State of Iowa v. Travis Lee Gonterman

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1519
Filed May 21, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TRAVIS LEE GONTERMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Van Buren County, John M. Wright,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his sentence following his guilty plea for driving while

barred as a habitual offender. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Austin Jungblut of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Langholz, P.J., Sandy, J., and

Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
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SANDY, Judge.

Travis Gonterman appeals his sentence following his guilty plea for driving

while barred as a habitual offender. On appeal, Gonterman contends the district

court erred by not providing any reasons on the record for his sentence. But

because Gonterman has failed to establish good cause, we lack jurisdiction to

entertain his appeal. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

According to the minutes of testimony, on the afternoon of October 19,

2023, Van Buren County Sherriff’s Deputy Adam McIntyre spotted Gonterman

driving a silver Chevrolet Impala. Deputy McIntyre knew Gonterman’s license was

barred at the time because he had previously arrested him three separate times

for driving with a barred license. Deputy McIntrye initiated a traffic stop and

arrested Gonterman without incident.

Gonterman was subsequently charged by trial information with one count

of driving while barred as a habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code

section 321.561 (2024). Gonterman initially entered a written plea of not guilty.

However, during a pre-trial conference hearing held in August 2024, Gonterman’s

attorney informed the district court that a plea agreement had been reached.

Gonterman’s attorney stated:

Your Honor, at this time my client wishes to withdraw his
previously entered plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to the
charge of driving while barred. In exchange for that guilty plea, it is
the joint request of the parties, including my client, that he be
sentenced to incarceration, period of up to two years; the fine would
be waived based on his incarceration; and that would be all at this
time, Your Honor.
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Following this statement by defense counsel, the district court engaged in a plea

colloquy. As part of the colloquy, the following exchange with Gonterman took

place:

COURT: My understanding of the plea agreement is that in
exchange for your voluntary plea of guilty to this charge, at the time
of sentencing, you, your attorney, and the county attorney will
request that the Court incarcerate you for up to two years in the
prison and that the fine in this case be suspended.
Is that your understanding of the plea agreement?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
COURT: Are you in agreement with it?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

After the colloquy and ensuring a factual basis for the plea existed, the district court

accepted Gonterman’s guilty plea. The district court subsequently entered an

order setting a sentencing hearing.1 Of note, a written plea agreement was never

filed with the district court. Nor does a written guilty plea appear in the record.

An unreported sentencing hearing was held on September 13, 2024. It is

not entirely clear from the record why the sentencing hearing was unreported.

There are no indications that Gonterman waived his right to have the hearing

reported or that he was ever advised that he could waive his right to a reported

sentencing hearing. Nonetheless, the district court issued its written sentencing

order shortly after the hearing. Gonterman was sentenced to a two-year

indeterminate prison sentence. Additionally, he received a suspended $855 fine.

The written sentencing order indicated Gonterman attended the sentencing

hearing, stating, “[t]he Defendant appeared personally and with his attorney.”

However, the written order did not provide reasoning for the chosen sentence. The

1 The district court order scheduling the sentencing hearing also sets forth the

parties’ plea agreement.
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written order simply provided, “[f]or the reasons as stated on the record of these

proceedings, the Court finds and concludes the following to be an appropriate

sentence under the circumstances shown.”

This appeal followed.

II. Good Cause

The right of appeal from a guilty plea exists only if the guilty plea is “for a

class ‘A’ felony or in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.” Iowa

Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). It is a defendant’s burden to establish good cause. State

v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 2020). If a defendant fails to establish good

cause, “the court has no jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.” State v.

Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142, 144 (Iowa 2023).

But what is a good cause? Our supreme court has stated that good cause

means a “legally sufficient reason.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 104. “What

constitutes a legally sufficient reason is context specific.” State v. Newman, 970

N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). Generally speaking, a defendant

must assert a claim for which we can potentially provide relief to establish good

cause. Id.

In the context of guilty pleas for non-class “A” felonies, a defendant

establishes good cause “when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather

than the guilty plea.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105. But not all challenges to

sentences following guilty pleas will establish good cause. We have consistently

found that good cause does not exist “when the sentence imposed is mandatory

or the agreed-upon sentence under the plea agreement.” State v. Estabrook,

No. 22-1118, 2023 WL 2671954, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023); Cf. Damme,
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944 N.W.2d at 100 (“We hold that the good-cause requirement is satisfied in this

context when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor

agreed to in the plea bargain.”). Here, Gonterman concedes in his brief that he

received the agreed-upon sentence under his plea agreement. Thus, he has failed

to establish good cause.

However, Gonterman invites us to conclude he has established good cause

because the record is devoid of a written plea agreement and “[t]here was no

request made or any waiver entered by [him] that he waived the making of a record

at his sentencing hearing.” Our rules of criminal procedure provide that:

If the offense is a misdemeanor or nonforcible class “D”
felony and the parties have entered into a written agreement as to
sentence that requests the court to proceed to sentencing without
presence of the parties or making of a record, the court may enter
judgment in accordance with the sentencing agreement.

Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.27(3)(c). Additionally, the rules state that “stenographic record

of all plea colloquies shall be made.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(3). However, we have

noted that a reported sentencing hearing can be waived by defendants in serious

or aggravated misdemeanor cases. See State v. Meeks, No. 16-1611, 2017 WL

3065161, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 19, 2017). And in the absence of waiver,

criminal defendants have a “right to formal record at sentencing.” Id. at *2.

We acknowledge there is some allure to Gonterman’s argument that good

cause should be found where it is unclear whether a defendant has waived their

right to a reported sentencing hearing and the hearing is ultimately unreported.

And our supreme court has recognized that errors related to the sentencing

hearing itself can establish good cause. See State v. Davis, 969 N.W.2d 783, 785

(Iowa 2022) (noting a defendant establishes good cause when “the defendant
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challenges his sentencing hearing”). Arguably, failure to report a sentencing

hearing without the defendant’s waiver could be construed as a sentencing hearing

defect.

Even so, we are not convinced this leads to the conclusion that Gonterman

has established good cause. In fact, we reach the opposite conclusion. We reach

this conclusion because Gonterman is not asserting—as a basis for relief—that

the district court erred by not having a reported sentencing hearing in the absence

of a waiver of a reported hearing. Instead, his claim for relief is that the district

court did not provide any reasons for his sentence. In essence, Gonterman is

attempting to use a claimed sentencing hearing defect to get us to reach his only

claim on appeal—that the district court did not provide any reasoning for his

sentence.

To allow Gonterman to claim a sentencing hearing defect simply to get

through the good-cause door for a sentencing challenge would invite a host of

issues. Most notably, it would invite frivolous appeals, which section 814.6(1)(a)(3)

was enacted to curtail. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 100 (“The legislature

amended section 814.6 to curtail frivolous appeals from guilty pleas and thereby

enforce their finality.”).

Because Gonterman received the agreed-upon sentence contemplated by

his plea agreement, we conclude he has not established good cause. State v.

Williams, No. 23-1258, 2024 WL 4965863, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024)

(“Because Williams received the agreed-upon sentence under the plea agreement,

he has not established good cause to appeal.”).
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III. Conclusion

Because we conclude Gonterman has failed to establish good cause, we

dismiss his appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.