State of Iowa v. Andrew James Allen Brewer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0672
Filed October 9, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ANDREW JAMES ALLEN BREWER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.

Fangman, Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.

Daniel M. Northfield, Urbandale, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ.
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TABOR, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted Andrew Brewer of sexual abuse in the second degree. On

appeal, Brewer contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

He also argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated. After careful review of

Brewer’s claims, we find no grounds to reverse his conviction.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In March 2021, Waterloo police received a report from the Iowa Department

of Health and Human Services after Brewer confessed to his wife, Yolanda, he

had “molested” their seven-year-old daughter, A.B. During an interview at the

Allen Hospital Child Protection Center, A.B. disclosed that on many occasions

Brewer had touched his penis to her vagina, buttocks, and mouth. A.B. also

reported that Brewer threatened to kill her or her mother if she told anyone of the

touches.

The State charged Brewer with sexual abuse in the second degree in

violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b) (2022). In December 2022, Brewer filed

waivers of his right to a speedy trial within ninety days and one year. Proceedings

had been paused as Brewer had withdrawn an earlier waiver of speedy trial and

later sought a stay to determine his competency to stand trial. Trial began in

February 2024.

At trial, A.B.—then in fourth grade—testified: “My dad would touch me.”

When asked when that started, she replied: “I don’t know. I think I was, like, three.”

A.B. said when her mother was at work, Brewer would touch her mouth with his

penis and mouth and would touch her butt and vagina with his penis. A.B. recalled

that the abuse happened “a lot of times.” During the abuse, Brewer would tell A.B.
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to “stop moving” and “no.” A.B. also remembered that Brewer “would do this weird

thing afterwards and something would come out” of his penis. She described the

ejaculate as being “like liquid.” When asked why she did not tell her mother about

the abuse, A.B. explained that Brewer threatened to “kill us all.”

Yolanda also testified, recalling that Brewer told her “that he ha[d] been

touching our daughter and that it ha[d] been going on since she was about three.”

Yolanda told the jury that Brewer said “he molested our daughter” but did not tell

her the extent of the molestation.

The jury found Brewer guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to

twenty-five years, with a mandatory minimum term of seventeen and one-half

years. Brewer appeals.

II. Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

“We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for the correction of errors at

law.” State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). “We consider all evidence,

not just the evidence supporting the conviction, and view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State, ‘including legitimate inferences and presumptions that

may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” State v. Ernst,

954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence exists if

the record “would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022) (citation

omitted). “Evidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is

insufficient.” State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1992). When reviewing

for substantial evidence, “it is not the province of the court to resolve conflicts in
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the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility

of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” State v.

Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up).

Brewer contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction. For the jury to find Brewer guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree,

it had to find these elements:

1. Between the 1st day of January, 2016 and the 31st day of
March, 2021, [Brewer] performed a sex act with [A.B.].
2. [Brewer] performed the sex act while [A.B.] was under the
age of 12 years.

Brewer contends that because A.B. first responded, “I don’t know” when

asked when the abuse started, “there is no certainty beyond a reasonable doubt

that any inappropriate behavior on behalf of [Brewer] occurred” between

January 1, 2016, and March 31, 2021.1 Rather, according to Brewer, A.B. “took a

wild guess,” and it is unclear how she could remember anything that happened to

her when she believed she was “like three.” Thus, according to Brewer, A.B.’s

testimony lacks credibility.

We reject Brewer’s contention for three reasons. First, the testimony of a

victim alone can constitute substantial evidence in a sexual abuse prosecution.

See State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Iowa 2021). And A.B. provided

ample details of the repeated sex acts, despite her initial uncertainty about her age

when they started.

1 We acknowledge the instruction covered a period over five years but note that

our court has upheld a conviction in a child sexual abuse case where the
marshalling instructions covered a period of six years. See State v. Hernandez,
20 N.W.3d 502, 508 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).
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Second, while Brewer questions A.B.’s credibility by arguing that she was

just guessing about her age, our supreme court has made clear: “Inconsistencies

and lack of detail are common in sexual abuse cases and do not compel a jury to

conclude that the victim is not credible or that there is insufficient evidence to

support a guilty verdict.” Id. at 11. Contrary to Brewer’s argument, A.B. detailed

the nature and the extent of the sexual abuse.

Lastly, as it relates to when the abuse happened, the State was not required

to prove the exact date of the abuse, only that it happened between January 1,

2016, and March 31, 2021. See State v. Yeo, 659 N.W.2d 544, 550–51 (Iowa

2003); State v. Wilde, 987 N.W.2d 486, 494 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022) (declining “to

impose a requirement of specificity in child sexual abuse cases that simply does

not exist in the law and would be nearly impossible to satisfy”). A reasonable jury

could conclude from A.B.’s testimony that Brewer performed a sex act against her

during that time frame.

Brewer also takes issue with Yolanda’s testimony, arguing that because he

did not explain the extent of the “molestation” to her there was insufficient proof

that he committed sexual abuse in the second degree. But even if Yolanda’s

testimony lacked specificity, A.B.’s testimony provided the necessary specifics on

its own. Her testimony did not need to be corroborated and was sufficient to

constitute substantial evidence of Brewer’s guilt. See State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d

487, 491 (Iowa 2022).

In sum, the State presented substantial evidence that Brewer committed a

sex act with A.B. between January 1, 2016, and March 31, 2021, and the act

occurred while A.B. was under the age of twelve. The State’s proof did more than
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create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture. Rather, the testimony of A.B. and

Yolanda could convince a reasonable jury of Brewer’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. We thus affirm his conviction.

B. Speedy Trial

Brewer also claims his December 2022 speedy trial waivers were invalid

because the deadline to file those waivers had come and gone. But we cannot

address this issue because Brewer did not raise it in the district court. “Matters not

raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, including

constitutional issues.” State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 476 (Iowa 1981).

In his brief Brewer concedes: “In the event that it is determined that this

issue was not preserved, the Appellant requests that this issue be preserved for

postconviction relief.” We no longer need to preserve claims for postconviction

relief. See Iowa Code § 814.7 (“The claim need not be raised on direct appeal

from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for postconviction

relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on direct appeal from the

criminal proceedings.”). So, we affirm the conviction.

AFFIRMED.