texas.6 Both exhibits placed Houk near the scene of the fire at the time of ignition,

and they showed the approximate timeline of his journey south.

6 The sheriff’s deputy who prepared the annotated copy of the cell tower list
testified that he identified the locations of the towers by entering their latitudes and
longitudes into Google Maps, a publicly accessible web mapping platform. Houk
raised no objection to the deputy’s notes, stipulating the list in the annotated exhibit
was otherwise identical to the original.
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When the State offered the cell phone records at trial, Houk objected on

hearsay grounds. The State argued these exhibits were admissible business

records. Houk made no reply, and the district court overruled the objection. In a

subsequent motion for new trial, Houk renewed his general argument that the

information provided by AT&T was “hearsay under the Iowa rules of Evidence, and

no exception [applied].” The district court disagreed, finding the documents were

admissible as business records and supported by a certificate of authenticity

signed by an AT&T custodian. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(6).

Houk now contends the certificate of authenticity included with the State’s

exhibits was deficient because it failed to identify the documents within its scope.

Houk did not advance this argument below, nor was it implied by his generalized

hearsay objection. “To preserve error on an objection to the admission of evidence

at trial, counsel must make known a specific objection to give the trial court an

opportunity to rule on the objection and correct any error.” Buboltz v. Birusingh,

962 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Iowa 2021); accord State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590,

598 (Iowa 2021). Because Houk did not challenge the State’s certificate of

authenticity at trial or in his post-trial motion, the district court had no opportunity

to rule, and the State had no opportunity to correct the alleged foundation problem.

Houk has failed to preserve this claim of error. We do not address it further.

AFFIRMED.